The Discipline of Nonmembers

A Michigan court issues an important ruling-Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 1998 WL 842259 (Mich. App. 1998) [Invasion of Privacy, Church Members,The Establishment Clause]

Church Law and Tax1999-03-01

The Discipline of Nonmembers

A Michigan court issues an important ruling-Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 1998WL842259(Mich. App. 1998) [Invasion of Privacy, Church Members, The Establishment Clause]

Article summary. A Michigan court addressed an important issue in a recent ruling-the authority of a church to discipline its members. The court concluded that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom provides churches with substantial protection when disciplining members. This protection extends to statements made by a minister to the church during worship services or in church publications. But when a member resigns from the church prior to being disciplined, a more difficult question is presented. The Michigan court, like others before it, drew a distinction between the discipline of members and nonmembers. It concluded that churches have limited constitutional protection when disciplining nonmembers, meaning that such individuals are more likely to succeed in pursuing legal action against their former church.

Ministers often learn of personal struggles and failings in the course of counseling. In some cases, such disclosures may reveal conduct that violates the church’s teachings. In such cases ministers may feel that the person be disciplined. If so, they may feel compelled to share the confidential information with others, including the church board or the congregation itself. But any disclosure of confidential information, without consent, creates potential legal problems. Persons who share confidential information may feel betrayed, even outraged, by a public disclosure of the information shared in confidence with their minister. This may lead to a lawsuit seeking damages on the basis of breaching the duty of confidentiality, emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and possibly breach of contract. The church will insist that it has a constitutionally protected right to discipline its members. Obviously, these cases present the civil courts with a very difficult task. A Michigan court addressed such a lawsuit in a recent case. The court concluded that the liability of a church for a pastor’s public disclosures of information received in confidence will depend on whether or not the person who shared the information was a member of the church. This feature article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and evaluate the relevance of the case to church leaders.

Facts

Can a pastor and church be liable for communicating information to the congregation that was shared with the pastor in confidence? This important question was addressed by a Michigan court in a recent ruling. A church member (the “plaintiff”) confessed to his pastor that he had previously committed adultery with prostitutes. The pastor decided to communicate this information to the entire congregation, including the member’s wife, family, and friends. The pastor insisted that he did not believe in confidential communications and that church doctrine required exposing sins to the congregation. The member claimed that the pastor had been motivated not by religious doctrine but by ill will and the intent to humiliate him and create dissension within his family.

The disgraced member sued his pastor and church, alleging that they breached their “duty of confidentiality” to him by disclosing personal, sensitive information to the church congregation. Moreover, the victim claimed that this intentional breach of confidentiality caused him to suffer psychological distress requiring treatment, as well as physical and mental pain. The trial court dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) the clergy-penitent privilege is a “rule of evidence that did not create a cause of action for disclosure of private or privileged communications”; (2) the member and his pastor and church had not entered into “an express agreement regarding the confidentiality of the confessions” and therefore there had been no “breach of contract”; and (3) “whether the church required that clergy keep confidential a member’s personal disclosures was a matter of religious doctrine that the court could not determine according to civil law principles.” The member appealed.

The court’s ruling

The First Amendment

The appeals court began its opinion by observing:

Absent conduct that negatively impacts on the public interest in peace, safety and order, both federal and state courts are severely restricted by the [first amendment] in resolving disputes between a church and its members. Indeed, jurisdiction over these matters is limited to determining property rights that can be resolved by the application of civil law. When the court faces issues for their resolution requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity, the court ceases to have jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has defined religious doctrine as ritual, liturgy of worship, and tenets of faith. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) .…

Here, the manner in which [the pastor and church] decide to discipline the church’s members and the religious doctrine that underlies the discipline are matters of ecclesiastical polity. In his affidavit [the pastor] stated that plaintiff’s discipline was consistent with … the church’s bylaws, entitled “Discipline,” which state that members willfully absent from services for an extended period of time or who are “under charges” are temporarily suspended from active voting membership pending investigation of the case. It also states that “[u]nscriptural conduct or doctrinal departure from the tenets of faith held by this assembly shall be considered sufficient grounds upon which any person may be disqualified as a member,” citing several biblical passages underlying these bylaws including Matthew 18:13-17; this biblical passage specifically states that the congregation should be told of the member’s sins if the sinner refuses to repent.

Despite the civil tort language that plaintiff applies to defendants’ actions, we cannot say that the facts in this case either permit or require judicial intervention into defendants’ decision to discipline its members because this exercise will necessarily involve interpreting religious doctrine.

The court concluded that the pastor’s statements to the congregation did not constitute a threat to public safety, peace, or order justifying state interference. It concluded that “disciplinary practices involving members of an ecclesiastical association, which do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order, are unquestionably among those hallowed first amendment rights with which the government cannot interfere.”

The effect of a member’s withdrawal on a church’s right to discipline-a review of three leading cases

The plaintiff insisted that the civil courts could resolve his claims since he resigned his church membership before the pastor shared the confidential information with the congregation. He insisted that he was not a church member on the date in question and that once he resigned his membership the pastor and church could not claim that the disclosure constituted church-imposed discipline against him. The court conceded that courts in a few other states have reached this conclusion, but it declined to do so because there was “conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether plaintiff was a member of church on that fateful day.” The court observed that courts in other states that have addressed the question of whether a church can discipline individuals without fear of judicial intervention “focus on whether the complaining individual was a member at the time of the disciplinary action.” Where the disciplined individual is a member of the church at the time of the church’s allegedly improper actions, and the person’s membership has not yet been severed, the church has authority to prescribe and follow disciplinary ordinances without fear of interference by the state.

The court referred extensively to two landmark decisions by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and a Missouri court ruling.

(1) Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989)

In 1974, a single woman (the “parishioner”) moved with her minor children to Collinsville, Oklahoma, and soon became a member of a local Church of Christ congregation. The first few years of the parishioner’s association with the church were without incident. In 1980, however, three “elders” of the church confronted the parishioner with a rumor that she was having sexual relations with a local resident who was not a member of the congregation. According to the elders, they investigated the rumor because of the church’s teaching that church leaders are responsible to monitor the actions of church members and confront and discuss problems with anyone who is “having trouble.” The Church of Christ follows a literal interpretation of the Bible, which it considers to be the sole source of moral and religious guidance.

When confronted with the rumor, the parishioner admitted violating the Church of Christ prohibition against fornication. As a transgressor of the church’s code of ethics, the parishioner became subject to the disciplinary procedure set forth in Matthew 18:13-17. This procedure provides: “If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou has gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church; but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.” Pursuant to this procedure, the church elders confronted the parishioner on three occasions over the course of a year. On each occasion, the elders requested that the parishioner repent of her fornication and discontinue seeing her companion. On September 21, 1981, a few days following the third encounter, the elders sent the parishioner a letter warning her that if she did not repent, the “withdrawal of fellowship” process would begin.

Withdrawal of fellowship is a disciplinary procedure that is based on Matthew 18 and carried out by the entire membership in a Church of Christ congregation. When a member violates the church’s code of ethics and refuses to repent, the elders read aloud to the congregation those Scripture passages which were violated. The congregation then withdraws its fellowship from the wayward member by refusing to acknowledge his or her presence. According to the elders, this process serves the dual purpose of encouraging transgressors to repent and return to fellowship with other members, and it maintains the purity and holiness of the church and its members. The parishioner had seen one incident of fellowship withdrawal, and was fully aware that such a process would result in the publication of her unscriptural conduct to the entire congregation. Accordingly, she contacted a lawyer who sent the elders a letter signed by the parishioner, and dated September 24, 1981, in which the parishioner clearly stated that she withdrew her membership. The attorney asked the elders not expose the parishioner’s private life to the congregation (which comprised about five percent of the town’s population).

On September 25, the parishioner wrote the elders another letter imploring them not to mention her name in church except to tell the congregation that she had withdrawn from membership. The elders ignored these requests, and on September 27 (during a scheduled service) they advised the congregation to encourage the parishioner to repent and return to the church. They also informed the congregation that unless the parishioner repented, the verses of Scripture that she had violated would be read aloud to the congregation at the next service and that the withdrawal of fellowship procedure would begin. The parishioner met with one of the elders during the following week, and she was informed that her attempt to withdraw from membership was not only doctrinally impossible, but could not halt the disciplinary process that would be carried out against her. The parishioner was publicly branded a fornicator when the scriptural standards she had violated were recited to the congregation at a service conducted on October 4. As part of the disciplinary process the same information regarding the parishioner’s transgressions was sent to four other area Church of Christ congregations to be read aloud during services.

The parishioner sued the three elders and local church, asserting that their actions both before and after her withdrawal from church membership on September 24, 1981 (the date of her letter to the church), invaded her privacy and caused her emotional distress. The invasion of privacy claim alleged that the elders and church had “intruded upon her seclusion,” and in addition, had “unreasonably publicized private facts about her life by communicating her transgressions to the [home church] and four other area Church of Christ congregations.” A jury ruled in favor of the parishioner, and awarded her $205,000 in actual damages, $185,000 in punitive damages, and $45,000 in interest. The decision was appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

The supreme court concluded that the discipline of church members is not always immune from civil court review. It ruled that the first amendment prevented the church and its elders from being sued for their actions prior to the parishioner’s withdrawal (which, according to the court, occurred on September 24 when the parishioner sent her letter of withdrawal to the church), but that the church and elders could be sued for actions occurring after the parishioner’s withdrawal. With regard to the parishioner’s claim for “pre-withdrawal” damages, the court noted that “under the first amendment people may freely consent to being spiritually governed by an established set of ecclesiastical tenets defined and carried out by those chosen to interpret and impose them.” The court continued: “Under the first amendment’s free exercise of religion clause, parishioner had the right to consent as a participant in the practices and beliefs of the Church of Christ without fear of governmental interference …. [H]er willing submission to the Church of Christ’s dogma, and the elders’ reliance on that submission, collectively shielded the church’s pre-withdrawal, religiously-motivated discipline from scrutiny through secular [courts].” As authority for this proposition, the court quoted from a decision of the United States Supreme Court:

The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 879 (1972).

The court noted that “insofar as [the parishioner] seeks vindication for the actions taken by the elders before her membership withdrawal, her claims are to be dismissed.” It concluded that the parishioner’s September 24, 1981 letter was an effective withdrawal from church membership, and it agreed with the parishioner that the elders and church could be sued for their actions following her withdrawal. It observed:

The first amendment of the United States Constitution was designed to preserve freedom of worship by prohibiting the establishment or endorsement of any official religion. One of the fundamental purposes of the first amendment is to protect the people’s right to worship as they choose. Implicit in the right to choose freely one’s own form of worship is the right of unhindered and unimpeded withdrawal from the chosen form of worship …. [The local church], by denying the parishioner’s right to disassociate herself from a particular form of religious belief is threatening to curtail her freedom of worship according to her choice. Unless the parishioner waived the constitutional right to withdraw her initial consent to be bound by the Church of Christ discipline and its governing elders, her resignation was a constitutionally protected right.

The court concluded that the parishioner had not “waived” her constitutional right to withdraw from church membership. A waiver, observed the court, is a “voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” The parishioner testified that she had never been informed by the church of its teaching that membership constitutes an insoluble bond of lifetime commitment, and accordingly she was incapable of knowingly and intentionally “waiving” such a right.

The court rejected the elders’ claim that their statements to the congregations were protected by a “conditional privilege.” The court acknowledged that a statement is conditionally privileged if “the circumstances under which the information is published lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the common interest is entitled to know.” The court concluded that the elders’ statements were not protected by a conditional privilege since the “parishioner was neither a present nor a prospective church member” at the time of the elders’ public statements, and accordingly that the “congregation did not share the sort of ‘common interest’ in parishioner’s behavior” that would render the elders’ statements privileged.

The court acknowledged that “communicating unproven allegations of a present or prospective member’s misconduct to the other members of a religious association is a privileged occasion because the members have a valid interest in and concern for the behavior of their fellow members and officers.” However, it concluded that the elders’ claim to a conditional privilege “as it pertains to their actions occurring after parishioner’s withdrawal from membership, is without merit.”

(2) Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1992 )

In 1992, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered a second landmark ruling on the discipline of church members. A church convened a disciplinary hearing to determine the membership status of two sisters accused of fornication. Neither sister attended, and neither sister withdrew her membership in the church. Following the hearing, both sisters received letters from the church informing them that their membership had been terminated. The sisters sued the church and its leaders, claiming that the church’s actions in delivering the termination letters and disclosing their contents “to the public” constituted defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts). A trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and the sisters appealed directly to the state supreme court, which upheld the dismissal of the case. The court began its opinion by rejecting the sisters’ claim that the contents of the termination letters had been disclosed improperly to the public. This allegation was based entirely on a conversation between a church board member and another member of the church. The member asked the board member why the board was “going after” the sisters, and the board member replied that it was on account of “fornication.” The court concluded that this comment did not constitute a disclosure of the contents of the letters “to the public,” and accordingly there had been no defamation of invasion of privacy. In rejecting the sisters’ allegation of emotional distress, the court noted that the evidence “does not suggest that the lay leader’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to justify submission of the claim to the jury.” The court then addressed the sisters’ claim that the manner in which the church notified them of the results of the disciplinary proceeding was inappropriate. In rejecting this claim, the court observed: “The church court had proper ecclesiastical cognizance when the letters were delivered. The [sisters] had not withdrawn their membership at the time they received notice of their expulsion. Under the first amendment, the procedural norms which govern the exercise of ecclesiastical cognizance are not subject to a secular court’s scrutiny. The [trial] court was hence without any authority to assess the propriety of the notice given.” The court then proceeded to announce an absolute constitutional protection for the membership determinations of religious organizations (assuming that the disciplined member has not effectively withdrawn his or her membership):

[The relationship between a church and its members] may be severed freely by a member’s positive act at any time. Until it is so terminated, the church has authority to prescribe and follow disciplinary ordinances without fear of interference by the state. The first amendment will protect and shield the religious body from liability for the activities carried on pursuant to the exercise of church discipline. Within the context of church discipline, churches enjoy an absolute privilege from scrutiny by the secular authority.

This absolute privilege also extends to the implementation of the decision of the church regarding the discipline of a member, even though the implementation occurs after the member has been dismissed. However, the absolute privilege only applies to disciplinary actions taken by the church before a member withdraws from membership. The court explained the effect of a member’s withdrawal from membership as follows:

At the point when the church-member relationship is severed through an affirmative act of either a parishioner’s withdrawal or excommunication by the ecclesiastical body, a different situation arises. In the event of withdrawal or of post-excommunication activity … the absolute privilege from tort liability no longer attaches.

However, the court cautioned that “until an affirmative notification of membership withdrawal is received the church need not reassess the course of its legitimate ecclesiastical interest.”

(3) Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987)

A minister visited a family in their home and invited them to trust and confide in him and assured them that any communication with him as minister would be kept in strictest confidence and not be divulged to anyone outside the family. The husband and wife then confided in the minister that their three children had severe disciplinary and behavioral problems. The minister offered to counsel with the family. Despite his assurances of confidentiality, the minister divulged to deacons of the church and members of the community the confidential communications from the family, without their consent. The family claimed that the minister falsely informed others that they had abused their children, and that he instructed the children to lie to others about parental abuse.

The family sued the minister, claiming that he had defamed them from the pulpit and in letters, church bulletins and publications, by accusing the father of stealing, arson, cheating, and the physical and emotional abuse of his children. The family also claimed that the minister falsely reported the abuse to the child abuse hotline. The pastor insisted that the first amendment clothed him with an “absolute privilege” in the performance of his duties that prevented him from being used for defamation. A state appeals court rejected the pastor’s defense, and concluded that he could be sued for defamation-assuming that the family were not members of his church:

Our decision rests on the assumption that the [family] were not members of the church served by [the pastor]. The petition alleges only that [the pastor] presented himself to them as the minister of the [church] and invited [them] to confide in him. They responded with the confidences about the problems with the children. There is no intimation in the petition or answer that the [family] were members of the [church], or that they subjected themselves to the doctrine, religious practices or discipline of the church or its congregation. Among the defamations [alleged in the lawsuit] against the pastor were statements made in the course of sermons delivered from the pulpit. The [first amendment guaranty of religious freedom] forbids a court from any evaluation of the “correctness” of the content of religious sermons as expressions of belief or religious practice. The stricture of the free exercise clause is against “any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.” It is competent, therefore, for a court to inquire whether the sermon declarations that the [family] stole, committed arson and abused their children were expressions of actual creed and practice, held and exercised in good faith, or were merely the religious occasion for the wholly secular purpose of intentional defamation and injury to reputation of persons not even communicants of the church.

It may be that the statements from the pulpit, and the several others asserted against [the pastor] as defamations, were a form of chastening usual as to wayward members and conformable to the liturgy, discipline and ecclesiastical policy of the church and congregation. If so, and if the [family] were members of that religious body, they presumptively consented to religiously motivated discipline practiced in good faith …. A person who joins a church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits which result from such a union he will submit to its control and be governed by its laws, usages and customs whether they are of an ecclesiastical or temporal character to which laws, usages, and customs he assents as to so many stipulations of a contract. The consent to submit to the discipline of the church, sect, or congregation is one of contract, therefore, between the member and the religious body. The discipline the religious body may impose, accordingly, must be within the terms of the consent. Damage incurred within the terms of consent is a nontortious consequence. It is a fundamental principle of the common law that to one who is willing no wrong is done.

The statements from the pulpit, and the others, moreover-if as to members and if as expressions of the religious practice of the church or congregation-are privileged as communications enjoined by duty [upon the pastor] to persons [church members] with a corresponding interest or duty. The privilege, however, is qualified, and is lost if the plaintiffs prove the defendant acted with the intention to injure the plaintiffs in reputation, feelings or profession. The use of the pulpit not as the pretext for the practice of religion, but as the occasion for intentional defamation, therefore, is neither justified by privilege nor protected by the free exercise clause.

In summary, if the family were members of the pastor’s church and the statements the pastor made from the pulpit were not only a form of chastening usual for wayward members but also consistent with the church’s liturgy, discipline, and ecclesiastical policy, then the family had no legal claim against either their pastor or church because they presumably consented to religious discipline.

The effect of a member’s withdrawal on a church’s right to discipline-the court’s conclusion

Having reviewed these three cases, the Michigan court turned to the facts of the present case, and concluded that it could not determine if the plaintiff had been a member of the church at the time of the pastor’s disclosures to the congregation. The evidence simply was not conclusive. However, the court left no doubt that this distinction was critical to the outcome of the case. If the plaintiff was a member of church on the date of the pastor’s disclosures to the congregation, then the court insisted that it was prevented by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom from resolving the lawsuit. On the other hand, if the plaintiff was not a member on the date of the pastor’s disclosures, then “a closer look at plaintiff’s intentional tort claims is justified because once he removed himself from membership and withdrew his consent to obey church disciplinary policies [the pastor and church] lost their power to actively monitor plaintiff’s spiritual life or impose overt disciplinary actions on him.”

Potential Theories of Liability

The court sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether or not the plaintiff was a member of the church on the date of the pastor’s disclosures. If the plaintiff was not a member on that date, then the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages on the basis of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.

(1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The court noted that for the plaintiff to recover damages on the basis of intentional infliction of emotional distress, he had to prove (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) performed intentionally or recklessly, (3) that caused severe emotional distress. The court added that “liability for such a claim has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”

(2) Invasion of Privacy

The court noted that invasion of privacy may consist of a number of different offenses, including public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. In order for the plaintiff to prove this kind of invasion of privacy, he would have to establish (1) the disclosure of information, (2) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that is of no legitimate concern to the public. The court concluded that “a jury must determine whether a public disclosure involves embarrassing private facts.”

The court concluded:

[W]e believe that plaintiff has pleaded that [the pastor] disclosed to the congregation plaintiff’s previous contacts with prostitutes, that this information was of no legitimate concern to the public and was conveyed to the congregation with the intent to embarrass plaintiff and cause him severe emotional distress. Whether [the pastor’s] conduct was sufficiently outrageous or extreme is a question best left to the jury. Also, whether plaintiff’s previous disclosure of these facts to his wife impacts his ability to recover under either intentional tort is not a question for this court. We believe, however, that if the trial court determines that plaintiff was not a member of defendant church on [the date of the pastor’s disclosures] then plaintiff’s intentional tort claims should survive summary disposition.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims alleging breach of contract and a breach of a duty of confidentiality.

Relevance of the case to church leaders

What is the significance of this case to other churches? A decision by a Michigan state appeals court has limited effect. It is not binding in any other state, and is subject to reversal by the Michigan Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the case represents one of the few extended discussions of church discipline and the relevance of membership status. As a result, it may be given special consideration by other courts. For these reasons the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:

1. The discipline of church members is constitutionally protected. The discipline of church members (i.e., persons who have not withdrawn from membership) is a constitutionally protected right of churches. The court concluded that “disciplinary practices involving members of an ecclesiastical association, which do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order, are unquestionably among those hallowed first amendment rights with which the government cannot interfere.”

If discipline of church members is a possibility in your church, then you should adopt a disciplinary procedure that is based upon and refers to scriptural references. The procedure should specify the grounds for discipline, and describe the process that will be conducted. Avoid references to loaded phrases such as “due process,” which have no legal relevance in the context of church law and only create confusion.

2. No constitutional protection after a member resigns. Discipline of persons who have effectively withdrawn their church membership, or who were never members, is not a constitutionally protected activity, and churches that engage in such conduct can be sued under existing theories of tort law. The court in the Michigan case concluded that the church and pastor could be sued for emotional distress and invasion of privacy-if the trial court later determined that the plaintiff was not a member of the church on the day of the pastor’s disclosures.

3. No liability for breaching the “duty of confidentiality.” The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the pastor’s disclosures to the congregation amounted to a breach of the “duty of confidentiality.” The plaintiff insisted that the clergy-penitent privilege imposed upon clergy a “duty of confidentiality,” and that clergy who disclose confidences without permission may be sued for breaching this duty. The court disagreed, noting that the clergy-penitent privilege is a “rule of evidence that did not create a cause of action for disclosure of private or privileged communications.”

A few courts have found clergy liable for breaching a “duty of confidentiality.” But this case suggests that such a duty cannot be based on the clergy-penitent privilege. The effect of such a conclusion will be to make it more difficult to prove a duty of confidentiality. This case will be a useful precedent to clergy who are threatened with litigation over a disclosure of confidential information, to the extent that an alleged duty of confidentiality is based on the clergy-penitent privilege.

4. Breach of contract. The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that he and his pastor and church had entered into “an express agreement regarding the confidentiality of the confessions” that was breached by the pastor’s public disclosures. The court concluded that no such agreement existed. Many churches have created “agreements” for persons to sign as a condition of receiving counseling services from a pastor or other church counselor. If your church has done so, you should carefully review your document for any assurances regarding confidentiality.

Example. A church requires persons to sign a document as a condition of counseling with the pastor. The document states that the counseling services provided by the church are religious in nature, rather than psychological; that statements shared in confidence with the pastor are protected by the clergy-penitent privilege; that statements shared in confidence with the pastor will be treated as confidential by the pastor, unless disclosure is legally mandated by the state child abuse reporting law. If the pastor discloses confidential information shared with him by a counselee, he (and the church) may be sued for breach of contract. Such a claim will be less likely to succeed, however, if the counselee was a member of the church at the time of the disclosure.

5. The importance of defining membership.The court in this case was unable to determine whether or not the plaintiff was a member of his church. Yet, this status was absolutely critical, since the ultimate outcome of the case depends entirely on this one issue. Unfortunately, the definition of “members” is ambiguous in many churches. For example, many churches have bylaws that limit the definition of members to those persons who regularly attend services and contribute to the support of the church. Such provisions are inherently ambiguous, and create uncertainty as to the definition of a “member”. Another example would be a church bylaw provision that limits membership to persons whose lives are consistent with the church’s moral and religious teachings. These provisions are worded in various ways, but the result is the same-the definition of “member” may be uncertain.

Church membership is an important status. Not only does it provide the church with substantial protection in disciplinary cases, but in most cases it also defines those persons who can vote at church membership meetings. It is a term that should be defined with precision.

Tip. Review the definition of “member” in your bylaws or other organizational documents. Is the definition ambiguous? If so, consider amending it.

6. Members have a right to resign. The Guinn case, referred to by the Michigan court, concluded that the right of a church member to withdraw from church membership is protected by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom unless a member has waived that right. An effective waiver requires the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. In other words, a member can waive the right to resign by a voluntary and intentional act, but not through inadvertence or ignorance.

A church wishing to restrict the right of disciplined members to withdraw must obtain a voluntary and knowing waiver by present and prospective members of their constitutional right to withdraw. How can this be done? One approach would be for a church to adopt a provision in its bylaws preventing members from withdrawing if they are under discipline by the church. Obviously, the disciplinary procedure must be carefully specified in the church bylaws so there is no doubt whether the disciplinary process has been initiated with respect to a member. Most courts have held that members are “on notice” of all of the provisions in the church bylaws, and consent to be bound by them when they become members. As a result, the act of becoming a member of a church with such a provision in its bylaws may well constitute an effective waiver of a member’s right to withdraw (if the disciplinary process has begun). The problem in the Guinn case was that the church attempted to discipline the parishioner following her withdrawal. According to the court’s ruling, the church could have avoided liability by obtaining an effective waiver.

7. Communication of matters of “common interest” to members. While the Michigan court did not address the issue, other courts have ruled that church members have a right to know about matters in which they have a “common interest,” and that this right permits some disclosures to church members concerning the discipline or misconduct of current members. These courts generally conclude that statements by church leaders to church members concerning the discipline of current members are conditionally privileged-meaning that the disciplined member cannot successfully sue the church for making such disclosures unless the church acted maliciously (i.e., it either knew that the disclosures were false or made them with a reckless disregard as to their truthfulness). It must be emphasized that this privilege only protects disclosures made to church members about church members. Disclosures made to a congregation during a worship service in which non-members are present would not be protected. And, statements about former members are not protected (presumably, non-members would need to be removed from the sanctuary before statements regarding church discipline could be made).

Obviously, the safest course of action for a church board that has disciplined a member is to refrain from disclosing any information to the congregation. If the board decides that the congregation should be informed, then a general statement that the individual is “no longer a member” is the safest approach. If the board decides, for whatever reason, that it would like to share more details with the church, then it can reduce the risk of doing so in either of the following ways:

l. Letter to members. The church can send a letter to all active voting members informing them of the basis for the member’s discipline. The envelope, as well as the letter itself, should be marked “privileged and confidential.” The letter should inform members that the information is being shared only with members, and that the recipient should not disclose the information with anyone. The letter should only communicate factually verifiable information. The disadvantage of this approach is that it provides information to all members, including those with no interest in learning the basis for the discipline.

l. Membership meeting. The church board can call a membership meeting at which the basis for the member’s discipline is disclosed. This approach has the added benefit of being specifically mentioned in the disciplinary procedure set forth in Matthew 18, and so it is probably more insulated from judicial review. It is essential that procedures be established to ensure that only members are present at such a meeting. For example, the audience could all be seated on one side of the sanctuary, and as the membership roll is read each member moves to the other side. Nonmembers are excluded from the meeting. In addition, ushers should be posted to prevent nonmembers from entering the sanctuary after the meeting has begun, and no tape recording should be permitted. It would be desirable, though not essential, for the members to adopt a resolution agreeing to maintain the confidentiality of the information that will be shared. Such a resolution would be useful only if 100 percent of all members present vote to adopt it.

l. Specific response. The church could simply inform the congregation that the member has been disciplined, and that members wanting to learn more about the basis for the discipline are directed to the senior pastor for more information. The pastor can then ensure that persons coming to him for more information are members. This approach will result in the disclosure of the sensitive information to the fewest number of persons.

Key point. A church should not disclose to its members any potentially damaging information about a disciplined member without first obtaining the counsel of a local attorney.

8. Arbitration. Churches wishing to reduce the risk of litigation by disciplined members (or any other members) should consider, in addition to the observations made above, the adoption of a binding arbitration policy. Such a policy, if adopted by the church membership at a congregational meeting as an amendment to the church’s bylaws, can force church members to resolve their disputes (with the church, pastor, board, or other members) within the church consistently with the pattern suggested by the apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 6:1-8. While a discussion of arbitration policies is beyond the scope of this text, churches should recognize that arbitration is an increasingly popular means of resolving disputes in the secular world since it often avoids the excessive costs and delays associated with civil litigation and the uncertainty of jury verdicts. Of course, any arbitration policy should be reviewed by an attorney and the church’s liability insurer before being implemented. A legally effective and properly adopted arbitration policy can force disgruntled members to take their complaints to a panel of church representatives rather than create a costly and protracted spectacle in the secular courts. Such an approach, at a minimum, merits serious consideration by any church.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Returning Excess Salary

How to handle the tax consequences of the return of excess funds.

Church Finance Today

Returning Excess Salary

How to handle the tax consequences of the return of excess funds.

Background. It occasionally happens. A church treasurer pays an employee more than the salary authorized by the church board. In most cases, this is due to an innocent mistake. But what happens if the treasurer and employee later discover the mistake, and attempt to correct it? Can the employee “give back” the excess to the church? And what if the mistake is discovered in the following year? How does a return of the excess affect the employee’s taxable income, and the church’s payroll reporting obligations? The IRS addressed these questions in a recent publication.

What the IRS said. Here are the tax consequences for employees who return to their employer in “year 2” excess salary received in “year 1”:

* The employer does not reduce the employee’s wages for FICA and federal income tax withholding purposes for year 2.

* The employer does not reduce the employee’s taxable income for year 1, or reduce the amount of income taxes withheld in that year.

* The repayment in year 2 of excess salary received in year 1 has no effect on the Form W-2 for year 2. The employer should furnish the employee a separate receipt acknowledging the repayment for the employee’s records.

* To the extent additional FICA taxes were paid in year 1 because of the erroneous salary payment, the repayment of the excess salary in year 2 creates an overpayment of FICA taxes in year 1, and credit may be claimed by the employer with respect to its FICA tax liability for that prior year.

* The employee may claim in year 2 a miscellaneous itemized deduction on Schedule A in the amount of the excess salary that was repaid.

* To the extent repayments in year 2 of erroneous salary paid in year 1 result in a reduced amount of social security (and Medicare) wages for year 1 and reduced amounts of employee social security (and Medicare) taxes paid for that year, the employer is required to furnish corrected Forms W-2 for year 1 showing the employee’s corrected “social security wages,” corrected “social security tax withheld,” corrected “Medicare wages and tips,” and corrected “Medicare tax withheld.” No changes should be made in the entries for “Wages, tips, other compensation” (Box 1 of Form W-2) or for “Federal income tax withheld” (Box 2 of Form W-2). SCA 1998-026.

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, March 1999.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Payroll Deduction IRAs

An option for churches with no retirement plan.

IRS Announcement 99-2

Some ministers and lay church staff members are not eligible to participate in a church or denominational pension plan. This may be because the employing church has never established such a plan, and is not affiliated with a denomination that has done so. Perhaps your church does not offer a retirement plan to staff members, and no denominational plan is available, but you would like to do something to assist with retirement savings. A number of options are available. One was the subject of a recent IRS announcement—a payroll deduction IRA.

In the Conference Report to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress indicated that “employers that choose not to sponsor a retirement plan should be encouraged to set up a payroll deduction system to help employees save for retirement by making payroll deduction contributions to their IRAs.” Congress encouraged the IRS to “continue its efforts to publicize the availability of these payroll deduction IRAs.”

The IRS responded in a recent announcement in which it reminded employers “that are not currently in a position to sponsor a retirement plan” that

the introduction of Roth IRAs in 1998 presents an additional opportunity to facilitate employee retirement savings. As with traditional IRAs, amounts accumulated under Roth IRAs are exempt from federal income tax, and contributions to Roth IRAs are subject to specific limitations. Unlike traditional IRAs, Roth IRA contributions cannot be deducted from gross income, but qualified distributions from Roth IRAs are excludable from gross income ….

The IRS further informed employers that they can allow employees to contribute to traditional or Roth IRAs by direct deposit though payroll deduction. In addition, the IRS noted that employees making direct deposits of deductible contributions to traditional IRAs may be able to adjust their federal income tax withholding on account of these contributions. By adjusting their withholding, employees may not have to wait until they file their tax return to get the benefit of the tax deduction for their contributions. Employees can review the instructions on IRS Form W-4 (Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate) and the worksheet on the back of that form to see if they are eligible for this withholding adjustment.

The IRS concluded: “Many employers permit their employees to directly deposit all or a portion of their paychecks into checking or savings accounts maintained by financial institutions. Employers may also assist their employees in saving for retirement by means of direct deposit through payroll deduction to IRAs.”

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Giving the IRS a Check that Bounces

Recent case highlights legal implications of bouncing checks to the IRS.

Church Finance Today

Giving the IRS a Check that Bounces

Recent case highlights legal implications of bouncing checks to the IRS.

Background. It can happen to anyone. You write a check to the IRS for your year-end tax liability, and your checking account does not have enough funds to cover the check. You may have intended to transfer funds to your checking account, but did not do so quickly enough. Or, you may have mistakenly believed there were sufficient funds to cover the check. What are the consequences in such a case? A recent Tax Court case provides the answer. The case involved a taxpayer who wrote a check to the IRS for a tax liability, but had the check returned due to insufficient funds. The IRS assessed the taxpayer a “dishonored check penalty.”

Section 6657 of the tax code gives the IRS the authority to assess a penalty against any taxpayer who issues the IRS a check that is not paid. For checks of $750 or more, the penalty is 2 percent of the amount of the check. For checks under $750, the penalty is the lesser of $15 or the amount of the check. The penalty can be waived if a taxpayer “tendered such check in good faith and with reasonable cause to believe that it would be duly paid.”

The taxpayer who issued the IRS the bad check was assessed a penalty of $10,000. He insisted that he was entitled to the “good faith” defense, on two grounds. First, while his checking account did not have enough funds to cover the check in question, his savings account did, and it was the bank’s responsibility to transfer funds from the savings account to cover the IRS check. Second, he claimed that his accountant assured him that it would take about 14 days for the check to the IRS to clear.

The taxpayer appealed the IRS-imposed penalty to a federal court. On appeal, the IRS noted that it was undisputed that the taxpayer did not have sufficient funds in his account when he wrote the check to the IRS, and therefore his actions could not be construed as reasonable. Waiting until the last minute to transfer sufficient funds to cover a check is not reasonable, the IRS insisted. The court agreed, noting that “writing checks out of accounts containing insufficient funds cannot be considered ordinary business care and prudence.”

The court rejected the taxpayer’s claim that the bank should have notified him that there were insufficient funds in his checking account to cover the IRS check. It noted that reliance upon a bank’s notification policy, especially when the taxpayer intends to wait until after notification to transfer funds to cover the check, “cannot be considered ordinary business care and prudence.”

The court also rejected the taxpayer’s claim that his reliance on his accountant’s advice (that checks to the IRS do not clear for about 14 days) qualified him for the “reasonable cause” defense to the dishonored check penalty. The court pointed out that the IRS did not deposit the check for 19 days, and that even at this late date the taxpayer’s accountant failed to contain sufficient funds. The court pointed out that “forgiveness of penalty assessments levied against taxpayers who write checks with insufficient funds planning to cover the checks at the last minute before the IRS deposits them, would only encourage this type of behavior in the future.”

What is the significance of this case to church leaders? Note the following:

1. You may be liable for a dishonored check penalty in the event that a check to the IRS is returned due to insufficient funds. This is in addition to interest and penalties that may also apply.

2. Do not assume that the penalty can be avoided because your bank failed to notify you that your checking account did not have sufficient funds to cover the check to the IRS, or failed to transfer funds from your savings account to cover the check. Neither may constitute “reasonable cause.”

3. A church that sends checks to the IRS to cover payroll or other tax liabilities is subject to the same penalties. Gregory v. United States, 97-2 USTC para. 50,741 (D. Mich. 1997).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, January 1999.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

When Is Compensation Too Much? New IRS Regulations Address “Intermediate Sanctions”

The IRS has issued long-awaited regulations addressing “intermediate sanctions.”

Church Law and Tax 1998-11-01

When Is Compensation Too Much?

New IRS Regulations Address “Intermediate Sanctions”

Article summary. The IRS has issued long—awaited regulations addressing “intermediate sanctions.” Intermediate sanctions refer to excise taxes that the IRS can assess against any officer or director of a tax—exempt organization (including churches and other religious organizations) who receives excessive compensation. It is very important for clergy and church board members to understand intermediate sanctions in order to avoid the substantial excise taxes that the IRS can impose upon the recipients of excessive compensation (and the board members who approved it). This article will review the background of these new sanctions, summarize the new regulations, and address the impact of intermediate sanctions on church leaders.

Background

The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR2), enacted by Congress in 1996, contained a provision allowing the IRS to assess “intermediate sanctions” (an excise tax) against “disqualified persons” in lieu of outright revocation of an organization’s exempt status. The intermediate sanctions may be assessed only in cases of “excess benefit transactions,” meaning one or more transactions that provide unreasonable compensation to an officer or director of the exempt organization. An excess benefit transaction is defined as:

any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided to a “disqualified person” (someone in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization) if the value of the benefit exceeds the value of the services provided by the disqualified person, or

to the extent provided in IRS regulations, any transaction in which the amount of an economic benefit provided to a disqualified person is based on the revenues of the organization, if the transaction results in unreasonable compensation being paid

Key point. Senior ministers ordinarily will be disqualified persons, since they are in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of their church. This means that they are subject to intermediate sanctions if they receive excessive compensation.

The payment of personal expenses and benefits to or for the benefit of disqualified persons, and non—fair—market—value transactions benefiting such persons, would be treated as compensation only if it is clear that the organization intended and made the payments as compensation for services. In determining whether such payments or transactions are, in fact, compensation, the relevant factors include whether the appropriate decision—making body approved the transfer as compensation in accordance with established procedures and whether the organization and the recipient reported the transfer (except in the case of nontaxable fringe benefits) as compensation on the relevant forms (i.e., the organization’s Form 990, the Form W—2 or Form 1099 provided by the organization to the recipient, the recipient’s Form 1040, and other required returns).

The presumption of reasonableness

A committee report to TBOR2 clarified that the parties to a transaction are entitled to rely on a presumption of reasonableness with respect to a compensation arrangement with a disqualified person if such arrangement was approved by a board of directors (or committee of the board) that: (1) was composed entirely of individuals unrelated to and not subject to the control of the disqualified person involved in the arrangement; (2) obtained and relied upon objective “comparability” information, such as (a) compensation paid by similar organizations, both taxable and tax—exempt, for comparable positions, (b) independent compensation surveys by nationally recognized independent firms, or (c) actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person; and (3) adequately documented the basis for its decision.

Key point. The new law creates a presumption that a minister’s compensation package is reasonable if approved by a church board that relied upon objective “comparability” information, including independent compensation surveys by nationally recognized independent firms. The most comprehensive compensation survey for church workers is the annual Compensation Handbook for Church Staff, written by Richard Hammar and James Cobble, and available from the publisher of this newsletter.

A similar presumption arises with respect to the reasonableness of the valuation of property sold by an organization to a disqualified person if the sale is approved by an independent board that uses appropriate comparability data and adequately documents its determination.

Penalties

The intermediate sanctions that the IRS can impose, in lieu of revocation of a charity’ exempt status, include the following:

1. Tax on disqualified persons. A disqualified person who benefits from an excess benefit transaction is subject to a penalty tax equal to 25% of the amount of the “excess benefit” (the amount by which actual compensation exceeds the fair market value of services rendered). This tax is paid by the disqualified person directly, not his or her employer.

2. Additional tax on disqualified persons. If the 25% excise tax is assessed against a disqualified person, and he or she fails to “correct” the excess benefit within the “taxable period,” the IRS can assess an additional tax of 200% of the excess benefit. The new law states that the disqualified person can “correct” the excess benefit transaction by “undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.” The “correction” must occur by the earlier of the date the IRS mails a notice informing the disqualified person that he or she owes the 25% tax, or the date the 25% tax is actually assessed.

3. Tax on organization managers. If the IRS assesses the 25% tax against a disqualified person, it is permitted by the new law to impose an additional 10% tax on any “organization manager” (any officer, director, or trustee) who participates in an excess benefit transaction knowing it is such a transaction, unless the manager’s participation “is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.” This tax is limited to a maximum of $10,000 per manager.

Key point. Intermediate sanctions apply to excess benefit transactions occurring on or after September 14, 1995.

Key point. In 1997 the IRS provided the following clarification: (1) the IRS will impose intermediate sanctions only in extreme cases meeting a “front page test”; (2) the new sanctions were intended to change the behavior of nonprofit boards by encouraging them to take seriously the task of establishing compensation packages; (3) nonprofit boards are encouraged to maintain records documenting how they determined the compensation of higher paid employees; and (4) intermediate sanctions will result in an estimated $33 million of excise taxes over the next five years.

Example. Many years ago, a church board adopted a resolution agreeing to pay its pastor “one—half of all revenues.” For the first several years, this formula resulted in modest compensation. But in recent years, the church has grown and the compensation paid to the pastor has increased dramatically. In 1997 the church received revenues of $500,000 and paid its pastor $250,000. How would the new law apply to this situation? Consider the following: (1) The level of compensation paid to the pastor is almost certainly unreasonable. As a result, it is possible that the IRS, if it learns of the amount of compensation paid by the church to its pastor, will revoke the church’s exempt status. This would have very negative consequences to the pastor, the church, and its membership. (2) Under the new law, the IRS has the option of applying “intermediate sanctions” against the church in lieu of outright revocation of its exempt status, if it establishes that the pastor is a “disqualified person” who was paid benefits in excess of the fair market value of his services. Sanctions available to the IRS include: (a) An excise tax of 25% of the amount of the pastor’s compensation that exceeds the fair market value of his services. If the IRS concludes that the maximum reasonable compensation under these circumstances would be $100,000, then the pastor was paid an “excess benefit” of $150,000, and the excise tax would be $37,500 for 1997 (25% x $150,000). This tax is paid by the pastor directly, not the church. (b) If the 25% excise tax is assessed against the pastor, and he fails to “correct” the excess benefit within the “taxable period,” the IRS can assess an additional tax of 200% of the excess benefit. In this case, this would amount to an additional $300,000! The new law states that the pastor can “correct” the excess benefit transaction by “undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.” The “correction” must occur by the earlier of the date the IRS mails a notice informing the pastor that he owes the 25% tax, or the date the 25% tax is actually assessed. (3) If the IRS assesses the 25% tax against the pastor, it is permitted by the new law to impose an additional 10% tax on any “organization manager” (any officer, director, or trustee) who participates in an excess benefit transaction knowing it is such a transaction, unless the manager’s participation “is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”

Example. A small rural church with total income of $20,000 in 1998 pays its pastor “75% of gross income.” It is doubtful that this arrangement will trigger intermediate sanctions, even though compensation is based on a percentage of church income, since the resulting compensation paid to the pastor is minimal.

Example. A pastor retires in 1998 after serving for 30 years in the same church. The church board authorizes a retirement gift of $100,000. Assume that the pastor also receives a salary of $50,000 for 1998. Assume that the IRS determines that the maximum “reasonable compensation” for this pastor for 1998 would be $100,000. This may expose the pastor to intermediate sanctions, beginning with a 25% excise tax applied to the amount of the pastor’s total compensation for 1998 that exceeds what the IRS has determined to be “reasonable.” This would yield a tax of $12,500 (25% x $50,000). If the excess compensation ($50,000) is not refunded to the church by the time the 25% tax is assessed, then the pastor can be assessed an additional excise tax of 200% times the amount of the excess compensation (for a total tax of $100,000). This is in addition to the 25% tax. In addition, members of the board may be assessed a tax in the amount of 10% times the excess compensation amount (or $5,000). The threat of intermediate sanctions could be reduced or eliminated under these circumstances if the board distributed the retirement gift over more than one year, so that the total compensation received by the pastor in any one year is reduced below what the IRS might consider to be unreasonable or excessive. Any such multi—year arrangement must avoid the “constructive receipt” rule, which is described in chapter 4 of Richard Hammar’s Church and Clergy Tax Guide.

Example. A pastor lives in a church—owned parsonage for 25 years. The parsonage has a current value of $100,000, and is debt—free. The church board authorizes a gift of the parsonage to the pastor. This transaction may trigger intermediate sanctions. The analysis in the previous example should be reviewed.

The new IRS regulations

The new IRS regulations provide clarification on a number of important questions. Here is a run—down of the key provisions:

Application to churches

Can intermediate sanctions be applied to church employees and church “managers”? The regulations confirm that intermediate sanctions apply to churches. However, a special rule applies-the regulations specify that the procedures of the “Church Audit Procedures Act” will be used “in initiating and conducting any inquiry or examination into whether an excess benefit transaction has occurred between a church and a disqualified person. The Church Audit Procedures Act imposes detailed limitations on IRS examinations of churches. The limitations can be summarized as follows:

Church tax inquiries

The IRS may begin a church tax inquiry only if

(a) an appropriate high—level Treasury official (defined as a regional IRS commissioner or higher official) reasonably believes on the basis of written evidence that an intermediate sanctions excise tax is due from a disqualified person with respect to a transaction involving a church, and

(b) the IRS sends the church a written inquiry notice that explains (1) the specific concerns which gave rise to the inquiry, (2) the general subject matter of the inquiry, and (3) the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that authorize the inquiry and the applicable administrative and constitutional provisions, including the right to an informal conference with the IRS before any examination of church records, and the first amendment principle of separation of church and state.

Church tax examinations

The IRS may begin a church tax examination of the church records or religious activities of a church only under the following conditions:

(a) the requirements of a church tax inquiry have been met, and

(b) an examination notice is sent by the IRS to the church at least fifteen days after the day on which the inquiry notice was sent, and at least fifteen days before the beginning of such an examination, containing the following information: (1) a copy of the inquiry notice, (2) a specific description of the church records and religious activities which the IRS seeks to examine, (3) an offer to conduct an informal conference with the church to discuss and possibly resolve the concerns giving rise to the examination, and (4) a copy of all documents collected or prepared by the IRS for use in the examination and the disclosure of which is required by the Freedom of Information Act.

Church records

Church records (defined as all corporate and financial records regularly kept by a church, including corporate minute books and lists of members and contributors) may be examined only to the extent necessary to determine the liability for and amount of any income, employment, or excise tax (including the excise taxes associated with intermediate sanctions).

Deadline for completing church tax inquiries

Church tax inquiries not followed by an examination notice must be completed not later than ninety days after the inquiry notice date. Church tax inquiries and church tax examinations must be completed not later than two years after the examination notice date.

Written opinion of IRS legal counsel

The IRS can make a determination based on a church tax inquiry or church tax examination that an excise tax is owed only if the appropriate regional legal counsel of the IRS determines in writing that there has been substantial compliance with the limitations imposed by the Church Audit Procedures Act and approves in writing of such assessment of tax.

Statute of limitations

Church tax examinations involving the liability for any tax may be begun only for any one or more of the three most recent taxable years ending before the examination notice date.

Limitation on repeat inquiries and examinations

If any church tax inquiry or church tax examination is completed and does not result in an assessment of taxes, then no other church tax inquiry or church tax examination may begin with respect to that church during the five—year period beginning on the examination notice date (or the inquiry notice date if no examination notice was sent) unless such inquiry or examination is (a) approved in writing by the Assistant Commissioner of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations of the IRS, or (b) does not involve the same or similar issues addressed in the prior inquiry or examination.

Example. A local IRS office suspects that Rev. A is receiving excessive compensation from First Church. It sends the church an inquiry notice in which the only explanation of the concerns giving rise to the inquiry is a statement that “you may be involved in an excess benefit transaction.” This inquiry notice is defective since the Church Audit Procedures Act requires that such a notice explain (1) the specific concerns which gave rise to the inquiry, (2) the general subject matter of the inquiry, and (3) the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that authorize the inquiry and the applicable administrative and constitutional provisions, including the right to an informal conference with the IRS before any examination of church records, and the first amendment principle of separation of church and state. Further, an inquiry notice may not be issued unless a regional IRS commissioner (or higher official) authorizes it.

Example. The IRS receives a telephone tip from a disgruntled church member who claims that her church is paying excessive compensation to her senior pastor. A telephone tip cannot serve as the basis for a church tax inquiry since such an inquiry may commence only if an appropriate high—level Treasury official reasonably believes on the basis of written evidence that a church is not tax—exempt, is carrying on an unrelated trade or business, or otherwise is engaged in activities subject to taxation.

Example. An IRS inquiry notice does not mention the possible application of the first amendment principle of separation of church and state to church tax inquiries. Such a notice is defective. However, a church’s only remedy is a stay of the inquiry until the IRS sends a valid inquiry notice.

Example. In 1998, the IRS conducts an examination of the tax—exempt status of First Church. It concludes that the church was properly exempt from federal income taxation. In 1999, the IRS commences an examination of First Church to determine if its managers authorized the payment of excessive compensation to their senior pastor. Such an examination is not barred by the prohibition against repeated examinations within a five—year period, since it does not involve the same or similar issues.

• Need more information? The Church Audit Procedures Act is explained fully in Richard Hammar’s book, Pastor, Church & Law (2nd ed. 1992). While this text is currently out—of—print, the full text (along with all back issues of this newsletter) is available on our Online Legal and Tax Library. You may become a member directly online at www.iclonline.com. Select the link Become a library member under the Church Law & Tax Report heading on the home page.

“Correcting” an excess benefit transaction

The intermediate sanctions law specifies that a disqualified person who receives excess compensation is subject to an excise tax equal to 25% of the amount of compensation in excess of a reasonable amount. Further, if the excess benefit is not “corrected,” the disqualified person is liable for a tax of 200% of the excess benefit. The correction must occur before the earlier of (1) the date the IRS mailed a “notice of deficiency” for the 25% tax, or (2) the date on which the 25% tax is assessed.

How can a disqualified person “correct” an excess benefit transaction? The regulations answer this question as follows:

Correction means, with respect to any excess benefit transaction, undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any additional measures necessary to place the organization in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person had been dealing under the highest fiduciary standards. Correction of the excess benefit occurs if the disqualified person repays the applicable tax—exempt organization an amount of money equal to the excess benefit, plus any additional amount needed to compensate the organization for the loss of the use of the money or other property during the period commencing on the date of the excess benefit transaction and ending on the date the excess benefit is corrected. Correction may also be accomplished, in certain circumstances, by returning property to the organization and taking any additional steps necessary to make the organization whole. If the excess benefit transaction consists of the payment of compensation for services under a contract that has not been completed, termination of the employment or independent contractor relationship between the organization and the disqualified person is not required in order to correct. However, the terms of any ongoing compensation arrangement may need to be modified to avoid future excess benefit transactions.

Example. A church pays its pastor a salary that the board later determines to have resulted in an excess benefit of $100,000. The board persuades the pastor to “correct” the arrangement by returning the excess amount to the church. This is not enough to “correct” the excess benefit transaction, and so the pastor is exposed to the 200% excise tax ($200,000). The regulations clarify that a “correction” involves more than a return of the excess benefit. The recipient of the excess benefit must repay the church or other tax—exempt organization “an amount of money equal to the excess benefit, plus any additional amount needed to compensate the organization for the loss of the use of the money or other property during the period commencing on the date of the excess benefit transaction and ending on the date the excess benefit is corrected.” In this example, this means that the pastor must pay the church an amount sufficient to compensate it for the earnings it would have received on the excess amount had it not been paid to the pastor.

Tax on managers

“Managers” who approve an excess benefit transaction are subject to an excise tax equal to 10% of the amount of the excess benefit-up to a maximum of $10,000. The new regulations provide the following clarifications:

Manager defined

The regulations define a manager of a church or other tax—exempt organization as

any officer, director, or trustee of such organization, or any individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees of the organization, regardless of title. A person shall be considered an officer of an organization if-(A) that person is specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, by—laws, or other constitutive documents of the organization; or (B) that person regularly exercises general authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the organization. Independent contractors, acting in a capacity as attorneys, accountants, and investment managers and advisors, are not officers. Any person who has authority merely to recommend particular administrative or policy decisions, but not to implement them without approval of a superior, is not an officer.

Example. A church purchases land as the site of a future building. Before signing the contract of sale, the church obtained written assurance from the seller that there were no known environmental hazards on the property. In fact, the seller was aware that it had dumped hazardous materials on a portion of the property. The church sued the former owner for fraud and won a judgment of $1 million. The attorney retained by the church had taken the case on a “contingency fee” basis, meaning that her compensation was one—third of any amount she recovered. According to the regulations, the attorney is not a “manager” since she was an independent contractor acting on behalf of the church. And, as we will see later, she is not a disqualified person, and so she will not be subject to intermediate sanctions.

• Tip. Many church board members will meet the regulations’ definition of a manager.

Participation

A manager must participate in the decision to pay excessive compensation to a disqualified person in order to be subject to the 10% excise tax. What is participation? The new regulations specify that

participation includes silence or inaction on the part of an organization manager where the manager is under a duty to speak or act, as well as any affirmative action by such manager. However, an organization manager will not be considered to have participated in an excess benefit transaction where the manager has opposed such transaction in a manner consistent with the fulfillment of the manager’s responsibilities to the applicable tax—exempt organization.

Knowing

A manager’s participation in an excess benefit transaction must be “knowing” in order for the 10% excise tax to apply. The regulations specify that

a person participates in a transaction knowing that it is an excess benefit transaction only if the person-(A) has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, such transaction would be an excess benefit transaction; (B) is aware that such an act under these circumstances may violate the provisions of federal tax law governing excess benefit transactions; and (C) negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the transaction is an excess benefit transaction, or the person is in fact aware that it is such a transaction.

Key point. The regulations clarify that “knowing” does not mean having reason to know. Actual knowledge is required. However, evidence tending to show that a person has reason to know of a particular fact or rule is relevant in determining whether the person had actual knowledge of the fact or rule. So, for example, evidence tending to show that a person has reason to know of an excess benefit transaction is relevant in determining whether the person has actual knowledge of it.

Willful

A manager’s participation in an excess benefit transaction must be “willful” in order for the 10% excise tax to apply. The regulations clarify that

participation by an organization manager is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make the participation willful. However, participation by an organization manager is not willful if the manager does not know that the transaction in which the manager is participating is an excess benefit transaction.

Advice of counsel

The regulations specify:

If a person, after full disclosure of the [facts] to legal counsel (including in—house counsel) relies on the advice of such counsel expressed in a reasoned written legal opinion that a transaction is not an excess benefit transaction, the person’s participation in such transaction will ordinarily not be considered knowing or willful … even if such transaction is subsequently held to be an excess benefit transaction …. [A] written legal opinion is reasoned so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and applicable law. However, a written legal opinion is not reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. The absence of advice of counsel with respect to an act shall not, by itself, however, give rise to any inference that a person participated in such act knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause.

Limit on manager liability

The new regulations clarify that the tax that must be paid by participating managers for any one excess benefit transaction cannot exceed $10,000.

Example. A church board gives a retiring pastor the church parsonage (having a value of $150,000). The board members later learn about intermediate sanctions, and are concerned that they may each be liable for up to $10,000 as managers. The new regulations clarify that the board members will not individually be liable for the 10% excise tax (up to $10,000). Rather, they will collectively be liable for an excise tax (as managers) of 10% of the amount of the excess benefit up to a maximum tax of $10,000. The total tax assessed for this single transaction will be allocated to the board members who participated in the decision.

Who is a “disqualified person”?

Since intermediate sanctions apply only to disqualified persons (and managers of tax—exempt organizations that approve an excess benefit transaction), it is important for church leaders to be familiar with this term. The new regulations provide helpful guidance, as noted below.

General definition

The regulations define a disqualified person as

any person who was in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization at any time during the five—year period ending on the date of the transaction.

Family members

The regulations clarify that some persons will be disqualified persons because of their relationship with a disqualified person. These include a spouse; brother or sister (by whole or half blood); a spouse of a brother or sister (by whole or half blood); an ancestor; child; grandchild; great grandchild; and a spouse of a child, grandchild, or great grandchild.

Example. A church wants to make a large retirement gift to its retiring pastor, Rev. G. The board does not want to expose Rev. G to intermediate sanctions, so it makes the retirement gift to Rev. G’s spouse. This arrangement does not avoid intermediate sanctions. According to the new regulations. Rev. G’s spouse will be deemed to be a disqualified person if Rev. G meets that definition.

Persons having substantial influence

A disqualified person is someone who “was in a position to exercise substantial influence” over the affairs of the church or other charity. What is substantial influence? The regulations clarify this term by listing persons who are presumed to exercise substantial influence, as well as those who are not. The regulations then address persons fitting within either of these categories.

1. Persons who are presumed to exercise substantial influence. These include any individual who serves on the governing body of the organization who is entitled to vote on matters over which the governing body has authority as the president, chief executive officer, or chief operating officer of the organization as treasurer or chief financial officer of the organization.

Key point. The regulations specify that “an individual serves as a treasurer or chief financial officer, regardless of title, if that individual has or shares ultimate responsibility for managing the organization’s financial assets and has or shares authority to sign drafts or direct the signing of drafts, or authorize electronic transfer of funds, from organization bank accounts.

2. Persons not having substantial influence. The new regulations specify that persons who do not meet the tax code’s definition of a highly compensated employee will not be deemed to exercise substantial influence over a charity and therefore will not meet the definition of a disqualified person. As a result, intermediate sanctions will not apply to them. The code defines a highly compensated employee as one who had compensation for the previous year in excess of $80,000 (and, if an employer elects, was in the top 20 percent of employees by compensation). The $80,000 amount is indexed annually for inflation.

Caution. Not all clergy earning annual compensation of less than $80,000 are exempt from the definition of a disqualified person. The new regulations specify that the exemption of persons earning less than this amount does not apply to (1) family members (as defined above) of a disqualified person, or (2) a board member, president, or treasurer of the church or charity.

Example. Rev. T is senior pastor of a church, and serves as president of the corporation and a member of the board (with the right to vote). Rev. T’s church salary for the current year is $50,000. Since Rev. T serves as both president and a member of the board, he is not automatically exempted from the definition of a disqualified person even though he is not a highly compensated employee. As a result, he will be subject to intermediate sanctions if the church pays him excessive compensation. However, Rev. T’s current level of compensation is not excessive. In summary, while he is a disqualified person, he is not subject to intermediate sanctions because his compensation is reasonable.

Example. Rev. C is an assistant pastor. He does not serve on the church board and is not an officer of the church. His church compensation for this year is $40,000. In addition, the church board is considering a gift of the parsonage to Rev. C. The parsonage has a current value of $75,000 (and is debt—free). The board is concerned that the gift of the parsonage to Rev. C will expose him to intermediate sanctions. They do not need to be concerned. It is true that Rev. C will be a highly compensated employee if the parsonage is given to him. But this in itself does not make him a disqualified person. The regulations require that he be in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the church. An assistant pastor who is neither an officer nor member of the board probably does not meet this test. Since Rev. C is not a disqualified person, he is not subject to intermediate sanctions.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Rev. C is a senior pastor who serves on the church board (with the right to vote). Under these circumstances, Rev. C will be deemed a disqualified person because of his status as a church board member. This will expose him to intermediate sanctions if the total amount of his church compensation for the current year is excessive.

Example. Rev. N is a part—time assistant pastor. She does not serve on the church board and is not an officer of the church. Her church compensation for this year is $15,000. In addition, the church board is considering a gift of a new car to Rev. N. The car has a current value of $25,000. The board is concerned that the gift of the car to Rev. N will expose her to intermediate sanctions. They do not need to be concerned. First, her total compensation (including the gift of the car) would not make her a highly compensated employee, and so she is presumed not to exercise substantial influence over church affairs. Therefore, she cannot be a disqualified person and is not subject to intermediate sanctions.

3. Other cases. Some persons will not fit within either of the previous two categories. They do not serve as a board member, president, or treasurer of their church or charity; and, they satisfy the definition of a highly compensated employee. Whether or not such persons will be deemed disqualified persons depends on the circumstances.

The new regulations clarify that circumstances tending to show that a person has substantial influence over the affairs of a church or charity include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following:

The person founded the organization.

The person is a “substantial contributor” (as defined in section 507(d)(2) of the code). This definition includes any person who contributed “an aggregate amount of more than $5,000” if such amount is more than 2 percent of the total contributions received by the church or charity before the close of the taxable year in which the contribution is received.

The person’s compensation is based on the revenues of the church or charity.

On the other hand, circumstances tending to show that a person does not have substantial influence over the affairs of a church or charity include but are not limited to, the following: (1) the person has taken a vow of poverty on behalf of a religious organization; or (2) the person is an independent contractor, such as an attorney, accountant, or investment manager or advisor, acting in that capacity-unless the person might economically benefit (aside from fees received for the professional services rendered).

Key point. A compensation arrangement based on a percentage of a church’s revenue suggests that the recipient exercises substantial influence over church affairs and therefore is a disqualified person subject to intermediate sanctions. However, this rule will apply only if the recipient (1) is not a board member, president, or treasurer of the church; and (2) receives annual church compensation of $80,000 or more. Obviously, this rule will apply to very few ministers.

Example. Rev. G is a pastor of a church and serves as president of the church corporation and a member of the board. The board agrees to pay him compensation equal to one—third of all church offerings. For 1998, the church receives offerings of $900,000, and Rev. G is paid $300,000. Rev. E is a disqualified person because he is president of the church and a member of the board, and as a result is presumed to exercise substantial influence over church affairs. The fact that the church pays him a percentage of revenue is another fact supporting his status as a disqualified person.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Rev. G is not an officer or director of the church. The fact that Rev. G is compensated on the basis of a percentage of church revenue is a fact that tends to show substantial influence over church affairs. As a result, it is likely that Rev. G will be deemed to be a disqualified person by the IRS.

Example. B is a member of a local church. In 1998, B contributes $50,000 to the church. The church received contributions of $700,000 in 1998. B is a substantial contributor since she contributed more than $5,000 in 1998, and her contributions exceeded 2 percent of the church’s total contributions for the year. As a result, she may be deemed to exercise “substantial control” over church affairs, and this would make her a disqualified person. This exposes her to intermediate sanctions, in the event that the church pays her excessive compensation. However, since the church pays B no compensation, there is no exposure to intermediate sanctions.

What is an excess benefit transaction?

The IRS can assess intermediate sanctions against a disqualified person who is involved in an excess benefit transaction with a church or charity. Both conditions must be satisfied. The IRS cannot impose intermediate sanctions against someone who is not a disqualified person-even if he or she receives substantial compensation. Of course, such arrangements will be rare. And, the IRS cannot impose intermediate sanctions against a disqualified person who does not receive an excess benefit. We have defined the term “disqualified person” in the preceding pages. The remaining task is to define an excess benefit transaction. The new regulations provide the following definition:

An excess benefit transaction means any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax—exempt organization directly or indirectly, to or for the use of, any disqualified person, and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received by the organization for providing such benefit. An excess benefit transaction also includes certain revenue—sharing transactions ….

Certain economic benefits are disregarded

The regulations list a few economic benefits that are not considered in determining whether or not a disqualified person is paid excessive compensation. The most relevant exceptions are as follows:

1. Reimbursement of some expenses. A church’s payment of reasonable expenses for officers and directors to attend board meetings is not taken into account in applying intermediate sanctions. However, the new regulations warn that “reasonable expenses do not include luxury travel or spousal travel.”

2. A member of a charitable class. The new regulations specify that “an economic benefit provided to a disqualified person that the disqualified person receives solely as a member of a charitable class that the applicable tax—exempt organization intends to benefit as part of the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purpose is generally disregarded” for purposes of assessing intermediate sanctions.

3. Insurance or indemnification of excise taxes. The payment of a premium for an insurance policy providing liability insurance to cover intermediate sanctions or indemnification of a disqualified person for such taxes will not constitute an excess benefit transaction if the premium or the indemnification is treated as compensation to the disqualified person when paid, and the total compensation paid to the disqualified person is reasonable.

Example. Rev. L has served as senior pastor of his church for 30 years. The congregation has a membership of 200 and annual revenue of $300,000. The board sets Rev. L’s salary at $50,000 for 1999. In July of 1999, Rev. L informs the board and congregation that he will retire at the end of the year. The board votes to present Rev. L with the church parsonage as a retirement gift. The parsonage has a value of $150,000, and is debt—free. Will the church’s generous gift represent an excess benefit that will trigger intermediate sanctions? Possibly. The new regulations define an excess benefit transaction as any transaction in which the value of an economic benefit provided by a church or charity to a disqualified person “exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received by the organization for providing such benefit.” The critical question is whether the value of the parsonage, when combined with Rev. L’s salary, exceeds the value of his services. Obviously, this is not an easy question to answer. But it is possible if not likely that the IRS would assert that the compensation paid to Rev. L is excessive. Consider the following: (1) The church previously agreed to pay Rev. L an annual salary of $50,000. This represented an “arm’s length” transaction that presumably reflected the “value” of Rev. L’s services. As a result, the gift of property valued at $150,000 represented additional compensation over and above what the church had already determined to be the value of Rev. L’s services for the year. (2) The total value of Rev. L’s compensation for 1999 ($200,000) is substantial, and is well beyond the upper end of clergy salary ranges for churches with a membership of 200 and annual revenue of $300,000. (3) The total value of Rev. L’s compensation for 1999 represents 67 percent of the church’s total income. As a result, the gift of the parsonage exposes Rev. L and the church board to intermediate sanctions. If the IRS determines that the maximum reasonable compensation for Rev. L in 1999 would be $100,000, then he has received an excess benefit of $100,000. He would be liable for an excise tax of $25,000 (25 percent of the excess), and an additional $200,000 (200 percent of the excess) if he did not “correct” the situation by returning the excess to the church. In addition, the church board would be subject to an excise tax of $10,000 (paid collectively, not individually). The church board should not have entered into this arrangement without seeking the advice of a tax attorney. It is possible that the church could have structured the gift in a way to “spread” it over more than one year, so that Rev. L’s annual compensation would never be excessive.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church has 1,000 members and annual revenue of $1.5 million. It is less likely that Rev. L’s total compensation for 1999 would be excessive under these facts, since ministers serving congregations of this size have higher incomes. Nevertheless, because of the serious consequences associated with intermediate sanctions, prudence dictates that church boards seek the opinion of a tax attorney when considering a significant gift to a minister in order to minimize or eliminate the risk of sanctions.

What is reasonable compensation?

Compensation in excess of what is “reasonable” constitutes an excess benefit that will expose a disqualified person to intermediate sanctions. What, then, is reasonable compensation? The regulations simply note that “compensation for the performance of services is reasonable if it is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.” The regulations clarify that compensation includes all items of compensation provided by a church or charity in exchange for the performance of services, including but not limited to:

All forms of cash and noncash compensation, including salary, fees, bonuses, and severance payments paid.

All forms of deferred compensation that is earned and vested, whether or not funded, and whether or not paid under a deferred compensation plan that is a qualified plan under section 401(a), but if deferred compensation for services performed in multiple prior years vests in a later year, then that compensation is attributed to the years in which the services were performed.

The amount of premiums paid for liability or any other insurance coverage, as well as any payment or reimbursement by the organization of charges, expenses, fees, or taxes not covered ultimately by the insurance coverage.

All other benefits, whether or not included in income for tax purposes, including payments to welfare benefit plans on behalf of the persons being compensated, such as plans providing medical, dental, life insurance, severance pay, and disability benefits, and both taxable and nontaxable fringe benefits … including expense allowances or reimbursements or foregone interest on loans that the recipient must report as income on his separate income tax return.

Compensation based on a percentage of revenue

The compensation of some ministers is based on a percentage of church income. In other cases, ministers receive a “bonus” if the church reaches a revenue goal. Do such arrangements result in “excess benefits” exposing the ministers to intermediate sanctions? Possibly, but not necessarily. The new regulations state that the answer depends on “all relevant facts and circumstances”. The regulations provide some clarification by noting that relevant facts and circumstances include, but are not limited to:

the relationship between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, and

the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based

The new regulations contain the following additional clarification:

A revenue—sharing transaction may constitute an excess benefit transaction regardless of whether the economic benefit provided to the disqualified person exceeds the fair market value of the consideration provided in return if, at any point, it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing proportional benefits that contribute to the organization’s accomplishment of its exempt purpose.

The application of the new regulations to revenue—based pay is illustrated by the following examples.

Example. Rev. C serves as an officer and director of his church. His annual compensation is one—half of all church income. In 1998, total church income was $60,000, and Rev. C was paid $30,000. The board is concerned that this compensation arrangement may trigger intermediate sanctions against Rev. C and the board members personally. The new regulations clarify that not all “revenue—based” compensation arrangements result in an excess benefit leading to intermediate sanctions. Rather, all of the “relevant facts and circumstances” must be considered. The regulations state that “relevant facts and circumstances” include, but are not limited to (1) the relationship between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, and (2) the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based. Rev. C’s compensation will not be excessive under these criteria. First, the size of his compensation is reasonably related to the quality and quantity of services performed (i.e., full—time professional services). And second, Rev. C has only limited ability to “control the activities” generating church revenue. Unlike many organizations, the amount of a church’s revenue is based on many variables that are beyond a minister’s control. Ultimately, church revenue is based largely on the theology and religious commitment of individual members concerning the importance of stewardship. It is doubtful that the IRS can even engage in intrusive inquiries into the motivation of church members in giving to their church. As a result, the second “fact and circumstance” cited in the new regulations will have limited application to local churches.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Rev. C is not an officer or director of his church. There is no possibility that the compensation arrangement will result in intermediate sanctions, since Rev. C is not a disqualified person.

Example. Rev. C serves as an officer and director of his church. The congregation has 300 members. His annual compensation is one—half of all church income. In 1998, total church income was $600,000, and Rev. C was paid $300,000. The board is concerned that this compensation arrangement may trigger intermediate sanctions against Rev. C and the board members personally. The new regulations clarify that not all “revenue—based” compensation arrangements result in an excess benefit leading to intermediate sanctions. Rather, all of the “relevant facts and circumstances” must be considered. The regulations state that “relevant facts and circumstances” include, but are not limited to (1) the relationship between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, and (2) the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based. Rev. C’s compensation may be excessive under these criteria since the IRS may conclude that the amount of Rev. C’s compensation is not proportional to the quantity and quality of the services he provides. This is a difficult and somewhat subjective inquiry, but note the following: (1) It is highly irregular for the chief executive officer of any organization (nonprofit or for—profit) to receive half of all the organization’s revenue. While such an arrangement may be justifiable when the organization’s revenue is modest, it becomes increasingly irregular as the organization’s revenue increases. Being paid half of a church’s revenue probably is reasonable for a small congregation with revenues of $60,000 (see the previous example). But the same cannot be said of a church with revenue of $600,000. (2) It is likely the IRS will assert that Rec. C’s compensation is excessive in light of the quality and quantity of services performed. It is true that Rev. C is providing professional and valuable services. However, these services must be placed in perspective. How many ministers serving a congregation of 300 members receive annual compensation of $300,000? Few if any. As a result, Rev. C will have a difficult if not impossible task in convincing the IRS that his compensation is reasonably related to the value of his services. How can it be reasonable if few (if any) ministers serving congregations of similar size receive this level of compensation? This conclusion is reinforced by the annual Compensation Handbook for Church Staff, published annually by this newsletter. It is our recommendation that any doubt with regard to reasonableness of clergy compensation should be resolved on the side of caution-because of the enormity of the sanctions that can be assessed against disqualified persons who are paid excessive compensation. In this example, if the IRS determines that Rev. C’s “reasonable” compensation would be $100,000, then he has an excess benefit of $200,000. He will face an excise tax of $50,000 (25 percent of the excess), and an additional tax of $400,000 if he does not “correct” the overpayment by returning it to the church. In addition, the church board members who authorized this arrangement may be assessed a tax of $10,000 (collectively, not individually).

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the congregation has more than 1,000 members and its revenue for 1998 was $1.5 million, resulting in compensation to Rev. C of $750,000. There is little if any doubt that Rev. C’s compensation will be deemed excessive by the IRS, and that Rev. C will be exposed to the 25 percent and 200 percent excise taxes discussed earlier in this article. In addition, the board is exposed to the 10 percent tax on managers.

Example. A church with 200 members has annual revenue of $300,000. The board enters into a compensation arrangement with its pastor, Rev. E, under which Rev. E is paid an annual salary of $50,000 and in addition receives a “bonus” of $25,000 if membership or revenue increases by 10 percent in any year. Assuming that Rev. E is a disqualified person, it is doubtful that this arrangement will result in an excess benefit leading to intermediate sanctions. The new regulations clarify that not all “revenue—based” compensation arrangements result in an excess benefit leading to intermediate sanctions. Rather, all of the “relevant facts and circumstances” must be considered. The regulations state that “relevant facts and circumstances” include, but are not limited to (1) the relationship between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, and (2) the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based. Rev. E’s compensation will not be excessive under these criteria. First, the size of his compensation is reasonably related to the quality and quantity of services performed (i.e., full—time professional services). Second, Rev. E has only limited ability to “control the activities” generating church revenue (see the previous examples). Third, the new regulations specify that “a revenue—sharing transaction may constitute an excess benefit transaction regardless of whether the economic benefit provided to the disqualified person exceeds the fair market value of the consideration provided in return if, at any point, it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing proportional benefits that contribute to the organization’s accomplishment of its exempt purpose.” However, an example in the new regulations clarifies that if additional compensation is based entirely on a “proportional benefit” to the charity, then the added pay is not an excess benefit. The example states that a manager of a charity’s investment portfolio, whose compensation consists of an annual salary plus a bonus equal to a percentage of any increase in the value of the charity’s portfolio, is not receiving an excess benefit. While the manager’s compensation (the bonus) is linked to the charity’s revenue, the arrangement gives the manager “an incentive to provide the highest quality service in order to maximize benefits.” Further, the manager “can increase his own compensation only if [the charity] also receives a proportional benefit. Under these facts and circumstances, the payment to [the manager] of the bonus described above does not constitute an excess benefit transaction.” It could be argued that Rev. E’s “bonus” is tied directly to a proportional benefit being received by the church (a 10 percent increase in membership or revenue), and therefore is not excessive.

Example. Rev. N serves as her church’s minister of music, and is a member of the church board. Because she occasionally composes religious music in the course of her employment, she and the church enter into an agreement specifying that the church owns the copyright in such “works made for hire” but that Rev. N will receive half of all royalties the church earns from publication of the music. This is a “revenue—based” pay arrangement, since Rev. N’s compensation is based in part on the church’s royalty revenue. However, it will not result in an excess benefit to Rev. N. The new IRS regulations contain a similar example which contains the following conclusion (the names have been changed): “Rev. N receives the revenue—based compensation, i.e., the percentage of royalties, as an incentive and a reward for producing work of especially high quality. In addition, any time the church benefits by receiving royalties, Rev. N benefits as well and to a proportionate degree. Finally, because the copyright belongs to the church, Rev. N has no control over how the copyright is used nor the stream of revenue it generates. Under these facts and circumstances, the church’s payment of revenue—based compensation to Rev. N does not constitute an excess benefit transaction under the rules of this section.

Example. A televangelist raises $10 million in annual revenue. The ministry’s board of directors adopts a compensation arrangement establishing the televangelist’s annual income at ten percent of the ministry’s total revenue. The televangelist engages in fundraising on every broadcast, and in addition conducts intensive fundraisers twice each year. The board is concerned that this compensation arrangement may trigger intermediate sanctions against the president and the board members personally. The new regulations clarify that not all “revenue—based” compensation arrangements result in an excess benefit leading to intermediate sanctions. Rather, all of the “relevant facts and circumstances” must be considered. The regulations state that “relevant facts and circumstances” include, but are not limited to (1) the relationship between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, and (2) the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based. The televangelist’s compensation probably is excessive under these criteria since the IRS likely would conclude that the amount of the televangelist’s compensation is not proportional to the quantity and quality of the services he provides. This is a difficult and somewhat subjective inquiry, but note the following: (1) Annual compensation of $1 million for the chief executive of any charity is presumably excessive. This certainly is true for religious organizations. For example, the president of the United States receives annual compensation of $250,000, and members of Congress, state governors, and university presidents receive much less than this. (2) It is highly irregular for the chief executive officer of any organization (nonprofit or for—profit) to receive one—tenth of all the organization’s revenue. While such an arrangement may be justifiable when the organization’s revenue is modest, it becomes increasingly irregular as the organization’s revenue increases. (3) It is likely the IRS will assert that the televangelist’s compensation is excessive in light of the quality and quantity of services performed. (4) The new regulations specify that “the ability of the person receiving the compensation to control the activities generating the revenues on which the compensation is based” is one factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a revenue—based pay arrangement. The IRS likely would conclude that the televangelist has the ability to control the activities generating the revenues because of his central role in fundraising activities.

The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness

Disqualified persons (and “managers”) may benefit from a “rebuttable presumption” that compensation is reasonable. The new regulations describe this presumption as follows:

Payments under a compensation arrangement between [a church or charity] and a disqualified person shall be presumed to be reasonable, and a transfer of property, right to use property, or any other benefit or privilege between an applicable tax—exempt organization and a disqualified person shall be presumed to be at fair market value, if the following conditions are satisfied-(1) The compensation arrangement or terms of transfer are approved by the organization’s governing body or a committee of the governing body composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest with respect to the arrangement or transaction; (2) The governing body, or committee thereof, obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its determination; and (3) The governing body or committee adequately documented the basis for its determination concurrently with making that determination.

1. Conflict of interest. The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness only arises if compensation is determined by a board or committee composed entirely of individuals not having a conflict of interest. If only one member of a board or committee has a conflict of interest, then the rebuttable presumption does not apply. The regulations state that a member of a board or committee has a conflict of interest if he or she

Is a disqualified person.

Is related to any disqualified person participating in or economically benefiting from the compensation arrangement or transaction. “Related” means a spouse; brother or sister (by whole or half blood); a spouse of a brother or sister (by whole or half blood); an ancestor; child; grandchild; great grandchild; and a spouse of a child, grandchild, or great grandchild.

Is in an employment relationship subject to the direction or control of any disqualified person participating in or economically benefiting from the compensation arrangement or transaction.

Is receiving compensation or other payments subject to approval by any disqualified person participating in or economically benefiting from the compensation arrangement or transaction.

Has no material financial interest affected by the compensation arrangement or transaction.

Does not approve a transaction providing economic benefits to any disqualified person participating in the compensation arrangement or transaction, who in turn has approved or will approve a transaction providing economic benefits to the member.

Key point. The new regulations specify that “a person is not included on the governing body or committee when it is reviewing a transaction if that person meets with other members only to answer questions, and otherwise recuses himself from the meeting and is not present during debate and voting on the transaction or compensation arrangement.” What does this language mean? Unfortunately, it is not clear. It may mean that clergy who serve as a member of a church board will remain eligible for the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness if they recuse themselves from board meetings where their compensation is addressed. This interpretation is reasonable, but not certain.

Example. A parachurch ministry’s board includes the president. If the IRS later asserts that the president was paid excessive compensation, the president will not be able to rely on the presumption of reasonableness because of his presence on the board. However, if he recuses himself from the board meeting in which his compensation is discussed (and so is not present for the debate and voting on the compensation arrangement), he may not have a “conflict of interest” that would preclude the presumption of reasonableness.

Example. Same facts as the previous example. The president does not serve on the board, but his wife does. The president recuses himself from the board meeting in which his compensation is determined, but his wife does not. The president will not be able to rely on the presumption of reasonableness, because one board member (the wife) is related to the president, and she did not recuse herself from the meeting that addressed her husband’s compensation.

2. “Comparability data”. The rebuttable presumption of reasonableness only arises if the governing board “obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its determination”. The new regulations specify that a board “has appropriate data as to comparability” if it “has information sufficient to determine whether … a compensation arrangement will result in the payment of reasonable compensation or a transaction will be for fair market value.” The regulations clarify that relevant information includes, but is not be limited to:

Compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, both taxable and tax—exempt, for “functionally comparable positions”

the availability of similar services in the same geographic area

independent compensation surveys compiled by independent firms

actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person

independent appraisals of the value of property that the organization intends to purchase from, or sell or provide to, the disqualified person

Example. A church with 500 members and an annual budget of $1 million pays its senior pastor compensation of $200,000 in 1998. The pastor participated in the board meeting in which his compensation was determined. The church board is concerned that the pastor’s compensation may be excessive. They begin doing “salary comparisons” of other churches and businesses in the area with a similar membership or budget. Such efforts will serve no purpose if the board is attempting to qualify the pastor for the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. The pastor’s presence on the board, and his participation in the meeting in which his compensation was determined, disqualify him for the presumption of reasonableness. However, salary surveys will be relevant in determining whether or not the pastor’s compensation is excessive.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the pastor recused himself from the board meeting in which his compensation was determined. The board’s efforts to obtain “salary comparisons” may be helpful. If the board determines that “similarly situated organizations, both taxable and tax—exempt”, are paying persons in a “functionally equivalent position” a similar amount of compensation, then this may establish a rebuttable presumption that the pastor’s compensation is reasonable. This assumes that the pastor’s recusing himself from the board meeting in which his compensation was determined avoided any “conflict of interest”.

Example. Same facts as the previous example. Assume that the board learns that the average annual compensation paid to senior pastors by 20 “similarly situated” churches in the same area is $75,000. The board also determines that the average annual compensation paid by 10 local businesses with annual revenue of $1 million is $100,000. The results of the board’s salary surveys clearly will not support the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.

Example. A church pays its senior pastor annual compensation of $75,000 for 1998. The pastor serves as a member of the church’s governing board. In 1998 the church board also provides the pastor with a new car (with a value of $25,000) in recognition of 30 years of service. The pastor recused himself from the board meetings in which his salary and the gift were approved. The gift of the car is fully taxable, and so the pastor’s total compensation for 1998 will be $100,000. The board obtains a copy of the Compensation Handbook for Church Staff, written by Richard Hammar and James Cobble, and determines that senior pastors in “similarly situated” churches are paid an average of $85,000 per year. This information may be used to support a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, since the pastor’s compensation (including the gift of the car) is not substantially above the average. This assumes that the pastor’s recusing himself from the board meeting in which his compensation was determined avoided any “conflict of interest”.

  • Tip. The intermediate sanctions law creates a presumption that a minister’s compensation package is reasonable if approved by a church board that relied upon objective “comparability” information, including independent compensation surveys by nationally recognized independent firms. The most comprehensive compensation survey for church workers is the annual Compensation Handbook for Church Staff, written by Richard Hammar and James Cobble, and available from the publisher of this newsletter.

3. Special rule for compensation paid by small organizations. The new regulations specify that for organizations with annual gross revenue of less than $1 million, the governing board will be considered to have appropriate comparability data if it has data on compensation paid “by five comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services.” The regulations also clarify that a rolling average based on the three prior years may be used to calculate annual gross revenue of an organization.

4. Rebutting the presumption. The regulations specify that the presumption “may be rebutted by additional information showing that the compensation was not reasonable or that the transfer was not at fair market value.”

5. Adequate documentation. In order to qualify for the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, the governing board must “adequately document” the basis for its decision at the same time that it makes the decision. The new regulations specify that for a decision to be documented adequately, the “written or electronic records” of the board must note:

  • the terms of the transaction that was approved and the date it was approved;
  • the members of the governing body or committee who were present during debate on the transaction or arrangement that was approved and those who voted on it
  • the comparability data obtained and relied upon by the committee and how the data was obtained, and
  • the actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who is otherwise a member of the governing body or committee but who had a conflict of interest with respect to the transaction or arrangement

Key point. For a decision to be documented concurrently, records must be prepared by the next meeting of the board occurring after the final action is taken. Records must be reviewed and approved by the governing body “within a reasonable time period thereafter”.

Effect on tax—exempt status

The new regulations caution that the ability of the IRS to assess intermediate sanctions “does not affect the substantive statutory standards for tax exemption under sections 501(c)(3) …. Organizations are described in [that section] only if no part of their net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” In other words, churches and other charities are still exposed to loss of their tax—exempt status if they pay excessive compensation. The fact that such compensation arrangements may trigger intermediate sanctions does not necessarily protect the organization’s tax—exempt status from attack.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m71 m24 ,c0698

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Foreign Travel Expenses

The Tax Court issues a helpful decision.

Fast v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-272 (1998)

Background. Many ministers have traveled to foreign countries. In some cases, the trip is primarily for church-related activities. In others, it is primarily a vacation. In many cases, there are elements of both “business” and pleasure. How should church treasurers report the church’s reimbursement of travel expenses incurred by a minister under these circumstances?

A recent case. A nurse attended an international health conference in China at which she had been invited to present a paper. The participants in the conference were public health professionals from around the world. The nurse spent 2 days attending the formal conference proceedings that included panel sessions and the presentation of papers (including hers). On 7 of the remaining 11 days, the conference participants, including the nurse, made conference-sponsored trips to medical facilities and met with local health officials, for either half of the day or for the entire day. Two days were fully devoted to sightseeing. The nurse deducted all of the costs of her trip (meals, food, lodging, transportation) as a business travel expense. The IRS audited her tax return, and disallowed any deduction for her travel expenses. It concluded that the trip was not primarily for business. The nurse appealed to the Tax Court.

The Court’s ruling. The Court ruled that the nurse could deduct all of her travel expenses incurred during the trip to China. It observed:

The regulations provide that travel expenses are deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer’s business. One of the important factors in deciding whether a trip is primarily business or personal is the amount of time spent on each activity. In an example in the regulations, if 1 week is spent on business and 5 are spent on vacation, the trip is primarily personal. Thus, if one-sixth of the time is spent on business and the rest is personal, the trip is primarily personal. Further, the regulations provide that expenses paid or incurred in attending a convention may be ordinary and necessary depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Based on our review of the record, we believe that [the attempt by the IRS] to portray [the nurse’s] trip to China as a personal sightseeing junket are unavailing. While it is true that she spent a certain amount of time touring the Great Wall and other sites of interest, a far greater proportion of her time was spent visiting hospitals and medical clinics accompanied by Chinese health officials or participating in the formal presentation of papers. Visiting medical facilities is not personal recreation. On the contrary, we believe it bears a direct relation to her work as an educator in the public health field and is accordingly an ordinary and necessary business activity with respect to petitioner. Consequently, her travel to China and participation in the conference activities were primarily for business reasons within the meaning of the regulations.

The Court allowed the nurse to claim the following “ordinary and necessary” travel expenses: airfare to China, the conference fee, visa fee, books regarding China, travel insurance, slides for presentations, tips, breakfast, taxi, customs fees, parking, and meals. However, the court also noted that the nurse claimed several additional expenses with respect to the China trip that were purely personal or living expenses which were not deductible.

The Court did not allow the nurse to deduct travel expenses incurred within China, because she lacked adequate substantiation. The income tax regulations provide the following explanation of the substantiation required for travel expenses incurred while away from home:

[The] amount of each separate expenditure for traveling away from home, such as cost of transportation or lodging, except that the daily cost of the traveler’s own breakfast, lunch, and dinner and of expenditures incidental to such travel may be aggregated, if set forth in reasonable categories, such as for meals, for gasoline and oil, and for taxi fares.

The Court concluded that the nurse failed to meet this standard with respect to travel expenses incurred while in China, since the meals, lodging, and travel expenses were not separately accounted for, as required by the regulations.

The tax code and regulations. The tax code and regulations directly address foreign business trips. Here is a summary of the rules:

1. Foreign travel entirely for business. If your trip to a foreign country is entirely for business, then all of your travel expenses are deductible (and reimbursable under an accountable arrangement). Travel expenses include such items as transportation, meals, and lodging.

2. “Safe harbors”. Some foreign trips are treated as if they were entirely for business, even though they were not. As a result, all travel expenses are deductible (and reimbursable under an accountable arrangement). Here are the four safe harbors recognized by the tax code and regulations:

No substantial control. A foreign trip is considered entirely for business if you did not have substantial control over arranging the trip. You do not have substantial control merely because you had control over the timing of the trip. But you will be considered to have substantial control over a trip if you were reimbursed or paid a travel expense allowance for a trip, and you are not a “managing executive”. A “managing executive” is an employee who has the authority and responsibility, without being subject to the veto of another, to decide on the need for the business travel.


Tip. Clergy who report their federal income taxes as self-employed are more likely to have substantial control over arranging business trips. This means that it is less likely that they will qualify for this rule.

Trips of less than one week. A trip is considered entirely for business if it involves travel outside the United States for a week or less—even if the trip combines both business and nonbusiness activities. One week means seven consecutive days. In counting the days, do not count the day of departure, but do count the day of return to the United States.

Less than 25% of time on personal activities. A trip is considered entirely for business if you were outside the United States for more than a week, but you spent less than 25% of the total time you were outside the United States on nonbusiness activities. For this purpose, count both the day your trip began and the day it ended.

Vacation not a major consideration. Your trip is considered entirely for business if you can establish that a personal vacation was not a major consideration, even if you have substantial control over arranging the trip.


Tip. If you do not meet any of the above exceptions, you may still be able to deduct some of your expenses.

3. Travel Primarily for Business. If you travel outside the United States primarily for business purposes but spend some of your time on nonbusiness activities, you generally cannot deduct all of your travel expenses—unless you qualify for one of the four exceptions summarized above. You can only deduct the business portion of your cost of getting to and from your destination. You must allocate the costs between your business and nonbusiness activities to determine your deductible amount. How do you make this allocation? In general, if your trip outside the United States was primarily for business, you must allocate your travel time on a day-to-day basis between business days and nonbusiness days. The days you depart from and return to the United States are both counted as days outside the United States. To figure the deductible amount of your round-trip travel expenses, multiply your expenses by the following fraction: The numerator (top number) is the total number of business days outside the United States; the denominator (bottom number) is the total number of travel days outside the United States.

Your business days include transportation days, days your presence was required, days you spent on business, and certain weekends and holidays. Count as a business day any day your presence is required at a particular place for a specific business purpose. Count it as a business day even if you spend most of the day on nonbusiness activities. Also, count as a business day any day you are prevented from working because of circumstances beyond your control. Count weekends, holidays, and other necessary “standby days” as business days if they fall between business days. But if they follow your business meetings or activity and you remain at your business destination for nonbusiness or personal reasons, do not count them as business days.

4. Travel primarily for vacation. If you travel outside the United States primarily for vacation, the entire cost of the trip is a nondeductible personal expense. This is true even if you spend some time attending brief professional seminars or a continuing education program. You can, however, deduct your registration fees and any other expenses incurred that were directly related to your business.


Caution. If you travel by ocean liner, cruise ship, or other form of luxury water transportation for the purpose of carrying on your trade or business, there is a limit on the amount you can deduct. You cannot deduct more than twice the federal “per diem” rate allowable at the time of your travel. For purposes of this limit, the federal per diem is the highest amount allowed as a daily allowance for living expenses to employees of the executive branch of the federal government while they are away from home but in the United States.

5. Conventions held outside North America. You cannot deduct expenses for attending a convention, seminar, or similar meeting held outside North America unless the meeting is directly related to your trade or business. Also, it must be as reasonable to hold the meeting outside North America as in it. If the meeting meets these requirements, you also must satisfy the rules for deducting expenses for business trips in general, discussed above. The following factors must be considered in deciding if it was reasonable to hold the meeting outside North America: (1) the purpose of the meeting and the activities taking place at the meeting; (2) the purposes and activities of the sponsoring organizations or groups; and (3) the homes of the active members of the sponsoring organizations and the places at which other meetings of the sponsoring organizations or groups have been or will be held.

Relevance to church treasurers. The following examples illustrate many of the rules summarized above. They are based on examples contained in the regulations:


Example. A church board authorizes Rev. G to travel to Mexico City to conduct religious services on three consecutive days. He leaves on a Saturday, conducts services on Sunday through Tuesday, goes sightseeing on Wednesday and Thursday, and returns home on Friday. Since Rev. G’s business trip outside the United States lasted for less than 7 days, his travel expenses for the entire trip are treated as business expenses. This means that he can deduct them on his tax return, or the church can reimburse them fully. If the church has an accountable reimbursement arrangement, its reimbursement of these expenses is not reported as taxable compensation on Rev. G’s W-2 or 1099.


Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Rev. G goes sightseeing for an entire week. Rev. G will only be able to treat a portion of his travel expenses as a deductible business expense. He multiplies his total travel expenses times a fraction whose numerator is the total number business days (3) and whose denominator is the total number of travel days (12). This is the amount that Rev. G can deduct, or that the church can reimburse. If the church has an accountable reimbursement arrangement, its partial reimbursement of these expenses is not reported as taxable compensation on Rev. G’s W-2 or 1099.


Example. Rev. N goes on a 10-day tour of Israel. He has no business functions or activities, other than the enrichment of his ministry. This trip is primarily for vacation, and so Rev. N’s travel expenses are not tax-deductible. Any reimbursement of his expenses by the church must be reported on his W-2 or 1099 as taxable compensation.


Example. Rev. C traveled to Brussels primarily for business. He left Denver on Tuesday and flew to New York. On Wednesday, he flew from New York to Brussels, arriving the next morning. On Thursday and Friday, he was engaged in business activities, and from Saturday until Tuesday, he was sightseeing. He flew back to New York, arriving Wednesday afternoon. On Thursday, he flew back to Denver. Although he was away from his home in Denver for more than a week, he was not outside the United States for more than a week. This is because the day he departed does not count as a day outside the United States. He can deduct the cost of the round-trip flight between Denver and Brussels. He can also deduct the cost of his stay in Brussels for Thursday and Friday while he conducted business. However, he cannot deduct the cost of his stay in Brussels from Saturday through Tuesday because those days were spent on nonbusiness activities. The church can reimburse the portion of Rev. C’s travel expenses that are tax-deductible. If the church has an accountable reimbursement arrangement, its partial reimbursement of these expenses is not reported as taxable compensation on Rev. C’s W-2 or 1099.


Example. Rev. J travels from Seattle to Taiwan, where he spends 14 days on a preaching and teaching mission and 5 days on personal matters. He then flew back to Seattle. He spent one day flying in each direction. Because only 5/21 (less than 25%) of his total time abroad was for nonbusiness activities, he can deduct as travel expenses what it would have cost him to make the trip if he had not engaged in any personal activity. The amount he can deduct is the cost of the round-trip plane fare and 16 days of meals (subject to the 50% limit), lodging, and other related expenses. Alternatively, the church can reimburse Rev. J’s travel expenses. If the church has an accountable reimbursement arrangement, its reimbursement of these expenses is not reported as taxable compensation on Rev. J’s W-2 or 1099.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Reclassifying Self-Employed Workers as Employees

Such a reclassification usually has tax implications.

When the IRS reclassifies a self-employed worker as an employee, there usually are tax consequences—an increase in income taxes and a decrease in social security taxes. Income taxes are increased because self-employed taxpayers can claim a number of “above the line” deductions on their income tax return that are not available to employees. These include deductions for half of a taxpayer’s self-employment tax, a portion of the taxpayer’s health insurance premiums, and contribution to a “Keogh” retirement plan. Income taxes also will be increased if the taxpayer has business expenses that are either unreimbursed, or reimbursed under a “nonaccountable” arrangement. Such expenses are fully deductible by self-employed persons, but only partially (if at all) by employees. On the other hand, social security taxes are slashed when a self-employed worker is reclassified as an employee, since the social security and Medicare tax rate for employees is 7.65 percent compared to the “self-employment tax” rate of 15.3 percent.

When the IRS reclassifies a self-employed worker as an employee, can it “offset” a “refund” of excess social security taxes by the additional income tax liability? Or, must it refund the entire overpayment of social security taxes, and charge the taxpayer for the additional income tax liability? In a recently published internal memorandum, the IRS said that it will offset the refund by the additional income tax liability. FSA 1992-116.1.

Example. Assume that a church treats its full-time custodian as self-employed. It does not withhold taxes from his pay and issues him a 1099 form at the end of each year. The IRS reclassifies the custodian as an employee. The custodian will be entitled to a refund of the excess social security taxes he paid as a self-employed person, but the IRS can offset this refund by the amount of the custodian’s additional income tax liability.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Are Gifts of Blank Checks Tax-Deductible?

No, the tax court rules.

Church Finance Today

Are Gifts of Blank Checks Tax-Deductible?

No, the tax court rules.

Background. A blank check is a check that is complete in all respects except for the designation of a payee. The person issuing the check specifies the date and an amount, and signs the check, but does not identify a payee. Occasionally a church will receive a blank check in the offering or in the mail. This can occur for a number of reasons. Some elderly church members may simply forget to complete the check. Others may assume that the church will insert (or “stamp”) its name as payee, so why bother.

Can church members claim a charitable contribution deduction for a blank check? No, said the United States Tax Court in a recent case.

The court’s ruling. A husband and wife claimed a charitable contribution of $16,000 to their church in 1991, and an additional $18,000 in 1992. The IRS audited the couple’s tax returns, and questioned the contributions to their church. The couple attempted to substantiate their deductions with canceled checks and carbon copies of checks from their two personal checking accounts on which they left the payee lines blank. The Tax Court ruled that “because these canceled blank checks fail to list [the church] as the donee, these checks to not establish” that the couple made tax-deductible charitable contributions to the church.

This case involved tax years prior to the overhaul of the charitable contribution substantiation requirements that occurred in 1994. Prior to those changes, taxpayers could rely on canceled checks to substantiate charitable contributions. Today, canceled checks may still be used to substantiate charitable contributions, but only for contributions of less than $250. As a result, this case is of continuing relevance, especially in light of the fact that the vast majority of checks issued by donors to churches are for less than $250.

Relevance to church treasurers. This case suggests the following actions: (1) From time to time churches should inform members that while checks can still be used to substantiate contributions of $250 or less, this rule may not apply to blank checks. Churches can share this information in church bulletins or newsletters, or in a note enclosed with contribution receipts. (2) Church treasurers should consider returning blank checks to donors, and asking them to reissue their checks with the name of a payee (generally, the church). Dorris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-324.

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, November 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Kidnapping Children on Church Premises

A recent ruling addresses a potential risk – Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Center, 699 So.2d 1242 (Ala. 1997)

Church Law and Tax1998-09-01

Kidnapping Children on Church Premises

A recent ruling addresses a potential risk – Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Center, 699 So.2d 1242 (Ala. 1997)

[ Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Article summary. The kidnapping of a child from church premises is a risk that is seldom considered by parents and church leaders. After all, who would commit so brazen a crime in a church? But this very indifference not only increases the risk of such acts, but also exposes churches to significant liability in the event such an act does occur. A recent decision by the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the liability of a church—operated child care program for the kidnapping of a baby girl. The court concluded that the child care center could be sued by the baby’s parents, even though the baby was found and returned to them. Church leaders (and any staff member who works with children) should be sure to review this article.

The kidnapping of a child from a church nursery is every parent’s worst nightmare. Yet, church leaders often fail to address this risk. They simply cannot conceive of such a crime occurring in their church. But consider the following:

• Most churches have frequent custody of infants and young children. Common examples include nursery services provided during worship services and special events, as well as formal preschool programs.

• Most churches have not developed safeguards for reducing the risk of kidnapping.

• A staggering number of marriages have ended in divorce, often followed by bitter struggles over custody of children. Parents who do not receive custody of their children sometimes look for opportunities to “reclaim” them. This often proves difficult, unless the children are placed in the temporary custody of an institution with little if any protection against transferring custody of infants to unauthorized individuals.

A recent decision by the Alabama Supreme Court addresses this tragic issue. This article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and then address steps that church leaders can take to reduce this risk.

Facts

A young couple enrolled their one—month—old baby girl (the “victim”) in a church—operated child care center. The center’s administrator provided the parents with a lengthy document entitled “operating policies.” This document, which stated that parents and guardians were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures,” set out specific rules and procedures to be followed by the center as well as by parents or guardians of enrolled children. It provided, among other things, as follows:

The [center] provides a healthy, safe, and Christian environment that promotes the physical, social, emotional, cognitive and spiritual development of young children, and seeks to respond to the needs of families.

All staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child. All participate in a continuous program of in—service education and studies for professional advancement in order to remain alert to the ever—changing needs of today’s children and families, and to the findings of current research ….

Children will be released only to properly identified persons who have been listed in the “child release” section of the Parent—Agreement Form. We must have written authorization for changes in this respect. In unusual circumstances, we will accept verbal (phone) authorization to release a child to an individual not listed in writing. It must be followed up in writing if the child is to be released to that person on an ongoing basis. We will ask for identification of individuals we do not know. It would be helpful if you would arrange for the persons to pick up your child to visit the school with you so that the staff may become acquainted with them. We will not release a child in the care of anyone under the age of 14 years.

In addition to a number of adults, the center employed a 14—year—old girl and her 17—year—old sister to assist in the care of the children. These girls were foster children who had lived with the center’s administrator for a few months. The center also allowed another sister, who was 12 years old, to assist with the children from time to time, although she was not paid for doing so. This sister was not one of the administrator’s foster children.

When the victim was three months old, and under the center’s care and supervision, she was kidnapped by the three sisters. At the time of the kidnapping, there was no qualified adult teacher, other than perhaps the administrator herself, directly supervising the sisters. The administrator later testified that the other teachers had “gone for the day” and that she thought one of the sisters had intentionally distracted her while the other two slipped the baby out the front door undetected. The evidence suggested that the 17—year—old sister was preoccupied with the notion of having her own baby, even to the point of misleading the administrator into thinking that she was pregnant, and she devised the plot to kidnap the victim.

The local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the incident, eventually found the baby, and reunited her with her parents. The parents experienced severe shock as a result of the kidnapping, and later sued the center. They claimed that the center was legally responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of the following theories: (1) negligent hiring of the three sisters; (2) negligent “supervisory policies”; (3) respondeat superior (a legal theory imposing liability on an employer for the negligent acts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment); and (4) breach of contract. With respect to the negligent hiring claim, the center pointed out that while there was evidence suggesting that the two older sisters had been physically abused (perhaps sexually) by certain members of their family, and that one of them had deceived the center’s administrator into believing that she was pregnant, there was no evidence that could have placed the center or its administrator on notice that the two older girls had criminal propensities. A trial court threw out the entire lawsuit, and the parents appealed.

The court’s ruling

Negligent hiring, negligent supervision, respondeat superior

The Alabama Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s dismissal of all of the parents’ claims except for breach of contract. The court began its opinion by observing:

It is well settled that, absent special relationships or circumstances, no person or entity has a duty to protect another from the criminal act of a third person. A defendant cannot be held liable for the criminal act of a third party unless the defendant knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to occur on the defendant’s premises.

Example. The court referred to the following 1992 New Jersey case: A mother sued a church alleging that the church had failed to use due care in watching and supervising her minor daughter in its day care program, and that this failure resulted in the rape of her daughter on the church’s premises. A state appeals court disagreed, finding that there was insufficient evidence of negligent supervision on the church’s part. It expressed its reluctance to impose liability on one person or entity for the criminal act of another, and specifically rejected the mother’s attempt to hold the church liable under the negligent supervision claim: “The affidavits of the director of the kindergarten and the pastor of the church indicate that (1) they had no knowledge of other criminal acts of a similar nature that might have occurred on the church’s premises; and (2) they had no knowledge of any previous criminal behavior by [the rapist]. Thus, the church [demonstrated] that it was not responsible for the rape.” N.J. v. Greater Emanuel Temple Holiness Church, 611 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992).

The Alabama Supreme Court, in commenting on the case summarized in this example, noted that “implied in the holding … is that there were no special circumstances or special relationships that would give rise to a duty on the church’s part to take additional steps to protect [the victim].”

Example. The court referred to one of its previous rulings in support of its conclusion. It ruled that a university was not liable for the murder of one of its students by a former professor. The victim’s parents sued the university, claiming that it had negligently hired and supervised the professor, and that it was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the murder of their son. With respect to the negligent hiring and supervision claims, the court noted that the parents “did not present substantial evidence that [the university] should have, or could have, foreseen that [the professor] would or might commit the murder.” With respect to the claim based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court noted simply that it was preposterous to assume that the professor was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed murder. Copeland v. Samford University, 686 So.2d 190 (Ala.1996).

The court concluded:

The undisputed evidence in the present case indicated that [the two older sisters] were not acting in the line and scope of their duties at the center when they kidnapped the [baby]. The evidence suggested that [the oldest sister] was preoccupied with the notion of having her own baby, even to the point of misleading [the administrator] into thinking that she was pregnant. The apparent plot hatched by the sisters to provide [the oldest sister] with a baby by kidnapping the [victim] constituted, as a matter of law, a gross deviation from the center’s business; that fact precludes the imposition of liability upon the center under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of [the sisters]. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence indicated that there was nothing that should have, or could have, put [the administrator] or the center on notice that the sisters would or might kidnap one of the children.

Based on the two cases summarized above, the court concluded that the trial court acted properly in dismissing the negligent hiring and supervision claims, the respondeat superior claim, and all other claims except for breach of contract.

Breach of contract

The court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the parents’ breach of contract claim against the center. The parents asserted that they entered into a contract with the center when they enrolled their daughter in the program and paid the weekly fee of $55. In return, the center agreed to be entrusted with the care and custody of their baby. The parents claimed that the center breached this contract by the following acts and omissions:

• failing to have [the baby] at the day care when her mother … arrived to pick her up

• failing to properly supervise its employees and agents

• putting [the baby] in a position of potential harm, including kidnapping

• allowing the baby to get into the hands of “underaged, unqualified, and incompetent persons”

• allowing people to have access to the day care and have responsibilities in the running of the day care center who were not appropriate persons for such access and responsibilities

• employing unqualified people at the day care and allowing unqualified people to do the business of the day care

• failing to have a sufficient number of qualified persons on staff at all times to care for the babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to properly set up operations to appropriately care for babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to provide a safe place for the care and custody of babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to comply with state and other licensing requirements

The center insisted that there was no evidence of a contract provision imposing a duty to provide “any level of care.” The court disagreed:

The evidence indicates that the center expressly contracted with the [parents] to care for their daughter on a daily basis for a sum certain per week. The evidence is sketchy with respect to the discussions [the administrator had with the parents] when the contract was [signed]. However, reasonable inferences from the evidence indicate that the document entitled “Operating Policies” was provided to the [parents] and that it was intended by the center to become a part of the contract. That document, which incorporated the minimum standards imposed by [the state department of human resources] stated that parents were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures” contained therein. Those operating procedures specifically obligated the center (1) to release the [parents’] daughter only to a properly authorized and identified person; (2) to employ only persons qualified (in accordance with [the state’s] minimum standards) to care for the [victim]; (3) and to keep the [victim] safe while she was under its care and supervision. The evidence indicates that unqualified and unauthorized persons (the sisters) removed the [victim] from the center’s premises. The evidence also indicates that a qualified teacher or child care provider was not directly supervising the [victim] at the time of her kidnapping. The basic elements of a contract are an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of the agreement. We conclude that the [parents] presented sufficient evidence of these basic elements to submit to a jury their claim alleging the breach of an express contract.

Relevance to other churches

What is the significance of this case to other churches? Obviously, the decision by the Alabama Supreme Court has limited effect. It will not be binding on any court outside of the State of Alabama. Nevertheless, the decision represents an extended discussion of the liability of church—operated day care centers for the kidnapping of young children, and accordingly it may be given special consideration by other courts. For this reason, the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:

1. Liability based on negligent selection. Whenever a child is kidnapped on church premises, it is possible that the church may be legally responsible on the basis of negligent hiring. That is, the church was negligent in hiring those persons who would care for children, and this negligence led to the kidnapping. The parents in this case insisted that the center was liable for the kidnapping of their child on this basis. After all, the center used girls who were only 12, 14, and 17 years of age to care for infants. And, there was evidence that the two older sisters had been physically (and perhaps sexually) abused by members of their family, and that the oldest sister lied to the center’s administrator by telling her that she was pregnant. Did this evidence demonstrate that the center was negligent in employing the sisters? The court did not think so.

Key point. Other courts may disagree with the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that a church—operated child care center is not guilty of negligent hiring when it uses girls who are 17, 14, and 12 years of age to care for infants-especially when two of the girls had been sexually abused.

One judge dissented from the court’s decision. He pointed out that state regulations that apply to licensed child care centers require that workers be at least 19 years of age (16 years of age for “student aides”). He concluded that the center was guilty of negligent hiring by using persons below these state—mandated minimum ages. This was so even though the center in this case had let its license lapse and as a result the minimum age regulations were not applicable. Further, the dissenting judge asserted that the center’s administrator should have known that the three sisters did not meet the following provision in the center’s own “Operating Policies”:

All staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child. All participate in a continuous program of in—service education and studies for professional advancement in order to remain alert to the ever—changing needs of today’s children and families, and to the findings of current research.

2. Liability based on negligent supervision. Whenever a child is kidnapped on church premises, it is possible that the church may be legally responsible on the basis of negligent supervision. That is, the church was negligent in supervising those persons who had custody of the child, or in supervising its premises and activities. The parents claimed that the center was guilty of negligent supervision as a result of numerous acts, including the following:

• allowing the baby to get into the hands of “underaged, unqualified, and incompetent persons”

• allowing people to have access to the day care and have responsibilities in the running of the day care center who were not appropriate persons for such access and responsibilities

• failing to have a sufficient number of qualified persons on staff at all times to care for the babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to properly set up operations to appropriately care for babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to comply with state and other licensing requirements

The court rejected the parents’ allegations, and concluded that the center was not guilty of negligent supervision. It relied primarily on a New Jersey court ruling finding that a church—operated child care center was not responsible on the basis of negligent supervision for the rape of a young child. The New Jersey court concluded: “The affidavits of the director of the kindergarten and the pastor of the church indicate that (1) they had no knowledge of other criminal acts of a similar nature that might have occurred on the church’s premises; and (2) they had no knowledge of any previous criminal behavior by [the rapist]. Thus, the church [demonstrated] that it was not responsible for the rape.” N.J. v. Greater Emanuel Temple Holiness Church, 611 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992).

Once again, however, the dissenting judge disagreed, pointing out that the center “employed the underaged and untrained girls in the day care center” and allowed them to care for a three—month—old infant. Further, when the kidnapping occurred at approximately 4 o’clock in the afternoon, the 17 and 14—year—old sisters “were virtually the only ones left on the premises of the day care facility [since the administrator] had allowed most of the adult staff to leave for the day although there were still children to be picked up.”

Key point. Other courts may disagree with the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that a church—operated child care center is not guilty of negligent supervision when it dismisses adult workers in the afternoon and allows infants and young children to be in the sole custody of two girls aged 17 and 14.

3. Respondeat superior. The court rejected the parents’ claim that the center was responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of respondeat superior. Under this legal principle, the center would be liable for the negligence of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. The court concluded that the “undisputed evidence” indicated that the sisters were not acting within the scope of their duties at the center when they kidnapped the baby.

4. Breach of contract. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that the center could be legally responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of a breach of contract. The parents had signed a brief enrollment form containing very little information and no policies or procedures. However, the center also provided the parents with a separate document entitled “Operating Procedures”. This document was not referred to in the enrollment form, was not signed by the parents, and did not indicate that it was a contractual document. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the “Operating Procedures” document formed a part of the “contract” between the parents and the center.

The “Operating Procedures” document contained the following provisions: (1) “[t]he [center] provides a healthy, safe, and Christian environment that promotes the physical, social, emotional, cognitive and spiritual development of young children”; (2) “[a]ll staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child”; and (3) “[c]hildren will be released only to properly identified persons who have been listed in the `child release’ section of the Parent—Agreement Form.” Since these assurances were contained in a document that the court considered to be part of a “contract” between parents and the center, the center was guilty of a “breach of contract” if it violated any of them.

The parents claimed that the center breached this contract in numerous ways, as noted above. The court agreed:

[R]easonable inferences from the evidence indicate that the document entitled “Operating Policies” was provided to the [parents] and that it was intended by the center to become a part of the contract. That document, which incorporated the minimum standards imposed by [the state department of human resources] stated that parents were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures” contained therein. Those operating procedures specifically obligated the center (1) to release the [parents’] daughter only to a properly authorized and identified person; (2) to employ only persons qualified (in accordance with [the state’s] minimum standards) to care for the [victim]; (3) and to keep the [victim] safe while she was under its care and supervision.

The court concluded that these “contractual” provisions were violated because

• unqualified and unauthorized persons (the sisters) removed the victim from the center’s premises, and

• a qualified teacher or child care provider was not directly supervising the victim at the time of her kidnapping.

Key point. Does your church operate a child care program? If so, you should recognize that any policies or operating procedures you adopt may be considered to be part of a “contract” with parents. This exposes your church to liability for breach of contract in the event that you violate any of these policies or procedures.

5. The importance of reviewing official policies. The center’s “Operating Procedures” contained a provision obligating it to employ only persons qualified in accordance with state standards. These standards required child care workers to be at least 19 years of age. Since none of the three sisters met this requirement, the center violated this provision of the “contract”. Why did the center have this provision in its Operating Procedures? Because the center had been a state—licensed facility at one time. However, the center let its license lapse, in part because church day care centers were not required to be licensed under state law. But it failed to delete or modify this provision in its Operating Procedures, meaning that it could only employ workers who met the otherwise nonapplicable state standards.

What is the lesson here? Church leaders should periodically review all policies, procedures, and forms to ensure that they are up—to—date and in full compliance with the law. The assistance of a local attorney is indispensable in this process.

Key point. It is common for churches to abandon provisions in written policies. In many cases, this occurs because church leaders fail to periodically review their policies to be sure they are current and accurate. In other cases the person responsible for creating and implementing a particular policy has relocated and no longer attends the church. Churches that no longer comply with their policies are exposing themselves to legal jeopardy, as this case illustrates. The church was liable for the victim’s kidnapping in part because it failed to comply with an outdated provision in its child care policies requiring all workers to meet state standards.

Example. A church adopts a policy requiring at least two adults to be in the nursery at all times. An adult who was scheduled to work in the nursery during a Sunday morning worship service has an emergency at the last minute that prevents her from performing her duties. The nursery director is unable to find another adult with so little notice, and assigns a 15—year—old girl to work with the other adult. A child is injured while in the nursery. The church may be liable for the child’s injuries on the basis of “negligent supervision” because it failed to follow its own “two adult” policy.

Example. A church adopts a policy requiring reference checks on all persons who volunteer to work in any youth program. Bob is allowed to work as a volunteer in a youth activity without any reference checks. The church is exposed to liability for any injuries that Bob may cause since it failed to follow its policy.

6. Reducing the risk of kidnapping. What steps can a church take to reduce the risk of kidnapping, and the risk of liability in the event that an incident of kidnapping occurs? Consider the following precautions:

Day care centers

• Comply with applicable state requirements. If your church operates a day care program, be sure you are in compliance with all applicable state requirements. Church day care centers are required to be licensed in many states. But even if your center is not required to be licensed, some state regulations may apply.

• Additional precautions. See the additional precautions for church nurseries that are summarized below.

Nurseries

• Screening workers. While screening workers may not reduce the risk of kidnapping, it will reduce a church’s risk of liability in the event an incident of kidnapping occurs. Screening ordinarily will include an application form and reference checks.

• Need more help? We have produced a variety of helpful resources to assist churches in screening nursery workers. These include: (1) the “Reducing the Risk” kit (includes a video, audio tape, and two booklets); and (2) our new “Selection and Screening of Church Volunteers” kit (includes all the forms you will need, along with an explanatory booklet). Both resources can be obtained by calling Christian Ministry Resources at 1—800—222—1840. Or, you can order them from our new online bookstore at our website www.iclonline.com.

• Check in procedures. A number of churches have implemented a check in procedure to reduce the risk of kidnapping. As children are checked in at the nursery, a small piece of plastic with a randomly selected number is pinned to their clothing. Another piece of plastic with the same number is given to the adult who brought the child. The adult is informed that the child will be returned only to a person presenting the correct number.

Example. A mother brings her infant child to the church nursery before a morning worship service. During the service, an adult male comes to the nursery and asks a teenage nursery attendant for the same child. The attendant is reluctant, because she had never seen the man before. He assures her that he is an “uncle” visiting from out—of—town. The attendant is satisfied with this explanation and gives the child to the man. Following the morning service the mother goes to the nursery and is shocked to learn that her child is not there. It is later determined that the “uncle” in fact was a former husband who was seeking custody of the child.

Example. A mother brings her infant child to the church nursery before a morning worship service. An attendant pins a plastic number on the child, and gives the mother an identical plastic number. The attendant informs the mother that the child will be returned only to a person presenting the plastic number. During the service, an adult male comes to the nursery and asks a teenage nursery attendant for the same child. He claims to be an “uncle” visiting from out—of—town. In fact, he is a former husband seeking custody of the child. The attendant asks the “uncle” to present the correct plastic number. He obviously does not have it, and so the attendant refuses to give him the child.

• Adequate supervision. Church nurseries should be staffed by an adequate number of qualified adults. The appropriate number will depend upon the number of children present. Many churches use teenagers as helpers in the nursery. Such a practice will not increase a church’s risk of kidnapping (or liability in the event of an incident of kidnapping) so long as adults are also present.

Key point. It is often helpful to contact other institutions for assistance with staffing ratios. For example, some churches base their adult to child ratio in the nursery to what the state requires of licensed day care facilities. You may also contact the Red Cross, Salvation Army, or similar organizations. The point is this-if you can demonstrate that you based your adult to child ratio on the established practices of other similar organizations in your community, then this will be a strong defense in the event you are accused of liability for an incident of kidnapping (or any injury to a child) on the basis of “negligent supervision.”

• Off—site activities. Be especially careful of off—site activities such as field trips. These outings can be difficult to control. It is essential that an adequate number of adults are present. While on the trip, precautionary measures must be implemented to assure adequate supervision of the group. For example, some churches group children in pairs, always keep the entire group together, and have frequent “roll calls.” Once again, you can call other community—based organizations for guidance.

• Be sure policies are being followed. As this case demonstrates, it is absolutely essential to familiarize nursery workers with relevant policies, and to be sure that these policies are followed. At a minimum, this should be part of an orientation process for all new nursery workers (both paid and volunteer). Periodic training sessions are also desirable to reinforce nursery policies.

• Legal review of all policies, contracts, and enrollment forms. It is a good practice to have your nursery policies, contracts, and enrollment forms reviewed periodically by a local attorney. Such a review will help to ensure that your policies are current and accurate, and in compliance with the law. The church—operated day center in this case was found liable for the incident of kidnapping in part because it failed to update its official policies.

• 2 adult rule. Churches can reduce the risk of an incident of kidnapping by establishing a “two adult” rule in the nursery. Such a rule mandates that no child shall ever be in the presence of fewer than two adults. Not only does such a policy reduce the risk of an incident of kidnapping, but it also protects workers from being unjustly accused of child molestation.

Example. A church has a policy requiring two adults to work in the nursery. However, the policy does not prohibit children from being in the custody of less than two adults. On a Sunday morning during worship services, one adult temporarily leaves the nursery for ten minutes to speak with another church member. A few days later the parents of one of the infants in the nursery suspect that their child has been molested. Suspicion is focused on the church nursery. Since the two nursery workers cannot prove that they both were present with the child throughout the entire worship service, they cannot “prove their innocence.” The worker who was present in the nursery while the other worker was temporarily absent is suspected of wrongdoing, even though she is completely innocent.

• Video. Some churches are incorporating video technology into their nurseries. Such a practice has a number of potential benefits, including the following: (1) it reduces the risk of kidnapping, since the videocamera will serve as a powerful deterrent; (2) it reduces the risk of other inappropriate behavior; (3) it provides irrefutable evidence of innocence if a nursery worker is falsely accused of wrongdoing; (4) it may identify a kidnapper.

• Restroom breaks. Church restrooms present a unique risk of kidnapping for both infants and older children. After all, they are frequented by children, they are easily accessible, and they often are in remote locations or are not adequately supervised. Church leaders should take steps to reduce this risk. While a full discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article, here are some ways that this risk can be reduced: (1) Restrict restroom breaks to restrooms that have limited access to other adults, if this is possible. (2) Have two adults accompany children in groups to the restroom, whenever possible. (3) Do not allow a lone adult to take one or more children to the restroom. (4) Consider installation of “half doors” that will permit adults to have partial vision into restrooms used by young children. (5) Do not allow young children to use the restroom without adult supervision. (6) Install videocameras in prominent locations to discourage kidnapping and provide evidence identifying the perpetrator in the event an incident does occur.

• Architecture. Unauthorized access to nursery areas by outsiders should be discouraged or prevented by the physical layout. Many churches accomplish this with counters staffed by an adult worker or attendant.

• Relevance of state regulations. State regulations that apply to licensed child care facilities do not apply to church nurseries, but they will contain a wealth of information that may be useful in adopting policies to reduce the risk of kidnapping and injuries. Further, compliance with selected regulations can be cited as evidence that your church should not be legally responsible on the basis of negligent supervision for an incident of kidnapping.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m11 m86 m58 c0598

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Congress Enacts New Tax Legislation

How churches and clergy are affected

Church Law and Tax 1998-09-01

Congress Enacts New Tax Legislation

How churches and clergy are affected

Article summary. Congress has enacted another major tax bill. While the objective was to “reform” and restructure the IRS in response to an outpouring of taxpayer complaints during days of congressional hearings, Congress also took the occasion to clarify some recent tax changes and strengthen taxpayer rights. This article reviews 40 changes of most relevance to church leaders.

“The Committee is aware that the taxpaying public may never relish contacts with the agency responsible for collecting taxes. Nevertheless, by establishing a new management structure that will better enable the IRS to develop and fulfill long—term goals, the Committee believes that the IRS will be able to gain public support, and will make contacts with the IRS as infrequent and as pleasant as possible.” (From a committee report accompanying the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.)

On July 2, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. This comprehensive legislation was designed to “restructure” the IRS to make it more responsive to taxpayers. But it does much more. It provides taxpayers with many new benefits and protections. This feature article will review those provisions of most significance to churches and ministers.

Technical Corrections and Clarifications

1. Sale of a home owned and occupied for less than two years. Under current law, a taxpayer is able to exclude up to $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly) of gain on the sale of a principal residence. To be eligible, the taxpayer must have owned the home and used it as a principal residence for at least two of the five years prior to the sale. A taxpayer who fails to meet this test because of a change in place of employment, health, or unforeseen circumstances, can exclude a fraction of the gain corresponding to the fraction of two years that he or she owned and occupied the home as a principal residence.

The new law contains a big break for taxpayers. It allows taxpayers who own and occupy their home for less than two years to claim a partial exclusion based on the fraction of $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly), not the fraction of the gain, corresponding to the fraction of two years that they owned and occupied the home as their principal residence.

Example. Rev. B and his wife purchased a home on July 1, 1997 for $150,000, and sold it on July 1, 1998 for $200,000 because of a change in place of employment. Under the old rules, since they owned and occupied the home for only half of the minimum requirement of two years, they could exclude only half of the gain on the sale of their home. This meant that they could exclude only $25,000 of their $50,000 gain. But under the new rules, they can exclude up to half of $500,000-which means that their entire gain is nontaxable. They avoid paying taxes on half their gain.

This provision is effective retroactive to sales occurring after May 6, 1997.

The new law also provides that if a married couple filing a joint return does not qualify for the $500,000 maximum exclusion, the amount of the maximum exclusion that may be claimed by the couple is the sum of each spouse’s maximum exclusion determined on a separate basis. This provision is effective retroactive to sales occurring after May 6, 1997.

Example. Rev. T is unmarried, and owns a home. In July of 1998 he marries Mary, who also owns a home. The couple sell their homes in August of 1998 and purchase a new home together. They are not eligible for the $500,000 exclusion because they did not own and occupy their homes together for at least two of the five years preceding the dates of sale. However, under the new law, they each will be able to exclude up to $250,000 of gain on the sale of the homes they owned at the time of marriage.

2. Roth IRAs. Beginning in 1998 taxpayers can make annual nondeductible contributions of up to $2,000 to a “Roth IRA”. Distributions from such IRAs are not taxed if they are made after a five year “holding period,” and are made as a result of the taxpayer attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, death, disability, or purchase of a first home. Earnings on Roth IRAs accumulate tax—free. Eligibility for Roth IRAs is phased out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $95,000 to $110,000, and for married taxpayers filing jointly with adjusted gross income of $150,000 to $160,000. A regular IRA may be rolled over to a Roth IRA. Only taxpayers with adjusted gross income of less than $100,000 are eligible for this provision. If you roll over your regular IRA into a Roth IRA prior to 1999, the amount that would have been included in taxable income had the funds been withdrawn (any gain or income in excess of annual contributions) are included in your taxable income over a four—year period. The ten percent penalty on early withdrawals from an IRA does not apply.

Example. Rev. D has a nondeductible IRA with a value of $40,000. The $40,000 consists of $30,000 of annual contributions and $10,000 of earnings. Rev. D converts the IRA into a Roth IRA in 1998. As a result of the conversion, $10,000 is includible in income over four years ($2,500 per year). The 10—percent early withdrawal tax does not apply to the conversion. Contributions made by Rev. D each year to the Roth IRA will not be tax—deductible. However, following a five—year holding period Rev. D may make tax—free distributions from the Roth IRA on account of any one or more of the following conditions: (1) attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, (2) death, (3) disability, or (4) purchase of a first home.

Key point. In summary, the advantage of a Roth IRA is that it is “backloaded.” This means that annual contributions to the IRA are not tax—deductible, but earnings and distributions are nontaxable if they meet the requirements mentioned above. This will be a major tax break for many taxpayers, and will make Roth IRAs preferable in some cases to ordinary IRAs.

The new tax law modifies Roth IRAs in the following ways:

• Four—year income “spread” is elective. Under prior law, taxpayers who rolled over a regular IRA into a Roth IRA in 1998 were required to report as taxable income over a four—year period the amount that would have been included in taxable income had the funds been withdrawn. Generally, this refers to the “gain” in the IRA over and above annual contributions. The new law gives taxpayers the option of “spreading” this income over four years, or reporting it all in 1998. If no election is made, it is assumed that the taxpayer has elected to spread income over four years. In the previous example, Rev. D has the election in 1998 to report the entire gain on the conversion IRA ($25,000) as taxable income in that year instead of spreading it out over four years.

• Death during four—year spread. What happens if a taxpayer who has elected to spread income over a four—year period dies before the end of the four years? Under the new law any amounts remaining to be included in income as a result of a 1998 “conversion” of a regular IRA into a Roth IRA are included in income on the taxpayer’s final tax return. But if a surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary of the Roth IRA, the spouse may include the remaining amounts in his or her income over the remainder of the 4—year period.

• Distributions before the end of the four—year “spread”. Taxpayers who convert a regular IRA into a Roth IRA pay tax on the gain or income they have earned on their IRA, but they are exempt from the 10—percent “early withdrawal” tax that normally applies to withdrawals from an IRA prior to age 59 and 1/2. The new law prevents taxpayers from receiving premature distributions (before the end of the 5—year holding period) from their Roth IRA while avoiding payment of the “early withdrawal” 10—percent tax. If amounts in a Roth IRA that was converted from a regular IRA are withdrawn within the 5—year holding period beginning with the year of the conversion, then, to the extent attributable to amounts that were includible in income due to the conversion, the amount withdrawn will be subject to the 10—percent early withdrawal tax.

• Corrections. In order to assist individuals who erroneously convert regular IRAs into Roth IRAs or for anyreason want to change the nature of an IRA contribution, contributions to an IRA may be transferred in a “trustee—to—trustee” transfer from any IRA to another IRA by the due date for the taxpayer’s return for the year of the contribution. Any such transferred contributions are treated as if contributed to the new IRA. Trustee—to—trustee transfers include transfers between IRA trustees as well as IRA custodians, apply to transfers from and to IRA accounts and annuities, and apply to transfers between IRA accounts and annuities with the same trustee or custodian.

• Maximum IRA contributions. The new law clarifies that an individual may contribute up to $2,000 a year to all of his or her IRAs.

Example. Rev. E is not eligible to make deductible IRA contributions because she is a participant in a church—sponsored retirement plan and earns more than the “phase—out” amount. However, she is eligible to make a $1,000 Roth IRA contribution. She can contribute $1,000 to the Roth IRA and $1,000 to a nondeductible IRA.

3. Traditional IRAs. The new tax law modifies traditional IRAs in a couple of important ways:

• Spouses who are not active participants in an employer—sponsored retirement plan. Under present law, if a married individual (filing a joint return) is an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan, the $2,000 IRA deduction limit is phased out over the following levels of adjusted gross income (“AGI”):

Taxable years beginning in: Phase—out range

1997 $40,000-$50,000

1998 $50,000-$60,000

1999 $51,000-$61,000

2000 $52,000-$62,000

2001 $53,000-$63,000

2002 $54,000-$64,000

2003 $60,000-$70,000

2004 $65,000-$75,000

2005 $70,000-$80,000

2006 $75,000-$85,000

2007 $80,000-$100,000

The new tax law confirms that an individual is not considered an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan merely because his or her spouse is an active participant. For example, assume that Rev. J is eligible for a church—sponsored retirement plan, but his wife who is employed by a secular business is not. Rev. J’s wife is not an “active participant” in such a plan because her husband is. Rev. J’s phase—out range is described in the above table. His wife’s phase—out range is between $150,000 and $160,000 of adjusted gross income.

This provision is effective for tax years beginning after 1997.

l”Hardship” distributions. Under current law, the 10—percent “early withdrawal” tax does not apply to distributions from an IRA if the distribution is for first—time homebuyer expenses (subject to a $10,000 life—time cap), or for higher education expenses. These exceptions do not apply to distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans. A distribution from an employer—sponsored retirement plan that is an “eligible rollover distribution” may be rolled over to an IRA. An eligible rollover distribution that is not transferred directly to another retirement plan or an IRA is subject to 20—percent withholding on the distribution. Participants in employer—sponsored retirement plans, including section 403(b) tax—sheltered annuities, have been able to avoid the early withdrawal tax by rolling over “hardship distributions” to an IRA and then withdrawing the funds from the IRA. The new law modifies the rules relating to the ability to roll over hardship distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans (including section 403(b) annuities) in order to prevent such avoidance of the 10—percent early withdrawal tax. The law provides that distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans made on account of hardship of the employee are not eligible rollover distributions. However, the new law further clarifies that such distributions will not be subject to the 20—percent withholding rule applicable to eligible rollover distributions.

This provision is effective for tax years beginning after 1998.

4. Capital gains-elimination of 18—month holding period. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided lower capital gains rates for individuals. Generally, the 1997 Act reduced the maximum rate on the net capital gain from 28 percent to 20 percent and reduced the 15—percent rate to 10 percent. However, to qualify for these reduced rates, a taxpayer had to hold an asset for more than 18 months prior to sale. This was a major change in the law, since in the past lower capital gains rates were available if an asset had been held for only one year. Beginning in 2001, lower rates of 18 and 8 percent will apply to the gain from certain property held more than five years. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 reduces the 18—month holding period to qualify for the reduced capital gains rates to one year.

This provision takes effect for any tax year beginning after 1997.

Key point. The low capital gains rates, taken together with the reduced holding period of one year, will make taxable investments in mutual funds and individual stocks more attractive for some investors than tax—deferred retirement plans such as IRAs and 403(b) plans. The reason is that tax—deferred retirement plans generally distribute income at ordinary income tax rates, not the reduced capital gains tax rates. And, while earnings accrue on a tax—deferred basis on most retirement plans, the same is true for securities that are held indefinitely. Ministers and lay church workers should discuss with their tax advisors the possible advantages of taxable investments in light of the changes to the capital gains tax.

Key point. Ministers whose estimated taxes for 1998 were inflated because of the 18—month rule should recalculate their estimated taxes for the year and adjust their remaining quarterly payments accordingly.

Example. Rev. K sold several shares of stock in February of 1998 that had been held for 16 months. In computing his estimated tax payments for the year, Rev. K assumed that he would be paying a 28 percent capital gains tax because he held the stock for less than 18 months. He can recalculate his 1998 taxes on the basis of the 20 percent tax rate (which applies retroactively to January 1, 1998) and adjust his estimated tax payments for September 15, 1998 and January 15, 1999 accordingly.

5. Education IRAs. Taxpayers were given an important break for education expenses under a law enacted by Congress in 1997-they can contribute up to $500 each year to an “education IRA.” Here is how it works. A taxpayer establishes an education IRA and designates a “beneficiary” (usually, the taxpayer’s child). The taxpayer contributes up to $500 each year into the account, up until the beneficiary’s 18th birthday. Earnings on an education IRA generally accumulate tax—free-provided they are distributed for the post—secondary educational expenses of the beneficiary. Expenses for elementary and secondary school expenses do not qualify. Any balance remaining in an education IRA when a beneficiary attains 30 years of age must be distributed, and the earnings portion of such a distribution will be included in the beneficiary’s taxable income and subject to an additional ten percent penalty tax because the distribution was not for educational purposes.

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 provides that any balance remaining in an education IRA will be deemed to be distributed within 30 days after the date that the designated beneficiary reaches age 30 (or, if earlier, within 30 days of the date that the beneficiary dies). The Act further clarifies that, in the event of the death of the designated beneficiary, the balance remaining in an education IRA may be distributed (without imposition of the additional 10—percent tax) to a contingent beneficiary or to the estate of the deceased designated beneficiary. If any member of the family of the deceased beneficiary becomes the new designated beneficiary of an education IRA, then no tax will be imposed on such redesignation and the account will continue to be treated as an education IRA. However, the new beneficiary must be under 30 years of age for the “rollover,” or change of beneficiary, to be nontaxable.

Key point. The 10—percent tax on early distributions from an IRA will not apply to a distribution from an education IRA, which although used to pay for qualified higher education expenses is includible in the beneficiary’s gross income because the taxpayer elects to claim a HOPE or Lifetime Learning credit with respect to the beneficiary.

The new law clarifies that, in order for taxpayers to establish an education IRA, the designated beneficiary must be a life—in—being.

The new law also provides that if any qualified higher education expenses are considered in determining the amount of a distribution from an education IRA that is nontaxable, then no business expense deduction will be allowed with respect to those same education expenses.

These provisions are effective for tax years beginning after 1997.

6. Meals provided for the convenience of the employer. Current law specifies that the value of meals furnished to an employee by his employer is excluded from the employee’s gross income if the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer and they are furnished for the convenience of the employer. Under what circumstances meals provided on an employer’s premises meet this test has proven to be a difficult question. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act attempts to provide some clarification by providing that all meals furnished to employees on an employer’s premises are for the convenience of the employer if the meals furnished to at least half of the employees are for the convenience of the employer. Generally, meals are for the convenience of the employer if the employer has a “noncompensatory” business reason for furnishing the meals (for example, there are few if any restaurants nearby, and the employer would have to provide employees with longer lunch breaks if they were not furnished meals at work).

Key point. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 attempted to provide some clarification by specifying that the operation by an employer of an eating facility for employees will be treated as a nontaxable fringe benefit if (1) the facility is located on or near the employer’s premises, and (2) revenue from the facility normally equals or exceeds the operating costs of the facility.

The Code specifies that ministers may not claim an exclusion for meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of an employer in computing their self—employment tax liability. IRC 1402(a)(8).

7. Donations of computer equipment. In computing taxable income, a taxpayer who itemizes deductions generally is allowed to deduct the fair market value of property contributed to a charitable organization. However, in the case of a charitable contribution of inventory, short—term capital gain property, and certain other gifts, the amount of the deduction is limited to the taxpayer’s basis (cost) in the property. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided that certain contributions of computers by corporations to educational institutions for use by elementary and secondary school children qualify for an increased deduction. Under this special rule, the amount of the increased deduction generally is equal to the donor’s basis in the donated property plus one—half of the amount of ordinary income that would have been realized if the property had been sold. However, the increased deduction cannot exceed twice the basis of the donated property. To qualify for the increased deduction, the contribution must satisfy various requirements. This special provision expires after the year 2000.

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 clarifies that the increased charitable contribution deduction applies regardless of whether the recipient is an educational organization or some other tax—exempt charitable entity.

This provision is effective as of August 5, 1997.

Example. A corporation would like to contribute several computers to a church—operated elementary and secondary school. The corporation will be eligible for an increased charitable contribution deduction if several conditions are met even if the school is considered to be a “religious” institution.

IRS Restructuring and Management

8. IRS structure and functions. The main focus of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 is to make the IRS more responsive to taxpayers and less vulnerable to abuse. Here are some of the ways the new law accomplishes this objective:

• IRS reorganization plan. During extensive public hearings, Congress found that a key reason for taxpayer frustration with the IRS is the lack of attention to taxpayer needs. At a minimum, taxpayers should be able to receive from the IRS the same level of service expected from the private sector. For example, taxpayer inquiries should be answered promptly and accurately; taxpayers should be able to obtain timely resolutions of problems and information regarding activity on their accounts; and taxpayers should be treated fairly and courteously at all times. In order to make the IRS more “customer” oriented, the IRS is being reorganized. The old 3—tier geographic structure (including a National Office, Regional Offices, and District Offices) is being replaced by a structure that focuses on four groups of taxpayers with similar needs-individual taxpayers, small businesses, large businesses, and the tax—exempt sector. Under this structure, each unit will be charged with end—to—end responsibility for serving its group of taxpayers.

Key point. Currently, each of the current 33 IRS district offices and 10 service centers is required to deal with every kind of taxpayer and every type of issue. The proposed plan would enable IRS personnel to understand the needs and problems of particular groups of taxpayers, and better address those issues. The current structure is also inefficient. For example, if a taxpayer moves, the responsibility for the taxpayer’s account moves to another geographical area. As a result, many taxpayers have to deal with different IRS offices on the same issues. The proposed structure would eliminate many of these problems.

Example. Rev. E is audited by the IRS. During the audit, Rev. E moves to another state. The responsibility for Rev. E’s audit is assigned to another District Office. Under the new law, the same “taxpayer unit” would oversee Rev. E’s audit from beginning to end, whether or not Rev. E moves to another state.

Example. A church is contacted by the IRS to learn why it is not withholding taxes from its pastoral employees. Of course, the reason is that clergy wages are exempt from income tax withholding under federal law. However, an IRS agent at the local District Office is not aware of this rule, because she seldom has worked with churches. The church treasurer informs her that clergy are exempt from withholding, but she is skeptical. Under the new structure, a separate IRS unit will specialize in exempt organizations. As a result, it is more likely that church treasurers will be dealing with IRS agents having some familiarity with the unique tax rules that apply to churches and clergy.

• IRS mission statement. The current “mission statement” of the IRS begins by declaring that the purpose of the IRS is “to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost.” The new law requires the IRS to revise its mission statement to provide greater emphasis on serving the public and meeting the needs of taxpayers.

• IRS oversight board. The new law provides for the establishment within the Treasury Department of the “Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board”. The general responsibilities of the new Board are to “oversee the IRS in the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application of the internal revenue laws.” The Board will be composed of nine members, six of whom must be from the private sector.

9. Study of tax law complexity. Congress noted “a clear connection between the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code and the difficulty of tax law administration and taxpayer frustration.” It further noted that “complexity and frequent changes in the tax laws create burdens for both the IRS and taxpayers. Failure to address complexity may ultimately reduce voluntary compliance.” As a result, the new law requires the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation to provide an analysis of complexity concerns raised by tax provisions of widespread application to individuals and small businesses. The analysis is to include: (1) an estimate of the number and type of taxpayers affected; and (2) if applicable, the income level of affected individual taxpayers.

In addition, the complexity analysis should include, if possible, the following: (1) the extent to which existing tax forms would require revision and whether a new form or forms would be required; (2) whether and to what extent taxpayers would be required to keep additional records; (3) the estimated cost to taxpayers to comply with the provision; (4) the extent to which enactment of the provision would require the IRS to develop or modify regulations and other official guidance; (5) whether and to what extent the provision can be expected to lead to disputes between taxpayers and the IRS; and (6) how the IRS can be expected to respond to the provision (including the impact on internal training, whether the Internal Revenue Manual would require revision, whether the change would require reprogramming of computers, and the extent to which the IRS would be required to divert or redirect resources in response to the provision).

This provision is effective with respect to legislation considered on or after January 1, 1999.

10. Disclosure of income tax returns. The confidentiality of personal income tax returns has become a growing issue in recent years. In 1997 alone, the number of “federal income tax return disclosures” exceeded 3.2 billion! That works out to an average of 32 “disclosures” for the year for each individual tax return. The Act as originally worded would have required the IRS to place “plain English” notices on all tax forms informing taxpayers of the many different ways in which tax return information is disclosed by the IRS. However, a House—Senate conference committee dropped this provision on the ground that language in the current instruction booklets to the main tax forms provides sufficient “notice” to taxpayers. Even though the proposal for more effective disclosure to taxpayers of the nonconfidentiality of their tax returns did not pass, it has raised the issue. More and more taxpayers will now be aware of how common it is for the IRS to disclose personal tax information to others. This in turn will affect the inaccurate public perception that personal tax return data is confidential.

11. Removal of the “scarlet letter.” For many years, the IRS has placed a special code letter (“P”) in its computer systems and tax files to identify tax “protestors”. This letter has been associated with several tax protestor schemes, including the following: (1) contributions to “mail order” or other “sham” churches; (2) “constitutional” exemptions from tax; (3) reducing taxes because of the declining value of the dollar; and (4) reliance on the gold standard. While such schemes have been universally rejected by the courts, many in Congress felt that it was wrong to stigmatize a person for life as a tax protestor. After all, some of these persons eventually abandon their tax protestor position, and why should they continue to be stigmatized with the letter “P”? The new law forbids the IRS to use this designation any more.

12. Payment of taxes. The new law allows taxpayers to pay their taxes with checks payable to the “United States Treasury” instead of the IRS. The idea here is to reinforce the fact that the IRS merely collects taxes on behalf of the federal government.

Electronic Filing

13. Electronic filing. Each year the IRS publishes a list of forms and schedules that may be electronically filed. During the 1997 tax filing season, the IRS received approximately 20 million individual income tax returns electronically. Under the new law, the stated policy of Congress is to promote “paperless” filing of tax returns, with a long—range goal of providing for the filing of at least 80 percent of all tax returns in electronic form by the year 2007.

Key point. One of the goals of this electronic filing initiative is to reduce errors. The error rate associated with processing paper tax returns is approximately 20 percent, half of which is due to the IRS and half to errors in taxpayer data. Because electronically—filed returns usually are prepared using computer software programs with built—in accuracy checks, and experience no key punch errors, electronic returns have an error rate of less than one percent. In short, Congress believes that an expansion of electronic filing will significantly reduce errors (and the resulting notices that are triggered by such errors). In addition, taxpayers who file their returns electronically receive confirmation from the IRS that their return was received.

14. Due date for certain information returns. Employers are required to file an “information return” (Form W—3) by February 28 of each year reporting the amount of employee wages paid during the previous year. In addition, employers are required to file Form 1096 by February 28 of each year reporting the amount of nonemployee compensation paid during the previous year (to persons who received $600 or more). Under present law, the due date for filing information returns with the IRS is the same whether such returns are filed on paper, on magnetic media, or electronically. The new law provides an incentive to filers of information returns to use electronic filing by extending the due date for filing such returns from February 28 to March 31 of the year following the calendar year to which the return relates.

This provision applies to information returns required to be filed after December 31, 1999.

The new law also requires the Treasury Department to issue a study evaluating the merits and disadvantages, if any, of extending the deadline for providing taxpayers with copies of information returns from January 31 to February 15 (Forms W—2 would still be required to be furnished by January 31).

Example. In January of 1999 a church issues W—2 forms to five employees, and 1099 forms to three self—employed persons. These forms are due no later than January 31, 1999. The new law does not affect these deadlines. However, the church’s deadline for filing Form W—3 (transmitting the five W—2 forms) and Form 1096 (transmitting the three 1099 forms) is extended from February 28 until March 31 of 1999 if it files these forms electronically. If it does not file the forms electronically, the deadline remains February 28.

15. Electronic signatures. Federal tax law requires that tax forms be signed. The IRS will not accept an electronically filed return unless it has also received a Form 8453, which is a paper form that contains signature information on the filer. Obviously, this requirement greatly reduces the convenience and efficiency of electronic filing. The new law requires the IRS to develop procedures that would eliminate the need to file a paper form (Form 8453) relating to signature information. Until the procedures are in place, the provision authorizes the IRS to provide for alternative methods of signing all returns and other documents. An alternative method of signature would be treated identically, for both civil and criminal purposes, as a signature on a paper form.

16. Filing dates for electronically filed returns. Generally, a return is considered timely filed when it is received by the IRS on or before the due date of the return. If the return is mailed by registered mail, the dated registration statement is evidence of delivery. But what about electronically filed returns? When are they filed? The new law requires the IRS to develop rules for determining when electronic returns are deemed filed.

17. Access to account information. Under current law, taxpayers who file their returns electronically cannot review their accounts electronically. The new law requires the IRS to develop procedures under which taxpayers filing returns electronically can review their accounts electronically not later than December 31, 2006-if all necessary privacy safeguards are in place by that date.

Taxpayer Rights and Protections

18. Civil damages against the IRS for negligence. Under current law, a taxpayer may sue the government for up to $1 million because of an IRS agent’s reckless or intentional disregard of federal tax law in the course of any tax collection activity. The new law allows taxpayers to sue the government for up to $100,000 in civil damages caused by an IRS agent’s negligent disregard of the law. The law clarifies that taxpayers cannot seek civil damages for negligence or reckless or intentional disregard of the law unless they first exhaust their administrative remedies within the IRS.

This provision is effective immediately.

19. Limitation on financial status audits. The IRS selects returns to be audited in a number of ways, including “financial status” audits. Under such an arrangement, IRS agents look for discrepancies between taxpayers’ reported income and their “standard of living.” If the standard of living seems excessive in light of reported income, then several financial questions can be raised in an effort to find unreported income. This technique has been criticized because of the potential for abuse. The new law prohibits the IRS from using financial status or economic reality examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer unless the IRS has independent and reasonable proof that there is a likelihood of unreported income.

This provision is effective immediately.

20. Explanation of taxpayers’ rights in interviews with the IRS. Prior to (or at) audit interviews, the IRS must explain to taxpayers the audit process and taxpayers’ rights under that process. In addition, the IRS must explain the collection process and taxpayers’ rights under that process. If a taxpayer clearly states during an interview with the IRS that he or she wishes to consult with a “representative,” the interview must be suspended to allow the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to consult with the representative. The new law requires that the IRS rewrite Publication 1 (“Your Rights as a Taxpayer”) to more clearly inform taxpayers of their rights (1) to be represented by a representative and (2) if the taxpayer is so represented, that the interview may not proceed without the presence of the representative unless the taxpayer consents.

21. Disclosure of IRS top—secret audit formula. Disclosure of criteria for examination selection. Under current law, the IRS selects returns to be audited in a number of ways, such as through a computerized classification system (the discriminant function (“DIF”) system). The DIF system accounts for about one—third of all audits, but the IRS has refused to disclose any of the details of this system to taxpayers. The new law requires the IRS to add to Publication 1 (“Your Rights as a Taxpayer”) “a statement which sets forth in simple and nontechnical terms the criteria and procedures for selecting taxpayers for examination.” The statement must specify the general procedures used by the IRS, including the extent to which taxpayers are selected for examination on the basis of information in the media or from informants.

Key point. The IRS is not required to include any information that would be detrimental to law enforcement.

Key point. The public disclosure of at least some information regarding the top—secret DIF system is a big break for taxpayers. In the future, taxpayers will have a better idea of their chances of being audited.

The addition to Publication 1 would have to be made not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the new law.

22. Confidentiality privilege extended to some non—attorney tax professionals. Communications made between an attorney and client are “privileged,” meaning that neither party can be compelled to disclose in court the substance of their confidential conversations. For the privilege to apply, the client must have been meeting with the attorney for legal advice. The IRS also recognizes the attorney—client privilege in tax proceedings. However, no equivalent privilege is provided for communications between taxpayers and other professionals authorized to practice before the IRS, such as CPAs or enrolled agents.

The new law recognizes a new privilege of confidentiality for communications between taxpayers and individuals who are authorized to practice before the IRS. Enrolled agents and CPAs are the tax professionals contemplated by the new law. For the privilege to apply, the professional must be acting within the scope of his or her profession when the communication occurs. Further, the privilege will not apply to criminal proceedings before the IRS.

The purpose of the new privilege is to allow taxpayers to consult with other qualified tax advisors in the same manner they currently may consult with attorneys.

The provision would be effective on the date of enactment.

23. IRS employee contacts. The IRS sends many different notices to taxpayers. Many of these notices do not contain the name and telephone number of an IRS employee the taxpayer can call with questions. This failure has led to untold frustration. The new law addresses this problem by requiring that all IRS notices and correspondence contain a name and telephone number of an IRS employee whom the taxpayer may call. In addition, to the extent practicable and where it is advantageous to the taxpayer, the IRS should assign one employee to handle a matter with respect to a taxpayer until that matter is resolved.

This provision is effective 60 days after the date of the law’s enactment.

24. IRS telephone hotline. The new law requires that all IRS telephone helplines provide an option for any taxpayer to speak with a “live person” in addition to hearing recorded messages.

25. IRS local office telephone numbers. Have you ever experienced the frustration of being unable to find the telephone number for your local IRS office in the telephone directory? Millions have. The new law addresses this problem by requiring each IRS office to list its office telephone number and address in the telephone directory.

26. Approval of IRS levies. Under current law, IRS agents can impose liens, levies or seizures to collect taxes, without a supervisor’s approval (except for the seizure of a taxpayer’s home). The new law requires the IRS to implement an approval process under which any lien, levy or seizure would be approved by a supervisor, who would review the taxpayer’s information, verify that a balance is due, and affirm that a lien, levy or seizure is appropriate under the circumstances. Circumstances to be considered include the amount due and the value of the asset. Failure to follow such procedures should result in disciplinary action against the supervisor or agent.

This provision applies to all future tax collection actions.

27. Changes in levy exemption amounts. Under current law, the IRS can “levy” on all non—exempt property of a taxpayer. This means that the IRS can seize and sell a taxpayer’s property to satisfy an unpaid tax bill. But some property is exempt from this process. Examples include up to $2,500 in value of fuel, provisions, furniture, and personal effects in the taxpayer’s household, and up to $1,250 in value of books and tools necessary for the trade, business or profession of the taxpayer. The new law increases the value of personal effects exempt from levy to $6,250 and the value of books and tools exempt from levy to $3,125. These amounts are indexed for inflation.

This provision is effective for all future collection actions.

28. Waiver of early withdrawal tax for IRS levies on employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs. Under current law, a distribution of benefits from any employer—sponsored retirement plan or an IRA generally is includible in gross income in the year it is distributed, except to the extent the amount distributed represents the employee’s after—tax contributions. Distributions from qualified plans and IRAs prior to attainment of age 59 and 1/2 that are includible in income generally are subject to a 10—percent early withdrawal tax, unless an exception applies.

Under current law, the IRS is authorized to levy on all non—exempt property of the taxpayer. Benefits under employer—sponsored retirement plans (including section 403(b) plans) and IRAs are not exempt from levy by the IRS. Distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs made on account of an IRS levy are includible in the gross income of the individual, except to the extent the amount distributed represents after—tax contributions. In addition, the amount includible in income is subject to the 10—percent early withdrawal tax, unless an exception applies.

Congress concluded that the imposition of the 10—percent early withdrawal tax on amounts distributed from employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs on account of an IRS levy may impose significant hardships on taxpayers. As a result, the new law provides an exception from the 10—percent early withdrawal tax for amounts withdrawn from any employer—sponsored retirement plan or an IRA that are subject to a levy by the IRS. The exception applies only if the plan or IRA is levied. It does not apply, for example, if the taxpayer withdraws funds to pay taxes in the absence of a levy, or to release a levy on other property.

This provision is effective for future withdrawals.

29. Seizure of personal residences. Under current law, the IRS may seize the property of a taxpayer who neglects or refuses to pay any tax within 10 days after notice and demand. The IRS may not levy on the personal residence of the taxpayer unless (1) the District Director (or the assistant District Director) personally approves in writing, or (2) in cases of jeopardy. There are no special rules for property that is used as a residence by parties other than the taxpayer.

Congress was concerned that seizure of the taxpayer’s principal residence is particularly disruptive for the taxpayer as well as the taxpayer’s family. The seizure of any residence is disruptive to the occupants, and is not justified in the case of a small deficiency. As a result, the new law prohibits the IRS from seizing real property that is used as a residence (by the taxpayer or another person) to satisfy an unpaid liability of $5,000 or less, including penalties and interest.

The new law further requires the IRS to exhaust all other payment options before seizing the taxpayer’s principal residence.

Key point. The new law does not prohibit the seizure of a principal residence, but would treat such a seizure as a payment option of last resort. The IRS will consider installment agreements, offer—in—compromise, and seizure of other assets of the taxpayer before taking collection action against the taxpayer’s principal residence.

This provision is effective immediately.

30. “Due process” in IRS collection actions. The IRS may collect taxes by “levy” upon a taxpayer’s property (including accrued wages) if the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay the tax within 10 days after notice and demand that the tax be paid. Notice of the IRS’s intent to collect taxes by levy must be given no less than 30 days before the day of the levy. The notice of levy must describe the procedures that will be used, the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer and the procedures relating to such appeals, the alternatives available to the taxpayer that could prevent levy, and the procedures for redemption of property and release of liens.

Following days of hearings in which taxpayers recounted horror stories of IRS seizures of their property, Congress was convinced that taxpayers are entitled to protections in dealing with the IRS that are similar to those they would have in dealing with any other creditor. Accordingly, the new law establishes formal procedures designed to insure due process where the IRS seeks to collect taxes by levy. As under present law, notice of the intent to levy must be given at least 30 days before property can be seized or salary and wages garnished. During the 30—day notice period, the taxpayer may demand a hearing to take place before an appeals officer who has had no prior involvement in the taxpayer’s case. If the taxpayer demands a hearing within that period, the proposed collection action may not proceed until the hearing has concluded and the appeals officer has issued his or her determination. During the hearing, the IRS is required to verify that all statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements for the proposed collection action have been met. IRS verifications are expected to include (but not be limited to) showings that (1) the IRS agent recommending the collection action has verified the taxpayer’s liability; (2) the estimated expenses of levy and sale will not exceed the value of the property to be seized; (3) the IRS agent has determined that there is sufficient equity in the property to be seized to yield net proceeds from sale to apply to the unpaid tax liabilities; and (4) with respect to the seizure of the assets of a going business, the IRS agent recommending the collection action has thoroughly considered the facts of the case, including the availability of alternative collection methods, before recommending the collection action.

The taxpayer is allowed to raise any relevant issue at the hearing. Issues eligible to be raised include (but are not limited to): (1) challenges to the underlying liability as to existence or amount; (2) appropriate spousal defenses; (3) challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions; and (4) collection alternatives, which could include the posting of a bond, substitution of other assets, an installment agreement or an offer—in—compromise.

The taxpayer may contest the determination of the appellate officer in Tax Court by filing a petition within 30 days of the date of the determination. The Tax Court is expected to review the appellate officer’s determination for abuse of discretion and also may consider procedural issues, as under present law. The IRS may not take any collection action pursuant to the determination during this 30 day period or while the taxpayer’s contest is pending in Tax Court.

The due process procedures apply to collection actions initiated more than six months after the date of the new law’s enactment.

31. Application of fair debt collection practices. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides a number of rules relating to debt collection practices. Among these are restrictions on communication with the consumer, such as a general prohibition on telephone calls outside the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. local time, and prohibitions on harassing or abusing the consumer. In general, these provisions do not apply to the federal government (including the IRS). Congress concluded that the IRS should be at least as considerate to taxpayers as private creditors are required to be with their customers. Accordingly, the new law makes the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s restrictions relating to communication with the debtor and the prohibitions on harassing or abusing the debtor applicable to the IRS by incorporating these provisions into the Internal Revenue Code. The restrictions relating to communication with the taxpayer are not intended to hinder the ability of the IRS to respond to taxpayer inquiries (such as answering telephone calls from taxpayers).

This provision is effective immediately.

32. Offers in compromise. The tax code permits the IRS to compromise a taxpayer’s tax liability. An offer—in—compromise is an offer by the taxpayer to settle an unpaid bill for less than the full amount of the assessed balance. There are two bases for making an offer in compromise-doubt as to a tax liability for the amount owed, and doubt as to ability to pay the amount owed. Congress came to the conclusion, following several days of testimony, that the IRS should be flexible in finding ways to work with taxpayers who are sincerely trying to meet their obligations and remain in the tax system. Accordingly, Congress concluded that the IRS should make it easier for taxpayers to enter into offer—in—compromise agreements, and should do more to educate the taxpaying public about the availability of such agreements.

The new law modifies the offer in compromise rules in the following ways:

1. National and local schedules of allowances. The IRS must now develop and publish schedules of national and local “allowances” (personal expenses) that will provide taxpayers entering into an offer—in—compromise with adequate means to provide for basic living expenses. The IRS also will be required to consider the facts and circumstances of a particular taxpayer’s case in determining whether the national and local schedules are adequate for that particular taxpayer. If the facts indicate that use of scheduled allowances would be inadequate under the circumstances, the taxpayer would not be limited by the national or local allowances.

2. Low—income taxpayers. The new law prohibits the IRS from rejecting an offer—in—compromise from a low—income taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer. This provision does not affect the ability of the IRS to reject an offer in compromise made by a taxpayer (other than a low—income taxpayer) because the amount offered is too low. The new law further prohibits the IRS from requesting a financial statement if a taxpayer makes an offer—in—compromise based solely on doubt as to a tax liability.

3. Suspension of levy efforts. The new law prohibits the IRS from collecting a tax liability by levy during any period that a taxpayer’s offer in compromise for that liability is being processed, or during the 30 days following rejection of an offer (and during any period in which an appeal of the rejection of an offer is being considered).

Key point. This prohibition would not apply if the IRS determines that collection is in jeopardy or that the offer was submitted solely to delay collection.

4. Review of an IRS rejection of an offer—in—compromise. The IRS must implement procedures to review all rejections of taxpayer offers in compromise prior to the rejection being communicated to the taxpayer. The IRS must allow the taxpayer to appeal any rejection of such offer to the IRS Office of Appeals. The IRS must notify taxpayers of their right to have an appeals officer review a rejected offer—in—compromise on the application form for an offer in compromise.

5. Publication of taxpayer’s rights with respect to offers in compromise. The new law requires the IRS to publish guidance on the rights and obligations of taxpayers relating to offers—in—compromise.

6. Liberal acceptance policy. Congress instructed the IRS to “adopt a liberal acceptance policy for offers in compromise to provide an incentive for taxpayers to continue to file tax returns and continue to pay their taxes.”

These provisions are effective for all offers in compromise submitted after the date of the new law’s enactment.

33. Guaranteed availability of installment agreements. The tax code currently authorizes the IRS to enter into written agreements with any taxpayer under which the taxpayer is allowed to pay taxes (plus interest and penalties) in installment payments if the IRS determines that doing so will “facilitate collection of the amounts owed”. An installment agreement does not reduce the amount of taxes, interest, or penalties owed. However, it does provide for a longer period during which payments may be made during which other IRS enforcement actions (such as levies or seizures) are suspended. Many taxpayers can request an installment agreement by filing Form 9465. This form is relatively simple and does not require the submission of detailed financial statements. The IRS in most instances readily approves these requests if the amounts involved are not large (in general, below $10,000) and if the taxpayer has filed tax returns on time in the past. Some taxpayers are required to submit background information to the IRS substantiating their application. If the request for an installment agreement is approved by the IRS, a user fee of $43 is charged. This user fee is in addition to the tax, interest, and penalties that are owed.

Congress has concluded that the ability to make payments of tax liability by installment enhances taxpayer compliance. Further, Congress has concluded that the IRS should be flexible in finding ways to work with taxpayers who are sincerely trying to meet their obligations.

The new law requires the IRS to enter into an installment agreement, at the taxpayer’s option, if

(1) the liability is $10,000, or less (excluding penalties and interest)

(2) within the previous 5 years, the taxpayer has not failed to file or to pay, nor entered an installment agreement under this provision

(3) when requested by the Secretary, the taxpayer submits financial statements, and the Secretary determines that the taxpayer is unable to pay the tax due in full

(4) the installment agreement provides for full payment of the liability within 3 years, and

(5) the taxpayer agrees to continue to comply with the tax laws and the terms of the agreement for the period (up to 3 years) that the agreement is in place.

This provision is effective immediately.

34. Statute of limitations. The “statute of limitations” which defines the period of time during which the IRS must assess additional taxes is generally three years from the date a return is filed (a return filed before the due date is considered to be filed on the due date). Prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, both the taxpayer and the IRS may agree in writing to extend the three—year period, using Form 872 or Form 872—A. An extension may be for either a specified period or an indefinite period. The statute of limitations for the collection of tax is generally ten years after assessment. Prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, both the taxpayer and the IRS may agree in writing to extend the statute, using Form 900.

The new law eliminates the provision of current law that allows the statute of limitations on collections to be extended by agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS. The new law also requires that, on each occasion on which the taxpayer is requested by the IRS to extend the statute of limitations on an assessment of tax, the IRS must notify the taxpayer of the taxpayer’s right to refuse to extend the statute of limitations or to limit the extension to particular issues.

These provisions apply to requests to extend the statute of limitations made after the date of the new law’s enactment, and to all extensions of the statute of limitations on collections that are open 180 days after the date of enactment.

Key point. Congress concluded that taxpayers should be fully informed of their rights with respect to the statute of limitations on assessments of tax. It expressed concern that in some cases taxpayers have not been fully aware of their rights to refuse to extend the statute of limitations, and have felt that they had no choice but to agree to extend the statute of limitations upon the request of the IRS. Moreover, it concluded that the IRS should collect all taxes within ten years, and that such statute of limitation should not be extended.

35. Relief for innocent spouses. Under current law, each spouse who signs a joint tax return is fully responsible for the accuracy of the return and for the full tax liability. This is true even though only one spouse may have earned the income which is shown on the return. This is “joint and several” liability. A spouse who wishes to avoid joint liability must file as a “married person filing separately.”

Relief from liability for tax is available for “innocent spouses” in certain limited circumstances. To qualify for such relief, the innocent spouse must establish: (1) that a joint return was made; (2) that an understatement of tax, which exceeds the greater of $500 or a specified percentage of the innocent spouse’s adjusted gross income for the most recent year, is attributable to a grossly erroneous item (items of gross income that are omitted from reported income and claims of deductions or credits having no basis in law) of the other spouse; (3) that in signing the return, the innocent spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was an understatement of tax; and (4) that taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for the deficiency in tax. The specified percentage of adjusted gross income is 10 percent if adjusted gross income is $20,000 or less. Otherwise, the specified percentage is 25 percent.

Congress concluded that that the innocent spouse provisions of present law are inadequate, and that it is inappropriate to limit innocent spouse relief only to the most extreme cases where the understatement is large and the tax position taken is grossly erroneous. It also concluded that partial innocent spouse relief should be considered in appropriate circumstances, and that all taxpayers should have access to the Tax Court in resolving disputes concerning their status as an innocent spouse. Finally, Congress concluded that taxpayers need to be better informed of their right to apply for innocent spouse relief in appropriate cases and that the IRS is the best source of that information.

The new law accomplishes these objectives in the following ways:

1. Relief more easy to obtain. The new law eliminates all of the understatement thresholds and requires only that the understatement of tax be attributable to an erroneous (and not just a grossly erroneous) item of the other spouse.

2. Partial relief available. The new law provides that innocent spouse relief may be provided on a partial basis. That is, the spouse may be relieved of liability as an innocent spouse to the extent the liability is attributable to the portion of an understatement of tax which the spouse did not know of and had no reason to know of.

3. Review of denials of relief. The new law specifically provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review any denial (or failure to rule) by the IRS regarding an application for innocent spouse relief.

4. A separate form. The new law requires the IRS to develop a separate form with instructions for taxpayers to use in applying for innocent spouse relief within 180 days from the date of the new law’s enactment. An innocent spouse seeking relief under this provision must claim innocent spouse status with regard to any assessment not later than two years after the date of such assessment.

These provisions are effective for understatements with respect to taxable years beginning after the date of the new law’s enactment.

36. Burden of proof. Under current law, there is a “rebuttable presumption” that any determination of tax liability by the IRS is correct. As a result, taxpayers who challenge IRS determinations have the “burden of proof”. There are a few exception to this rule, in which the IRS has the burden of proof (including fraud and proof of employee status for payroll tax purposes). Congress has concluded that (1) individual and small business taxpayers frequently are at a disadvantage when forced to litigate with the IRS, and that the present “burden of proof” rules contribute to that disadvantage; (2) facts asserted by individual and small business taxpayers who cooperate with the IRS and satisfy relevant recordkeeping and substantiation requirements should be accepted; and (3) shifting the burden of proof to the IRS in such circumstances will create a better balance between the IRS and taxpayers, without encouraging tax avoidance.

The new law addresses these concerns by providing that the IRS will have the burden of proof in any court proceeding with respect to a factual issue if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s income tax liability. Four conditions apply:

” The taxpayer must comply with the requirements of the tax code and regulations to substantiate any item.

” The taxpayer must maintain records required by the tax code and regulations.

” The taxpayer must cooperate with reasonable requests by the IRS for meetings, interviews, witnesses, information, and documents (including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to and inspection of witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer, as reasonably requested by the IRS). A necessary element of cooperating with the IRS is that the taxpayer must exhaust his or her administrative remedies (including any appeal rights provided by the IRS). The taxpayer is not required to agree to extend the statute of limitations to be considered to have cooperated. Cooperating also means that the taxpayer must establish the applicability of any privilege.

” Taxpayers (other than individuals) must meet the net worth limitations that apply for awarding attorney’s fees. Corporations, trusts, and partnerships whose net worth exceeds $7 million are not eligible for the benefits of the provision. No net worth limitations apply to individuals.

Key point. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that it meets each of these conditions, because they are necessary prerequisites to establishing that the burden of proof is on the IRS.

Key point. Taxpayers have not produced credible evidence if they merely make implausible factual assertions, frivolous claims, or tax protestor—type arguments. The introduction of evidence will not meet this standard if the court is not convinced that it is worthy of belief. If after evidence from both sides, the court believes that the evidence is equally balanced, the court shall find that the IRS has not sustained his burden of proof.

Key point. Taxpayers who fail to substantiate any item in accordance with the legal requirement of substantiation will be unable to avail themselves of this provision regarding the burden of proof. To illustrate, if a taxpayer required to substantiate an item fails to do so in the manner required (or destroys the substantiation), this burden of proof provision is inapplicable.

This provision applies to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations beginning after the date of the new law’s enactment.

37. Suspension of interest and certain penalties if the IRS fails to contact individual taxpayer. Under current law, interest and penalties accrue continuously while taxes are unpaid whether or not the taxpayer is aware there is tax due. In many cases, the interest and penalties eventually exceed the tax liability itself. The new law suspends the accrual of penalties and interest after 18 months if the IRS has not sent the taxpayer a notice of deficiency within 18 months following the date which is the later of (1) the original due date of the return or (2) the date on which the individual taxpayer timely filed the return. The suspension only applies to taxpayers who file a timely tax return. The provision applies only to individuals and does not apply to the “failure to pay” penalty, in the case of fraud, or with respect to criminal penalties. Interest and penalties resume 21 days after the IRS sends a notice and demand for payment to the taxpayer.

This provision is effective immediately.

38. Mitigation of “failure to deposit” penalty. An employer’s deposits of payroll taxes are allocated to the earliest period for which a deposit is due. If an employer misses or makes an insufficient deposit, later deposits will first be applied to satisfy the shortfall for the earlier period. The remainder is then applied to satisfy the obligation for the current period. If the employer is not aware this is taking place, “cascading penalties” may result as payments that would otherwise be sufficient to satisfy current liabilities are applied to satisfy earlier shortfalls.

Congress concluded that the cascading penalty effect is unfair and that employers should be able to designate payments to minimize its effect. As a result, the new law allows employers to designate the period to which each deposit is applied. The designation must be made no later than 90 days after the related IRS penalty notice. The new law also extends the authorization to waive the “failure to deposit” penalty to the first deposit a taxpayer is required to make after the taxpayer is required to change the frequency of the taxpayer’s deposits.

This provision applies to deposits made more than 180 days after the date of the new law’s enactment.

Key point. For deposits required to be made after December 31, 2001, any deposit is to be applied to the most recent period to which the deposit relates, unless the taxpayer explicitly designates otherwise.

39. Personal delivery of notice of penalty under section 6672. Any person who is required to collect and pay over any tax imposed by the tax code who willfully fails to do so is liable for a penalty equal to the amount of the tax. Before the IRS may assess any such “100—percent penalty,” it must mail a written preliminary notice informing the person of the proposed penalty to that person’s last known address. The mailing of such notice must precede any notice and demand for payment of the penalty by at least 60 days. The statute of limitations on assessments shall not expire before the date 90 days after the date on which the notice was mailed. These restrictions do not apply if the IRS finds the collection of the penalty is in jeopardy.

The imposition of the 100—percent penalty is a serious matter that potentially affects church treasurers and officers. Congress has concluded that permitting personal service of the preliminary notice may afford taxpayers the opportunity to resolve cases involving the 100—percent penalty at an earlier stage. As a result, the new law permits in person delivery, as an alternative to delivery by mail, of a preliminary notice that the IRS intends to assess a 100—percent penalty.

This provision is effective immediately.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m69 c0598

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Tax Consequences of Tuition Discounts

A recent IRS ruling provides some clarification.

IRS Letter Ruling 9821053

Background. Many churches operate schools and offer “tuition discounts” to some employees whose children attend the school. Consider the following example:

Example. A church operates a private school. The annual tuition is $2,500. However, the school allows the children of its two pastors to attend the school for free. Both pastors are full-time church employees, but they do have some involvement with the school. One of them serves as “president” of the school as part of his job description as senior pastor of the church, and the other teaches a course each semester at the school (and is paid $500 each semester). The school allows the children of its employees to attend at “half” tuition. The same rate applies to the children of church employees.

Are there tax consequences to the tuition discounts described in this example? Do the tuition “reductions” represent taxable income to the parents, or are they nontaxable? If they are nontaxable, what conditions apply? These are important questions, and church treasurers should have some familiarity with them.

“Qualified tuition reductions”. Section 117(d) of the tax code specifies that the amount of any “qualified tuition reduction” is excluded from an employee’s gross income for income tax purposes so long as the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The tuition reduction is for the education of (a) an individual who currently is employed by the school; (b) an individual who quit working at the school on account of retirement or disability; (c) a widow or widower of an individual who died while employed at the school; or (d) a spouse or dependent child of any of the above named individuals.

(2) The school is an elementary, secondary, or undergraduate institution, and it normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.

(3) “Highly compensated employees” cannot exclude qualified tuition reductions from their gross income unless the same benefit “is available on substantially similar terms to each member of a group of employees which is defined under a reasonable classification set up by the employer which does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.”

The term highly compensated employee generally refers to an employee who had compensation in excess of $80,000 for the previous year. The fact that a highly compensated employee must report the value of a tuition reduction in his or her income for tax reporting purposes does not affect the right of employees who are not highly compensated to exclude the value of tuition reductions from their income.

What about church employees? Many churches that operate private schools offer tuition discounts to employees of both the church and school, and assume that the tax treatment is the same. But is it? Does the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions from a school employee’s taxable income apply to church employees? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is far from clear. Let’s begin by looking at the example at the beginning of this article. Which employees would qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions? There is no question about the school employees—assuming that none earned more than $80,000 in the previous year. As a result, the value of the tuition discount should not be reported on their W 2 forms. This should be true even if these employees are paid by the church, since they work full time for the school and therefore could be considered school employees.

But what about the two pastors? Are they eligible for the exclusion? Section 117(d) of the Code defines a qualified tuition reduction as “any reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education (below the graduate level) at such organization.” Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) refers to educational institutions that “normally maintain a regular faculty and curriculum and normally have a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.” In other words, tuition reductions granted to the employees of an educational institution are tax exempt.

But, it is unclear whether the IRS or the courts would consider an employee who works directly for a church to be an employee of an educational institution, even if the church operates a private school. The church still may be considered to be a religious rather than an educational institution. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Code section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) specifically lists “churches” as a separate category. The IRS may consider these persons to be employed by a church rather than by an educational institution. If so, they would not be eligible for the exclusion.

Could it not be argued that the pastor who teaches one course per semester at the school is a school employee for purposes of the qualified tuition reduction exclusion because he is performing services on behalf of the school for compensation? Does the fact that he is teaching only one course per semester matter? A recent IRS ruling suggests that it does not.

A recent IRS ruling. Here are the facts of the IRS ruling. A worker was hired to teach English as a second language by a public school. She worked three evenings per week and was paid an hourly wage. Either the school or the worker could terminate the agreement for services at any time. For a number of years, the school treated the teacher as an employee and reported her wages on a W-2 form. In 1994 the school began treating the teacher as self-employed and reported her earnings on a 1099 form. The teacher was given training by the school in the form of teacher workshops; she was given instructions by the school and was subject to its supervision; from time to time the assistant principal sat in the classroom and observed her teaching; a formal evaluation was prepared by the assistant principal at least once per semester; the teacher performed her services at the school using supplies and materials furnished by the school. Other than transportation costs, the teacher did not incur any expenses while performing her services. She did not have a financial investment in a business related to her teaching and could not incur a loss or realize a profit. Under these facts, the IRS ruled that the teacher was an employee rather than self-employed. It stressed that the key consideration in deciding whether or not a worker is an employee or self-employed is the degree of control that the employer exercises over the worker’s performance of services. It concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated sufficient control to render the teacher an employee. It noted that less control is needed to find that a professional worker is an employee, since such workers generally work with very little control or supervision. IRS Private Letter Ruling 9821053.

Key point. The IRS ruling can be used to support the availability of the qualified tuition reduction exclusion to pastors and other church employees who teach one or more classes each semester at a church-operated school. After all, this ruling leaves little doubt that the IRS considers part-time teachers who work only a few hours each week to be employees. The same logic should apply to the definition of a “school employee” for purposes of determining eligibility for the qualified tuition reduction exclusion.

Key point. If you decide that a pastor who teaches a course at a church-operated school is a school employee and therefore eligible for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions, be sure to be consistent. Any teaching compensation should be reported as employee wages. If the school issues its own paychecks, it should do so for the pastor.

What about the other pastor in our example—the one who serves as the school’s president? Should he be considered a part-time school employee because his job description includes serving as the school’s president? Does it matter whether or not he is paid for his services? Obviously, employees ordinarily must be paid something, although it does not necessarily have to be in the form of cash. But while the pastor is not compensated directly for his services as school president, the argument could be made that, since his job description includes these duties, a portion of his church salary should be considered compensation for these services.

A Tax Court decision. A few years ago the United States Tax Court addressed the eligibility of a pastor and his wife for the tuition discount exclusion. Rasmussen v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. 30 (1994). The pastor served as senior pastor of a Baptist church, and his wife served as principal of a private school operated by the same church. The couple received tuition discounts for their children who attended the school. The Court noted that “by reason of their employment with the church and the school, petitioners, as well as all other full-time employees of the school, received tuition reductions for their children’s education at the school.” In fact, the Court noted that the IRS had conceded that the couple’s tuition discounts were not taxable. It is interesting that the Court observed that the couple received tuition discounts “by reason of their employment with the church and the school.” However, this language should not be pushed too far. After all, the wife was a school employee, and the tuition discounts were nontaxable by reason of her employment. Nevertheless, this case will of some value in supporting the nontaxability of tuition discounts received by the children of pastors and other church employees who are not employees of a school operated by their church.

Conclusions. Consider the following conclusions:

* Employees of a church-operated school. They qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions, assuming that all of the conditions summarized above are satisfied.

* Church employees who perform compensated service for a church-operated school. For example, a church secretary performs some secretarial services for the school; a church custodian performs some custodial services for the school; a church bookkeeper performs some accounting functions for the school; or, a pastor teaches a course. In each of these examples it is likely that the church employee will qualify for the tuition reduction exclusion, assuming that all of the conditions summarized above are satisfied.

* Church employees who perform uncompensated service for a church-operated school. As noted in this next paragraph, it is not clear that these employees are eligible for the qualified tuition reduction exclusion. However, keep in mind that in some cases a church employee who performs “uncompensated” services for a church-operated school in fact may be compensated. The pastor in our example who served as president of the school is a good example. So long as the pastor’s job description included serving as the school president, the argument can be made that he was a school employee and that a portion of his church compensation could be allocated to these duties.

Key point. Church employees who perform compensated or uncompensated services on behalf of a church-operated school should be sure that their job descriptions reflect their school services. This will increase the likelihood of their eligibility for the tuition reduction exclusion.

* Church employees who perform no services for a church-operated school. According to the literal language of the tax code, they do not qualify for the tuition reduction exclusion because they are not school employees. However, as a practical matter, there are thousands of pastors and other church employees who are claiming the exclusion under these same circumstances, and neither the IRS nor the courts have addressed their eligibility for the exclusion in any reported ruling or decision. The ultimate answer to this question depends upon how narrowly or broadly the IRS or a court will interpret the “school employee” requirement. In the final analysis, whether or not such employees should claim the exclusion will depend on how aggressive they want to be in reporting their taxes. Our recommendation—discuss your eligibility with a professional tax advisor.

Example. A federal appeals court rejected the claim of one church that its school employees were really church employees and therefore exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (minimum wage and overtime pay). The church pointed out that the school was “inextricably intertwined” with the church, that the church and school shared a common building and a common payroll account, and that school employees were required to subscribe to the church’s statement of faith. The court rejected this reasoning without explanation. This case suggests that church employees should not assume that they can be treated as school employees in order to qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, September 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Assignment of Income Doctrine

Tax Court ruling of special interest to church treasurers.

Ferguson v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 244 (1997)

Background. Donors occasionally attempt to “assign” their right to receive income to a church, assuming that they are avoiding any receipt of taxable income.

Example. Rev. T is senior pastor of First Church. He conducts a service at Second Church, and is offered compensation of $500. Rev. T refuses to accept any compensation, and asks the pastor of Second Church to put the $500 in the church’s building fund. Rev. T, and the treasurer at Second Church, assume that there is no income to report. Unfortunately, they may be wrong.

The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in a landmark ruling in 1940. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The Horst case addressed the question of whether or not a father could avoid taxation on bond interest coupons that he transferred to his son prior to the maturity date. The Supreme Court ruled that the father had to pay tax on the interest income even though he assigned all of his interest in the income to his son. It observed: “The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment and hence the realization of the income by him who exercises it.” The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in two other landmark cases. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).

Example. A taxpayer earned an honorarium of $2,500 for speaking at a convention. He requested that the honorarium be distributed to a college. This request was honored, and the taxpayer assumed that he did not have to report the $2,500 as taxable income since he never received it. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer should have reported the $2,500 as taxable income. It noted that “the amount of the honorarium transferred to the educational institution at the taxpayer’s request … is includible in the taxpayer’s gross income [for tax purposes]. However, the taxpayer is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction ….” The IRS further noted that “the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a taxpayer who assigns or transfers compensation for personal services to another individual or entity fails to be relieved of federal income tax liability, regardless of the motivation behind the transfer” (citing the Horst case discussed above). Revenue Ruling 79 121.

A recent Tax Court ruling. The Tax Court has issued an important ruling addressing the assignment of income to a church. Don owned several shares of stock in Company A. On July 28, Company A agreed to merge with Company B. Pursuant to the merger agreement, Company B offered to purchase all outstanding shares of Company A for $22.50 per share (an 1,100% increase over book value). On August 15, Don informed his stockbroker that he wanted to donate 30,000 shares of Company A to his church. On September 8 Don deposited 30,000 shares in his brokerage account and on September 9 signed an authorization directing his broker to transfer the shares to his church. A few days later the church issued Don a receipt acknowledging the contribution. The receipt listed the “date of donation” as September 9. The church sold all of the shares to Company B for $22.50 per share. Don claimed a charitable contribution deduction for $675,000 (30,000 shares at $22.50 per share). He did not report any taxable income in connection with the transaction..

The IRS audited Don, and conceded that a gift of stock had been made to the church. It insisted, however, that Don should have reported the “gain” in the value of his stock that was transferred to the church. Not so, said Don. After all, he never realized or “enjoyed” the gain, but rather transferred the shares to the church to enjoy.

The IRS asserted that Don had a legal right to redeem his Company A shares at $22.50 per share at the time he transferred the shares to the church. As a result, Don had “assigned income” to the church, and could not avoid being taxed on it.

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS. It began its opinion by addressing the date of Don’s gift. Did the gift to the church occur before he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share for his Company A stock? If so, there was no income that had been assigned and no tax to be paid. Or, did Don’s gift occur after he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share? If so, Don had “assigned income” to the church and he would have to pay tax on the gain. The court concluded that Don’s gift occurred after he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share. It quoted the following income tax regulation addressing the timing of gifts of stock:

Ordinarily, a contribution is made at the time delivery is effected …. If a taxpayer unconditionally delivers or mails a properly endorsed stock certificate to a charitable donee or the donee’s agent, the gift is completed on the date of delivery or, if such certificate is received in the ordinary course of the mails, on the date of mailing. If the donor delivers the stock certificate to his bank or broker as the donor’s agent, or to the issuing corporation or its agent, for transfer into the name of the donee, the gift is completed on the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.

The critical issue was whether Don’s broker was acting as Don’s agent or the church’s agent in handling the transaction. The court concluded that the broker had acted as Don’s agent. The broker “facilitated” Don’s gift of stock to the church, and was acting on the basis of Don’s instructions. The court concluded:

[Don has] failed to persuade us that depositing stock in his brokerage account with instructions to [the stockbroker] to transfer some of the stock to the [church] constituted the unconditional delivery of stock to a charitable donee’s agent …. [Don] has failed to persuade us that depositing stock in [his] brokerage account with instructions to [his stockbroker] to transfer some of the stock to the [church] constituted the unconditional delivery of stock to a charitable donee’s agent pursuant to [the regulations] …. Based on the circumstances surrounding the gift … we believe that [the stockbroker] acted as [Don’s] agent in the transfer of the stock and that [he] relinquished control of the stock on September 9 when the letters of authorization were executed, and we so find. The gift to the [church], therefore, was complete on September 9.

The court concluded that on the date of the gift (September 9) Don had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share for all his shares of Company A, and therefore his gift to the church was a fully taxable “assignment of income.” The court observed:

It is a well-established principle of the tax law that the person who earns or otherwise creates the right to receive income is taxed. When ]the right to income has matured at the time of a transfer of property, the transferor will be taxed despite the technical transfer of that property …. An examination of the cases that discuss the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine reveals settled principles. A transfer of property that is a fixed right to income does not shift the incidence of taxation to the transferee …. [T]he ultimate question is whether the transferor, considering the reality and substance of all the circumstances, had a fixed right to income in the property at the time of transfer.

The court concluded that Don did have a “fixed right to income” at the time he donated the 30,000 shares to his church. According to the terms of the merger agreement between Company A and Company B, each outstanding share of Company A was “converted” into a right to receive $22.50 per share in cash. In essence, the stock in Company A “was converted from an interest in a viable corporation to a fixed right to receive cash.”

Conclusions. Here are a few principles for church treasurers to consider:

* Charitable contribution reporting. Note that the “assignment of income” doctrine does not bar recognition of a charitable contribution. Both the Tax Court and IRS conceded that Don was eligible for a charitable contribution deduction as a result of his gift of stock.

* Timing of a gift of stock. This case will provide helpful guidance to church treasurers in determining the date of a gift of stock. The income tax regulations (quoted above) contain the following three rules:

(1) Hand delivery. if a donor unconditionally delivers an endorsed stock certificate to a charity or an agent of a charity, the gift is completed on the date of delivery

(2) Mail. if a donor mails an endorsed stock certificate to a charity or an agent of a charity, the gift is completed on the date of mailing

(3) Delivery to an agent. if a donor delivers a stock certificate to his or her bank or stockbroker as the donor’s agent (or to the issuing corporation or its agent) for transfer into the name of a charity, the gift is completed on the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation

* Notification of income consequences. While certainly not required, church treasurers may want to inform some donors about the assignment of income doctrine. It often comes as a shock to donors (such as Don) to discover that their charitable contribution is “offset” by the taxable income recognized under the assignment of income doctrine. Assignments of income most often occur in connection with donations of stock rights or compensation for services already performed.

* Gifts of appreciated stock not affected. Many donors give stock that has appreciated in value to their church. Such transactions are not affected by the court’s ruling or by the assignment of income doctrine because the donor ordinarily has no “fixed right to income” at the time of transfer. Don’s case was much different. He had a contractual right to receive $22.50 per share for all of his shares of Company A stock as a result of the merger.

Key point. Persons who donate stock often can deduct the fair market value of the stock as a charitable contribution (there are some important limitations to this rule) and they have no “assigned income” to report.

Example. Jill is employed by a local business. Her company declares a $1,000 Christmas bonus. Jill asks her supervisor to send the bonus directly to her church. The supervisor does so. The church treasurer should be aware of the following: (1) Jill will be taxed on the bonus under the assignment of income doctrine. The church treasurer may want to point this out to Jill, although this is not required. There is no need for the church to report this income, or issue Jill a W-2 or 1099. (2) Jill should be given credit for a charitable contribution in the amount of the bonus. Since the bonus was in excess of $250 the receipt issued by the church should comply with the charitable contribution substantiation rules that apply to contributions of $250 or more.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Responding to Allegations of Child Molestation

A Washington state court issues in important ruling-Funkhouser v. Wilson, 950 P.2d 501 (Wash. App. 1998)

Church Law and Tax1998-07-01

Responding to Allegations of Child Molestation

A Washington state court issues in important ruling-Funkhouser v. Wilson, 950 P.2d 501 (Wash. App. 1998)
[ Corporations, Church Officers, Directors, and Trustees,Negligence as a Basis for Liability ]

Article summary. A Washington state court ruled that a church and a member of the church board could be sued by three women who had been molested by a volunteer youth worker when they were minors. The board member had received information indicating that the worker was a child molester, but failed to disclose this information for twenty—three years. The court found that the church had a “special relationship” with minors that imposed upon it a duty to protect them from the criminal and intentional acts of others. This feature article addresses this important ruling and its relevance to church leaders.

A woman calls your church and asks to speak with “someone in authority.” The pastor is out—of—town, so the church secretary refers the caller to a member of the church board who happens to be at the church. The caller informs the board member that a volunteer youth worker in the church is a child molester, and she urges the board member to have the volunteer removed from any position involving contact with children. The board member does not disclose this call to the pastor, the church board, or any other person. Over the next few years the volunteer worker molests the pastor’s three minor daughters. Is the board member legally responsible for the girls’ injuries? What about the church? These were some of the questions addressed by a Washington state court in an important case. This feature article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and evaluate the significance of the case to other churches.

Facts

In 1968 a member of the church board who also served as the church’s youth director (“David”) was at the church when the church secretary received a call from an unknown woman who asked to speak with someone in a position of authority. Since the pastor was not in his office the secretary asked David to take the call. The woman informed the board member that a prominent church leader (“Bob”) who had served as a member of the board of deacons, Sunday School teacher, and vacation Bible school director, was a child molester. The purpose of her call was to warn the church that Bob posed a risk of harm to children in the congregation. David advised the woman to file charges with the police, and asked that she “keep the church informed.” He did not inform anyone of the woman’s accusation until some twenty—three years later. However, he was concerned enough about what the woman told him that he felt it was his duty as the church’s youth director to “keep an eye” on Bob.

In 1969 the church employed a new pastor who had three minor daughters. Between 1969 and 1973 the two older girls were repeatedly molested by Bob. Most of these acts occurred in Bob’s home where he and his wife served as “babysitters” for the girls while the pastor and his wife traveled on church—related business. David was aware of the babysitting arrangement, but said nothing to the pastor regarding the risk Bob posed to the girls.

In 1974 the pastor and his family moved to another state to accept another pastoral position. During this time the church’s new pastor (the “successor pastor”) received information from Bob’s daughter—in—law that Bob had sexually molested his granddaughter in 1974. The successor pastor also learned from the sheriff’s office that a warrant had been issued for Bob’s arrest on charges of child molestation. The successor pastor immediately called a state denominational agency and asked an official what he should do with this information. The official allegedly advised him to “let it be and see what happens.” He also asked the successor pastor to keep him informed. In response to the successor’s question about removing Bob from the church board, the official replied “why hang your dirty wash out?” Neither the successor pastor nor the denominational official with whom he had spoken ever told anyone in the local church that Bob was a child molester.

In 1978 the former pastor and his family returned to their previous congregation. By this time the pastor’s two older daughters had grown up and moved away from home. The youngest daughter was eleven years old. Like her sisters, she was repeatedly molested by Bob in his home and on at least one occasion on church premises.

The sisters claimed that they “suppressed” their memories of Bob’s abuse for many years. In 1991 the youngest sister became fully aware of the abuse in the course of psychological counseling. She and her sisters then informed their father of the countless times they had been molested. It was only then, some twenty—two years after the first incidents of molestation occurred, that their father learned the truth. The pastor disclosed the allegations to David out of a concern that David’s own daughters may have been molested. David then disclosed the telephone call he had received from the woman some twenty—three years ago. The pastor and his daughters then learned that the successor pastor and the denominational agency had become aware of Bob’s propensities but did nothing to intervene.

In 1994 the three sisters sued David, the church, and the denominational agency that had counseled the successor pastor about Bob.

David (the church board member)

The sisters claimed that David was liable on two grounds. First, he had received information that Bob “had a prior history of child sexual abuse but negligently failed to investigate in order to substantiate the accusation against him, or to prevent him from being installed in church leadership positions that gave [him] unlimited access to and significant authority over children of the church.” Second, David “negligently and intentionally” failed to warn the girls’ father about Bob, thereby preventing him from protecting his daughters.

The local church

The sisters claimed that their church “negligently failed to protect them from abuse” despite David’s knowledge of Bob’s history of child abuse.

The denominational agency

The youngest sister claimed that the denominational agency “negligently failed to protect her” from Bob’s sexual abuse despite knowing of his disposition to sexually abuse children.

A trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and the sisters appealed.

The court’s decision

The court’s decision addressed a fundamental question-can an individual or church ever be legally responsible for not disclosing the dangerous propensities of another person? Consider the following examples:

Example. A mother informs a member of the church board that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The board member does nothing about the allegation. The same volunteer later molests another child. Is the board member legally responsible for the injuries suffered by the second victim? Did the board member have a legal duty to protect other children from harm?

Example. A church member informs her pastor that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The pastor confronts the youth worker, who leaves the church. A few weeks later the pastor learns that the youth worker has begun working with children in another church. The other church never asks the pastor for a reference or any other information concerning the youth worker. The pastor is concerned, but does not contact the other church. Later in the year it is disclosed that the youth worker molested a child in the other church. Is the pastor legally responsible for this incident? Did the pastor have a legal duty to inform the other church of the youth worker’s prior misconduct so that it could protect children from harm?

These are questions of fundamental importance to church leaders, and they were addressed directly by the court in this case.

The court began its opinion by noting that “as a general rule, there is no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.” However, it referred to two exceptions to this general rule:

(1) Special relationship. A church may have a duty to prevent a third person from causing physical harm to another if (i) a “special relationship” exists between the church and the third person which imposes upon the church a duty to control the third person’s conduct, or (ii) a “special relationship” exists between the church and the victim which imposes upon the church a duty to “protect” the victim from harm.

(2) Duty to warn. A church or church leader may be negligent by failing to warn another church that an individual represents a risk of harm to others, if the church or church leader should recognize that the failure to warn “involves an unreasonable risk of harm” to others-even if the risk involves criminal conduct. Since the court concluded that David, the church, and the denominational agency were liable on the basis of a “special relationship,” it did not determine whether or not they were also liable on the basis of a failure to warn.

special relationship-between the defendants and Bob

Did a “special relationship” exist between any of the three defendants (David, the church, and denominational agency) and Bob? If so, that defendant had a legal duty to control Bob’s conduct. If this duty was violated by failing to adequately control Bob, then the defendant would be liable for Bob’s acts of molestation.

The court noted that a “duty to control” will be imposed “only upon a showing of a definite, established and continuing relationship between the defendant and the [wrongdoer],” and that “cases in which such a duty has been established … have uniformly involved situations where the person charged with the duty of control has some sort of legal authority to control the [wrongdoer’s] conduct.”

The sisters insisted that a special relationship did exist between the three defendants and Bob which imposed upon the church a duty to “control” him. They pointed out that Bob was a “deacon” of his church, and then noted that the church constitution “recited the obligations of church members and leaders to comply with the highest standards of behavior and deportment, including the obligation to nurture those under their care and to live exemplary lifestyles.” According to the church constitution, deacons are to be “men of dignity [and] beyond reproach.” The pastor and deacons are charged with the responsibility of interviewing and disciplining members who violate their Christian obligations. The constitution contains provisions for formal disciplinary proceedings. The sisters further noted that the deacon board was expected to address issues concerning the welfare of the children in the church and to warn church members about dangers or risks presented by any church members who were “wayward or destructive in their actions (if such a situation were to arise).” They insisted that David and the church, by virtue of the church constitution, “voluntarily assumed a duty which included active intervention if one of the church members became a source of danger to other church members.”

The court rejected the sisters’ arguments, and concluded that neither David, the church, nor the denominational agency exercised sufficient control over Bob to create a “special relationship” that would impose a duty to control his behavior. Among other things, the court pointed out that the church’s disciplinary process could be triggered only upon receipt of a formal, written charge of misconduct. The woman’s telephone call in 1968 did not satisfy this requirement. Further, the church’s alleged “control” over Bob “was weaker than the usual employer—employee relationship would allow.”

Special relationship-between the defendants and the three sisters

The court noted that there is a second exception to the general rule that a church (or any other person or institution) has no legal duty to protect others from criminal acts of third persons. While a special relationship did not exist between the defendants and Bob imposing upon the defendants a duty to control his behavior, a special relationship also could arise between the defendants and the three sisters which would impose upon them a legal duty to protect the sisters from harm. If such a special relationship existed, then it may have been violated by the failure of the defendants to investigate or disclose Bob’s background. In other words, does a special relationship exist between churches and children who participate in their programs and activities? The court concluded that such a relationship did exist:

[W]e believe that churches and the adult church workers who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children of the congregation, whether as paid clergy or as volunteers, have a special relationship with those children that gives rise to a duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over them. In each of the protective special relationships considered by the Washington courts to date, one party has, in some sense, been entrusted with the well being of another. The entrustment aspect is what appears to us to underlie the imposition of the additional duty to protect someone from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.

The church then rejected the following defenses offered by David and the church:

(1) Courts should not apply contemporary understandings of child abuse to incidents occurring many years ago. David and the church insisted that much more is understood today about child sexual abuse than was understood in 1968 when the church received the telephone call concerning Bob. They also claimed that the information given by the caller was ambiguous, and that David reasonably could have believed that Bob was being accused only of having made unwanted advances of an immoral nature to a teenage girl rather than of molesting a child. The court was not convinced, noting that David was alarmed enough by the call to “keep an eye” on Bob for the protection of children in the church. Further, the court concluded that the call was not “anonymous” since the woman identified herself by name and expressed concern for the safety of children in the church.

(2) There was nothing the church could have done with the information provided by the telephone call in 1968. David and the church claimed that there is little they could have done with the information provided by the caller in 1968 since it was not a written accusation that would have triggered the possibility of formal disciplinary action under the church’s bylaws. And, they insisted that they could have been sued for defamation had they issued any warnings to the congregation based on the content of the telephone call. The court disagreed, noting that there would have been no defamation had David or the church warned the pastor that his daughters were in danger while Bob was serving as their babysitter.

(3) Most if not all of the molestation occurred in Bob’s home, and not on church premises. David and the church pointed out at least two of the daughters were never molested on church property or in the course of any church activity. The court did not consider this relevant. It noted that the daughters were alleging that the defendants were liable because they breached the duty of protection that arose as a result of the special relationship between the daughters and their church. The fact that the daughters were molested in Bob’s home did not matter. The court observed:

[T]he duty of reasonable care was breached when [David] not only failed to notify [the pastor] of the warning [he] had received but also failed to take any action that would have prevented [Bob] from continuing to serve in leadership roles in the church that gave him responsibility for the spiritual well being of the children of the congregation and that may have inspired trust by parents and children alike in [Bob’s] morality. There is also evidence in the record that [David] knew that [the pastor] had called upon [Bob] to baby—sit the [daughters] so that the pastor could travel on church business; yet he failed to warn [the pastor] that [Bob] might be a child molester.

Statute of limitations

The trial court had dismissed the claims of the youngest daughter on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Washington has a three—year statute of limitations for negligence cases, although the statute does not begin to run for injuries occurring to minors until their eighteenth birthday. The appeals court conceded that the youngest daughter’s lawsuit had been filed more than three years after her eighteenth birthday, but it insisted that she was protected by the so—called “discovery rule.” Under the discovery rule a lawsuit does not “accrue” (and the statute of limitations does not begin to run) until a person “knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, all the essential elements of the cause of action.”

The court acknowledged that the youngest daughter had always recalled some of the acts of abuse against her and had always known that they harmed her to some extent. The church and denominational agency argued that because she always remembered some of the acts and corresponding injuries, the statute of limitations began running when she turned eighteen. The court disagreed:

The issue, however, is not when [the daughter] discovered [Bob’s] intentional tort, but when she discovered or should have discovered the elements of her negligence claims against the [defendants]. This, in turn, depended on her finding out that information about [Bob’s] history of sexually molesting children had been given to the [defendants] on two separate occasions before she was molested, and that they failed to warn her father or otherwise take reasonable steps to protect her from abuse by [Bob] ….

[T]he same factors that are likely to delay recognition of the full extent of injury inflicted by the perpetrator of sexual abuse are likely to delay discovery that the abuse might have been prevented if persons having a special relationship with the child had not breached a duty to protect the child from the abuse. Here, there is evidence that although [the youngest daughter] always knew that [Bob] had molested her, she suppressed the memory of the worst of the abuse until she was in therapy. Only after receiving therapy was she able to disclose the abuse to her father. Her disclosure to her father led to the discovery of her cause of action against the [defendants] only by happenstance. [The pastor] disclosed the abuse to [David] because he was concerned for the welfare of [David’s] daughters; he did not set out to discover a cause of action by his daughters against the [defendants] or any of them by making that initial disclosure. Indeed, we believe that a [jury] could conclude that the failure of church leaders to take reasonable steps to protect children of the congregation from sexual abuse by another church leader whom they believe to have molested even one child, let alone more than one, is so far beyond the pale of expected human behavior that due diligence simply does not require that an inquiry be made as to whether church leadership concealed their knowledge instead of taking reasonable steps to protect the children of the congregation.

The court rejected the defendants’ claim that the daughter failed to exercise due diligence by failing to inform her father of the abuse: “We decline to rule as a matter of law that [she] failed to exercise due diligence by failing to disclose the abuse to her father until 1991. The [defendants] may wish to make that argument to a jury, if they can find no more logical basis for arguing a lack of due diligence, but we are not persuaded as a matter of law that [the daughter] failed to exercise due diligence.”

Significance of the case to other churches

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? A decision by a Washington state appeals court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. Personal liability of board members for failing to act. The most important aspect of this case was the court’s conclusion that churches as well as “adult church workers” have a “special relationship” with children that gives rise to a “duty to protect” those children from harm. The court observed:

[W]e believe that churches and the adult church workers who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children of the congregation, whether as paid clergy or as volunteers, have a special relationship with those children that gives rise to a duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over them.

This is an extraordinary conclusion. It exposes church leaders to liability for failing to protect children against “reasonably foreseeable risks of harm” by volunteer or paid youth workers. In this case, David (the church board member) could be sued because he breached his duty to protect the three girls from the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm associated with Bob. Of course, the church can be sued in such cases too. But the critical point is that those church leaders “who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” have a duty to protect children and they can be personally liable for breaching that duty.

Key point. Basing personal liability on a failure to protect children from foreseeable harm makes the location of acts of child molestation irrelevant. Most of the incidents in this case occurred in Bob’s home. The court concluded that this did not affect David’s responsibility for the girls’ injuries.

Let’s address each of the examples presented earlier in this article in light of this ruling:

Example. A mother informs a member of the church board that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The board member does nothing about the allegation. The same volunteer later molests another child. Is the board member legally responsible for the injuries suffered by the second victim? According to the Washington court’s decision, the answer is probably yes. The board member likely has “assumed responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” as a member of the church board, and this responsibility gave rise to a “duty to protect” children in the church from any “reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over [children].” It is possible if not likely that any court following the Washington court’s ruling would conclude that this duty was breached by the board member’s failure to intervene after being informed by a mother that her minor child had been molested by the volunteer youth worker.

Example. A church member informs her pastor that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The pastor confronts the youth worker, who leaves the church. A few weeks later the pastor learns that the youth worker has begun working with children in another church. The other church never asks the pastor for a reference or any other information concerning the youth worker. The pastor is concerned, but does not contact the other church. Later in the year it is disclosed that the youth worker molested a child in the other church. Is the pastor legally responsible for this incident? According to the Washington court’s decision, the answer is probably yes. The pastor likely has “assumed responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” as a result of his position in the church, and this responsibility gave rise to a “duty to protect” children in the church from any “reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over [children].” It is possible if not likely that any court following the Washington court’s ruling would conclude that this duty was breached by the pastor’s failure to intervene after being informed by the parent that her minor child had been molested by the volunteer youth worker.

2. Avoiding personal liability. What steps can church leaders take to reduce the risk of personal liability after receiving information suggesting that a youth worker poses a risk of harm to children in the church? The court responded to this question as follows:

[T]he duty of reasonable care was breached when [David] not only failed to notify [the pastor] of the warning [he] had received but also failed to take any action that would have prevented [Bob] from continuing to serve in leadership roles in the church that gave him responsibility for the spiritual well being of the children of the congregation and that may have inspired trust by parents and children alike in [Bob’s] morality. There is also evidence in the record that [David] knew that [the pastor] had called upon [Bob] to baby—sit the [daughters] so that the pastor could travel on church business; yet he failed to warn [the pastor] that [Bob] might be a child molester.

In summary, the court concluded that a board member (such as David) can satisfy the “duty to protect” children and avoid personal liability by:

• warning potential victims (or their parents), and

• “preventing” an alleged molester from working with children in the church

3. What about defamation claims? The court rejected the argument that “notifying” potential victims of a known risk would be defamatory. It concluded that notifying the pastor that his three girls were being exposed to risk by their association with Bob would not be defamatory-presumably because only one person was being informed.

4. Is there a duty to inform the entire congregation? As so often happens, the court’s decision left unanswered a few critical questions. One of those questions is whether or not church leaders should “notify” an entire congregation that a known or suspected child molester is in their midst. For example, what if a person with a prior conviction for child molestation wants to teach Sunday School? Or, what if such a person merely wants to attend the church? Are board members and pastors personally responsible for this person’s actions unless they notify the entire congregation of his background? This is a very difficult question. Note that the court concluded that the risk of liability can be reduced if church leaders refuse to permit such a person to work with children in the church. In addition, the court suggested that church leaders can reduce the risk of liability by notifying individual victims or their parents. If the potential molester is not allowed to work with children in the church this will minimize the need for notification. However, as this case illustrates, it may not eliminate it altogether. Remember that most of Bob’s acts of molestation occurred off of church premises in his own home. Yet, the court found David (the board member) personally liable because of his failure to notify the victims’ father. What does this mean? It suggests that church leaders who are aware that a known or suspected child molester is “babysitting” or entertaining children from the church in his home have a duty to notify the children’s parents of the risk of harm. This is exactly what David failed to do, and he was found personally liable because of it.

Further, note that the risk of defamation of invasion of privacy is reduced if not eliminated if parents are informed only of a criminal conviction that is a matter of public record.

Key point. Church leaders should consult with an attorney before disclosing to anyone that a known or suspected child molester poses a risk of harm.

5. The church’s constitution or bylaws. The court rejected the victims’ attempt to impute liability to the church and David on the basis of the church constitution. The victims pointed out that the church constitution called upon members to comply with the highest standards of behavior, and charged the board with responsibility for disciplining members who violate those standards. A specific procedure for disciplining members also was set forth in the constitution. The court concluded that these provisions were not sufficient to impose liability on David or the church for Bob’s actions. It noted that the church’s disciplinary process could be triggered only upon receipt of a formal, written charge of misconduct, and that the woman’s telephone call in 1968 did not satisfy this requirement.

This conclusion will be good news for many churches. It is common for church constitutions to contain similar provisions, and this case will be helpful in rebutting any attempt to use such provisions as a basis for church liability.

6. The “discovery rule.” Another aspect of the court’s ruling that should be of special interest to church leaders is its expansive interpretation of the statute of limitations. Even though the youngest daughter was well aware of her injuries on her eighteenth birthday, the court ruled that the statute of limitations did not begin to “run” until she became aware of the legal basis for her claims against David and the church. This did not occur until she learned of the information that had been communicated with David about the alleged risk that Bob presented. Only then did she “discover” her legal claim, and so it was then that the statute of limitations began to run.

This ruling greatly extends the statute of limitations on child molestation claims-at least when church leaders fail to disclose or act upon information that a youth worker is a known or suspected child molester.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m67 m86 m56 m10 c0498

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

What Church Treasurers Should Know about IRS Form 8282

Part 2 – your church transfers donated property to another church or charity

Background. In last month’s Church Treasurer Alert! we addressed Form 8282, and we learned that churches should file this form if they meet the following requirements: (1) a donor makes a contribution of noncash property to the church that is valued at more than $5,000 (other than publicly traded securities); (2) the donor presented the church with a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) for signature; (3) the church sells, exchanges, consumes, or otherwise disposes of the donated property within two years of the date of contribution; (4) the church did not consume the donated property or distribute it without charge to another organization or individual in furtherance of the church’s tax-exempt purposes.

Last month’s issue assumed that your church received the donated property directly from the original donor, and disposed of it within two years of the date of the contribution. There are two additional situations that need to be addressed—what happens if your church transfers donated property to another church, and what if your church receives donated property not from the original donor but from another church? These two issues will be addressed in turn.

Your church transfers the property to another church. Your church may decide to transfer donated property to another church or charity. This can happen in three ways. First, you sell the property to the other church or charity. Second, you give the property to the other church or charity in a way that does not further your own exempt purposes. Third, you give the property to the other church or charity in a way that does further your exempt purposes. Church treasurers need to be familiar with how the Form 8282 reporting rules apply in each of these cases.

(1) Your church sells the property to another church or charity. Your church will need to file a Form 8282 with the IRS (assuming the conditions summarized above are met). See last month’s newsletter for the details. There are no additional requirements. You do not need to share any information with the other church, and it does not need to file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the original donor’s contribution to your church.

(2) Your church donates the property to another church or charity—not in furtherance of your church’s exempt purposes. In some cases a church receives donated property from the original donor and then gives it to another church or charity in a transaction that does not further its exempt purposes. To illustrate, assume that your church receives a donated car from a member and you give the car to a local charity that is not organized for the same exempt purposes as your church. You are required to file Form 8282 if you donate the car to the other charity within two years of receiving it from the original donor (assuming the conditions summarized above are met). Note that you will complete all of Part 1 (you identify the other charity on lines 2a-2d). In addition, you are required to give the other charity the following information:

  • The name, address, and employer identification number of your church. In general, this information must be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).
  • A copy of the qualified appraisal summary (the Form 8283 you received from the original donor). In general, this information must be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).
  • A copy of the Form 8282 that your church filed with the IRS within 15 days after you file it.

(3) Your church donates the property to another church or charity—in furtherance of your church’s exempt purposes. Your church may receive donated property from the original donor and then give it to another church in furtherance of your exempt purposes. In such a case your church is exempted from the Form 8282 filing requirement (see last month’s article). To illustrate, assume that your church receives a donated car from a member and you give the car to another church that is financially needy. Since this donation directly furthers your religious purposes, your church is not required to file Form 8282. The instructions to Form 8282 specify that “you do not have to file Form 8282 if an item is … distributed, without consideration, in fulfilling your purpose of function as a tax-exempt organization.”

But what about the other church? Is it exempted from the Form 8282 filing requirement? Unfortunately, the tax code, regulations, case law, and instructions to Form 8282 do not address this issue directly. The instructions to Form 8282 simply state that a “successor donee” must file a Form 8282 if it disposes of donated property within two years of the date of the original contribution. But the instructions assume that you gave the other charity a copy of your Form 8282 within 15 days after you filed it with the IRS. The problem is that your church was not required to file a Form 8282 and so there is no form to give the other church and the “15 day” requirement has no meaning.

Until further clarification is provided by the IRS, the best answer is that the other church is subject to the Form 8282 filing requirement if it disposes of the car within two years of the date it was given to your church by the original donor. You should provide the other church with the following information to assist it in complying with this requirement:

  • A copy of the qualified appraisal summary (the Form 8283 you received from the original donor).
  • An “unofficial” copy of Form 8282. Identify your church at the top of the form and then complete all of Part I and Part III. “Unofficial” means that your church did not file the form with the IRS.

In general, this information should be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).

Your church receives property from another church. What are your reporting obligations if you receive donated property from another church or charity? That will depend on the circumstances. Consider the following:

(1) Your church purchased property donated to another church or charity. Assume that John donated property to First Church, and that First Church sold the property to your church within two years after receiving it from John. First Church would need to file a Form 8282 with the IRS (assuming that the conditions summarized above are met). But your church is not required to file a Form 8282 even it disposes of the property within two years after the date of John’s original gift.

(2) Another church gives donated property to your church, but not in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The other church should file a Form 8282 if it transfers the property to your church within two years of the date it received the donated property (and the other conditions summarized above are met). Your church has the following obligations:

  • First, it must file Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the date it was given to the other church by the original donor. Of course, as noted above, the other church is required to provide you with information that will assist you in complying with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.
  • Second, your church should provide the other church with its name, address, and employer identification number within 15 days of the later of the date it received the property or the date it received a copy of the original donor’s qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) from the other church.


Tip. If another church donates property to your church, be sure to ask the following questions in order to determine if you will need to file a Form 8282: (1) Was the property donated to your church by the original donor? (2) If so, did the donor ask your church to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B)? (3) Did your church donate the property to our church within two years of the date of the original gift? (4) If so, did you file a Form 8282 with the IRS?

(3) Another church gives donated property to your church in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The other church is not required to file a Form 8282. However, as noted above, your church should file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the date it was given by the original donor to the other church.


Tip. Your church is not required to file a Form 8282 unless all of the requirements discussed at the beginning of this article are met. Further, your church is exempt from this requirement if it disposes of the donated property without charge in furtherance of its exempt purposes.

Examples. The following examples will illustrate the main points in this article.

Example. Jill donated a car to First Church on November 1, 1997. She obtained a qualified appraisal (that valued the car at $7,500), and she had the church sign her qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B). On July 1, 1998, First Church sold the car to Second Church, and on October 1, 1998 Second Church sells the car to a third party. First Church has to file a Form 8282, but Second Church does not.

Example. Same facts as the previous example except that the car was valued at only $3,500 and Jill did not obtain a qualified appraisal. Neither First Church nor Second Church is required to file Form 8282.

Example. John donated a car to First Church on July 1, 1997. He obtained a qualified appraisal (that valued the car at $9,500), and he had the church sign his qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B). First Church donates the car to Second Church on May 1, 1998, in furtherance of its religious purposes. First Church is not required to file Form 8282. Second Church will have to file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the car within two years of the date John gave it to First Church—unless it does so at no charge in direct furtherance of its exempt purposes. How will Second Church know the date of the original gift? First Church is required to provide Second Church with the following information that will assist Second Church in complying with the Form 8282 reporting requirement: (1) its name, address, and employer identification number, and a copy of John’s qualified appraisal summary, within 15 days after the later of the date it transferred the car to Second Church, or the date it signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B); (2) an “unofficial” copy of Form 8282. If First Church does not provide this information, then Second Church should request it.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Second Church does not dispose of the car until December of 1999. Since this is more than two years after John donated the car to First Church, Second Church is not required to file Form 8282.

Example. If Second Church gives the car to another church, at no charge, in furtherance of its religious purposes, then it will not need to file a Form 8282 even if the disposition occurred within two years of the date John made the original gift to First Church.

Conclusions. This article has reviewed what church treasurers need to know about Form 8282–when their church receives a gift of noncash property from another church or when it disposes of property to another church or charity. In summary, be aware that you may have to file a Form 8282 anytime that another church or charity donates property to your church. Also, note that if your church gives donated property to another church or charity, you may need to provide the other church or charity with the information summarized in this article.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

What Church Treasurers Should Know about IRS Form 8282

Part 1 – your church receives a gift of property from a donor.

Churches that receive a contribution of noncash property may be required to file a Form 8282 with the IRS. Not many church leaders are familiar with this form. This article will provide you with the information you need to comply with this reporting requirement.

Purpose of the form. The purpose of Form 8282 is to ensure that donors do not claim inflated values for property they donate to charity.

When is the form required? Your church is required to file Form 8282 with the IRS if you meet certain conditions. The following checklist will help you to quickly determine if your church needs to file this form.

Checklist #1

your church receives a gift of noncash property from the original donor

STEP #1. Did the donor present the church with a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) for signature? In general, any donor who claims a charitable contribution deduction of more than $5,000 for any gift of noncash property (other than publicly traded securities) to a church or charity must obtain a qualified appraisal of the donated property and then complete a qualified appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283, Part B). The appraisal summary is attached to the tax return on which the charitable contribution deduction is claimed. Churches receiving contributions of property valued by the donor at more than $5,000 must complete and sign Part IV of Section B of the donor’s Form 8283 appraisal summary.

No. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

Don’t know. You will need more information. Ask donors who gave noncash property to the church with a potential value of more than $5,000 whether or not they obtained a qualified appraisal and submitted a qualified appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283, Part B) to the church for signature.

Yes. Go to step 2.

STEP #2. Did the church sell, exchange, consume, or otherwise dispose of the donated property within two years of the date of contribution?

No. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

Don’t know. Check the church’s records, and talk with the donor if necessary, to determine the date the property was contributed. Once the date of contribution is established, determine if the church sold, exchanged, consumed, or otherwise disposed of the property within two years of the date of contribution.

Yes. Go to step 3.

STEP #3. Does an exception apply? A Form 8282 does not need to be filed if either or both of the following exceptions apply: (1) Form 8282 does not need to be filed if a church consumes the donated property or distributes it without charge to another organization or individual. The consumption or distribution must be in furtherance of the church’s tax exempt purposes. (2) If at the time the church signed the appraisal summary (see Step 1) the donor had signed a statement on the appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part II) that the appraised value of the donated property was not more than $500. This exception will apply if a donor contributes several similar items of property (having a combined value in excess of $5,000) to a church during a calendar year, and the church disposes of or consumes one item that is separately valued by the donor at $500 or less.

No. Go to step 4.

Don’t know. Review the instructions to Form 8283 (Section B, Part II), and also the instructions to Form 8282. Note that the instructions to Form 8283 are a separate IRS document, while the instructions to Form 8282 are contained on the back side of the form itself.

Yes. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

STEP #4. You must file Form 8282 (only Parts I and III) within 125 days of the date you disposed of the property. There is an exception. If you did not file a Form 8282 because you had no reason to believe that the qualified appraisal requirement applied to a donor, but you later learned that it did apply, you must file Form 8282 within 60 days of learning of your obligation to file.


Key point. In the next issue of this newsletter we will address a related issue—what happens if a donor contributes property to a church, obtains a qualified appraisal and completes a qualified appraisal summary, but the church gives the property to another church or charity within two years of the date of the gift? Does the Form 8282 filing requirement “transfer” to the second church?


Key point. The Internal Revenue Manual (the IRS administrative manual) states that the tax return of any donor who contributes property valued at more than $5,000 to a charity should be selected for examination by the IRS if no Form 8282 is filed by the church. IRM 4175.2. Obviously, it is now more important than ever for churches to comply with this important filing obligation.

Miscellaneous rules. Here are a few additional considerations that will assist you in properly completing Form 8282.

  • Missing information. The instructions to Form 8282 specify that you must complete at least “column a” of Part III. If you do not have enough information to complete the other columns, you may leave them blank. This may occur if you did not keep a copy of the donor’s appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B).
  • Where to file. Send the completed Form 8282 to the Internal Revenue Service Center, Cincinnati, Ohio 46944.
  • Informing the donor. You must provide the donor with a copy of the Form 8282 you filed with the IRS.

Examples. The following examples illustrate the 4 steps summarized in the checklist.

Example. A member contributes a house to her church on July 1, 1998. The church sells the property on November 1, 1998. The church must complete and file Form 8282 with the IRS within 125 days of the date of sale, and also mail a copy to the donor.

Example. A member contributed a car to his church on October 1, 1997. The car had an apparent value in excess of $5,000, but the church is never asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV). The church sells the car on July 1, 1998. It is not required to file Form 8282. See Step 1.

Example. A member contributed a car to her church on May 1, 1998. The car had an apparent value in excess of $5,000. The church sells the car on June 1, 1998, for $8,000. The church was never asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV), and so it does not file a Form 8282. See Step 1. However, on November 1, 1998 the donor provides the church treasurer with a qualified appraisal summary for signature. Since November 1 is more than 125 days following the church’s disposition of the car, the filing deadline for Form 8282 was missed. However, an exception permits the church to file a Form 8282 within 60 days of learning that it is required to file the form. Since the church treasurer had no reason to believe that a Form 8282 was required until the donor presented the qualified appraisal summary on November 1, the church has 60 days from that date to file the form.

Example. A member contributes several shares of publicly traded stock to his church in July of 1998. The stock has a market value of $15,000. The church sells the stock within a few weeks. It is not required to file a Form 8282 because it will not be asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV). The qualified appraisal summary requirement does not apply to gifts of publicly traded stock. Note that the qualified appraisal and Form 8282 requirements are designed to ensure that donors claim fair valuations for contributions of noncash property. In the case of publicly traded stock, the valuation is determined each business day by the stock market. There is no question as to proper valuation. As a result, the qualified appraisal summary and Form 8282 requirements do not apply.

Example. A member contributes a car to her church in June of 1998. In November, the member has a church board member sign a qualified appraisal summary on behalf of the church. The board member is not familiar with this requirement, and so does not inform the pastor, church treasurer, or any other member of the board. In January of 1999 the church sells the car. The church treasurer is familiar with the Form 8282 requirement, but does not file this form after the car is sold because he was never informed that the church had signed a qualified appraisal summary. This is a very real problem that can occur in any church. There are a number of ways to prevent this from happening. For example, the church could establish a written policy requiring a designated person (such as the senior pastor or church treasurer) to sign any qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283) on behalf of the church, and requiring a log or journal to be made of each qualified appraisal summary that is signed. If such a policy is clearly communicated to all staff and board members it is unlikely that the church will fail to comply with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.

Example. A member donates a car to his church in June of 1998. The church issues the member a receipt acknowledging the contribution. The church uses the car for three years before selling it. It is not required to file Form 8282 because it did not dispose of the car within 2 years of the date of gift. See Step 2.

Example. A member donates a car to his church in June of 1998. The next month the church board votes to give the car to the pastor. If the donor asks the church to sign a qualified appraisal summary then the church will be required to file a Form 8282 with the IRS. Part III, column e, would simply report “0” as the amount received upon disposition.

Example. A local business contributes food to a church for distribution to the needy. The church is not required to file a Form 8282 even if it is asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary by the donor. The Form 8282 requirement does not apply if a church distributes donated property without charge to another organization or individual in furtherance of the church’s tax exempt purposes.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church distributes the donated food to its members. The Form 8282 reporting requirement may apply. While the donated food is distributed without charge to church members, this may not further the church’s tax-exempt purposes unless the congregation is predominantly poor.

Conclusions. This article has reviewed what church treasurers need to know about Form 8282—when the church receives a gift of noncash property directly from the original donor. Different rules apply when a church receives donated property from another church or charity. Those rules will be addressed in next month’s newsletter.

In summary, be alert to any donation of property that may be valued by the donor at $5,000 or more. Be sure the donor is aware of the need to obtain a qualified appraisal and complete a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B). It is a good practice to have some of these forms on hand to give to such donors. And, as noted above, designate one person to sign all qualified appraisal summaries on behalf of the church, inform the church board and staff of this policy, and make a record of each of these forms that is signed. This will help to ensure that the church is in full compliance with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Substantiating “Ticketless Travel”

The IRS issues a helpful ruling.

IRS Letter Ruling 9805007

The problem. For the past few years most airlines have offered passengers the option of “ticketless travel.” A few airlines have switched completely to this arrangement. The concept is simple. A passenger makes a reservation and the airline or travel agency makes an electronic record of the reservation that is stored in the airline’s computer system. The airline or travel agency collects the fare and instead of providing the passenger with a ticket issues an itinerary of the travel plus a receipt document. Often, the receipt is incorporated into the itinerary. The itinerary and receipt contain the following information: name of passenger; flight itinerary (airline name, flight number, date of flight, departure and arrival time, origin and destination airports); amount of air fare and taxes; form of payment; name of credit card and credit card holder for credit card charges. The itinerary and receipt usually are sent to the passenger by email or fax. The passenger does not receive a paper ticket or paper receipt.

Let’s assume that your pastor travels by air to a conference or seminar in another state using ticketless travel. Let’s further assume that your church has an “accountable” business expense reimbursement arrangement. Will the itinerary and receipt issued by the travel agent or airline be an adequate substantiation of your pastor’s air fare? Or, must the pastor produce additional evidence? Given the growing popularity of ticketless travel, it is important for church treasurers to be familiar with the answers to these questions. The IRS addressed this issue in a recent ruling.

What the IRS said. The IRS noted that the tax code denies a business expense deduction for any travel expense (including air fare) unless the taxpayer substantiates the expense by adequate records or other sufficient evidence. These records must substantiate the amount, time, place, and business purpose of each travel expense. In addition, receipts are required to substantiate the amount of any expense of $75 or more. Does an itinerary and receipt issued by a travel agent or airline for a ticketless trip satisfy these requirements? Yes, ruled the IRS. It noted that the tax code “does not specify the precise form of the documentary evidence” and “there is no requirement that documentary evidence must consist of original documents and no prohibition against documentary evidence in the form of” faxes or email.

The IRS concluded that an itinerary and receipt document provided to a passenger constitutes sufficient substantiation of a business travel expense under an accountable reimbursement arrangement–so long as the document “contains the amount, date, place and essential character” of the expense. Of course, an itinerary and receipt will seldom document the business nature of a trip, and so this must be proven in other ways in order to satisfy the requirements of an accountable reimbursement.


Key point. The good news is that the IRS is not requiring that ticketless travelers produce an actual air fare receipt or ticket in order to substantiate their air fare under an accountable reimbursement arrangement.


Example. Rev. G travels by air to a conference in another state, using ticketless travel. His travel agent faxes him an itinerary and receipt document confirming the price of the ticket along with the dates and destination of travel. Assuming that the church has adopted an accountable expense reimbursement arrangement, the itinerary and receipt document will provide adequate substantiation of the amount, place, and date of travel. However, Rev. G still will need to substantiate the business purpose of the trip in order to satisfy the requirements of an accountable reimbursement arrangement. This can be done in a number of ways. For example, Rev. G could provide the church treasurer with a copy of his conference registration form or a copy of a conference workbook or agenda that was distributed at the conference.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Risks of Inaction

An Ohio court issues an important ruling-Evans v. Ohio State University, 680 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio 1996) [Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Church Law and Tax1998-05-01

The Risks of Inaction

An Ohio court issues an important ruling-Evans v. Ohio State University, 680 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio 1996) [Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Article summary. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the 4—H organization was not responsible for the molestation of a girl by a 4—H volunteer despite the fact that 4—H officials were aware that he was a convicted child molester when they decided to use him. The court stressed that the incident occurred in the volunteer’s home and not in the course of any official 4—H activity. The court’s opinion provides useful guidance in predicting when a church or other agency that cares for children may be legally responsible for a volunteer’s acts of child molestation occurring outside of officially sanctioned activities or programs.

A pastor receives an anonymous letter informing him that a youth worker in his church was convicted of child molestation several years ago. The pastor shares this information with the church board. The board decides that no action needs to be taken since the worker is involved in group activities that are “in the open.” Besides, other adult workers are almost always present. A few months later the worker invites a young girl in the youth group to his home and molests her. The girl and her parents sue the church. Is the church legally responsible for the molester’s behavior? Was it negligent? These were the issues before an Ohio court in a recent case. While the case involved a non—religious charity (4—H), the court’s decision is of direct relevance to church leaders. This feature article will review the facts of this unfortunate case, discuss the court’s ruling, and evaluate the relevance of the case to churches and church leaders.

Facts

In 1981 a man (the “defendant”) became a volunteer advisor for a local 4—H club in Ohio. He had two children in the 4—H program at the time. In 1984 the defendant was convicted of gross sexual imposition and corruption of a minor. He served two years in prison and was released in 1987. In 1988 he again became involved in 4—H activities. Some 4—H volunteers were aware of the criminal conviction and prison sentence, but they believed that the defendant was innocent.

A 4—H volunteer in a neighboring county was acquainted with the defendant, and invited him to be a “small animal” judge at the 1988 and 1989 county fairs. The volunteer also asked the defendant to speak at pre—fair clinics. In 1990, a 4—H official received a phone call from a woman who stated that the defendant “is on your nonrecommended, nonapproved, noncertified judges list, and I believe he is a convicted child molester. I’m not for sure, but I’ve heard that.” As a result of this conversation, the 4—H official sent out a letter to 4—H officials in every county in the state advising them to inform those persons responsible for selecting judges of the facts concerning the defendant.

The letter was discussed at a meeting of 4—H volunteers in the county in which the defendant had served as a judge and speaker. During that meeting, a woman stood up and spoke on behalf of the defendant, stating that she had known him “for a long time,” that she was aware of his prior criminal record, and that she did not believe that he was guilty. Several people then spoke up and expressed confidence in this woman’s opinion since she was personally acquainted with the defendant. Others observed that “we were only asking him to come and do a clinic, in a public setting, where he would be under our control, and then he would be back across the county lines, that it was a reasonable thing to go ahead and ask him to come and allow him to do that clinic.” The group decided to let the defendant speak at clinics in 1990 and 1991.

A young girl (the “victim”) joined the neighboring county’s 4—H program in late 1991-after the defendant had completed his judging and speaking commitments. She met the defendant, and the two began talking about the victim’s interest in small animals. These casual conversations led to numerous telephone conversations. The defendant informed the victim and her mother that he was an orthopedic physician who worked at a local hospital. He often carried a small black medical bag with him. In fact, the defendant was not a physician and was not employed in any medical occupation. The victim’s mother found the defendant to be very trustworthy, and on one occasion allowed the defendant to take the victim to his home to show her some of his animals. The victim was molested by the defendant that day, in his home, under the pretext that he was going to give her a physical examination. At the time of the molestation, the victim believed that the defendant was a physician. It was later disclosed that the defendant had molested other girls in the 4—H program, all under the same pretext that he was a physician. The defendant was later convicted on various counts of kidnapping, corruption of a minor, rape and felonious sexual assault involving four minors.

The victim and her mother sued a state university that was responsible for administering the 4—H program, claiming that the university and 4—H officials knew of the defendant’s criminal record and that he posed a risk of harm to minors, and that they were negligent in hiring him and in supervising and retaining him. A trial court refused to find the university or 4—H program liable for the victim’s injuries. It based its decision on the fact that the defendant was not acting in his capacity as a 4—H volunteer when he took the victim to his home. The court observed:

The child molesting activities of [the defendant] in this case were the direct and proximate result of [his] securing the confidence and trust of [the victim] and her parents. The county extension agent had no reason to anticipate or believe that [he] would develop such personal relationships, and he was never aware of any such activities …. [4—H officials] had neither the power nor the duty to control [the defendant’s] personal activities. The criminal acts that [he] committed against [the victim] did not occur at a 4—H event, function or activity and did not occur on property owned or under the control of 4—H. [He] was only paid to judge [events] and do pre—fair clinics …. He properly performed those responsibilities. 4—H is not responsible for the personal actions of [the defendant] or of the actions of the thousands of young people who participate in volunteer 4—H activities when they are not attending a 4—H function. In this case [the victim and her mother] have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [4—H] was negligent and such negligence was a cause of the assault on [the victim]. It was not reasonable or foreseeable that a person hired to be a judge from [another] county would then become personally involved with children and their families who attended the fair and clinics.

The victim and her mother appealed this decision to a state appeals court.

The court’s decision

Negligence

The appeals court acknowledged that “it was not disputed” that 4—H officials had knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record. The victim and her mother insisted that this was all that was needed to find 4—H responsible for the victim’s injuries on the basis of negligent hiring and retention. The court disagreed. It stressed that mere knowledge of a volunteer’s criminal background does not automatically make a charity liable for every injury caused by that person. Rather, in order for a charity to be liable on the basis of negligence a victim must prove that the charity had a “duty” to protect him or her from the volunteer. The court pointed out that such a duty ordinarily arises only if it was reasonably foreseeable that the victim would be injured by the misconduct of the volunteer or other worker. In other words, 4—H could be responsible for the victim’s injuries on the basis of negligence only if the victim could prove that her injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the decision by 4—H to use the defendant as a judge and speaker. The court concluded that this requirement was not met. It observed:

Under the facts of this case, we find that the attack on [the victim] was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [the decision by 4—H] to engage [the defendant] as a judge or clinic speaker. The record indicates that [he] was hired … to conduct four separate clinics and to judge two county fair shows. The two fair events (in 1988 and 1989) as well as two of the clinics (in 1988 and 1989) took place before the [information concerning the defendant’s criminal record] was circulated. After learning of [the defendant’s] prior record, the [4—H volunteers] met and discussed the [matter]. Thereafter, a decision was made to allow [the defendant] to speak at a clinic in 1990 and a subsequent clinic in 1991 based upon the view that the nature of his employment, including the fact that [he] would have limited contact with 4—H members, would not result in any harm. The duties [he] was hired to perform required him to speak at clinics in a controlled setting under the supervision of the county extension office. The clinics were open to the public and there was no evidence that any incidents occurred at the clinics (or fairs) in which he was asked to participate. The injured plaintiff was not a member of … 4—H at any time during which [the defendant] judged a fair show or conducted a clinic; she became a 4—H member approximately six months after [he] last spoke at a clinic and the molestation took place, not at a 4—H activity, but at [his] residence, over one year after the employment relationship between 4—H and [the defendant] had ended ….

The evidence indicated that [the defendant] gained the trust and friendship of parents and members of the 4—H community, [that] he was adept at developing personal relationships and he convinced these individuals that he was a physician and that he could be influential in obtaining “scholarships” for the children. The evidence further indicated that [he] would appear unannounced at the home of [the victim] and that he pursued a continuing relationship with the family through numerous telephone calls to [the victim’s] home ….

[T]he molestation of [the victim] by [the defendant] was a self—serving act, unrelated to [his] employment as a 4—H judge or clinic speaker. On the date of the incident, [he] made arrangements with [the victim’s] mother to pick up [the victim] and drive her to his home. As noted above, the molestation occurred at [the defendant’s] home, over a year after he was last hired to conduct a clinic … and the events giving rise to the incident occurred without the sanction, knowledge or control of the county 4—H extension office.

In summary, 4—H was not liable on the basis of negligence for the victim’s injuries because it did not owe her a “duty” of care in selecting the defendant as a judge and speaker. It did not owe her a duty of care because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the defendant would harm her. The court concluded:

[W]e are unable to conclude that the probability of harm to the [victim] should have been reasonably anticipated by [4—H] at the time [the defendant] was engaged to be a clinic speaker. As previously noted, the duties for which [he] was hired involved limited contact with those in attendance and took place in a controlled setting …. The scope of an employer’s duty in exercising reasonable care in making a hiring decision is largely dependent on the type of responsibilities associated with the particular job. In addition to the limited nature of the duties for which [the defendant] was hired as well as the limited degree of contact he had with other individuals in performing those duties, the circumstances of this case indicate that no incidents occurred at any clinic in which [he] participated … the assault at issue did not occur at a 4—H event, the injured [victim] was not a member of 4—H at the time [the defendant] was employed … and there was no employment relationship between [4—H and the defendant] at the time of the molestation [since the defendant’s] last clinic event took place over one year prior to the incident.

The court conceded that 4—H owed a duty of care “to children attending the fair and clinic events for which [the defendant] was hired.” Further, this duty may have extended to 4—H members with whom the defendant “was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities,” if known to 4—H officials. However, the court noted that “we are unable to conclude that a duty of care extended to every member of 4—H who [the defendant] may have come in contact with following his fair and clinic employment; more particularly, under the circumstances of this case [the] duty of care did not extend to the risk of foreseeing the misconduct that occurred.”

Key point. Why is a “duty of care” a requirement for negligence? Why aren’t charities liable for all of the injuries caused by their negligence-whether or not those injuries are foreseeable? The “duty” requirement was created to limit liability. To illustrate, assume that a church has a large tree on its property that has not been inspected or trimmed for many years. During a thunderstorm, a branch breaks off and severs a power line. This causes a power failure at a hospital 10 miles away, while an operation is in process, causing the patient’s condition to deteriorate. Is the church’s negligence in failing to maintain the tree the “cause” of the patient’s additional injuries? Yes it is. But this result is so unlikely that as a matter of policy the law does not impose liability on the church. There must be some limit to the consequences of one’s negligence, and that limit is defined in terms of “duty.” That is, a charity will be liable for injuries caused by its negligence-but only if it owed a “duty of care” to the victim. A charity owes a duty of care to any “foreseeable” victim of its negligence. It was not foreseeable that a church’s failure to maintain a tree would cause a problem to a surgical patient 10 miles away, and so the church is not liable for those injuries even though it caused them. It owed no duty of care to the patient. Similarly, 4—H did not owe the victim a duty of care since it was not foreseeable that she would be injured as a result of the decision by 4—H to use the defendant as a judge and speaker several months before she became a member.

Agency

The victim and her mother insisted that by selecting the defendant as a judge and clinic speaker 4—H had given him an “aura of respectability” with 4—H members and their families-and this was enough to make him an “agent”. The court disagreed. It acknowledged that a charity can be liable for a person’s actions on the basis of “apparent agency” if (1) it holds the apparent agent out to the public as having authority to do a particular act, and (2) a person dealing with the apparent agent had reason to believe that the agent possessed the authority to do the act in question. These requirements were not met, the court concluded:

[A]part from the occasions in which [4—H] hired [the defendant] to judge two fair shows and conduct four clinics, the evidence does not indicate that [it] had the right to control, nor that it manifested a right to control or supervise [his] actions. [The defendant] was not a 4—H advisor and, while he may have attempted to clothe himself with authority from the 4—H organization, his self—serving pursuits were not in service to … 4—H. In an action alleging apparent authority, a principal is responsible for the acts of an agent within his apparent authority only where the principal himself by his acts or conduct clothes the agent with the appearance of the authority, and not where the agent’s own conduct creates the apparent authority.

In summary, the defendant was not an apparent agent of 4—H since it had only retained him to serve as a judge and speaker on a few occasions. These actions could not create a reasonable impression that 4—H was “holding out” the defendant as its agent in any other context, including what he did in his own home.

Relevance to churches

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? Obviously, a decision by an Ohio appeals court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. No negligence without a duty of care. Perhaps most importantly, this case illustrates that there can be no liability based on negligence without a duty of care. A church cannot be responsible for a person’s conduct on the basis of negligence unless it owed a duty of care to the victim. This case demonstrates the rule recognized in most states that a duty of care extends to any foreseeable victim of negligent conduct. What is the relevance of this legal principle to church leaders? Consider the following examples:

Example. A church member is assaulted and robbed in a church parking lot while approaching her car after leaving a church activity. No assaults or any other criminal activity have ever occurred in the church’s parking lot. The member sues the church, claiming that it was negligent in supervising its premises and that its negligence caused her injuries. The church can argue that it was not negligent and therefore not liable for the woman’s injuries since her injuries were not reasonably foreseeable and therefore the church owed her no duty of care.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that three other assaults have occurred in the church’s parking lot over the past two years. It is far more likely under these circumstances that the church will be legally responsible for the member’s injuries on the basis of negligence. The previous assaults in the parking lot made future assaults reasonably foreseeable, and as a result a court may conclude that the church owed its members a duty of care when they were in the parking lot. If the church breached that duty by failing to adequately supervise its parking lot, then it would be legally responsible for injuries occurring to a foreseeable victim.

2. Factors to consider in evaluating foreseeability. The court concluded that 4—H was not liable for the victim’s injuries since it could not have reasonably foreseen those injuries. This was so despite the fact that 4—H officials were aware of the defendant’s criminal record. Here are the factors cited by the court in concluding that the victim’s injuries were not foreseeable:

• The defendant was hired by 4—H in a very limited capacity-to judge a few events and speak at a few clinics.

• Both judging and speaking involved “controlled settings” with no unsupervised access to minors.

• The defendant’s judging and speaking were under the direct supervision of a 4—H official.

• The defendant’s judging and speaking were in settings “open to the public.”

• The victim was not a member of 4—H at the time of any of the defendant’s judging or speaking activities. She did not become a member until more than six months after the defendant’s last authorized activity.

• The molestation occurred not at any 4—H activity, but at the defendant’s home.

• The molestation occurred more than a year after the defendant’s last authorized activity.

• No 4—H official was aware that the defendant had taken the victim to his home.

3. A duty of care in this case. The court concluded that 4—H did owe a duty of care to children attending the defendant’s judging and speaking events, and therefore it would have been liable for any acts of molestation committed by the defendant at those events if it was guilty of negligence in hiring or supervising him.

The court added that 4—H also may have had a duty to 4—H members “with whom the defendant was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities if known to 4—H officials.” However, it insisted that 4—H did not have a duty of care “to every member of 4—H who came in contact [with the defendant] following his fair and clinic employment.”

These are very important observations. The court was saying that a charity dealing with minors is not automatically responsible for every injury that occurs. This is especially true for injuries that occur in the homes of volunteer leaders when not engaged in any official function or activity. On the other hand, if charity officials are aware that an adult worker is “involved” with a minor as a result of charity activities, then a duty of care may arise which will make the charity liable for any injury to the minor that results from the charity’s negligence. Let’s illustrate these points with some examples.

Example. T was a Sunday School teacher for several years. T resigned his position, and had no further position in the church involving minors. A few years later it is disclosed that T invited a child from the church to his home and molested her. Church leaders were not aware that T had ever invited a child to his home, or that he ever had any social contacts with children from the church. T’s parents sue the church, claiming that it was negligent in supervising T. It is unlikely that the parents will win. The church could argue that negligence is the breach of a duty of care that is owed to foreseeable victims of harm. Since it was not foreseeable that T would molest the child, the church cannot be liable for her injuries on the basis of negligence.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that T had been asked to resign as a Sunday School teacher after the pastor learned that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with another minor. Church leaders were not aware of any contacts or socializing between T and children from the church. It is unlikely that the parents will win in a lawsuit against the church. As in the previous example, the church could argue that (1) negligence is the breach of a duty of care that is owed to foreseeable victims of harm; and (2) it was not foreseeable that T would molest the child in his home, and so the church owed her no duty of care; and (3) since the church did not owe the girl a duty of care, it could not have been negligent (negligence is a breach of a duty to use reasonable care with regard to a foreseeable victim).

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that church leaders were aware that T was having frequent social contacts with the victim prior to the date of the molestation. The church may be liable to the victim under these circumstances on the basis of negligence. The court in the 4—H case noted that 4—H may have had a duty to those members “with whom the defendant was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities if known to 4—H officials.” This suggests that the church may have had a duty of care with regard to the victim if it knew that T was visiting her and that he had engaged in inappropriate contact with another minor on a prior occasion. This example suggests that churches may have an affirmative duty to “warn” parents about the propensities of known or suspected child molesters who socialize with children from the church. If such a situation arises in your church, be sure to consult with a local attorney for specific guidance. Remember-this is a volatile situation that may result in legal liability for the church if not handled correctly.

4. Not a “guarantor” of the safety of minors. This case illustrates an important point-churches and other agencies that care for children are not absolutely liable for every injury that occurs. They are not “guarantors” of the safety of the children. Rather, they will be liable only if they were negligent, meaning that they breached a duty to use reasonable care with regard to a foreseeable victim of harm.

5. Agency. Persons who are molested by a church volunteer often assert that the church is liable for the volunteer’s behavior on the basis of agency. That is, the volunteer was an “agent” of the church, and as a result the church is legally responsible for his or her actions. This case illustrates that such a conclusion is far from automatic. The victim and her mother insisted that 4—H had given the molester an “aura of respectability” with 4—H members and their families by selecting him as a judge and clinic speaker -and this was enough to make him an “agent”. The court disagreed. It acknowledged that a charity can be liable for a person’s actions on the basis of “apparent agency” if it holds the apparent agent out to the public as having authority to do a particular act, and outsiders have reason to believe that the agent possessed the authority to do the act in question. These requirements were not met in this case since 4—H had retained the molester to serve as a judge and speaker on only a few occasions. This limited involvement did not create a reasonable impression that 4—H was “holding out” the molester as its agent in any other context, including what he did in his own home.

6. The risks of mercy. It is common for church leaders to give people a “second chance.” Mercy, grace, and forgiveness are powerful elements of the Christian faith. But when these impulses are directed to convicted child molesters, church leaders need to be careful. Remember what happened in this case. Leaders of 4—H were aware that the defendant was a convicted child molester, but they chose to disregard the obvious risk that he posed because of the comments of a woman who had known him for several years and who insisted that he was not guilty. In retrospect, this was a foolish statement that directly resulted in the molester being given another chance to be placed in a position of trust involving children. Tragically, he abused this trust by molesting another victim. Church leaders must recognize that they are assuming enormous risks, and subjecting innocent lives to horrible tragedy, when they give child molesters a “second chance.” Such a decision should never be made without first consulting with your insurance agent and an attorney.

Key point. It is reckless and irresponsible for church leaders to use an applicant for youth work and ignore his previous conviction for child molestation on the ground that a church member has known the applicant for many years and does not believe that he was guilty. Remember that guilt in a criminal case is determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a very high standard to meet. The applicant had the chance to convince a jury of his innocence, but failed to do so. Trusting a member who insists that the applicant was “innocent” of the previous charges will expose the church, and its officers and directors, to substantial liability.

7. A dissenting judge. One judge dissented from the court’s opinion.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m10 m86 m67 c0398

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

What Church Treasurers Need to Know About “Inurement”

The Tax Court issues an important ruling.

Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-575 (1997)

Background. Most church treasurers are not familiar with the term “inurement.” That is unfortunate, because unfamiliarity with this term can jeopardize a church’s tax-exempt status. For this reason it is important for church treasurers, as well as church board members, to be familiar with this term. This article will define inurement, and then review a recent Tax Court ruling that addresses the term.

What is inurement? Churches are exempt from federal income taxes so long as they comply with a number of conditions set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. One of those conditions is that “no part of the net earnings [of the church or charity] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” What does this language mean? The IRS has provided the following clarification:

An organization’s trustees, officers, members, founders, or contributors may not, by reason of their position, acquire any of its funds. They may, of course, receive reasonable compensation for goods or services or other expenditures in furtherance of exempt purposes. If funds are diverted from exempt purposes to private purposes, however, exemption is in jeopardy. The Code specifically forbids the inurement of earnings to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals …. The prohibition of inurement, in its simplest terms, means that a private shareholder or individual cannot pocket the organization’s funds except as reasonable payment for goods or services. IRS Exempt Organizations Handbook section 381.1.

A recent Tax Court ruling. The United States Tax Court addressed the concept of inurement in a recent decision. A charity was organized to benefit disabled and underprivileged children. It conducted bingo games to raise funds. The charity’s charter contained the following paragraph:

No part of the net earning of the corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of [its exempt] purposes.

The IRS revoked the charity’s tax-exempt status on the ground that some of its earnings “inured” to the benefit of its treasurer and another officer. The IRS based its action on the following grounds:

* The treasurer and another officer of the charity embezzled more than $130,000 of bingo earnings.

* The charity paid the legal fees of the treasurer in defending himself against criminal charges associated with his embezzlement of bingo proceeds.

* The treasurer misappropriated a check that was payable to the charity.

* The charity rented a building owned by its treasurer for the bingo games, and paid him $26,000 in rent for eight months each year.

The charity appealed the IRS ruling. The Tax Court’s decision is summarized below.

embezzlement

Did the embezzlement of bingo proceeds by the treasurer and other officer constitute “inurement” of the charity’s resources to private individuals? If so, the IRS was justified in revoking the charity’s exempt status. The charity insisted that inurement requires an intentional payment of excessive compensation to an officer or employee, and that this requirement is not met when an officer embezzles a charity’s funds. The Court agreed with the charity that the embezzlement of funds did not constitute inurement:

  • [The treasurer and other officer] worked together to skim part of the proceeds of the bingo games … and to hide this skimming from [the charity’s] board of trustees by falsifying the records of the bingo operations. Part of the skimmed funds was used for unauthorized repairs and renovations, part was used for unauthorized and illegal compensation paid to bingo workers, and part went into [the officers’] pockets.
  • Neither side has directed our attention to any court opinion in the inurement area involving theft from an organization by an insider with respect to that organization, and our research has not led us to any such opinion …. The boundaries of the term “inures” have thus far defied precise definition. As [the IRS] points out, [the charity’s] suggestion that inurement means the intentional conferring of a benefit cannot be allowed to mean that there is no inurement unless “all the organizations’ officers and board members have actual knowledge of, and affirmatively act to cause, the prohibited benefit.” By the same token, we do not believe that the Congress intended that a charity must lose its exempt status merely because a president or a treasurer or an executive director of a charity has skimmed or embezzled or otherwise stolen from the charity, at least where the charity has a real-world existence apart from the thieving official. We conclude that [the charity in this case] had such a real-world existence … and that [the officers’] thefts were not inurements of [the charity’s] net earnings.

Key point. Prohibited inurement must be received by a “private shareholder or individual.” This term is defined by the income tax regulations to include “persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.” The Tax Court concluded that this term refers to “those who have significant control over the organization’s activities.”

payment of attorneys’ fees

The IRS insisted that a charity’s “payment of legal fees on behalf of its individual members and officers acting in their private capacity constitutes private inurement.” And, since the charity in this case had paid legal fees incurred by the treasurer in defending himself against the criminal prosecution, prohibited inurement occurred.

The Court noted that the charity’s charter called for the “indemnification” of officers for expenses incurred in a civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution stemming from the performance of their official duties—but only if certain conditions were satisfied. Those conditions were not met. As a result, the Court concluded: “[The charity] did not follow the procedure prescribed by its articles of incorporation for indemnifying an officer. Thus, the net effect of the transaction was that [it] paid a private expense of [its treasurer]. We conclude that this constitutes an inurement of [the charity’s] net earnings to a private shareholder or individual.”

It is important for church treasurers to be familiar with this conclusion. The payment of an officer’s legal fees by your church may constitute inurement that will jeopardize your tax-exempt status if the fees were incurred in defending the officer for acts committed in his or her private capacity. This can occur in either of two ways:

(1) Indemnification provision. Does your church charter or bylaws contain an indemnification provision permitting the payment of an officer’s legal expenses under certain conditions? If so, then it is essential that these conditions be met before any legal fees are paid. This case suggests that a failure to do so may constitute inurement and jeopardize the church’s exempt status.

(2) No indemnification provision. Many churches do not have an indemnification provision in their charter or bylaws. If this is true of your church, then the payment of the legal fees of an officer for acts unrelated to his or her official duties may constitute inurement that will jeopardize the church’s exempt status.


Example. A pastor is prosecuted for a traffic offense. The offense did not occur while the pastor was performing his pastoral duties. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses out of church funds. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A youth pastor is accused of sexual misconduct. The incident occurred off of church property and was not in the course of an official church activity. The family of the victim sues the youth pastor and church. The church’s insurance company agrees to defend the church but not the youth pastor. The church board would like to pay the youth pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the youth pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A pastor is audited by the IRS and assessed several thousand dollars in back taxes. The pastor retains a tax attorney and appeals the IRS determination. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A church issues securities to raise funds for a new building and sells the securities to members of the congregation. Several members lose a significant portion of their investments in these securities, and they sue the pastor and church. The church’s insurance policy does not cover this lawsuit, and so the church has to pay its legal expenses. The church charter contains an indemnification provision allowing the church board to pay the legal expenses of any officer as a result of actions committed in the course of church business—so long as there is no finding of criminal activity. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances would not constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The payment of legal expenses under an indemnification clause is not inurement if all of the conditions of the clause are satisfied. This assumes, of course, that the pastor is not found guilty of a criminal act in connection with the issuance or sale of securities.

misappropriation of a check

The charity issued a check in the amount of $2,500 to another charity. One of its officers acquired the check and endorsed it to himself. The IRS asserted that this was another example of prohibited inurement that justified a revocation of the charity’s tax-exempt status. The Tax Court disagreed, noting that any misappropriation would have been an “unauthorized taking, essentially a theft similar to the bingo proceeds skimming that [the officers] engaged in.” As such, it was not inurement since it was not a voluntary and intentional action by the charity.

rental of an officer’s building

The IRS insisted that the charity’s payment of $26,000 each year to its treasurer to rent his building for bingo sessions amounted to prohibited inurement. The charity argued that it had to pay rent to someone to conduct bingo games and that the amounts it paid to its treasurer were reasonable. The Tax Court announced the following rule:

  • An organization’s payment of reasonable rent to an insider for the organization’s use of the insider’s property would not constitute inurement of net earnings but payment of an excessive amount in the form of rent would.

The Court acknowledged that if the charity paid more than reasonable rent to the treasurer for use of his building “then it appears that there was inurement of [its] net earnings to [the treasurer].” However, the Court concluded that the IRS had failed to prove that $26,000 was an excessive amount of rent and therefore no inurement was established.


Example. A church board member owns a building near the church. The church would like to rent a portion of this building for one day each week. The board member and church enter into a lease agreement calling for annual lease payments of $50,000. Such an arrangement will constitute prohibited inurement, and will jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status, if the size of the lease payments is “excessive.” Whether or not the lease payments are excessive requires an analysis of all of the facts.


Key point. The lesson for church treasurers is clear—never enter into a lease arrangement with a pastor, officer, or board member unless the lease payments are reasonable in amount. We recommend that you obtain a written opinion from a neutral real estate broker, or attorney, that the amount of the lease payments is reasonable. Such a letter will be very helpful to the church in the event that the IRS asserts that the lease arrangement resulted in prohibited inurement.

retroactivity

The IRS revoked the charity’s tax-exempt status retroactively for all of the years in which prohibited inurement occurred. The Tax Court agreed that this was appropriate. The Court observed that “if the revocation, which occurred years after the last of the years in issue, had been made prospective only, then the revocation would have been little more than a meaningless act.” This is an important point. It illustrates that if prohibited inurement occurs, the IRS has the discretion to revoke a charity’s exempt status retroactively for those years during which the inurement occurred (and for all subsequent years).

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Recovering “Lost Profits” in an Eminent Domain Proceeding

Court rules church is not a business and cannot ask for payment for “lost profits.”

Church Finance Today

Recovering “Lost Profits” in an Eminent Domain Proceeding

Court rules church is not a business and cannot ask for payment for “lost profits.”

Assume that a government agency informs you that it is going to take a portion of your property as part of a street expansion project. Can it do so? And if so, what if anything should the church receive in return? Church treasurers should be familiar with the answers to these questions.

Let’s begin with the basic principle that government can take private property for a public purpose without the owner’s consent—so long as it pays the owner “just compensation.” This is known as “eminent domain” or “condemnation.” Churches are subject to eminent domain like any other private property owner. But what is “just compensation” when a government agency “takes” part or all of a church’s property? That was the issue before a Florida court in a recent case. A county government exercised the power of eminent domain to take a portion of a church’s parking lot. The county agreed to pay the church for the value of the land it took. The church wanted more. It insisted that the county pay it “business damages.” Under many state laws the government must pay business owners “business damages” in addition to the value of the property that is taken. Business damages recognize that a business does not receive “just compensation” when the government reimburses it only for the value of property taken by eminent domain. Such a taking may also adversely affect the business’s profits, at least in the near future.

The church argued that it was entitled to business damages because of the county’s taking of its property. It noted that the county had taken a portion of its parking lot which would result in “lost profits” because fewer donors would be able to attend services. A state appeals court disagreed. It noted that business damages are available only for “businesses,” and that the church was not a business. It observed: “Because the promotion of religion, not its own livelihood, is the primary purpose of a church … we conclude that a church is not a business as that term is used [in the statute].” Trinity Temple Church of God in Christ v. Orange County, 681 So.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1996).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, April 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Do Federal Employment and Discrimination Laws Apply to Churches?

A federal court issues an important ruling- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

In a decision of extraordinary importance, a federal court has addressed the application of federal civil rights laws to religious organizations. This decision will assist church leaders in evaluating the application of several civil rights laws to church employment practices. These include the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act.

The case addresses not only the meaning of “commerce,” but also the important question of when a church and its affiliated entities (such as a school or preschool) should be treated as “one employer” for purposes of meeting the minimum number of employees required by these laws.

Finally, the court addressed the important question of which employees are counted in meeting the minimum number required by these laws. Because no other court has ever addressed such questions in the context of religious organizations, this decision is of immense importance to church leaders and should be studied carefully.

Are churches, church—operated schools, and other religious organizations subject to the wide array of federal civil rights laws that apply to employers engaged in commerce and having a minimum number of employees? This is a troublesome question that the courts have seldom addressed. The lack of judicial interpretation has increased the confusion over the application of these laws to religious organizations. A federal appeals court has addressed this issue directly in an important ruling. This article reviews the facts of the case, summarizes the court’s decision, and explains the relevance of the case to churches and other religious organizations.

Facts in the case

A church school placed an ad in a local newspaper for a part-time music teacher. A woman (the “plaintiff”) with multiple sclerosis, and confined to a wheelchair, called the school in response to the ad. The plaintiff’s recollection of that telephone conversation differs substantially from the school’s account. According to the plaintiff, she spoke with the principal’s secretary, who informed her that the school was in the process of scheduling appointments for interviews.

The secretary asked the plaintiff if she had an educational background in music. When the plaintiff replied that she did, the secretary scheduled an appointment. The plaintiff then asked the secretary if the building was “wheelchair accessible.” At this point the secretary placed the plaintiff on hold for several minutes. When the secretary returned to the phone, she informed the plaintiff that the interview had been canceled.

The plaintiff then suggested that the school “accommodate” her disability by conducting the interview outside. She was again put on hold, and was later informed that the school would not make this accommodation. The plaintiff then asked, “You mean you won’t even make an accommodation for an interview because of my disability?” The secretary responded, “I wouldn’t put it that bluntly” and informed the plaintiff that she should direct further questions to the principal.

The school’s account of the telephone conversation was quite different. It acknowledged that the plaintiff had called about the advertisement, and had asked if the building was wheelchair accessible. The school claimed that the secretary informed the plaintiff that the building was not accessible, but then informed her that the part-time music teacher position had already been filled. The plaintiff then became upset and asked if the position had been filled because she had indicated that she was handicapped. The secretary denied this motive, but the plaintiff remained agitated. The secretary placed the plaintiff on hold to let her “calm down,” and when she picked up the phone again she asked for the plaintiff’s name and phone number so that the principal could call her. The plaintiff did not disclose this information, saying that she would call the principal later.

The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which determined that the plaintiff had been a victim of discrimination on account of her disability. The EEOC sued the church and its school, claiming that they both had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as a result of their refusal to “accommodate” the plaintiff’s disability, and their failure to hire her because of her disability.

The church and school argued that they were not covered by the ADA since they were not engaged in “commerce” and had less than 15 employees.

The trial court’s decision

Background

The ADA prohibits employers engaged in an activity “affecting commerce” and having at least 15 employees from discriminating in any employment decision on account of the disabled status of an employee or applicant for employment who is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer. Note that both conditions are required in order for an employer to be subject to the ADA—it must be engaged in an activity affecting commerce, and it must have at least 15 employees. The court considered these two tests separately.

Commerce

Were the church and school engaged in an industry affecting commerce? The court noted that the ADA defines this crucial term as “any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

The church and school insisted that they were not an “industry affecting commerce” under this definition. The court concluded that the school did affect commerce. It relied on an earlier case in which a federal appeals court found that an employer affected commerce since (1) it purchased products and supplies from out of state; (2) its employees traveled out of state on the employer’s business; and (3) its employees made interstate telephone calls. Martin v. United Way, 829 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.1987). The court concluded:

The school and its employees have engaged in activities that affect commerce. The school purchased supplies and books from companies outside of the District of Columbia …. Approximately five of its employees commuted to the school from outside of the District. Employees made interstate telephone calls and mailed letters to locations outside of the District of Columbia.

However, the court cautioned that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence that the church had engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce, and so “this issue is inconclusive.” The court added that “[we] presume that some of the same factors exist with respect to the church.” There is little doubt that the court believed that the church was engaged in commerce.

15 Employees

The ADA does not apply to an employer simply because it engages in activities that affect commerce. The employer also must have a minimum of 15 employees during the current or preceding calendar year. “Current calendar year” is defined as the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred.

The court acknowledged that the school employed fewer than 15 employees. Recognizing this, the plaintiff argued that under the so-called “single employer doctrine” the court should combine the employees of the church and its school and preschool to come up with the required 15 employees.

Under the single employer doctrine, separate entities that represent a “single, integrated enterprise” may be treated as a single employer for purposes of meeting the 15 employee test. The plaintiff asserted that the church operated the school and the preschool, and therefore these three entities should be considered as one.

Key point. The court noted that the parties had failed to indicate in their pleadings whether the church, school, and preschool were a single legal entity under one corporate umbrella or three separate legal entities.

In deciding whether or not the church, school, and preschool were a “single, integrated enterprise,” the court applied a four-part test announced by the Supreme Court in a 1965 ruling. Radio Union v. Broadcast Services, 380 U.S. 255 (1965). This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control.

The court clarified that “the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive,” and that “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.” The court cautioned that a plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and that there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.

The court referred to an earlier federal appeals court case finding that the entities must be “highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations” in order for single employer status to be found.

The court’s analysis of each of the four factors is summarized below.

(1) interrelation of operations

The court referred to combined accounting records, bank accounts, lines of credit, payroll preparation, telephone numbers, or offices as examples of “interrelated” operations. However, it concluded that there was insufficient interrelationship between the church, school, and preschool to consider them as a single employer. It did acknowledge that the pastor signed the school’s budget, that a room in the church occasionally was used for school purposes, and that school children ate in a room that was also used by the preschool.

However, the following factors demonstrated that there was insufficient interrelationship among the three entities (church, school, and preschool) to treat them as a single employer: (1) the school had a separate budget; (2) daily operations of the three entities (church, school, and preschool) were independent; (3) hours of operation of the three entities were significantly different (preschool was open earlier and later than the school, and the church alone was open on Saturdays and Sundays); (4) each of the three entities was operated by a different staff; (5) each of the three entities had its own principal or administrator; (6) each entity had different employment contacts and practices; (7) the school was located in a different building from the church and preschool; and (8) while the schoolchildren ate lunch in a room that was also used by the preschool, they did not use the room at the same time.

(2) common management

A second factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of common management. The court noted that the “focus of this factor … is on the existence of common directors and officers.” In other words, are the directors and officers of the separate entities the same? The court concluded that this factor was not present in this case: “Here, there are separate management structures for the church, the day care center, and the school. These structures do not continuously monitor one another. The circumstances present here do not warrant a finding of common management.”

The court cautioned that common management will exist when one organization runs another organization “in a direct, hands-on fashion, establishing the operating practices and management practices.”

(3) centralized control of labor operations

A third factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of “centralized control of labor operations.” The court observed that “the control required to meet the test of centralized control of labor relations is not potential control, but rather actual and active control of day-to-day labor practices.” This test was not met, the court concluded:

The enterprises here have separate employees, directors, and employment practices. The sole way in which the church is involved with the labor practices of the school is in the final phases of hiring. Plaintiff asserts that the pastor “interviews all applicants for the school,” but plaintiff’s own exhibits contradict this assertion. Rather, the principal and assistant principal screen resumes and conduct interviews; the pastor does not become involved until the end of the process, after the principal and assistant principal have selected two or three finalists, at which point he gives his input. When there is a disagreement, the pastor makes the final decision. The entities have different administrators and distinct labor pools. Plaintiff does not present adequate evidence of day-to-day active control by the church of the school’s labor relations to justify a finding that the entities should be treated as a single employer.

(4) common ownership or financial control

A fourth factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of “common ownership or control.” The court noted that “there is common ownership of the property and the buildings in which the day care center, the church, and the school are located, and that the pastor must sign the school’s budget.” On the other hand, the court noted that the church was part of the Archdiocese of Washington “which is the corporate entity that owns the property and the buildings. Further … the Archdiocese has ultimate control over the school’s budget.” The court cautioned that “even if the Archdiocese were a party, common ownership alone is not enough to establish that separate employers are an integrated enterprise.” The court continued:

Even though the Archdiocese, rather than the church, is the owner and locus of financial control, the church does have some intermediary supervisory power over the school. However, given (1) the Archdiocese’s ultimate control over the school’s budget, (2) the Archdiocese’s status as owner of the property and buildings, and (3) the fact that the school, the church, and the day care center have separate budgets, the court finds that this factor does not support a finding that the entities constitute a single employer. Accordingly, the court declines to apply the integrated enterprise doctrine to consolidate defendants into constituting a single employer.

The appeals court’s ruling

15 employees

The EEOC appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. A federal appeals court for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the church, school, and preschool should not be treated as a single employer in applying the 15 employee requirement.

Of most significance to the appeals court was the fact that the record did not reveal whether or not the church, school, and preschool were one corporate legal entity, or three separate entities. The court observed that “we cannot answer a question of utmost importance—whether the school (and the day care center) are distinct legal entities or whether they are merely parts of one legal entity—the church.”

Why was this question so important? Because the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) has only been applied in the context of separate legal entities. In other words, if the church, school, and preschool were a single corporate entity, with the school and preschool operating under the church’s corporate umbrella, then they presumably would be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee requirement. There would be no need to apply the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test.

This test would be applied only if the three entities were legally distinct—that is, they were each separately incorporated. Only then would the 4 factor test be applied to determine whether or not the three entities were sufficiently related to be treated as a single employer for purposes of the 15 employee requirement.

The court conceded that “the door is at least open to apply the test to entities that have different names (a condition satisfied here)—even if they are not legally distinct (a condition that may or may not be satisfied here),” and that “leaving the door open allows the possibility that a single legal entity could … encompass divisions that are sufficiently independent of one another to warrant being treated as distinct employers within the meaning of the employment discrimination statutes.” The court added that “such cases are perhaps rare, but we see no reason to think they are non-existent.”

Key point. The court sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether or not the church, school, and preschool were a single entity or three separate legal entities. If they were a single entity, it would be much more likely that they would be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee requirement.

In summary, the appeals court’s analysis can be reduced to the following points:

Church with no affiliated entities. Consider only the church’s employees in applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

Church with one or more affiliated entities that are not separately incorporated. Many churches operate a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other ministry. If these ministries are not separately incorporated, then the church along with its affiliates ordinarily will be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law). In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

Church with one or more affiliated entities that are separately incorporated. Many churches operate a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other ministry. If these ministries are separately incorporated, then the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

Example. A church with 10 employees is accused of violating the federal age discrimination law by not hiring a job applicant who was 60 years old. Since the church does not have 20 employees, it is not subject to the federal age discrimination law.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church operates a preschool that has 12 employees. The preschool is not separately incorporated. Since the preschool has no separate legal existence, the church and preschool probably will be treated as a “single employer” for purposes of applying the 20 employee test under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

This means that the 10 church employees and 12 preschool employees are combined, and therefore the 20 employee requirement is met. In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 20 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. In applying this test, the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive, and “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.”

A plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and “there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.”

This example assumes that the church is engaged in commerce. Finally, note that the appeals court in the case addressed in this article cautioned that “the cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases … applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non-aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test].”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the preschool is separately incorporated. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 20 employee test under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (or any other federal discrimination law-see the table at the end of this article). This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. In applying this test, the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive, and “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.”

A plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and “there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.” A table at the end of this article will help in applying this test.

This example assumes that the church is engaged in commerce. Finally, note that the appeals court in the case addressed in this article cautioned that “the cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases … applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non—aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test].”

Religious employers

The appeals court acknowledged that no other court has ever addressed the application of the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test to religious organizations:

The cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases in this circuit or elsewhere applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non—aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test]. Although we express no opinion on the question, we note that the question to be answered by the [trial] court on remand may be [the first time any court has addressed this question].

Counting employees

The court also addressed the important question of which employees should be counted in determining whether or not the minimum 15 employee test is met. Should part—time employees be counted? Hourly workers? Temporary workers? Persons on vacation or sick leave? These are important questions that must be answered in applying the 15 employee test.

The church, school, and preschool pointed out that in order to be subject to the ADA, an employer must have at least 15 employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” They noted that the church was open on Saturdays and Sundays, and that a few of its employees worked on those days.

Therefore, if the work week is defined to include Saturdays and Sundays, then they would not have the required number of employees “for each working day” since only a few persons worked on those days. Obviously, many churches have a few employees whose duties require them to work on Saturdays or Sundays.

However, since the number of employees who work on these days usually is minimal, such churches could argue that they are not covered by any civil rights law (federal or state) that applies to employers having a specified number of employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.”

The appeals court referred to a 1997 Supreme Court ruling addressing the question of which employees to count in applying the 15 employee requirement under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and similar requirements under other federal civil rights laws). Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 660 (1997).

The Supreme Court noted that Title VII applies only to an employer “who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” During one year an employer had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day, but in only nine weeks of the year was it actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day (including paid leave as compensation). The difference resulted from the fact that the employer had two part-time hourly employees who ordinarily skipped one working day each week.

The Supreme Court applied the so-called “payroll method” for counting employees. Under this approach, an “employee” is any person with whom the employer has an employment relationship during the week in question. The Court explained: “Under the interpretation we adopt … all one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure.”

As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision repudiates the argument made by the church, school, and preschool that they did not meet the 15 employee requirement since less than 15 employees were employed on Saturdays and Sundays.

Key point. In summary, in determining whether an employer has 15 or more employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,” each week in which an employer has an employment relationship with 15 or more employees is counted.

Key point. The Supreme Court acknowledged that self-employed persons will appear on an employer’s payroll, and that they should not be counted in applying the 15 employee requirement under the Americans with Disabilities Act. It clarified that in counting employees under the “payroll method” it adopted, only those persons who in fact are employees are counted.

Relevance to other churches

What is the significance of this case to other churches? A decision by a federal appeals court has limited effect. It is binding only in the relevant federal circuit-which in this case is the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, federal appeals court rulings often are given special consideration by courts in other jurisdictions. More importantly, the decision represents one of the few extended discussions of the coverage of religious organizations under federal civil rights laws, and so it may be given special consideration by other courts. For these reasons the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:

1. Definition of “commerce.” A number of federal civil rights and employment laws apply to employers that (1) are engaged in interstate commerce, and (2) have a minimum number of employees. These laws include the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act.

The first question to ask in determining if any of these laws applies to a church is whether or not the church is engaged in commerce. This has been a difficult question to resolve, partly because of the lack of court decisions addressing it. This case is helpful because the court relied on a simple three—part test in deciding that the school was engaged in commerce.

(1) Does the church purchase products and supplies from out of state?

(2) Do church employees travel out of state on church business (including commuting to work)?

(3) Do church employees make interstate telephone calls or send mail out of state?

Example. A church is accused of violating the Americans with Disabilities Act. The church insists that it is not engaged in commerce. However, note the following: (1) the church purchases Sunday School literature from a publisher in another state; (2) the church purchases office equipment and computers from a mail—order company in another state; (3) a few church employees commute to work from another state; (4) the pastor occasionally is sent by the church to conferences in other states; (5) church staff occasionally make out—of—state telephone calls; (6) church mail occasionally is sent out of state. There is no question that this church is engaged in commerce if the three—part test discussed above is applied. As a result, the church would be subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act so long as it had a minimum of 15 employees.

There are other factors that indicate that a church or other religious organization is engaged in commerce. These include any one or more of the following:

  • Operation of a private school
  • Sale of products (such as literature or tapes) to persons or churches in other states
  • Persons from other states attend your church
  • operation of a “web page” on the internet
  • operation of a commercial or “unrelated trade or business”
  • television or radio broadcasts

Example. A church is accused of engaging in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The church insists that it is not covered by Title VII since it is not engaged in commerce. The church operates a web page on the internet. This single factor may persuade a court that the church is engaged in commerce.

Example. A church is accused of engaging in age discrimination in violation of federal law. The church insists that it is not covered by this law since it is not engaged in commerce. The church conducts a weekly 15-minute radio broadcast. This single factor indicates that the church is engaged in commerce.

Key point. Even if your church does not satisfy any of these factors, it still may be deemed to be engaged in commerce.

Key point. The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling in 1997 that defined “commerce” very broadly. The case is important because it involved a religious organization (a church-affiliated summer camp). The case is discussed in the recent developments section of this newsletter. This case makes it more likely that churches and other religious organizations will be deemed to be engaged in commerce.

The Court observed: “Even though [the] camp does not make a profit, it is unquestionably engaged in commerce, not only as a purchaser … but also as a provider of goods and services …. The attendance of these campers necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of “commerce” …. Our cases have frequently applied laws regulating commerce to not—for-profit institutions …. The nonprofit character of an enterprise does not place it beyond the purview of federal laws regulating commerce. We have already held that the commerce clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit …. We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of [the commerce clause].” Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).

2. 15 employees. Some federal civil rights laws apply only to employers having a minimum number of employees. To illustrate, employers must have 15 or more employees to be subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An employer must have at least 20 employees to be subject to the federal age discrimination law. These laws raise two important questions: (1) which employees are counted, and (2) are a parent organization and its affiliates or subsidiaries treated as a single employer? The court resolved these questions as follows:

Which employees are counted?

The court applied the “payroll method” in counting employees, on the basis of a 1997 Supreme Court decision that adopted this method. Under this method, an “employee” is any person with whom the employer has an employment relationship during the week in question. To illustrate, in determining whether an employer has 15 or more employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,” each week in which an employer has an employment relationship with 15 or more employees is counted. Note that only those persons on the payroll who are employees are counted. Self-employed persons are not considered. Church leaders need to recognize, however, that the definition of “employee” in this context is very broad, and would include most full-time and part-time workers. An example of a self-employed person in this context would be a plumber the church hires for a day or so to make repairs.

Employees of affiliated organizations

Should the employees of an affiliated or subsidiary organization be combined with the employees of a parent organization when counting employees? That is, should the employees of a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other church-affiliated ministry be combined with the employees of the church when counting employees for purposes of applying federal civil rights laws? This is an important question, given the large number of churches that operate affiliated ministries. The court in this case resolved this question as follows:

Unincorporated affiliates. The employees of affiliated ministries that are not separately incorporated ordinarily will be combined with the employees of the parent church for purposes of counting employees under federal civil rights laws. In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

Separately incorporated affiliates. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of counting employees. However, the court in this case cautioned that the 4 factor test may not always be appropriate in the context of religious organizations:

The cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases in this circuit or elsewhere applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non-aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test]. Although we express no opinion on the question, we note that the question to be answered by the [trial] court on remand may be [the first time any court has addressed this question].

3. Should churches incorporate affiliated ministries? Does this case encourage church leaders to separately incorporate affiliated ministries in order to reduce the likelihood that federal civil rights and employment laws will apply to them? Not necessarily. The only benefit to separate incorporation of affiliated ministries, according to this court, is that the employees of the affiliates are not automatically combined with church employees for purposes of counting employees under federal civil rights and employment laws. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test is used to determine whether or not the employees of the affiliates are counted.

Note that in some cases the relationship between a church and its affiliates will be sufficiently close under the 4 factor test to combine all employees. Therefore, churches wanting to separately incorporate an affiliated ministry solely to avoid the application of federal civil rights and employment laws should carefully consider the 4 factor test. If this test would be met, even with separate incorporation of the affiliate, then it makes no sense to pursue separate incorporation unless there are other compelling reasons to do so.

Note that there are compelling reasons not to incorporate an affiliated ministry in many cases. Most importantly, by treating the affiliate as a department or integral part of the church, it is much more likely to share in the church’s exemption from property taxes and sales taxes (where applicable) and the church’s preferential zoning classification.

4. Avoidance of EEOC “anti—church” bias. Many church leaders are not concerned about the application of federal civil rights laws, since they are confident that they do not discriminate in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, age, or disability. However, many view avoidance of federal civil rights laws as desirable, because it can be a very costly, frustrating, and time-consuming ordeal to defend against discrimination cases—even if they are clearly frivolous. Over the past several years, many churches have been charged with violating federal civil rights laws. In a surprising number of these cases, the EEOC itself sues the church. This is a truly extraordinary action that the EEOC reserves for only a few hundred “high profile” cases each year. Churches that are sued by the EEOC are in for a truly negative experience. They often are considered guilty until proven innocent. They are treated with thinly veiled condescension and contempt by government investigators. And, they often are forced to spend thousands of dollars in their own defense since such claims ordinarily are not covered under their general liability insurance policy.

Consider the following example. A Catholic university refused to grant tenure to a nun on the basis of “marginal performance in teaching and scholarly publications.” The nun claimed that the university was guilty of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC launched a 2-year “investigation” of the university in an attempt to substantiate the nun’s claim of discrimination. It then sued the university, despite the fact that the university’s actions in denying tenure to a nun in the canon law department was clearly outside of the protection of Title VII. A federal appeals court, in dismissing the EEOC lawsuit, noted that the first amendment’s “nonestablishment of religion” clause, which prohibits “excessive entanglement” between church and state, was violated by the 2-year investigation by the EEOC:

An excessive entanglement may occur where there is a sufficiently intrusive investigation by a government entity into a church’s employment of its clergy …. In this case, the EEOC’s 2-year investigation of [the nun’s] claim, together with the extensive pre-trial inquiries and the trial itself, constituted an impermissible entanglement with judgments that fell within the exclusive province of the Department of Canon Law as a pontifical institution …. This suit and the extended investigation that preceded it has caused a significant diversion of the Department’s time and resources. Moreover, we think it fair to say that the prospect of future investigations and litigation would inevitably affect to some degree the criteria by which future vacancies in the ecclesiastical faculties would be filled. Having once been deposed, interrogated, and haled into court, members of the Department of Canon Law and of the faculty review committees who are responsible for recommending candidates for tenure would do so “with an eye to avoiding litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve the … needs” of the Department. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3rd 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

5. State civil rights and employment laws. Even if you determine, on the basis of this article, that your church is not covered by some or all of the federal civil rights and employment laws summarized in the table at the end of this article, note that many states have enacted their own versions of these laws, and it is possible that these will apply to your church. So, be sure to review your state law to see if there is any comparable law that applies to your church.

6. The Shenandoah Baptist case. In one of the only other court decisions to address the application federal employment laws to employees of a church-operated affiliate, a federal appeals court ruled in 1990 that the federal minimum wage law applied to employees of a church-operated private school. In rejecting the church’s claim that the minimum wage law (the Fair Labor Standards Act) did not apply to a church-operated school, the court noted that the Act was amended in 1966 to specifically cover nonprofit, private schools.

The church claimed that school employees were really church employees and therefore exempt from the Act. It pointed out that the school was “inextricably intertwined” with the church, that the church and school shared a common building and a common payroll account, and that school employees must subscribe to the church’s statement of faith. The court rejected this reasoning without explanation.

The court rejected the church’s claim that its constitutional right of religious freedom would be violated by subjecting its school employees to the minimum wage and “equal pay” provisions of the Act. Any burden on the church’s religious beliefs was limited and outweighed by the government’s compelling interest in ensuring that workers receive the minimum wage. The court observed that school employees whose religious convictions were violated by the school’s coverage under the Act could simply return a portion of their compensation back to the church. Or, they could volunteer their services to the school. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).

7. The minister-church relationship. The courts have refused to apply federal civil rights laws to the relationship between a church and its ministers. Therefore, even if a church is engaged in commerce and has the required number of employees for a federal civil rights law to apply, it will not be liable for violating such a law with respect to a minister. To illustrate, a federal appeals court made the following observation in a case involving a dismissed minister’s claim of unlawful discrimination: “This case involves the fundamental question of who will preach from the pulpit of a church, and who will occupy the church parsonage. The bare statement of the question should make obvious the lack of jurisdiction of a civil court. The answer to that question must come from the church.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court acknowledged that the government’s interest in preventing employment discrimination “is compelling,” but it concluded that such an interest “does not override” the protection that the church claims under the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

In another case a female sued a religious denomination alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when her application to serve as an “associate in pastoral care” was rejected. In rejecting this lawsuit, the court observed:

[C]ourts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling state interest from burdens where the “inroad on religious liberty” is too substantial to be permissible …. This case is of the latter sort: introduction of government standards to the selection of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and state. While an unfettered church may create minimal infidelity to the objective of Title VII, it provides maximum protection of the first amendment right to the free exercise of religious beliefs. In other words, in a direct clash of “highest order” interests, the interest in protecting the free exercise of religion embodied in the first amendment to the Constitution prevails over the interest in ending discrimination embodied in Title VII. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).

In another case a black female sued her religious denomination, claiming both sex and race discrimination when her application for appointment as a member of the clergy was denied. A federal appeals court rejected her claim, noting that “religious bodies may make apparently arbitrary decisions affecting the employment status of their clergy members and be free from civil review having done so.” The court added: “[The minister’s] argument, that Title VII may be applied to decisions by churches affecting the employment of their clergy, is fruitless.” The court concluded: “To accept [the minister’s] position would require us to cast a blind eye to the overwhelming weight of precedent going back over a century in order to limit the scope of the protection granted to religious bodies by the free exercise clause.” Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of the United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).

8. Religious exemptions. A number of federal civil rights laws contain limited exemptions for religious organizations. To illustrate, the Americans with Disabilities Act states that religious organizations (including religious educational institutions) are not prohibited “from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work” connected with the carrying on by the organization of its activities. The ADA further provides that “a religious organization may require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization.”

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifies:

This title shall not apply to … a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.

This provision permits religious corporations, associations, and educational institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion in the employment of any person for any position. In 1987 the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that this exemption did not violate the first amendment’s nonestablishment of religion clause. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Many state civil rights laws contain limited exemptions for religious organizations.

A Summary of the Court’s Decision

Explanation: In deciding whether or not the employees of a church-operated school and preschool should be combined with the employees of the church in deciding whether or not the “15 employee” requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act was met, the court applied a 4 factor test. This test ordinarily is applied only if the church and its affiliates are separate legal entities. If they comprise a single legal entity, they presumably are a single employer for purposes of the 15 employee requirement without the need to apply this test. In rare cases there may be exceptions to this rule.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
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