Take steps to make sure this exemption is up to date.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. In many states, sales of construction materials by suppliers to contractors are exempt from sales tax if the contractor uses the materials on a church construction project. To qualify for the exemption, a contractor ordinarily must obtain an exemption certificate or number from the church that is presented to the supplier.
A recent case. A contractor was hired by a church to complete a construction project. The contractor purchased a large quantity of materials from a supplier, and presented an exemption certificate from the church. On the basis of the certificate, the supplier did not charge sales tax. The state revenue department later audited the supplier, and determined that it owed several thousands of sales taxes on the sales it made to the contractor. It rejected the supplier’s claim that it relied on the exemption certificate presented by the contractor. It insisted that suppliers cannot rely on exemption certificates, but rather must take additional steps to insure that the supplies in fact are used for a church construction project.
An Illinois court rejected the revenue department’s claim, and ruled that the supplier did not owe any taxes. It concluded that suppliers are free to rely on valid exemption certificates presented to them by contractors who are performing church construction projects. They do not have any duty to confirm that the supplies in fact are used on such construction projects. Accepting the state’s argument would “vastly alter the retailer’s burden.”
Relevance to church treasurers. Are sales of materials to churches exempt from sales tax in your state? If so, consider the following two precautions:
* Be sure your exemption is current. In many states, churches must apply for a sales tax exemption, and the exemption lasts only for a specified number of years. In some cases, churches have lost their exemption because of a failure to renew it. This will result in significant and unexpected sales tax liability.
* Contracts. If your church enters into a contract for the purchase of goods (such as a construction contract, or a contact for the purchase of computer equipment), be sure that the issue of sales taxes is addressed. Often it is not, or there is a brief notation that the church is exempt from sales tax. What happens if the church’s exemption is later questioned by the state revenue department? For example, the state asserts (as in this case) that a mere reference to the church’s exemption is not sufficient. A church can protect itself by inserting language in a contract that (1) confirms that the church is exempt from sales tax under state law; and (2) clarifies that the contractor or seller will be responsible for the payment of any sales tax assessed as a result of its failure to comply with any condition required by state law or sales tax regulations. Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 663 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. 1996).
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, February 1998.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Background. Most churches will receive gifts of noncash property during 1998. If a donor claims a charitable contribution deduction of more than $5,000 for such a gift, he or she must comply with specific substantiation rules. These rules were adopted for one reason—to make it harder for donors to inflate the value of donated property and claim an excessive charitable contribution deduction.
Donors who contribute property valued at more than $5,000 to a church or other charity must satisfy each of the following requirements in order to claim a charitable contribution deduction:
(1) obtain a qualified appraisal
A donor’s first obligation is to obtain a qualified appraisal. The income tax regulations define a qualified appraisal as an appraisal made by a “qualified appraiser” no earlier than sixty days prior to the date of a contribution, and containing the following information: (1) a description of the donated property; (2) the physical condition of the property; (3) the date of the contribution; (4) the terms of any agreement regarding the use of the donated property; (5) the name, address, and social security number of the qualified appraiser; (6) the qualifications of the qualified appraiser; (7) a statement that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes; (8) the date of the appraisal; (9) the appraised fair market value of the property on the date (or expected date) of the contribution; (10) the method used to determine the fair market value; and (11) the fee arrangement between the donor and appraiser.
Only a “qualified appraiser” can perform a qualified appraisal. A qualified appraiser is anyone who: (1) holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser; (2) is qualified to perform appraisals because of his or her education, experience, background, and membership, if any, in professional appraisal associations; (3) is not the donor, the person from whom the donor obtained the property, the donee, any person employed by one of the foregoing persons, or any person whose relationship with any of the foregoing persons would cause a reasonable person to question his or her independence; and (4) understands that a false or fraudulent overvaluation of property may subject the appraiser to civil penalties. The income tax regulations also provide that qualified appraisers cannot base their fee on a percentage of the appraised value.
The qualified appraisal must be received by the donor before the due date (including extensions) of the federal income tax return on which the deduction is claimed. A qualified appraisal must be obtained for each item of contributed property valued by the donor in excess of $5,000.
(2) prepare a qualified appraisal summary
A donor must also complete an appraisal summary and enclose it with the tax return on which the charitable contribution deduction is claimed. The appraisal summary is a summary of the qualified appraisal and is made on Section B (side 2) of IRS Form 8283. Section A (side 1) of Form 8283 is completed by donors who contribute property valued between $500 and $5,000.
Section B of Form 8283 contains four parts. Part I is completed by the donor or appraiser, and sets forth information from the qualified appraisal regarding the donated property, including its appraised value. Part II is completed by the donor and identifies individual items in groups of similar items having an appraised value of not more than $500. Part III contains the appraiser’s certification that he or she satisfies the definition of a qualified appraiser. Part IV is a donee acknowledgment, which must be completed by the church. The church simply indicates the date on which it received the contribution, and agrees to file an information return (Form 8282) with the IRS if it disposes of the donated property within two years. The regulations specify that the church’s acknowledgment “does not represent concurrence in the appraised value of the contributed property. Rather, it represents acknowledgment of receipt of the property described in the appraisal summary on the date specified in the appraisal summary ….”
The instructions to Form 8283 permit a church to complete part IV before the qualified appraisal is completed. They instruct the donor to “complete at least your name, identification number, and description of the donated property,” along with Part II if applicable, before submitting the Form 8283 to the church (or other donee). In other words, the donor should fill in his or her name and social security number on the lines provided at the top of page 1 of the form, and also complete line 5(a) of Section B, Part I (on the back page of the form), before submitting the form to the church. After completing Section B, Part IV, the church returns the form to the donor, who then completes the remaining information required in Part I. The donor should also arrange to have the qualified appraiser complete Part III at this time.
(3) maintain records
The donor’s third obligation is to maintain records containing the following information: (1) the name and address of the church; (2) the date and location of the contribution; (3) a description of the property; (4) the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution, including a description of how the value was determined; (5) the cost or other basis of the property; (6) if less than the donor’s entire interest in the property was given, an explanation of the total amount claimed as a deduction in the current year; and (7) the terms of any agreement regarding the use of the property. Most of these items will be contained in the qualified appraisal, which should be retained by the donor.
Key point. Publicly traded stock is not subject to these requirements since its value is readily ascertainable. Contributions of nonpublicly traded stock (i.e., stock held by most small, family owned corporations) are subject to these requirements but only if the value claimed by the donor exceeds $10,000.
A recent case. In 1990 and 1991 a taxpayer donated noncash property to his church and claimed substantial charitable contribution deductions on his tax returns for each year. In 1991, his deduction was $40,000. No appraisal summary (Part B, Form 8283) was attached to the tax return, since the taxpayer did not obtain a qualified appraisal. Rather, he valued the contributions on the basis of their fair market value on the dates of the contributions. The IRS conceded that the taxpayer made the contributions and that the amounts of the deductions fairly represented the value of the donated property. However, it disallowed the charitable contribution deductions for the sole reason that the taxpayer failed to obtain qualified appraisals and attach qualified appraisal summaries to his tax returns. The taxpayer insisted that the qualified appraisal, and Form 8283, were technicalities that should not bar a charitable contribution deduction if there is no doubt (1) that the contribution was made, and (2) that a deduction was claimed for the fair value of the donated property.
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument, and disallowed any deduction for his charitable contributions of noncash property. The Court noted that the income tax regulations require that a qualified appraisal be obtained prior to the filing of the tax return on which the deduction is claimed and that an appraisal summary be submitted with that return. It concluded:
For donations of property as to which the donor appraisal requirements apply, the donor must obtain and retain a qualified written appraisal by a qualified appraiser for the property contributed and must attach a signed appraisal summary to the return on which the deduction is first claimed (with such other information as prescribed by regulations). [The taxpayer in this case] furnished practically none of the information required by either the statute or the regulations ….
Moreover, it is clear that the principal objective of [the qualified appraisal requirement] was to provide a mechanism whereby [the IRS] would obtain sufficient return information in support of the claimed valuation of charitable contributions of property to enable [it] to deal more effectively with the prevalent use of overvaluations. Such need exists even though in a particular case, such as this, it turns out that the taxpayer’s deduction was in fact based on the fair market value of the property. This happenstance is insufficient to constitute substantial compliance with a statutory condition to obtaining the claimed deduction. As we see it, what [the taxpayer] is seeking is not the application of the substantial compliance principle but an exemption from the clear requirement of the statute and regulations in a situation where there is no overvaluation of the charitable contribution. We are not prepared to follow that path to decision.
A limited exception. In another case the Tax Court ruled that a taxpayer was entitled to a deduction for a contribution of noncash property even though he failed to obtain a qualified appraisal. However, the Court pointed out that the taxpayer had a qualified appraiser complete a Form 8283 which was attached to the taxpayer’s tax return, and the Form 8283 contained most of the information that would have appeared in a qualified appraisal. Under these circumstances the Court concluded that the taxpayer had “substantially complied with the requirements of the statute and the regulations even though a separate appraisal had not been obtained and the qualifications of the appraiser were omitted from the appraisal summary attached to the return.” The Court concluded that the substantiation requirements for contributions of noncash property valued at more than $5,000 “could be met by substantial, rather than strict, compliance.” Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32 (1993).
However, the Tax Court ruled that this exception did not apply in the present case, since there was not “substantial compliance” with the substantiation requirements.
Relevance to church treasurers. The lesson is clear—persons who claim a charitable contribution deduction of more than $5,000 for contributions of noncash property risk losing their deduction if they do not obtain a qualified appraisal and attach a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283) to their tax return. To reduce this risk, consider the following steps:
4 Do not assume that donors are familiar with the substantiation rules that apply to gifts of noncash property. We recommend that church treasurers obtain several copies of Form 8283 each January to give to persons who donate noncash property to the church during the year. Many donors will not be familiar with these requirements, and so you will be doing them a big favor. You can order these forms by calling the IRS forms hotline at 1-800-TAX-FORM.
4 Make a note to contact the donor by the end of the year to be sure that a qualified appraisal has been obtained—if you believe the donor may claim a charitable contribution deduction of more than $5,000. Make a written record of your contact, or send the donor a letter and keep a copy for the church’s files.
Remember, these rules do not apply to gifts of publicly traded stock. And, for gifts of nonpublicly traded stock, the qualified appraisal requirement only applies to gifts of more than $10,000.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Avoiding Double Payments on Construction Projects
Make sure your church does not make this unnecessary and costly misstep.
Make sure your church does not make this unnecessary and costly misstep.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. In most states, a company that supplies building materials for a construction project can claim a “materialman’s lien” against the property in the event it is not paid. If the property owner pays a general contractor for the materials, and the general contractor fails to pay the supplier, then the owner must pay the supplier in order to avoid the sale of its property to enforce the lien. In other words, the property owner ends up paying twice for the same materials. Of course the owner can sue the general contractor, but in some cases this person cannot be found or is insolvent.
A recent case. A company provided materials for a church construction project. Before delivering the materials the company wrote the church a letter warning it that if the general contractor failed to pay for the materials, the company could claim a lien against the church’s property. When the company failed to receive payment from the general contractor, it sued to enforce its lien. The company sought not only payment in full for the materials it had supplied, but also finance charges and attorney fees. A court ruled that a materialman’s lien only allows a supplier to collect the full price of materials that were supplied. The supplier is not entitled to an additional amount, whether for finance charges or attorney fees, unless the contract between the parties specifically provides for it.
Relevance to church treasurers. It is important for church treasurers to be familiar with the concept of materialman’s liens. Whenever your church hires a contractor to perform a construction or remodeling job, the last thing you want to do is pay twice for the same materials. This not only can create a substantial financial hardship, but it also can be embarrassing. There are a various ways to avoid such a situation. Here are some recommendations: (1) Only deal with reputable contractors who have been in business in your community for several years and who have an excellent reputation. Many churches use a contractor who is a member of their congregation. (2) Require the contractor to provide you with “lien waivers” from all suppliers and workers before making payments for the job. (3) Hold back a portion of the contract price until you are assured that all suppliers and workers have been paid. (4) Ask the contractor to submit bills from suppliers and workers directly to the church, and inform the contractor that the church will pay these bills directly. (5) If you sign a contract, you may want to address some of these options in the contract. The services of an attorney are essential. Sherman v. Greater Mt. Olive Baptist Church, 678 So.2d 156 (Ala. App. 1996).
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, January 1998.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
How the New Tax Changes Will Impact Ministers and Churches
Article summary. In August the President signed into law two major tax bills-the Taxpayer Relief Act and the Balanced Budget Act. These new laws contain a number of provisions that will be of interest to ministers and churches. The more important provisions are summarized in this feature article, with several examples and a review of all effective dates.
Once again Congress has enacted sweeping tax changes that will impact every taxpayer. This article will review those provisions of greatest relevance to ministers and churches.
• Key point. The Taxpayer Relief Act was passed by huge majorities in Congress (389—43 in the House, and 92—8 in the Senate). It contains over 800 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, and adds more than 300 new sections.
Individuals
1. Child tax credit. One of the key provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act is the creation of a new child tax credit. Here is how it works. If you have one or more children under 17 years of age, and you earn less than a specified amount of income, then you will be able to claim a $400 credit on your 1998 tax return for each child. The credit increases to $500 in 1999. Here are some key considerations to note:
! Qualifying child. To qualify for the credit, you must have a child who (1) is under 17 years of age; (2) is your child, descendent, stepson or stepdaughter, or foster child; and (3) is claimed by you as a dependent on your tax return.
! Phaseout for high—income taxpayers. The child care credit is reduced by $50 for each $1,000 of adjusted gross income in excess of $110,000 for married couples filing jointly. For single persons, the credit is reduced by $50 for each $1,000 of adjusted gross income in excess of $75,000. These amounts are not adjusted for inflation.
! Refundable child care credit. Some lower income families will be eligible to receive a supplemental credit. To qualify, a family must be eligible to receive the earned income tax credit. Unfortunately, the amount of this credit is so difficult to compute that few eligible families will be able to claim it. Congress anticipated this problem, and has instructed the IRS to determine “whether a simplified method of calculating the credit can be achieved.” We will report any progress in future issues of this newsletter. For now, here is a “ballpark test” that can be used-the supplemental credit will not be available unless you (1) qualify for the earned income credit, and (2) your earned income credit exceeds your share of FICA or self—employment taxes.
• Key point. The child tax credit is in addition to the personal exemption amount ($2,650 for 1997) that can be claimed for each dependent child.
• Key point. The child tax credit is in addition to the dependent care credit you can claim if you pay someone to care for your dependent child who is under 13 (or a disabled dependent) so that you can work. This credit is 30% of the amount you pay for dependent care. You can only count expenses of up to $2,400 for one child, or $4,800 for two or more children. The credit is phased out for persons earning above a specified amount.
• Key point. Tax credits benefit taxpayers far more than deductions or exclusions, since they represent a dollar—for—dollar reduction in taxes.
• Key point. The new law introduces the HOPE credit, lifetime learning credit, and education IRA. Each of these provisions will be of direct relevance to churches that operate schools or that have scholarship funds for students, or whose members contribute to the postsecondary educational expenses of their children.
2. Home office expenses. Many ministers and church staff members maintain an office in their home and perform some of their duties in their home office. Are expenses associated with the home office deductible as a business expense? Unfortunately, it has become much more difficult in recent years to claim a home office deduction. The Taxpayer Relief Act makes it a little easier. Consider the following:
! Background. Prior to 1976, home office expenses were deductible whenever they were “appropriate and helpful” to the taxpayer’s business. In 1976 Congress narrowed the home office deduction by making it available only when the office is used regularly and exclusively as a principal place of business, or as a place of business used to meet clients in the normal course of business. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court announced a very narrow interpretation of a taxpayer’s “principal place of business.” Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993). The Court concluded that a physician did not qualify for a home office deduction even though he used his home office regularly and exclusively for business, because the “essence of his professional service” was performed in hospitals. It focused on the place where the primary income—generating functions are performed, and the amount of time spent at each location. Under this analysis, the only possible conclusion was that the physician’s principal place of business was at the hospitals where he worked, and not his home office where he performed largely administrative tasks.
! The new law. The Taxpayer Relief Act repeals the Soliman decision and recognizes that some taxpayers will be eligible for a home office deduction if they use their home office for largely administrative tasks-even if their income—generating activities occur at another location. This is a major break for taxpayers with home offices. The new law provides that a home office qualifies as a principal place of business if:
(1) the office is used by the taxpayer to conduct administrative or management activities related to a trade or business, and
(2) there is no other fixed location where the taxpayer conducts substantial administrative and management activities of the trade or business
As before, the home office must be used regularly and exclusively for business purposes.
Taxpayers who meet these new requirements are eligible for a home office deduction even if they conduct some administrative and management activities at a fixed location of their business outside their home-so long as those activities are not substantial. For example, a taxpayer occasionally does minimal paperwork at another fixed location of the business. Further, taxpayers can claim a home office deduction even though they conduct substantial non—administrative or non—management business activities at a fixed location of their business outside their home. For example, a taxpayer meets with or provides services to customers or clients at a fixed location that is away from home. It is this rule that overturns the Soliman decision, and makes the home office deduction available to many more persons.
! Effect of an office in the church. What if a minister has a home office, but an office is also available at the church? Is a home office deduction ever available under these circumstances? In the past, the answer has been “no,” at least for ministers who are employees for federal income tax reporting purposes. For an employee to qualify for a home office deduction, the use of a home office must not only be regular and exclusive, but it also must be for the “convenience of the employer.” This has meant that the home office must be essential for the employee to perform his or her work. This is simply not the case when an office is available in the church. The courts and the IRS have ruled that if an employer provides employees access to an office on its premises for the performance of their duties, and an employee elects to conduct these duties at home as matter of personal preference, then the employee’s use of the home office is not for the “convenience of the employer” and there is no deduction allowed.
In summary, if a self—employed taxpayer in fact does not perform substantial administrative or management activities at any fixed location of the business away from home, then the second part of the new test is met whether or not the taxpayer elected not to use an office away from home that was available. However, for employees, the fact that they elect not to use an office on their employer’s premises that is available to them for administrative activities will still be relevant in deciding whether or not they meet the “convenience of the employer” requirement.
• Example. Rev. V reports his income taxes as an employee. He has an office at his church, but also maintains an office in his home where he occasionally does research and other work—related activities. He also uses his home office to monitor investments, and assist his children with their homework. Rev. V is not eligible for a home office deduction for two reasons. First, his home office is not used exclusively for business purposes. And second, his home office is not for the convenience of his employer since an office is available at the church where Rev. V can perform all of his work—related duties.
• Example. Rev. H is pastor of a small congregation. He reports his income taxes as an employee. The church does not maintain an office for Rev. H, and so he performs all of his work—related administrative tasks at a home office that he uses regularly and exclusively in performing his duties. While H performs all of his non—administrative duties (preaching, sacraments) at the church, all of his administrative tasks (sermon preparation, business planning) are performed at his home office. While Rev. H might not have qualified for a home office deduction under the Soliman ruling, he clearly qualifies under the new rules that take effect in 1999.
• Example. Rev. K has an office at the church, but she also has a home office which she uses regularly and exclusively to counsel with church members. Does she qualify for a home office deduction? While she uses her home office as a place for meeting with clients in the normal course of her activities, the home office still must be used for the convenience of her employer. This means that it is essential to use her home office to perform her duties. This is very unlikely if not impossible when an office is maintained in the church.
• Key point. Taxpayers who qualify for a home office deduction get an additional tax break-travel between their home and church (or other business location) is not commuting since they are not traveling between home and work. Rather, they are traveling between two business locations. In many cases this will convert nondeductible “commuting” expenses into a deductible business expense.
3. Health insurance deduction for the self—employed. Under current law, self—employed persons can deduct health insurance costs for themselves (and their spouse and children) as follows: 40 percent in 1997; 45 percent in 1998 through 2002; 50 percent in 2003; 60 percent in 2004; 70 percent in 2005; and 80 percent in 2006 and thereafter. This deduction is not allowed in any year in which the self—employed person is eligible to participate in a subsidized health plan maintained by an employer of either the self—employed person or his or her spouse.
The Taxpayer Relief Act accelerates the health insurance deduction for self—employed workers as follows: 40 percent in 1997; 45 percent in 1998 and 1999; 50 percent in 2000 and 2001; 60 percent in 2002; 80 percent in 2003 through 2005; 90 percent in 2006; and 100 percent in 2007 and thereafter.
4. Real estate reporting requirements. Under current law, persons who close real estate transactions are required to file an information return (Form 1099S) with the IRS. This return reports the details of the transaction, and is designed to disclose persons who may owe capital gains tax. The Taxpayer Relief Act exempts sales of personal residences with a gross sales price of $500,000 or less ($250,000 or less for single taxpayers) from this reporting requirement, beginning after May 6, 1997. The purpose of this change is to relieve taxpayers of the reporting requirement on transactions that will be exempt from the capital gains tax under new rules (explained below) that took effect after May 6, 1997.
• Key point. To qualify for this exemption, a home seller must provide the buyer with written assurance that no capital gain tax will be payable on the transaction. The IRS will issue further guidance on this requirement.
5. “Continuous levy” authority of the IRS extends to social security payments. Under current law, taxpayers who do not pay a tax within 10 days of notice and demand by the IRS are subject to “levy.” A levy is a procedure the IRS uses to collect the tax deficiency. It permits the IRS to seize property owned by the taxpayer. Generally, a levy does not apply to property acquired after the date of the levy-with one exception. A levy on wages is “continuous” from the date it is first made until the debt is paid in full.
The Taxpayer Relief Act permits the IRS to impose a continuous levy on federal payments for which eligibility is not based on the income or assets of the taxpayer. To illustrate, the IRS will now be able to treat social security checks like wages. This means that a levy against such payments will “continue” until the tax deficiency is paid. The new law specifies that such levies can attach up to 15 percent of any payment due the taxpayer.
This provision took effect on August 6, 1997.
6. Earned income credit modifications. Certain low—income workers are entitled to claim a refundable earned income credit (EIC) on their tax return. A refundable credit is a credit that not only reduces income taxes, but allows a refund to taxpayers whose credit exceeds their tax liability. The amount of the credit depends on the number of children the taxpayer has, and it is phased out for taxpayers with adjusted gross income above certain limits. The Taxpayer Relief Act makes certain changes to the earned income credit, including the following:
! Fraud or recklessness. A taxpayer who fraudulently claims an EIC is ineligible to claim the EIC for the next 10 years. A taxpayer who erroneously claims the EIC due to reckless or intentional disregard of the law is ineligible to claim the credit for the next 2 years. This provision took effect January 1, 1997.
! Definition of adjusted gross income. The EIC is phased out for taxpayers with adjusted gross income above specified levels. The new law provides that tax—exempt interest and nontaxable distributions from pensions, annuities, and IRAs (if not rolled over into similar tax—favored products) are not counted in computing adjusted gross income for purposes of determining eligibility for the EIC. This provision takes effect in 1998.
7. Foreign earned income credit. United States citizens generally are subject to federal income tax on all their income, whether derived in the United States or in a foreign country. However, citizens working in foreign countries may be eligible to exclude from their income for federal income tax purposes certain foreign earned income and housing costs. To qualify for these exclusions, the individual must either (1) be a resident of the foreign country for an uninterrupted period that includes the entire tax year, or (2) be present overseas for 330 days out of any 12 consecutive month period. The maximum exclusion for foreign earned income under current law is $70,000 per year.
The Taxpayer Relief Act increases the $70,000 annual foreign earned income exclusion by $2,000 per year beginning in 1998, until it reaches a maximum of $80,000 in the year 2002. In addition, the credit will be indexed for inflation beginning in 2008. This credit is claimed by many American missionaries serving in foreign countries.
8. Increase in standard deduction of dependents. Under current law, the standard deduction of a taxpayer who is claimed as a dependent on another’s tax return cannot exceed the lesser of (1) the standard deduction for an individual (projected to be $4,250 for 1998), or (2) the greater of $500 (indexed for inflation) or the dependent’s earned income. In other words, a minor child who works outside the home, and who is claimed as a dependent on his parents’ tax return, is eligible for a reduced standard deduction based on this formula.
The Taxpayer Relief Act increases the standard deduction for a taxpayer who is claimed as a dependent on another’s tax return to the lesser of (1) the standard deduction for individuals, or (2) the greater of (a) $500 (indexed for inflation), or (b) the individual’s earned income plus $250. The $250 amount will be indexed for inflation after 1998. The new standard deduction rules take effect in 1998.
• Example. Rev. L’s daughter is 17 years old and works part—time in a local restaurant. Assuming that she earns $2,000 in 1997, and is claimed as a dependent on her parents’ tax return, her standard deduction under current law is the lesser of (1) the standard deduction for an individual ($4,000 for 1997), or (2) the greater of $500 or the dependent’s earned income ($2,000). This formula permits the daughter to claim a standard deduction on her own tax return in the amount of $2,000.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the year is 1998. Under the new rules, the daughter’s standard deduction is the lesser of (1) the standard deduction for individuals (projected to be $4,250 in 1998), or (2) the greater of (a) $500, or (b) the dependent’s earned income ($2,000) plus $250. This formula permits the daughter to claim a standard deduction on her own tax return in the amount of $2,250-an increase of $250 over the 1997 deduction.
9. Estimated tax penalties. Taxpayers are subject to an “addition to tax” for any underpayment of estimated taxes. This penalty is not assessed if the total tax liability for the year (reduced by any withheld tax and estimated tax payments) is less than $500. The Taxpayer Relief Act increases this amount to $1,000, beginning in 1998.
• Key point. This provision is relevant to ministers, who always pay estimated taxes because their wages are exempt from tax withholding (unless they elect voluntary tax withholding).
10. Estimated tax requirements. Under current law, a taxpayer is subject to a penalty for underpayments of estimated taxes. The penalty is avoided if a taxpayer makes timely estimated tax payments at least equal to (1) 100 percent of the previous year’s tax liability, or (2) 90 percent of the current year’s tax liability. The 100 percent of last year’s tax liability exception is increased to 110 percent for individuals with adjusted gross income of more than $150,000 for the previous year.
The Taxpayer Relief Act changes the 110 percent of last year’s tax liability rule to 100 percent of the previous year’s tax liability in 1998; 105 percent of the previous year’s tax liability in 1999, 2000, and 2001; and 112 percent of the previous year’s tax liability in 2002.
Education
1. HOPE scholarship tax credit. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides welcome relief to families with children in college or vocational training. Beginning in 1998, taxpayers can claim a “HOPE” credit against federal income taxes of up to $1,500 per student per year for 50 percent of qualified tuition and related expenses (not including room, board, and books) paid during the first two years of the student’s postsecondary, undergraduate education in a degree or certificate program. Here are some of the key provisions:
! Effective date. HOPE scholarship credits are available for tuition expenses and academic fees paid after December 31, 1997, for education furnished in academic periods beginning after such date.
! Eligible taxpayers. Who qualifies for the HOPE scholarship credit? The law provides that the credit is available for tuition expenses incurred by a taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent child.
• Example. A church member would like to claim a HOPE tax credit for monies he pays for scholarships on behalf of members of his church who are attending college. He is not eligible for the credit with respect to any student who is not his spouse or dependent.
• Example. A student attending a church—related college incurs $9,000 in tuition expenses for 1997. The student’s mother pays this entire amount. She is not eligible for a HOPE credit, even if she claims her son as a dependent, since the credit is not available until 1998.
• Example. Same facts as the previous problem, except the year is 1998. The parent would be eligible for a HOPE credit in the amount of $1,500-assuming that she meets the conditions summarized below.
• Example. A parent pays $10,000 in tuition fees incurred by his son during 1998 while attending seminary as a full—time student. The parent is not eligible for a HOPE credit, since the tuition was not incurred during the first two years of postsecondary, undergraduate education.
• Example. A parent pays the full $5,000 tuition for 1998 on behalf of his daughter who attends a church—operated high school. The parent is not eligible for the HOPE credit, since the credit is limited to the first two years of postsecondary, undergraduate education.
! First two years of college. The HOPE credit applies only to tuition incurred during the first two years of a college or vocational program leading to a degree or certificate.
! Amount of credit. The credit is 100 percent of the first $1,000 of tuition and fees, and 50 percent on the next $1,000 of tuition and fees-for a total available credit of $1,500. Remember that a credit is a direct dollar—for—dollar reduction in income taxes. It is far more beneficial than a tax deduction which merely reduces taxable income.
• Example. A student who incurs tuition of $1,000 is eligible for a $1,000 HOPE credit. A student who incurs tuition of $2,000 or more is eligible for a $1,500 HOPE credit.
• Key point. The amount of the HOPE credit is indexed for inflation after the year 2000.
! Eligible students. To be eligible for a HOPE credit, a student must be enrolled at least half—time in a degree or certificate program leading to a recognized educational credential at an eligible educational institution.
! What expenses are eligible for the credit? The credit is available with respect to amounts paid for tuition and academic fees. It is not available with respect to amounts paid for books, meals, lodging, student activities, athletics, insurance, transportation, and similar personal expenses.
! Phaseout for high—income taxpayers. The HOPE credit is phased out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross income between $40,000 and $50,000. The credit is phased out for married taxpayers who file jointly with adjusted gross income between $80,000 and $100,000. These amounts will be indexed for inflation after 1999, although the first year when an adjustment can be made is 2001.
• Example. A student incurs $5,000 in tuition expenses during her first semester of college in 1998. Her parents pay this entire amount. They have adjusted gross income of $50,000 for 1998. They are eligible to claim a HOPE credit of $1,500.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the parents have adjusted gross income of $100,000. They are not eligible for a HOPE credit because their income is too high.
! Which year is the credit claimed? The HOPE credit is available in the year the tuition expenses are paid-so long as the education begins or continues during that year or during the first three months of the next year.
• Key point. Congress gave the IRS authority to issue regulations providing that the HOPE credit will be “recaptured” if a student receives a refund of tuition for which a credit was previously claimed.
! What about loans? Qualified tuition expenses paid with the proceeds of a loan are eligible for a HOPE credit. The credit is not applied to the repayment of the loan itself.
! Reporting requirements. The new law specifies that parents cannot claim the HOPE credit unless their tax return reports the name and social security number of the eligible student. Tax returns for 1998 and future years will allow parents to provide this information.
2. Lifetime learning credit. Here’s another break for parents with children in college-taxpayers are allowed a “lifetime learning credit” against federal income taxes equal to 20 percent of tuition and academic fees incurred during a year on behalf of the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent child. Here are some of the details:
! Effective date. This credit applies to tuition expenses incurred after June 30, 1998, for education furnished in academic periods beginning after such date.
! Eligible taxpayers. The credit is available for tuition expenses incurred by a taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent child.
! Amount of credit. The credit is 20 percent of the first $5,000 of tuition and academic fees. This means that the maximum credit will be $1,000 per year. However, for expenses paid after December 31, 2002, up to $10,000 of tuition and academic fees will be eligible for the 20 percent lifetime learning credit. This means that the maximum credit will increase to $2,000 per year.
! No two—year limitation. Unlike HOPE credits, the lifetime learning credit is not limited to the first two years of postsecondary, undergraduate education. It can be claimed for an unlimited number of years.
! Multiple children. The lifetime learning credit can be claimed in any one year on behalf of any number of eligible students.
• Example. A church member has three dependent children who are attending college (one church—related college and two public universities). The parent may claim a credit of $1,000 for each of these three students, assuming that they each incur tuition expenses of at least $5,000 per year and all other conditions are met.
• Key point. The amount of the lifetime learning credit is indexed for inflation after the year 2000.
! Eligible students. The lifetime learning credit is available to students at both undergraduate and graduate educational institutions (and postsecondary vocational schools). In addition, students need not be enrolled half—time or full—time.
• Key point. There are important differences between students who qualify for HOPE credits and the lifetime learning credit. Consider the following:
! HOPE credits are available only with respect to postsecondary, undergraduate education. Lifetime learning credits are available for both undergraduate and graduate education.
! HOPE credits are available only for the first two years of undergraduate education. There is no limit on how often lifetime learning credits can be claimed.
! HOPE credits cannot be claimed for more than two years for the same student. Lifetime learning credits are not subject to this limitation.
! Like HOPE credits, lifetime learning credits are available with respect to education that is at least half—time. But unlike HOPE credits, lifetime learning credits also are available with respect to “any course of instruction at an eligible educational institution to acquire or improve job skills of the individual.” In other words, many continuing education courses and professional seminars would qualify for the lifetime learning credit-if offered by an eligible educational institution.
• Example. A parent incurs tuition expenses of $10,000 in 1998 for a child who attends seminary. The parent is eligible for a lifetime learning credit of $1,000 (unless phased out because of the parent’s adjusted gross income).
What expenses are eligible for the credit? Same as for HOPE credits (see above).
! Phaseout for high—income taxpayers. Same as for HOPE credits (see above).
! Which year is the credit claimed? Same as for HOPE credits (see above).
! What about loans? Same as for HOPE credits (see above).
! Choice of credit. If a taxpayer claims a HOPE credit with respect to a student then the lifetime learning credit will not be available with respect to that same student for the year, although the lifetime learning credit may be available with respect to that student for other years. Also, taxpayers who claim an exclusion for distributions from an “education IRA” (explained later in this article) with respect to a student will not be able to claim a lifetime learning credit for that student during the same year.
3. Education IRAs. Taxpayers are given yet another break for education expenses under the new law-they can contribute up to $500 each year to an “education IRA.” Here is how it works. A taxpayer establishes an education IRA and designates a “beneficiary” (usually, the taxpayer’s child). The taxpayer contributes up to $500 each year into the account, up until the beneficiary’s 18th birthday. Earnings on an education IRA generally accumulate tax—free-provided they are distributed for the post—secondary educational expenses of the beneficiary. Here are some more specifics:
! Effective date. Parents can begin contributing to education IRAs on or after January 1, 1998.
! Annual contribution limit. Parents can contribute a maximum of $500 each year to an education IRA. This amount is phased out for higher income taxpayers. The phaseout begins at $95,000 of adjusted gross income for single parents, and is phased out completely at $110,000. The phaseout begins at $150,000 of adjusted gross income for married couples filing jointly, and is phased out completely at $160,000.
! Qualified expenses. Earnings must be distributed for “qualified expenses” in order to accumulate tax—free. Such expenses include post—secondary tuition, fees, books, supplies, equipment, and certain room and board expenses. Room and board expenses qualify only if the beneficiary is enrolled on at least a half—time basis. Further, “room and board expenses” are defined to mean the minimum room and board allowance as determined by the college or other academic institution in computing costs of attendance for federal financial aid programs.
• Key point. Expenses for elementary and secondary school expenses do not qualify.
! Termination of education IRAs. Any balance remaining in an education IRA when a beneficiary attains 30 years of age must be distributed, and the earnings portion of such a distribution will be included in the beneficiary’s taxable income and subject to an additional ten percent penalty tax because the distribution was not for educational purposes.
• Key point. However, prior to a beneficiary reaching age 30, the balance in the education IRA may be “rolled over” (without penalty or tax) to another education IRA benefiting a different beneficiary-if the new beneficiary is a member of the family of the original beneficiary.
! Interaction with HOPE credits and lifetime learning credits. In any year in which an exclusion is claimed for a distribution from an education IRA, neither a HOPE credit nor a lifetime learning credit may be claimed with respect to educational expenses incurred during that year on behalf of the same student. The HOPE credit and lifetime learning credit may be available in other years with respect to that beneficiary.
! Qualified educational institutions. Education IRAs can be distributed for the qualified educational expenses incurred by beneficiaries attending post—secondary undergraduate or graduate educational institutions. Some vocational institutions also qualify.
! Tax treatment of distributions. An education IRA will consist of two components-all annual contributions made to the account plus accumulated earnings. Distributions from the account likewise will consist of both contributions and earnings. The portion of an annual distribution that comes from annual contributions is always tax—free to the beneficiary, but the portion that comes from earnings may not be. Here are two rules to keep in mind:
(1) Qualified education expenses equal or exceed the annual distribution from an education IRA. The full amount of the distribution is tax—free to the beneficiary.
• Example. A college student is the beneficiary of an education IRA established by her parents. The parents have made annual contributions of $500 for eight years (for a total of $4,000), and the account has accumulated an additional $1,000 in earnings, for a total account balance of $5,000. During one year the student incurs $10,000 of educational expenses, and $1,000 is distributed from the education IRA for these expenses. This distribution represents $800 of contributions and $200 of earnings. These amounts are computed on the basis of the ratio of total contributions ($4,000) to the total account balance ($5,000, representing contributions and earnings). Since the qualified educational expenses exceed the amount of the distribution, the full amount of the distribution is tax—free.
(2) Qualified education expenses are less than the annual distribution from an education IRA. This scenario will be far less common, especially for the next several years. However, it may apply to students who are taking only a few courses. The earnings component of a distribution (see the previous example) will be partially tax—free and partially taxable. You compute these amounts by multiplying the earnings component of the distribution times the ratio of educational expenses to the total amount of the distribution.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the student’s educational expenses are only $600 for the year in question. Since her education expenses are less than the amount of the distribution, a portion of the distribution allocated to earnings will be tax—free and a portion will be taxable. The tax—free portion is computed by the ratio of educational expenses ($600) divided by the total distribution ($1,000)-or 60 percent. Taking 60 percent of the earnings component of the distribution ($200, as computed in the previous example) yields a tax—free earnings distribution of $120. This leaves a taxable portion of $80, which should be included in the beneficiary’s taxable income.
! Technical requirements. Parents cannot treat an existing IRA as an education IRA. You must establish a separate IRA that you specifically designate as an education IRA.
4. Penalty—free withdrawals from an existing IRA to pay for educational expenses. Beginning in 1998, the 10 percent penalty that applies to early distributions from an IRA will not apply to amounts used for qualified higher education expenses (including graduate courses) of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse, child, or grandchild. The penalty—free withdrawal is available for “qualified higher education expenses,” meaning tuition, fees, books, supplies, equipment required for enrollment, and room and board. All expenses must be incurred at a post—secondary educational institution, including a graduate program.
5. Extension of employer—provided educational assistance exclusion. In the past, an employee’s taxable income did not include amounts paid by an employer for educational assistance if such amounts were paid pursuant to an educational assistance program that met certain requirements. This exclusion was limited to $5,250 of educational assistance per employee during a calendar year, and applied whether or not the education was job related. The exclusion expired for graduate education beginning after June 30, 1996, and for undergraduate education beginning after June 30, 1997. The Taxpayer Relief Act extends this exclusion for undergraduate education for courses beginning before June 1, 2000. The exclusion does not apply to graduate—level courses.
Retirement
1. Increase IRA phaseout limits. Under current law, if an individual (or his or her spouse) is an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan, the $2,000 IRA deduction limit is phased out over the following levels of adjusted gross income: (1) $25,000 to $35,000 for single persons; and (2) $40,000 to $50,000 for married persons filing jointly. The Taxpayer Relief Act contains two important modifications in these rules, effective in 1998:
(1) Spouse’s participation not considered. An individual will not be considered to be an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan merely because his or her spouse is an active participant in such a plan. However, the maximum deductible IRA contribution for an individual who is not an active participant, but whose spouse is, is phased out for taxpayers with adjusted gross income between $150,000 and $160,000.
(2) Phaseout limits increased. The deductible IRA phaseout ranges are increased as follows:
Joint Returns
tax year phaseout range (adjusted gross income)
1998 $50,000—$60,000
1999 $51,000—$61,000
2000 $52,000—$62,000
2001 $53,000—$63,000
2002 $54,000—$64,000
2003 $60,000—$70,000
2004 $65,000—$75,000
2005 $70,000—$80,000
2006 $75,000—$85,000
2007 and thereafter $80,000—$100,000
Single Taxpayers
tax year phase out range (adjusted gross income)
1998 $30,000—$40,000
1999 $31,000—$41,000
2000 $32,000—$42,000
2001 $33,000—$43,000
2002 $34,000—$44,000
2003 $40,000—$50,000
2004 $45,000—$55,000
2005 and thereafter $50,000—$60,000
• Example. Rev. B is not a participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan. Rev. B’s spouse works for a secular employer, and is a participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan. The combined adjusted gross income of the couple is $80,000. Neither can make a deductible contribution to an IRA during 1997.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the year is 1998. Rev. B is eligible to make a deductible $2,000 to an IRA. The fact that Rev. B’s spouse is an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan does not affect Rev. B’s eligibility.
2. “Roth” (“backloaded”) IRAs. Another new IRA that debuts in 1998 is the so—called “Roth” or “backloaded” IRA. It is named in honor of Senator William Roth (R—Del.), its chief advocate. Here is how it works. Taxpayers can make annual nondeductible contributions of up to $2,000 to a Roth IRA, and distributions from such an IRA are not taxed if they are made after a five year holding period, and are made as a result of the account holder’s: (1) attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, (2) death, (3) disability, or (4) purchase of a first home. Further, earnings on Roth IRAs accumulate tax—free. Here are some more details:
! Phaseout for higher income taxpayers. Roth IRAs are phased out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $95,000 to $110,000, and for married taxpayers filing jointly with adjusted gross income of $150,000 to $160,000.
! Rollovers. A regular IRA may be rolled over to a Roth IRA. Only taxpayers with adjusted gross income of less than $100,000 are eligible for this provision.
• Caution. If you roll over your regular IRA into a Roth IRA prior to 1999, the amount that would have been included in taxable income had the funds been withdrawn are included in your taxable income over a four—year period. The ten percent penalty on early withdrawals from an IRA does not apply.
• Key point. If you expect your income tax rate to drop when you retire, it ordinarily will not be advantageous to roll over your existing IRA into a Roth IRA. But if you are younger and a disciplined saver and investor, and expect your tax rate to increase when you retire, then a rollover should be considered. Discuss the specifics of your situation with a financial planner or CPA.
! Maximum IRA contribution. Persons who cannot (or do not) make contributions to a deductible IRA or a Roth IRA can continue to make contributions to a nondeductible IRA, as under prior law. However, the new law clarifies that in no case may contributions to all of a taxpayer’s IRAs for the same year exceed $2,000.
! No age limit on contributions. Unlike a regular IRA, taxpayers can make contributions to a Roth IRA after they reach age 70 and 1/2.
! Technical requirements. A Roth IRA must be separately established, and it must be designated as a Roth IRA when it is created.
• Example. Rev. G opens a Roth IRA. Contributions made by Rev. G each year are not tax—deductible. However, following a five—year holding period Rev. G may make tax—free distributions from the Roth IRA on account of any one or more of the following conditions: (1) attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, (2) death, (3) disability, or (4) purchase of a first home.
• Key point. In summary, the advantage of a Roth IRA is that it is “backloaded.” This means that annual contributions to the IRA are not tax—deductible, but that earnings and distributions are nontaxable if they meet the requirements mentioned above. This will be a major tax break for many taxpayers, and will make Roth IRAs preferable in some cases to ordinary IRAs.
• Key point. In general, a Roth IRA will be preferable to a regular IRA if your tax rate remains the same or increases during retirement. If your total effective tax rate drops during your retirement years, a regular IRA may be more attractive (though not significantly).
Comparing Regular and Roth IRAs
Regular IRARoth IRA
annual contribution limit
$2,000
$2,000
both spouses can contribute
yes
yes
tax treatment of annual contributions
tax—deductible (phaseout rules apply to higher income taxpayers)
not tax—deductible
earnings
accumulate tax—free, but are taxed at distribution
accumulate tax free, and are not taxed at distribution (if on account of age, death, disability, or first—time homebuyer expenses)
distributions
taxed as ordinary income
not taxed (if on account of age, death, disability, or first—time homebuyer expenses)
how long can contributions be made
until age 70 and 1/2 (for deductible IRAs)
no limit
3. No penalty for early IRA withdrawals by first—time homebuyers. Under current law, a 10 percent “additional tax” applies to distributions from an IRA prior to age 59 and 1/2. Beginning in 1998, the Taxpayer Relief Act permits taxpayers to withdraw funds from their IRA prior to age 59 and 1/2 for “first—time homebuyer expenses” without triggering the 10 percent penalty (up to $10,000). The expenses must be incurred to buy or build a principal residence for yourself, or a child or grandchild.
• Caution. To avoid the 10 percent tax on premature IRA distributions, you must use the distribution within 120 days to build or buy a first—time home.
• Caution. To be considered a “first—time homebuyer,” you must not have had an ownership interest in a principal residence during the 2—year period ending on the date of acquisition of the principal residence.
4. Repeal of 15 percent tax on excess distributions from a retirement plan. Under current law, a 15 percent tax is imposed on excess distributions from most types of retirement plans (including IRAs and tax—sheltered annuities). Excess distributions generally are those in excess of $160,000 for 1997, or $800,000 in the case of a lump—sum distribution. Congress suspended this tax for the years 1997 through 1999. The Taxpayer Relief Act repeals it permanently. The new law also repeals the assessment of the 15 percent penalty to “excess accumulations” of funds within a retirement account.
5. Modification of section 403(b) exclusion allowance. Under current law, annual contributions to a 403(b) annuity cannot exceed the “exclusion allowance.” In general, the exclusion allowance is the excess (if any) of (1) 20 percent of the employee’s “includible compensation” multiplied times his or her years of service, over (2) the total employer contributions for an annuity excluded for prior years. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that the term “includible compensation” shall not include elective deferrals (by salary reduction agreement) into a 403(b) annuity or a cafeteria plan. The effect of this change, which took effect on January 1, 1998, will be to increase the amount that some employees can contribute to their 403(b) annuity.
• Key point. Congress enacted legislation in 1996 removing salary reduction contributions to both 403(b) annuities and cafeteria plans from the definition of “compensation” for computing the limits on employer contributions to 403(b) annuities and other defined contribution retirement plans under Code section 415. The Taxpayer Relief Act applies this same definition of compensation in the context of the exclusion allowance.
Capital gains
1. Capital gains tax rate reduction. Under current law, gain or loss in the value of an asset is not recognized for income tax purposes until a taxpayer disposes of the asset. On the sale or exchange of a “capital asset,” the “capital gain” is taxed at ordinary income tax rates, except that individuals are subject to a maximum rate of 28 percent on the net capital gain. A capital asset generally means any property, with some exceptions (including depreciable real estate used in a taxpayer’s trade or business, and property held for sale to customers). Common examples include real personal residences and investments.
The Taxpayer Relief Act contains the following modifications:
! Reduction in rate of tax. The maximum rate of tax on net capital gain of individuals is reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent. This means that taxpayers who are in the 28 percent (or higher) income tax bracket will pay a capital gains tax of 20 percent. Lower—income taxpayers whose ordinary income is taxed at the 15 percent rate will pay a capital gains tax of 10 percent.
• Key point. The lower capital gains tax rates apply to sales and exchanges of capital assets after July 28, 1997. For the lower tax rates to apply, the capital asset must have been held by the taxpayer for more than 18 months.
• Key point. For capital assets held for more than 1 year but not more than 18 months, the maximum capital gains tax rate is 28 percent.
• Key point. The capital gains rate on depreciable real estate used in a taxpayer’s trade or business is reduced to 25 percent.
! Additional tax rate reduction in 2001. Beginning in the year 2001, the maximum capital gains rates for assets which are held for more than 5 years are 18 percent (for persons in the 28 percent or higher ordinary income tax bracket) and 8 percent (for persons in the 15 percent ordinary income tax bracket). The 18 percent rate applies only to assets that are acquired on or after January 1, 2001.
• Example. Rev. C is in the 28 percent ordinary income tax bracket. Rev. C sells securities in December of 1997 resulting in a capital gain of $10,000. The securities were purchased in 1995. The capital gains will be taxed at 28 percent ($2,800) since they were not held for more than 18 months beginning after July 28, 1997.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Rev. C waits until March of 1999 to sell the securities. If the gain remains $10,000, it will be taxed at the lower 20 percent rate ($2,000) since the securities were held for more than 18 months after July 28, 1997. If Rev. C waits until the year 2006 to sell the securities, the lower 18 percent tax rate will apply. Of course, by waiting for the lower capital gains tax rates to take effect, Rev. C assumes the risk that the value of the securities will decrease.
• Key point. Securities with growth potential as opposed to high income (dividends and interest) are favored by the lower capital gains tax rates.
2. Sales of personal residences. Under current law, no gain is recognized on the sale of a principal residence if (1) a new residence is purchased that is at least equal in cost to the sales price of the old residence, and (2) the new residence is used as a principal residence of the taxpayer at some point within a “replacement period” that begins two years prior to the sale of the old residence and ends two years after the sale. Also, under present law an individual can exclude on a one—time basis up to $125,000 of gains from the sale of a principal residence if the taxpayer (1) has attained age 55 before the sale, and (2) has owned the property and used it as a principal residence for 3 or more of the 5 years preceding the sale.
The Taxpayer Relief Act eliminates these rules for sales of principal residences occurring after May 6, 1997. The new rules are much more liberal, and will greatly benefit many taxpayers. Here is breakdown of the new rules:
! Higher nontaxable amounts. Most importantly, after May 6, 1997 a married couple (who file a joint return) can exclude up to $500,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of a principal residence. Single taxpayers can exclude up to $250,000.
! Holding period. To qualify for the full exclusion, a taxpayer must have owned and occupied the residence as a principal residence for at least 2 of the 5 years prior to the date of sale or exchange. But, unlike the former law, the tax benefit may not be lost completely if this “holding period” is not satisfied. Taxpayers who sell a home without meeting this requirement get a partial benefit if they had to sell their home on account of a change of place of employment, health, or other unforeseen circumstances. The partial benefit is the fraction of $500,000 (or $250,000 for single taxpayers) equal to the fraction of 2 years that the home was owned and occupied as a principal residence.
A special rule applies to persons who become physically or mentally incapable of self—care and who move into a licensed facility (including a nursing home). If they owned and occupied a residence for at least 1 year before moving into such a facility, the 2—year “holding period” rule will not apply to them.
! Multiple sales allowed. The old rule that permitted only one exclusion of up to $125,000 for taxpayers at least 55 years of age is out the window. Taxpayers can claim the $500,000 exclusion every two years, and there is no minimum age requirement!
! Remarriages. Assume that John is a single taxpayer who has never excluded gain from the sale of a home under the new rules. He marries Jane, who has used the exclusion within 2 years prior to their marriage. John can still claim up to a $250,000 exclusion of gain from the sale of residence. Once two years have passed since the last exclusion was allowed to either of them, they can exclude up to $500,000 of gain on a joint return.
• Example. Rev. T is 60 years old, and is considering moving into a smaller and less expensive home. The new law permits Rev. T to do so without being concerned about whether this is the right time to exercise the once in a lifetime exclusion of up to $125,000 in gains from the sale of a residence. The gains Rev. T realizes from selling his current home and buying a less expensive home will be nontaxable gain under the new law-assuming that he lived in the old home for at least 2 years. And, if he later decides to relocate to another home (and at least 2 years have elapsed), he again can exclude the gain from tax.
• Example. Rev. R accepts a position at a church and purchases a new residence. One year later she accepts a position in another church in another state. She sells her former home and purchases a less expensive home resulting in a capital gain of $50,000. Since Rev. R owned and occupied her former home for less than 2 years on account of a change in employment location, she is eligible for a partial exclusion in capital gains. The exclusion is the same fraction as the fraction of 2 years that she owned and occupied her former home. Since she owned and occupied the former home for 1 year, the fraction is one—half. This means that she will pay capital gains tax on only half of her $50,000 gain.
• Example. Rev. G is a widower. In December of 1997 he sells his home and purchases a less expensive home. He excludes the capital gains from tax under the new rules. He remarries in 1998, and his wife sells her home after the marriage. She has never excluded gain from the sale of a residence under the new rules. They can claim an exclusion of up to $250,000 on their 1998 joint tax return.
• Key point. The new law does not “force” taxpayers to replace a current residence with a residence of equal or greater cost in order to avoid capital gains tax.
Estate taxes
1. Estate tax relief. Some people unexpectedly find themselves subject to federal estate taxes because of insurance proceeds, successful investments, and inheritances. The estate tax is substantial-it begins at a 37 percent rate. Fortunately, there are ways to reduce it. Under current law, estates of less than $600,000 are exempt from tax (unchanged since 1987). This amount is increased under the new law as follows:
year ;&nbs p;effective exemption
1997 $600,000
1998 $625,000
1999 $650,000
2000 $675,000
2001 $675,000
2002 $700,000
2003 $700,000
2004 $850,000
2005 $950,000
2006 and thereafter $1 million
These rates are not indexed for inflation.
• Key point. A common technique for reducing estate taxes is through a credit shelter trust. A married couple can double their effective exemption through such a trust, meaning that in the year 2006 and thereafter a married couple can pass up to $2 million tax—free with such a trust. Without it, the estate tax would be avoided completely at the death of the first spouse, but the surviving spouse could then shelter only $1 million from tax.
• Key point. Some estates that include a family—owned business are eligible for a $1.3 million exemption amount beginning in 1998.
2. Annual gift exclusion. Under current law, a taxpayer can exclude up to $10,000 in gifts made to each donee during a calendar year without affecting the $600,000 lifetime exemption from estate taxes described above. Gifts of more than this amount reduce the $600,000 estate exemption. For married couples, the exclusion is available to each spouse. To illustrate, a couple with three children can give up to $60,000 each year ($20,000 to each child), without affecting their exemption from estate taxes. Many couples have used this technique to reduce estate taxes by reducing the size of their estate that will be distributed at death. The $10,000 annual gift exclusion has remained unchanged for several years, meaning that its real value has been steadily eroded by inflation. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that the $10,000 annual gift exclusion will be indexed for inflation beginning in 1999 (rounded to the next lowest multiple of $1,000).
Employment taxes
1. Delay in penalty for failure to deposit payroll taxes electronically. Current law requires a “phase in” of the electronic deposit of payroll taxes under the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). Employers that deposited payroll taxes of more than $50,000 in 1995 were required to begin depositing such taxes electronically not later than January 1, 1997. The Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996 postponed this deadline until July 1, 1997. The IRS announced in June of 1997 that it would not impose penalties for failure to comply through the end of 1997-for employers that make timely deposits using paper forms while converting over to the EFTPS system. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that no penalties will be assessed for failure to use the EFTPS system to deposit payroll taxes prior to July 1, 1998.
Tax—exempt organizations
1. Increase in charitable mileage rate. Under current law, taxpayers can deduct out—of—pocket expenses incurred in performing services on behalf of a church or other charity. Since 1984, taxpayers have been permitted to value the use of a car while performing charitable services at a “standard charitable mileage rate” of 12 cents per mile. The Taxpayer Relief Act increases this rate to 14 cents per mile for miles driven on or after January 1, 1998. The new rate is not indexed for inflation.
2. Corporate sponsorship payments. While this provision will not be directly relevant to most churches, it will be relevant to a number of other religious organizations (including parachurch ministries, broadcasters, denominational agencies, and schools). The Taxpayer Relief Act specifies that “qualified sponsorship payments” received by a tax—exempt organization will not be subject to the unrelated business income tax (UBIT). A qualified sponsorship payment is defined as a payment made by a business to a charity in exchange for the use of the business’s name or logo by the charity.
The new law cautions that this exception will not apply to:
(1) Advertising of a company’s products or services “including messages containing qualitative or comparative language, price information, or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an inducement to purchase, sell, or use such products or services.”
(2) Any payment which entitles a company to advertise its name or logo “in regularly scheduled and printed material” published by the charity-unless “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the charity.
(3) Any payment made in connection with any qualified convention or trade show activity.
• Key point. This provision applies to payments made or received on or after January 1, 1998.
• Example. A charity agrees to run ads in a monthly publication for any company that contributes $10,000. Payments received under this arrangement are subject to UBIT. The new law specifies that if a portion of a lump sum payment, if made separately, would be a qualified sponsorship payment, then such portion will be treated as a separate payment. To illustrate, if the company in this example was provided ads and an acknowledgment in exchange for its financial contribution, then the contribution can be divided into two parts-the portion allocated to the ad (which is not a qualified sponsorship payment) and the portion allocated to the acknowledgement (which is a qualified sponsorship payment). The portion allocated to the acknowledgement is that portion that exceeds the fair market value of the advertising provided to the company. It is not subject to UBIT.
• Example. A church is planning a pictorial directory of its membership. It informs the congregation that any business that contributes $1,000 to the project will have its name listed as a sponsor at the end of the directory. This acknowledgement does not subject the financial support to UBIT.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the congregation is informed that any business contributing at least $1,000 to the project will be able to publish an ad at the end of the directory. Income received by the church under this arrangement probably will be subject to UBIT, since the ads will not be “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the church.
• Example. A church is planning a public concert with a famous musician. To raise funds for the event, it allows local businesses to pay a fee in return for an ad in the printed program that will be distributed to each person attending the concert. The church receives payments from three local music companies. Income received by the church under this arrangement probably will not be subject to UBIT, since the ads are “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the church.
3. Eliminate gift tax filing requirements for gifts to charity. Persons who donate more than $10,000 to any one person or organization in the same year are required to file a federal gift tax return with the IRS. Gifts to churches and other charities are exempted from this requirement. The Taxpayer Relief Act clarifies that this exemption applies only to gifts of a donor’s entire interest in property to the church or charity. It does not apply to a gift of a partial interest in property. This provision applies to gifts made after August 5, 1997.
• Example. John contributes $15,000 in cash to his church in 1997. He is not required to file a gift tax return with the IRS, because he has made a gift of his entire interest in the funds to his church.
• Example. Joan gives her home to her church in December of 1997. She is not required to file a gift tax return with the IRS, even though the home is worth more than $10,000, because she gave her entire interest in the property to the church.
• Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Joan reserved a “life estate” in the home, which permits her to remain in the home for the rest of her life. Joan must file a gift tax return with the IRS, since she made only a partial gift of her property to the church.
• Example. Jack gives ten acres of land to a church in 1998. The deed provides that if the property ever ceases to be used for church purposes, then title will revert back to Jack or his heirs. Jack has retained a partial interest in the property since title may revert to him or his heirs in the future. As a result, he must file a gift tax return with the IRS. Jack’s interest is known as a “possibility of reverter.”
• Key point. It is common for churches to receive gifts of partial interests in property. Church treasurers should be ready to advise these donors of their obligation to file a federal gift tax return. The form can be obtained by calling the IRS at 1—800—TAX—FORM.
Provisions addressing churches and ministers
1. Contributions on behalf of self—employed ministers to church retirement plans. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that in the case of contributions made on behalf of a minister who is self—employed to a church plan, the contribution is nontaxable to the extent that it would be if the minister were an employee of a church and the contribution were made to the plan. This provision takes effect in 1998.
2. Church plan exception to group health coverage. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (enacted in 1996), group health plans may not condition participation on an employee’s health or medical condition. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that certain church plans do not violate this nondiscrimination requirement merely because the plan requires evidence of good health in order for an individual to enroll in the plan, for individuals (1) who are employees of an employer with 10 or fewer employees, or self—employed, or (2) who enroll after the first 90 days of eligibility under the plan. This provision applies to a church for a particular year if the plan required evidence of good health as of July 15, 1997, and at all times thereafter.
3. Religious schools exempt from federal unemployment tax. The Balanced Budget Act contained a provision exempting from federal unemployment tax any work performed in an elementary or secondary school that is operated primarily for religious purposes. The exemption is available even though a religious school is not operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or a convention or association of churches. This provision took effect as of August 7, 1997.
Background. Every church has received contributions designating a specific project or use. It is important for church treasurers to understand the tax implications of such gifts. Are they tax-deductible? Should the church issue the donor a receipt acknowledging the contribution? Can the donor claim a tax deduction on his or her tax return? A recent IRS ruling addresses this important topic. While the case involved a university, it is directly relevant to churches.
Facts. A university owned several fraternity houses. Over the past several years, the physical condition of the fraternity houses declined to such an extent that student safety was jeopardized. As a result, university officials launched a fund-raising drive to help finance the cost of reconstructing and remodeling the fraternity houses. Donors were encouraged to contribute for the renovation of a specific fraternity house, and the university assured donors that it would “attempt” to honor their designations. However, the university made it clear to donors that it accepted their designated gifts with the understanding that the designations would not restrict or limit the university’s full control over the contributions, and that the university could use the designated contributions for any purpose.
What the IRS said. The IRS cautioned that for a designated gift to be a tax-deductible charitable contribution, it
must be in reality a gift to the college and not a gift to the fraternity by using the college as a conduit. The college must have the attributes of ownership in respect of the donated property, and its rights as an owner must not, as a condition of the gift, be limited by conditions or restrictions which in effect make a private group the beneficiary of the donated property. In addition … the college should, as an owner, be free to use the property acquired with the gift as its future policy suggests or requires ….
[The] university will accept gifts designated for the benefit of a particular fraternity only with the understanding that such designation will not restrict or limit university’s full ownership rights in either the donated property or property acquired by use of the donated property.
Accordingly, we conclude that contributions made to university for the purpose of reconstructing and remodeling fraternity housing will qualify for a charitable contribution deduction ….
Relevance to church treasurers. There are two major types of designated contributions—those that designate a person as the intended recipient, and those that designate a project. This ruling addresses only the second type of designated contribution. It illustrates an important point—a contribution to a church that specifies a particular project qualifies as a charitable contribution so long as
(1) the church has the “attributes of ownership” with respect to the contribution, and
(2) the church’s rights as owner of the contributed property are not “limited by conditions or restrictions which in effect make a private group the beneficiary of the donated property.”
Examples. Let’s illustrate the IRS ruling with a few examples.
Example. A church establishes a “new building” fund. Bob donates $500 to his church, with the stipulation that the money be placed in the “new building” fund. This is a valid charitable contribution, and may be treated as such by the church treasurer.
Example. Barb would like to help her church’s music director buy a new home. She contributes $10,000 to her church, with the stipulation that it be used “for a new home for our music director.” Neither the church board nor congregation has ever agreed to assist the music director in obtaining a home. Barb’s gift is not a charitable contribution. As a result, the church treasurer should not accept it. Barb should be advised to make her gift directly to the music director. Of course, such a gift will not be tax-deductible by Barb. On the other hand, the music director may be able to treat it as a tax-free gift.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
What Church Treasurers Need to Know About the Recent Tax Legislation
Important changes in payroll taxes, unemployment taxes, charitable mileage rate, and more.
What Church Treasurers Need to Know About the Recent Tax Legislation
Important changes in payroll taxes, unemployment taxes, charitable mileage rate, and more.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. Congress enacted two major tax laws in August—the Taxpayer Relief Act and the Balanced Budget Act. Together, these laws amend over 800 sections of the Internal Revenue Code (our federal tax law), and add more than 300 new sections. We have fully reviewed the new laws, and are summarizing in this article those provisions of most relevance to church treasurers.
1. Delay in penalty for failure to deposit payroll taxes electronically. In 1993 Congress enacted legislation requiring the IRS to develop a system for the electronic filing of payroll taxes. Congress wanted a simple, “paperless” way for employers to deposit their payroll taxes. In response the IRS came up with the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (or EFTPS). The new electronic system is phased in over a period of years by increasing the percentage of total taxes subject to the new EFTPS system each year. For 1997, the target percentage was to be achieved by requiring all employers that deposited more than $50,000 in payroll taxes in 1995 to begin using EFTPS by January 1, 1997. Congress later postponed this deadline until July 1, 1997, and the IRS announced earlier this year that it would not impose penalties for noncompliance through the end of 1997—for employers that make timely deposits using paper forms while converting over to the EFTPS system. The recent Taxpayer Relief Act provides that no penalties will be assessed for failure to use the EFTPS system to deposit payroll taxes prior to July 1, 1998.
Key point. If you had a federal payroll tax obligation of more than $50,000 for 1995, you must use the EFTPS system to deposit payroll taxes not later than July 1, 1998. There are no exceptions for churches or other religious or charitable organizations. Failure to comply may result in a 10 percent penalty.
Example. A church had 2 ministers and 4 nonminister employees in 1995. The ministers were treated as employees, but did not elect voluntary withholding of their federal income taxes. The church had a federal payroll tax obligation of $20,000. It does not have to begin using the EFTPS system to deposit payroll taxes in 1998.
Example. A church had 3 ministers and 8 nonminister employees in 1995. The ministers were treated as employees, and elected voluntary withholding of payroll taxes. The church had a federal payroll tax obligation of $55,000. It must begin using the EFTPS program to deposit payroll taxes no later than July 1, 1998.
Key point. For further information on how to comply with the EFTPS requirements, see the May 1997 issue of this newsletter.
2. Increase in charitable mileage rate. Church members often ask if they can deduct transportation expenses incurred in performing services on behalf of the church. For example, a church member uses her car to visit other members in the hospital. Or, a member uses his car to visit new members. Are these expenses deductible as a charitable contribution, and if so, how is the contribution computed? Church treasurers should be able to respond to such questions.
The income tax regulations specify that “out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services are deductible” as charitable contributions. The IRS permits taxpayers to deduct either their actual transportation costs incurred in performing charitable work, or a standard mileage rate that has been 12 cents per mile since 1984.
The Taxpayer Relief Act increases the charitable standard mileage rate to 14 cents per mile for miles driven on or after January 1, 1998. The new rate is not indexed for inflation.
Key point. Church members can continue to deduct the actual cost of using a vehicle to perform charitable services instead of using the charitable standard mileage rate. IRS Publication 526 (“Charitable Contributions”) states that “you may deduct unreimbursed out of pocket expenses, such as the cost of gas and oil, that are directly related to the use of your car in giving services to a charitable organization. You may not deduct general repair and maintenance expenses, depreciation, or insurance …. You may deduct parking fees and tolls, whether you use your actual expenses or the standard rate.”
3. Corporate sponsorship payments. Many churches produce pictorial directories of members, and sponsor concerts or other events. In some cases, churches seek financing for these projects from local businesses. For a fee, a business can have its name appear as a sponsor in the pictorial directory, or in a printed program distributed at the concert or other event. Are these fees subject to the federal unrelated business income tax (UBIT)? The recent Taxpayer Relief Act addresses this issue directly. Here are the new rules:
“Qualified sponsorship payments” received by a church or other charity will not be subject to UBIT. A qualified sponsorship payment is defined as a payment made by a business to a charity in exchange for the use of the business’s name or logo by the charity.
This exception will not apply to any payment which entitles a company to advertise its name or logo “in regularly scheduled and printed material” published by the charity—unless “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the charity.
Key point. This provision applies to payments made or received on or after January 1, 1998.
Example. A church is planning a pictorial directory of its membership. It informs the congregation that any business that contributes $1,000 to the project will have its name listed as a sponsor at the end of the directory. This acknowledgement does not subject the financial support to UBIT.
Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the congregation is informed that any business contributing at least $1,000 to the project will be able to publish an ad at the end of the directory. Income received by the church under this arrangement probably will be subject to UBIT, since the ads will not be “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the church.
Example. A church is planning a public concert with a famous musician. To raise funds for the event, it allows local businesses to pay a fee in return for an ad in the printed program that will be distributed to each person attending the concert. The church receives payments from three local music companies. Income received by the church under this arrangement probably will not be subject to UBIT, since the ads are “related to and primarily distributed in connection with a specific event conducted by” the church.
4. Eliminate gift tax filing requirements for gifts to charity. Persons who donate more than $10,000 to any one person or organization in the same year are required to file a federal gift tax return with the IRS. Gifts to churches and other charities are exempted from this requirement. The Taxpayer Relief Act clarifies that this exemption applies only to gifts of a donor’s entire interest in property to the church or charity. It does not apply to a gift of a partial interest in property. This provision applies to gifts made after August 5, 1997.
Example. John contributes $15,000 in cash to his church in 1997. He is not required to file a gift tax return with the IRS, because he has made a gift of his entire interest in the funds to his church.
Example. Joan gives her home to her church in December of 1997. She is not required to file a gift tax return with the IRS, even though the home is worth more than $10,000, because she gave her entire interest in the property to the church.
Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Joan reserved a “life estate” in the home, which permits her to remain in the home for the rest of her life. Joan must file a gift tax return with the IRS, since she made only a partial gift of her property to the church.
Example. Jack gives ten acres of land to a church in 1998. The deed provides that if the property ever ceases to be used for church purposes, then title will revert back to Jack or his heirs. Jack has retained a partial interest in the property (since title may revert to him or his heirs in the future). Jack’s interest is known as a “possibility of reverter.”
Key point. It is common for churches to receive gifts of partial interests in property. Church treasurers should be ready to advise these donors of their obligation to file a federal gift tax return. The form can be obtained by calling the IRS at 1-800-TAX-FORM.
5. Contributions on behalf of self-employed ministers to church retirement plans. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that in the case of contributions made on behalf of a minister who is self-employed to a church plan, the contribution is nontaxable to the extent that it would be if the minister were an employee of a church and the contribution were made to the plan. This provision takes effect in 1998.
6. Church plan exception to group health coverage. Legislation enacted in 1996 prohibits group health plans from excluding an employee on account of his or her health or medical condition. The Taxpayer Relief Act provides that church plans do not violate this nondiscrimination requirement merely because the plan requires evidence of good health in order for an individual to enroll in the plan. However, this exception only applies with respect to individuals (1) who are employees of an employer with 10 or fewer employees, or self-employed, or (2) who enroll after the first 90 days of eligibility under the plan. Further, this exception applies to a church for a particular year only if the health plan required evidence of good health as of July 15, 1997, and at all times thereafter.
7. Religious schools exempt from federal unemployment tax. Since 1970, all work performed for nonprofit organizations is subject to federal unemployment tax and must be covered by state unemployment law, unless specifically exempted by law. Exemptions have included work performed for a church (or convention or association of churches), or an organization “which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” The recent Balanced Budget Act expands this list of exceptions to include work performed in an elementary or secondary school that is operated primarily for religious purposes, even if it is not operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or a convention or association of churches.
Key point. Some churches that operate private schools have separately incorporated them in order to reduce the church’s risk of liability. Unfortunately, separate incorporation will have little effect on the church’s liability for the obligations of the school—unless the church relinquishes control of the school. If a church is willing to relinquish control, then the school becomes largely independent. This has a number of consequences, including the following: (1) liability of the church is reduced; and (2) employees of the school are not covered by federal or state unemployment law in most states.
8. New W-4s. The recent Taxpayer Relief Act does what its title suggests—it provides significant tax relief to many taxpayers. The biggest winners are lower and middle income taxpayers. As a result, many church staff members will be paying less taxes in 1998. Church treasurers should encourage all staff members to consider filing new and updated W-4 forms for 1998—to reduce their income tax withholdings.
Key point. This is especially true for staff members with more than one minor child. These employees will be eligible for a $400 per child tax credit in 1998 ($500 in 1999). The effect of a credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction in income taxes—which is far more advantageous than a deduction or exclusion. These employees will see a significant reduction in their income tax liability.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, October 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Rental Income Not Taxable, Says IRS
Though only if certain conditions are met, IRS notes.
Though only if certain conditions are met, IRS notes.
Richard R. Hammar
A charity rented a portion of its premises to another charity with similar purposes. The IRS ruled that the rental income was not subject to the “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT), even though the property was “debt-financed,” since the rental arrangement was “substantially related” to the charity’s exempt purposes. The IRS noted that rental income received by a charity from “debt-financed” property generally is subject to UBIT. However, an exception applies to rental agreements that are substantially related to the charity’s exempt purposes. The IRS noted that “an organization’s leasing of its property to others may be substantially related to the performance of its exempt function.” This test was met, the IRS concluded, because the rental agreement “will contribute importantly to the accomplishment of [the charity’s] purposes” and will help further its “charitable goals.”
The IRS noted that a rental agreement will be “substantially related” to a charity’s exempt purposes if it meets any one or more of the following conditions:
(1) it has a “causal relationship to the achievement of exempt purposes (other than through the production of income)”
(2) it contributes importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes
(3) the entire property is devoted to the charity’s exempt purposes at least 85 percent of the time, or
(4) at least 85 percent of the property (in terms of physical area) is used for the charity’s exempt purposes. IRS Letter Ruling 9726005.
Key point. Church treasurers should apply these same considerations in evaluating whether or not rental income from debt-financed property is taxable.
Key point. Rental income from debt-free property is not subject to UBIT.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, September 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
IRS Issues New Business Expense Substantiation Rules
IRS Issues New Business Expense Substantiation Rules
What churches and their employees should know.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. In March the IRS released amended regulations addressing the substantiation of business expenses under an employer’s expense reimbursement arrangement. The amended regulations contain a number of provisions that will affect the way churches reimburse business expenses. It is important for church treasurers to be familiar with the new rules. This article will summarize the amended regulations, and illustrate them with several examples.
Receipts. For many years the income tax regulations required that taxpayers substantiate the amount of any business expense of $25 or more with a receipt. In 1995 the IRS announced that it was increasing this “receipt threshold” to $75. The amended regulations make official the action taken by the IRS in 1995.
Key point. The $75 receipt requirement applies both to the deductibility of a business expense, and to the substantiation of a business expense under an employer’s accountable expense reimbursement arrangement.
Example. A church has adopted an accountable business expense reimbursement arrangement for its two pastors and three staff members. This means that the church only reimburses those employee business expenses that are properly substantiated. In order to properly substantiate a business expense of $75 or more, an employee must produce a receipt.
Example. Rev. G is not reimbursed for business expenses that he incurs. In order to claim a business expense deduction on his tax return he will need to produce a receipt for each separate expense of $75 or more.
Retaining documentary evidence. The income tax regulations specify that a reimbursement arrangement will not satisfy the requirements of an accountable arrangement
to the extent that the employer … does not require an adequate accounting from its employees or does not maintain such substantiation. To the extent an employer fails to maintain adequate accounting procedures he will thereby obligate his employees to separately substantiate their expense account information.
According to this regulation, churches and other employers are required to keep the receipts and other records submitted by employees to substantiate their business expenses under an accountable expense reimbursement arrangement. In a 1963 ruling, the IRS observed that it was “studying the problems presented to employers regarding warehousing and retention of documentary evidence.” It promised to “issue a ruling on this matter in the near future.” For more than 30 years employers have waited for the promised ruling, and the expected relief from the requirement that they retain records and receipts submitted by employees to substantiate their business expenses under an accountable arrangement.
The amended income tax regulations address this issue directly—in response to numerous comments the IRS has received to provide employers with relief from the records retention requirement. Federal agencies and private employers alike asked the IRS to provide relief from the administrative burden and cost of storing large quantities of paper receipts. Some employers asked the IRS to adopt a rule allowing employers to dispose of documentary evidence after an employee has made an adequate accounting—or return the documentary evidence to the employee for retention. Other employers asked the IRS to consider modifying the rules for accountable expense reimbursement arrangements to permit employees to substantiate their business expenses by submitting an expense voucher or summary without any receipts of documentary evidence.
The IRS responded to these concerns in the following two ways:
It noted that with the increase in the receipt requirement to business expenses of $75 or more “the necessity for storing large quantities of paper records is significantly reduced.”
It amended the above-quoted regulation that in the past has required employers to retain records and receipts submitted by employees to substantiate their expenses under an accountable arrangement. The new, amended regulation provides:
The [IRS] Commissioner may, in his discretion, prescribe rules under which an employee may make an adequate accounting to his employer by submitting an account book, log, diary, etc., alone, without submitting documentary evidence.
This language is very important. It is saying that the IRS can issue new rules modifying the substantiation requirements for an adequate accounting by an employee to an employer under an accountable arrangement. The IRS explained this amendment as follows:
Under the amendment, the [IRS] could publish rules defining the circumstances (including the use of specified internal controls) under which an employee may make an adequate accounting to his employer by submitting an expense account alone, without the necessity of submitting documentary evidence (such as receipts). This change is expected to reduce the recordkeeping burden for employers and employees.
Key point. Why may the IRS issue rules allowing expense accounts (without supporting receipts or documentary evidence) to substantiate business expenses under an accountable arrangement? To relieve employers of the burden and cost of maintaining receipts and other documentary evidence supporting an employee’s business expenses.
Key point. The IRS has not yet issued rules permitting employees to substantiate business expenses under an accountable arrangement by submitting an expense account without any supporting receipts or documentary evidence. As soon as these rules are published, we will be addressing them in this newsletter. Until they are issued, churches should continue to rely on the old rules.
Key point. The IRS has warned that any relaxation in the substantiation requirements for accountable plans will not affect the deductibility of unreimbursed business expenses (or expenses reimbursed under a nonaccountable arrangement).
The importance of this proposed change cannot be overstated. In the future, churches may be able to maintain an accountable business expense reimbursement arrangement by having employees submit an expense account or summary without any supporting receipts or other documentary evidence. This is a major development that we will be following closely.
Example. A church reimburses its pastor’s business expenses upon receipt of an account book or log, without any receipts of other supporting documentary evidence. For 1996, the church reimbursed $4,000 of business expenses under this arrangement. Under present law, this arrangement is nonaccountable since it does not provide receipts for expenses of $75 or more. This means that the church should have reported the $4,000 as income on the pastor’s W-2 for 1996. However, under the amended income tax regulations, the IRS may relax the requirements for an accountable plan. Depending on what (if anything) the IRS announces later this year, the church may be able to treat its reimbursement arrangement as accountable—meaning that reimbursed expenses would not be reported as income on the pastor’s W-2. If the IRS does relax the rules for accountable plans, it likely will do so only if certain conditions are satisfied.
Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church only reimburses those business expenses for which the pastor submits adequate documentation substantiating the amount, date, place, and business purpose of each expense. The church also requires receipts to support any individual expense of $75 or more. The pastor must substantiate expenses not later than two months after they are incurred. This is an accountable arrangement under present law, meaning that the church’s reimbursements are not reported as income on the pastor’s W-2. However, under the amended income tax regulations, the IRS may relax the requirements for accountable plans. Depending on what (if anything) the IRS announces later this year, the church may be able to continue to treat its reimbursement arrangement as accountable while requiring less substantiation of expenses. If the IRS does relax the rules for accountable plans, it likely will do so only if certain conditions are satisfied.
Maintaining records in electronic form. Some employers urged the IRS to relieve their recordkeeping burden by permitting them to maintain records substantiating business expenses under an accountable arrangement in electronic form (on a computer). The new regulations do not address this issue. However, in commenting on the new regulations, the IRS noted that there is no requirement that records substantiating reimbursements of business expenses under an accountable arrangement be in paper or “hardcopy” form. It referred to a previous ruling in which it permitted retention of some records in electronic form.
Key point. Many church treasurers are unaware that some kinds of tax records can be kept in electronic form. Storing records electronically can result in a significant reduction in paperwork and storage facilities. Further, documents that are stored electronically often are far easier to access and research. There are several requirements that must be met in order to store records electronically. These include (1) documentation describing the electronic recordkeeping system; (2) specific documentation for retained files; (3) documentation of any change in the electronic recordkeeping system; (4) specific rules on how long such records must be kept, and where; (5) appropriate labeling of electronic records; and (6) periodic testing to identify data loss. These requirements will be addressed in a future issue of Church Treasurer Alert.
Credit card charges. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations allowing employees to substantiate lodging expenses with a credit card statement alone. The IRS rejected this request. It noted that current law requires that documentary evidence of lodging must show separate amounts for charges such as lodging, meals, and telephone calls. The IRS concluded:
A credit card statement or record of charge, unlike a hotel bill, normally will not segregate lodging and other expenses, such as meals and entertainment … or personal expenses (such as personal phone calls or gift purchases) that may not be deducted. Therefore, such a credit card statement or record of charge alone will not constitute acceptable documentary evidence of a lodging expense …. The temporary regulations make no change to the current documentary evidence requirements for lodging expenses. Because of the large number of expenses that can be charged to hotel bills, and extensive variation from traveler to traveler in the types of expenses charged to hotel bills, any attempt to establish percentages for allocating hotel bills to lodging and other fully deductible business expenses, meals and entertainment, and personal expenses is considered impracticable.
Oral substantiation. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations allowing employees to “orally”: substantiate the “business purpose” of their business expenses. The IRS responded by noting that “the current regulations do not preclude an initial oral substantiation of business purpose which is reduced to writing no later than the time of the employee’s final accounting to the employer.”
Employer verification procedures. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations allowing employers to conduct a review of only a statistical sampling as opposed to 100 percent of employees’ expense vouchers. The IRS responded to this request as follows:
[Current regulations] state that an employee who makes an adequate accounting to his employer will not again be required to substantiate such expenses, unless the employer’s accounting procedures are not adequate or it cannot be determined that such procedures are adequate. The [IRS] will determine whether the employer’s accounting procedures are adequate by considering all the facts and circumstances, including the employer’s use of internal controls. The employer’s accounting procedures should include a requirement that an expense account be verified and approved by a reasonable person other than the person incurring the expense. To the extent the employer fails to maintain adequate accounting procedures, the [IRS] may require the employee to separately substantiate his expense account information.
[Current regulations] cite post-expenditure review of employees’ expense accounts as an internal control that should normally be employed. However, whether the employer’s post-expenditure review procedures are appropriate is a matter within the discretion of the [IRS], based on a review of all the facts and circumstances.
“De minimis” exception to substantiation requirements. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations that would exempt employees who receive $1000 or less per year in reimbursed expenses from the need to substantiate the amount, date, and place of business expenses. Such a provision, these employers claimed, would reduce the paperwork burden imposed on employers that administer an accountable expense reimbursement arrangement. The IRS declined to adopt such an exception, noting that “in view of the other changes made by the temporary regulations that will lessen a taxpayer’s recordkeeping burden, such as the increase in the receipt threshold, the temporary regulations do not incorporate this suggestion.”
Increase in limit on deduction for gifts. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations increasing the $25 limit on the deduction for business gifts to $75. The IRS refused to do so, noting simply that it had “no discretion to raise this statutory limit.”
Use of full federal per diem method to substantiate travel for deduction purposes. Some employers asked the IRS to include a provision in the new regulations allowing self-employed persons and unreimbursed employees to substantiate lodging expenses for deduction purposes by means of the “high-low” per diem method. The IRS declined to adopt this suggestion, noting that existing law “permits this substantiation method for employee reimbursements only” and that “this suggestion is outside the scope of this revision to the temporary regulations.”
When do the new rules take effect? The new rules were released in March of 1997, and apply to business expenses paid or incurred after September 30, 1995.
Need additional clarification? The new regulations were written by Donna Crisalli, Office of the IRS Assistant Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information concerning the new regulations you can contact her at 1-202-622-4920.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, July 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
The Pitfalls of Borrowing Funds from Church Members
The Pitfalls of Borrowing Funds from Church Members
A Tennessee court issues a helpful ruling.
Richard R. Hammar
Whitehaven Community Baptist Church v. Halloway, 1997 WL 147529 (Tenn. App. 1997)
Background. A church purchased vacant land as the site of a new building. The church signed a $120,000 note, which was secured by a first mortgage on the land. When the church was unable to obtain a commercial loan to finance construction of the new building, it borrowed $100,000 from two of its members. The church signed a promissory note agreeing to pay the members in full within seven months, at ten percent interest. To secure this loan the church conveyed title to this property to the two members, subject to the first mortgage. With the financing in hand, construction of the new facility began. Unfortunately, the church defaulted on both loans. To protect against a foreclosure (and loss of its security) the two members paid off the church’s debt under the first mortgage. By now the members had invested more than $200,000 in the project. A court later ruled that the two members were entitled to exclusive possession of the church property. The church appealed. A state appeals court agreed with the trial court’s eviction of the church from the property.
Relevance to church treasurers. There are a couple of important points to note. First, churches that seek to raise funds by borrowing from their own members may be creating a significant problem. Church leaders sometimes assume that borrowing from members is an attractive option because it is convenient and members will be more “forgiving” than a bank if the church is late with a payment or defaults. As this case illustrates, borrowing from church members can create unforeseen legal complications. Some members cannot afford to be “forgiving” when the church fails to repay them their loans. This case illustrates another important point—failure to pay promissory notes ultimately may lead to a congregation’s eviction from church property. Promissory notes that are secured by mortgages on church property must be honored in order to avoid foreclosure.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, June 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
The Tax Court issues an important decision—Greene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-531 (1996)
Article summary. Ministers have a “dual” tax status. For social security purposes they always are self-employed with respect to services performed in the exercise of ministry. However, for federal income tax reporting purposes most ministers are employees. There are exceptions to this rule, as a recent decision by the Tax Court illustrates. The Court ruled that an Assemblies of God foreign missionary was self-employed for income tax reporting purposes. The Court’s decision will be a helpful precedent not just to foreign missionaries, but to pastoral ministers as well. The Court’s ruling is fully analyzed in this feature article.
Are ministers employees or self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes? This is an important question. In fact, the “audit guidelines for ministers” released by the IRS in 1995 inform agents that “the first issue that must be determined is whether the minister is an employee or an independent contractor.” A recent Tax Court decision provides useful guidance in resolving this important issue. The Tax Court ruled that an Assemblies of God foreign missionary was self-employed rather than an employee for federal income tax reporting purposes. The Court’s conclusion and analysis will be helpful to other missionaries and pastors in evaluating their own tax reporting status. This feature article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and evaluate the significance of the case to other missionaries and pastors.
facts
An Assemblies of God foreign missionary in Bangladesh reported his income taxes as self-employed. He was audited by the IRS and informed that he was in fact an employee. The IRS transferred his business expenses from Schedule C to Schedule A, resulting in additional taxes of $1,000. The missionary appealed to the Tax Court, which ruled that he was self-employed.
the court’s ruling-an 8 factor test
The Tax Court listed eight factors to be considered in deciding whether a worker is an employee or self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes:
(1) the degree of control exercised by the [employer] over the details of the work; (2) which party invests in the facilities used in the work; (3) the taxpayer’s opportunity for profit or loss; (4) the permanency of the relationship; (5) the [employer’s] right of discharge; (6) whether the work performed is an integral part of the [employer’s] business; (7) what relationship the parties believe they are creating; and (8) the provision of benefits typical of those provided to employees. No one factor is determinative; rather, all the incidents of the relationship must be weighed and assessed.
The court concluded that the missionary was self-employed on the basis of these eight factors. Its conclusions are summarized below:
#1 – degree of control
The court noted that an employer’s right to control the manner in which a person’s work is performed “is ordinarily the single most important factor” in determining whether that person is an employee. The more control, the more likely the worker is an employee. The court mentioned three additional factors to be considered in applying this test: (1) A sufficient degree of control for employee status does not require the employer to “stand over the taxpayer and direct every move made by that person.” (2) “The degree of control necessary to find employee status varies according to the nature of the services provided.” (3) “[W]e must consider not only what actual control is exercised, but also what right of control exists as a practical matter.”
Facts indicating control. The IRS insisted that the following facts demonstrated a sufficient degree of control for the missionary to be considered an employee:
Missionaries qualify as professionals who require little supervision and therefore the absence of actual control should not be confused with an absence of the right to control.
The Assemblies of God Division of Foreign Missions (DFM) maintained control over the missionary through its missions manual that dictated the manner in which he was to conduct his “deputational” and foreign ministry. Deputational ministry refers to the practice of Assemblies of God of missionaries raising their own financial support by visiting local churches.
The national Assemblies of God organization (the “National Church”) exercised control, or had the right to exercise control, over the missionary’s ministerial credentials to such a degree that he was an employee. For example, the National Church: (1) maintains specific requirements for ministerial licensing and ordination; (2) has the authority to discipline ministers based on their behavior and conduct; and (3) has the authority to withdraw ministerial credentials.
Facts indicating a lack of control. The court pointed to the following facts in concluding that there was no sufficient control exercised over the missionary to treat him as an employee:
Neither the National Church nor DFM provided any type of professional training for the missionary.
The DFM did not assign the missionary to minister in a particular country. The missionary himself selected Bangladesh, despite some reservations expressed by the DFM.
The DFM did not direct the missionary to work on a particular project in Bangladesh. Rather, the missionary independently chose to become involved in student ministry. He decided to expand his foreign ministry to include a drug-rehabilitation program. He was able to make this decision without seeking permission from the DFM. In fact, it appears that the DFM was not even aware of the missionary’s plans to initiate a drug-rehabilitation clinic in Bangladesh.
The missionary determined his own work days and hours.
The missionary used vacation and sick leave without notifying or seeking permission from the DFM.
The missionary decided to return from his foreign ministry after only three years in the foreign field. He made this decision considering the needs of his school-aged children and the schedules of the other missionaries in his area. It appears that the DFM played little or no role in his field departure date.
The missionary decided when his “personal allowance” (a monthly distribution for living expenses) would begin, and he had the power to designate the amount of his personal allowance up to the limit imposed by the DFM.
The missionary was required to attend only one meeting every five years.
Apart from filing periodic expense and activity reports, the missionary and the DFM did not communicate regularly. Specifically, the DFM did not contact him at all during his year of “deputational ministry” (when he visited churches in the United States raising support). Likewise, the DFM communicated with the missionary infrequently while he served in the foreign field.
The missionary was not directly supervised or evaluated by anyone.
The court acknowledged that the DFM missions manual contains extensive information with respect to foreign ministry. However, it concluded that “the missions manual was intended by the DFM to be an informational reference for missionaries, not a set of rules controlling their day-to-day conduct.”
The court concluded that the IRS’s emphasis on the National Church’s control of the missionary’s ministerial credentials was misplaced for two reasons. First, although the missionary was an ordained Assemblies of God minister, he worked as a missionary. The court observed that “the National Church’s requirements for ministerial licensing and ordination, as well as its authority to discipline [the missionary] and withdraw his ministerial credentials, have little or no bearing as to the details and means by which [he] performed his duties as a missionary.” Second, the court concluded that the “control test” is not satisfied “where the manner in which a service is performed is controlled by the threat of the loss of professional credentials. Carried to its logical extreme, this argument would serve to classify all ordained ministers as employees of the National Church, regardless of the type of service performed.”
The IRS pointed to a recent federal district court ruling in Arkansas in which an Assemblies of God pastor was found to be an employee for federal income tax reporting purposes. The Tax Court simply noted that the missionary’s circumstances in this case “are very different” from those of a pastor of a local church:
[The taxpayer in this case] was employed as a foreign missionary, not a pastor. We think that the National Church’s authority over the manner in which a pastor performs his or her duties is not highly probative in analyzing the National Church’s control over the daily activities of a foreign missionary. This is because pastoring a local church and engaging in foreign mission work are two different jobs involving different qualifications, duties, and bodies of authority. Pastors are subject to the controls of a local church whereas missionaries are subject to the authority of the DFM. As previously discussed, the DFM exerted very little control over petitioner.
The court concluded:
In summary, the DFM lacked the control and lacked the right to control the manner and means by which [the taxpayer] performed his duties as a foreign missionary. Rather, the DFM facilitates foreign ministry by processing a missionary’s collections and pledges and providing useful information to missionaries through the missions manual and a proposed foreign living budget. In other words, we view the DFM as a service provider relieving endorsed missionaries from the administrative burdens of collecting and processing their pledges and obtaining information regarding their country of service.
#2 – investment in facilities and equipment
The second factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is “which party invests in the facilities used in the work”? If the employer invests in the facilities, it is more likely that the worker is an employee. The court observed:
[The taxpayer’s] sole compensation as a missionary was in the form of a “personal allowance” secured from funds that he raised during his deputational ministry. In this regard, we observe that if a donor fails to remit a pledged amount, the DFM makes no effort to contact the donor, much less obtain the donation. Additionally, the National Church does not guarantee missionaries minimum compensation or support. [The taxpayer] used his personal car and telephone to raise funds during his deputational ministry. [He] occasionally hired assistants at his own discretion and accepted responsibility for paying those assistants.
The IRS pointed out that the missionary was reimbursed for his expenses when he withheld costs from the offerings remitted to the DFM. The court did not find this relevant: “Even if [he] were regarded as receiving reimbursement for his expenses, this matter is more than outweighed by other evidence probative of his being an independent contractor, e.g., petitioner’s efforts in securing the funding for his foreign ministry and his investment in his automobile and telephone.” The court concluded that the second factor supported self-employed status.
#3 – opportunity for profit or loss
The third factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is “the taxpayer’s opportunity for profit or loss.” The court noted that the National Church does not guarantee missionaries minimum compensation. Rather, compensation received by missionaries is in the form of a personal allowance, the amount of which depends on the total amount of funding that missionaries are able to secure during their deputational ministry. Additionally, upon resignation, missionaries forfeit any account balance they may have with the DFM and must reallocate their funds to another ministry. The court concluded that the third factor supported self-employed status.
#4 – permanency of the relationship
The fourth factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is the permanency of the relationship. The more permanent the relationship, the more likely the individual is an employee. The taxpayer conceded that missionary service is a lifetime career. Therefore, the court concluded that the fourth factor supported employee status.
#5 – DFM’s right of discharge
The fifth factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is whether or not the employer has the right to discharge the worker. If such a right exists, it is more likely that the worker is an employee. The court noted that the DFM did not have the power to prevent the taxpayer from serving as an Assemblies of God missionary in Bangladesh:
The DFM’s most extreme form of discipline is the withdrawal of a missionary’s endorsement. For a missionary, the practical consequence of losing the DFM’s endorsement is one of administrative inconvenience, namely, that the missionary must collect and process pledges without the assistance of the DFM. In any event, unendorsed Assemblies of God missionaries can and do serve in the foreign field.
The IRS insisted that because the missionary is an Assemblies of God minister, the National Church has the right to revoke his ministerial credentials, and therefore the National Church can effectively discharge him. The court disagreed:
Indeed, the credentials committee [of the National Church] has the authority to withdraw the approval and recommend the recall of ministerial credentials. Although [the taxpayer] is an Assemblies of God minister subject to the disciplinary proceedings in the constitution and bylaws, he presently serves in the capacity of a foreign missionary. Thus, we think the more appropriate analysis considers the DFM’s right to discharge [him] in his capacity as a missionary, rather than the National Church’s right to recall [his] ministerial credentials.
The court concluded that the fifth factor supported self-employed status.
#6 – integral part of business
The sixth factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is whether or not the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business. The court noted that the DFM’s primary mission is world evangelism and that the taxpayer’s work as an Assemblies of God missionary was directly related to the accomplishment of that mission. Therefore the court concluded that the sixth factor supported employee status.
#7 – relationship the parties believe they have created
The seventh factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is the relationship the parties believe they have created. That is, did the DFM and its missionaries believe that their relationship was that of employer and employee, or did they believe that their relationship was that of an employer and self-employed workers? The court concluded that the parties believed that missionaries were self-employed, based on the following factors: (1) the financial comptroller of the DFM testified that the DFM considered its missionaries to be self-employed; (2) the National Church issued the taxpayer a 1099 form each year reflecting nonemployee compensation for services rendered; (3) federal income tax was not withheld from the missionary’s compensation (the court apparently was unaware of the fact that the compensation of ministers and missionaries is exempt from federal income tax withholding whether they report their income taxes as employees or as self-employed); and (4) the taxpayer thought he was self-employed as evidenced by the fact that he reported his foreign ministry income and expenses on Schedule C. The court concluded that the seventh factor supported self-employed status.
#8 – employee-type benefits
The eighth factor in the Tax Court’s eight factor test is whether or not the employer provides “employee-type benefits” to the worker. The court noted that the DFM provided its missionaries with the following fringe benefits: (1) access to the National Church’s retirement plan, and (2) access to the National Church’s health insurance plan. On the other hand, the DFM has no policy regarding sick leave and does not maintain records reflecting either vacation or sick leave taken by missionaries. The court concluded that “although the matter is not free from doubt, we think that these facts support a finding that [the taxpayer] was an employee, not [self-employed].”
The court concluded its analysis of the eight factors by observing:
Some aspects of the relationship between [the missionary] and the National Church indicate that [he] was an employee, whereas other aspects of the relationship indicate that he was [self-employed]. After weighing the above factors, giving particular weight to the lack of control and the lack of the right to control that the National Church and the DFM had over endorsed missionaries, we conclude that [the taxpayer] was [self-employed], and not an employee ….
As a result, the court concluded that the missionary’s business expenses could be deducted on Schedule C and “need not be relegated to Schedule A.”
Relevance to other missionaries and ministers
What is the significance of this important ruling to other ministers? Consider the following:
1. “Dual tax status”. Most of the confusion associated with clergy tax preparation is based on the fact that clergy have a “dual tax status”. For federal income tax reporting purposes most clergy are employees, but for social security purposes all clergy are self-employed (with respect to services performed in the exercise of ministry). Many church treasurers assume that ministers who are treated as employees for income tax purposes must be treated as employees for social security purposes. They accordingly withhold FICA taxes from the wages of their ministers just as they would for a nonminister church employee. While common, this approach is incorrect. All ministers are self-employed for social security purposes with respect to their ministerial services. As a result, they pay the self-employment tax, not FICA taxes. This is so even if the ministers are employees for income tax reporting purposes.
2. The court’s 8-factor test. The Tax Court applied the same test that it used in two decisions in 1994 addressing the correct reporting status of ministers for federal income tax reporting purposes. In the first case the court applied a 7-factor test in concluding that a Methodist minister was an employee. Weber v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 378 (1994). In the second case, the court applied the same 7-factor test and ruled that a Pentecostal Holiness minister was self-employed. Shelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-432 (1994). The Tax Court applied the same 7-factor test in this case, but treated the seventh factor as two separate factors. In the Weber and Shelley cases, the seventh factor in the court’s 7-factor test was the relationship the parties themselves thought they had established. However, in addressing this factor, the court looked to the kinds of fringe benefits provided to the minister. The court separated this analysis in its new 8-factor test. Under the new 8-factor test, consideration must be given to the following factors in evaluating a person’s correct reporting status for income tax reporting purposes:
(1) the degree of control exercised by the employer over the details of the work
(2) which party invests in the facilities used in the work
(3) the opportunity of the individual for profit or loss
(4) the permanency of the relationship
(5) whether the employer has the right to discharge the individual
(6) whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business
(7) the relationship the parties believe they are creating
(8) whether benefits provided to the worker are typical of those provided to employees
There are three additional points the court made that should be considered in applying this test:
• A sufficient degree of control for employee status does not require the employer to “stand over the taxpayer and direct every move made by that person.”
• The degree of control necessary to find employee status varies according to the nature of the services provided. For example, the level of control necessary to find employee status is generally lower when applied to professional services than when applied to nonprofessional services.
• A court must consider not only what actual control is exercised, but also what right of control exists as a practical matter.
• Key point. The Tax Court did not refer to the 20-criteria test announced by the IRS in 1987. Ministers who report their income taxes as self-employed probably will have a higher chance of prevailing under the 8-factor test than under the more restrictive 20-factor test.
3. Ministers who may be self-employed for income tax reporting purposes. The Greene case demonstrates that there will be some ministers who will be self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes. In addition to missionaries who are substantially similar to the missionary in the Greene case, there are a number of other situations in which a minister is likely to be self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes. These include:
• Itinerant evangelists. Itinerant evangelists, who conduct services in several different churches during the course of a year, ordinarily would be considered self-employed for purposes of both income taxes and social security taxes. They ordinarily would not be considered employees under either the Tax Court’s 8-factor test or the IRS 20-criteria test.
• Guest speaking. Many ministers are called upon to conduct worship services in other churches on an occasional basis. To illustrate, Rev. D, who serves as senior minister at First Church, is invited to conduct a service at a church in another community. Clergy generally will be considered to be self-employed with respect to such occasional guest speaking commitments.
• Supply pastors. Many ministers serve temporary assignments in local churches until a permanent minister can be selected. In some cases, these ministers will be self-employed with respect to such an assignment. This will depend on an application of the Tax Court’s 8-factor test (or the IRS 20-criteria test). In general, the shorter the assignment the more likely that the minister will be considered self-employed.
• Direct services. IRS Publication 517 recognizes that it is possible for ministers who are employees of their churches for income tax reporting purposes to be self-employed for certain services (such as baptisms, marriages, and funerals) that are performed directly for individual members who in turn pay a fee or honorarium to the minister.
• Church polity. In some cases a church’s polity may suggest that ministers are self-employed rather than employees for income tax reporting purposes. For example, ministers who are not associated with a regional or national religious body that exercises control over their activities will find it easier in some cases to argue that they are self-employed for income tax reporting purposes.
• Key point. The Tax Court ended the Weber case with the following comment: “We recognize that there may be differences with respect to ministers in other churches or denominations, and the particular facts and circumstances must be considered in each case.”
4. The bottom line. Some missionaries and ministers will find it easier to defend self-employed status under the Tax Court’s 8-factor test. However, this should not necessarily cause those missionaries and ministers who presently report their income taxes as employees to change their status, nor should it keep self-employed ministers from changing to employee status. The simple fact is that in the vast majority of cases missionaries and ministers will be far better off for federal tax purposes by reporting as employees rather than as self-employed. The advantages of employee status include: (1) the value of various fringe benefits will be excludable, including the oftentimes significant cost of employer-paid health insurance premiums on the life of the minister and his or her dependents, (2) the risk of an IRS audit is substantially lower, and (3) as an employee, a minister avoids the additional taxes and penalties that often apply to self-employed clergy who are audited by the IRS and reclassified as employees.
The only “advantages” of self-employed status are that business expenses are deductible whether or not the minister is able to itemize deductions on Schedule C, and these expenses are not subject to the 2% “floor” that applies to employee business expenses (deductible only to the extent they exceed 2% of adjusted gross income). However, employees can realize the same benefits by having their employing church adopt an accountable business expense reimbursement policy.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
It Pays to Check Your Bank Account
Court ruling shows importance of checking bank statements to ensure you aren’t losing your money.
Court ruling shows importance of checking bank statements to ensure you aren’t losing your money.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. In 1977 a woman deposited $1 million in an investment account at a bank. She instructed the bank to accumulate earnings and leave them in the account. Within a year, the bank had lost the entire $1 million through poor investments, leaving only a small amount of earnings. Nearly twenty years later the woman sued the bank. She claimed that the loss of her investment was caused by the bank’s breach of its “fiduciary duties.” The bank argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed since the statute of limitations had expired. It noted that under state law bank customers have ten years to bring such a lawsuit, and that this period had long since expired.
The court’s ruling. A trial court ruled in favor of the bank, and the woman appealed. A state appeals court upheld the trial court’s decision in favor of the bank. The court noted that a bank customer “has a duty to exercise reasonable care and promptness” in examining bank statements. It pointed out that the bank had sent the woman (and her husband and accountant) monthly statements from the time she first invested funds with the bank, and that she was thereby “put on notice” of the loss of her funds long before the statute of limitations expired on her claim. The court rejected the woman’s claim that the ten-year limitations period should be extended because of her failure to discover the loss of her funds. It observed that
a cursory review, month to month, would have revealed the depletion of approximately $1 million in principal within a twelve month period. If anything, [the bank] attempted to aid [the woman] by sending multiple sets of the monthly statements. [She] had sufficient information to excite her attention. [She] had sufficient notice to alert her to the possibility that something was happening to her funds. Any unreasonable ignorance of the facts by [her] regarding the account activity is not excused …. [She] had sufficient notice to put her on guard that something was going on with her account.
Relevance to church treasurers. Nearly every church has one or more bank accounts, and several have endowment or other designated funds in an investment account. Be sure to review each monthly statement (and its contents) so that you can detect unexplained or unforeseen losses, unauthorized signatures, alterations, and other irregularities. This case illustrates that a failure to recognize problems may jeopardize a church’s legal right to correct or address them. Robinson v. Whitney National Bank, 683 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1996).
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, April 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Background. Many churches have obtained credit cards for their pastor or another staff member. If a few basic rules are followed, this can be a convenient way to handle business expenses. Unfortunately, church treasurers often are not aware of these rules, and this can result in problems for the person who uses the card. A recent IRS ruling addresses the ideal way to handle employer-provided credit cards.
Facts of the case. An employer has several employees who travel on business and incur travel and entertainment expenses. The employer implements a business expense reimbursement program using credit cards. Here are the features of the plan:
the employer obtains a credit card in each employee’s name
use of credit cards is restricted by policy to business travel and entertainment expenses
monthly credit card statements are sent directly by the credit card company to employees
employees are responsible for the payment of all charges, unless an expense report is submitted to the employer
if an employee submits a business expense report to the employer that meets certain requirements, the employer pays those expenses directly to the credit card company
a business expense report must be submitted within one week after incurring an expense
business expense reports for travel expenses (transportation, meals, lodging while away from home overnight) must show (1) the business purposes of the trip, (2) the amount of each expense, (3) dates of travel, and (4) travel locations
business expense reports for entertainment expenses must show (1) the business purpose of the entertainment including a description of the business activity conducted, (2) an identification of the person or persons entertained sufficient to establish a business relationship with the employer, (3) the amount of each separate expenditure for entertainment, (4) the date of the entertainment, (5) the location of the entertainment, (6) the type of entertainment (if not apparent from the designation of the place of entertainment), and (7) if the entertainment immediately precedes or follows a business discussion, the employee also must identify those persons entertained who participated in the business discussion, and the nature of the business discussion
employees whose business expenses are supported by the expense report (and receipts) are “reimbursed” by the employer (it sends a check to the credit card company for the amount of the expenses)
employees are required to return to the employer (within sixty days) any employer reimbursements in excess of substantiated business expenses
What the IRS said. The employer’s business expense reimbursement arrangement is “accountable” because it meets the following three requirements: (1) only those expenses with a “business connection” are reimbursed; (2) only those expenses that are properly substantiated (as to amount, date, location, and business purpose) are reimbursed; and (3) employees are required to return to the employer within sixty days any reimbursements in excess of substantiated expenses.
The IRS noted that reimbursements paid under an accountable plan are not reportable by the employer or employee as taxable income. This means that the reimbursements are not reported by the employer on the employee’s W-2, or on Form 941. Further, the employee does not report the reimbursements as income on his or her income tax return.
Key point. The IRS cautioned that if an arrangement does not satisfy one or more of the three requirements of an accountable plan, then all amounts paid under the arrangement are treated as paid under a “nonaccountable plan” and must be reported as income on the employee’s W-2 and Form 1040, and the employer’s Form 941. Further, such reimbursements would be subject to tax withholding for ministers who have elected voluntary withholding, and nonminister employees.
What about your church? Does your church make credit cards available to ministers or other staff members? If so, this ruling will provide you with useful guidance. Some churches will satisfy the requirements for an accountable plan summarized above, but many will not. It is fairly common for churches to simply provide a pastor with a credit card, in the pastor’s name, without any restrictions on use. There is nothing “wrong” with such an arrangement. It violates no law. But it is not the ideal arrangement for the pastor from a tax standpoint, since it will be a “nonaccountable” arrangement. As noted above, this means that the church will need to report all charges as taxable income on the minister’s W-2 and on its Form 941. The minister will then be able to claim a business expense deduction on Schedule A (Form 1040), but only if the minister uses Schedule A and only to the extent that the minister’s business expenses exceed 2 percent of his or her adjusted gross income.
If your church lets pastors or other staff members use a credit card, now would be a good time to reconsider such a practice in light of this ruling. If your arrangement is not accountable, consider making it accountable by conforming to the practices outlined above.
Example. Rev. G is senior minister of his church. The church reimburses him for all of his business expenses by means of a credit card (in the church’s name). However, Rev. G is not required to account for such expenses by providing the church treasurer with receipts documenting the amount, time, place, business purpose (and, in the case of entertainment expenses, the business relationship) of each expense. Rev. G simply informs the treasurer at the end of each month of the total expenses incurred during that month. Assume further that Rev. G cannot itemize deductions on Schedule A (he does not have sufficient deductions), and that he is an employee for income tax reporting purposes. If Rev. G receives reimbursements of $4,000 in 1997: (1) the church would report the entire reimbursements ($4,000) as income on Rev. G’s W 2, and Rev. G would report them as income (salary) on his Form 1040; (2) Rev. G cannot deduct the reimbursed expenses as adjustments to gross income (on Form 1040), since they are “nonaccountable” (i.e., he did not adequately account to the church for such expenses); (3) Rev. G cannot deduct the reimbursed expenses as a miscellaneous itemized deduction on Schedule A since he does not have sufficient expenses to itemize. In other words, all of Rev. G’s business expense reimbursements are includable in his income for tax purposes, but he cannot offset any of this income by deducting any portion of his business expenses. Even if Rev. G could itemize deductions, his nonaccountable reimbursed expenses would be treated just like unreimbursed expenses—they are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized deductions, and then only to the extent that they (along with most other miscellaneous expenses) exceed 2 percent of Rev. G’s adjusted gross income. These undesirable tax consequences could have been avoided had the church adopted an accountable reimbursement plan. Under these circumstances, the church would not have reported the $4,000 of reimbursements as income on Rev. G’s W 2, and Rev. G would not have to report the reimbursements or claim the expenses on his Form 1040.
Example. Rev. C has a church credit card (in the church’s name) on which he charges only church related business expenses. Each month, Rev. C submits a statement of all charges to the church treasurer along with an expense statement documenting the amount, date, place, business nature (and, in the case of entertainment expenses, the business relationship). This is a proper reimbursement policy, and as a result Rev. C need not report any of the charges as income and he need not deduct any expenses, and the church need not report any of the reimbursements as compensation on Rev. C’s W 2.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, April 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Church Liability for the Sexual Misconduct of Ministers
A California court renders a questionable decision.
Article summary. A California court ruled that a Catholic church was not responsible on the basis of negligent hiring for a priest’s acts of child molestation, since they had not been aware of any similar incidents of misconduct at the time the priest was employed. Further, the church could not be liable for the victim’s injuries on the basis of negligent supervision, since most if not all of the priest’s acts did not occur in the course of any official church duties and did not occur on church premises. The most astonishing aspect of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that a church, like any employer, can be sued on the basis of invasion of privacy or sexual harassment if it inquires into a prospective employee’s past sexual behavior. This conclusion is unfortunate, since it may put children at greater risk in California and in any other state that reaches a similar conclusion. This important ruling is addressed fully in this feature article.
A California court reached the shocking conclusion that a Catholic church did not have a legal duty to make inquiries into a priest’s sexual history at the time he was employed since doing so would have exposed it to liability for invasion of privacy and sexual harassment! Here we see the absurd results that can occur when legal rights are carried to extremes. If this lamentable ruling is not reversed by the state supreme court, California may become a magnet for pedophiles seeking employment with religious and secular employers alike, free from inquiries that might reveal the danger they pose to innocent children. This article will review the facts of this case, summarize the court’s ruling, and assess its significance to other churches.
Facts
Note. The facts summarized below are as stated by the victim in her lawsuit.
A 15—year—old female (the “victim”) claimed to have been “regularly and repeatedly sexually molested” by her parish priest. She sued her church, alleging that it negligently hired, retained and supervised the priest because it should have known of his dangerous propensities as a sexual exploiter of children. Specifically, the victim alleged that
the priest was under the direct employ, supervision, agency and control of the church, and that his employment duties “included providing for the spiritual and emotional needs of, and religious instruction for, parishioners, including providing for the proper supervision of minor parishioners entrusted to his care”
the diocese and its churches had held themselves out to be a safe environment in which persons could worship, and they thereby “entered into an express or implied duty to properly supervise her and to provide her with a reasonably safe spiritual environment”
the church assumed a duty to the victim by “holding [the priest] out to the public as a competent and trustworthy Roman Catholic priest and counselor of high morals”
The victim claimed that the church breached its duty to her by exposing her to a priest “who was an unfit agent with dangerous propensities, and by not properly supervising her.” She claimed the church “should reasonably have known of [his] dangerous propensities as a child sexual exploiter” and “despite such knowledge, [it] negligently retained or failed to supervise [him] in a position of trust and authority” where he was able to harm her. The victim claimed that the church failed to provide reasonable supervision of the priest, and failed to reasonably investigate him and warn her.
The church asked the court to dismiss the case on the ground that it was not negligent. It insisted that it did not know and had no reason to suspect that the priest posed any risk to parishioners prior to the victim’s accusations. In essence, the church argued it had no civil duty to investigate its employees and the constitutional requirement separating church and state barred the victim’s civil action for negligent hiring and supervision of a priest. A trial court rejected the church’s argument, and the case was appealed.
The court’s ruling
A state appeals court dismissed the victim’s lawsuit against the church. The court’s reasoning is summarized below.
Negligent hiring
The court acknowledged that “an employer may be liable to a third person for the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” However, the court qualified this rule by noting that
one who employs another to act for him is not liable … merely because the one employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. If liability results it is because, under the circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the business in hand …. Liability results … not because of the relation of the parties, but because the employer … had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment.
The court noted that the harm the victim suffered was criminal sexual abuse of a minor by her priest. It observed: “There is nothing in the record to indicate [the priest] had a criminal history or had been previously implicated in sexual abuse of a minor. Thus the church could not have had antecedent knowledge of [his] purported criminal dangerousness.” That is, evidence that the priest had engaged in sexual misconduct with adults did not necessarily make him a risk to children. The court observed that the victim failed to prove any facts “showing an undue risk of harm that [the priest] would commit criminal child sexual abuse if he were employed by the church.”
But even if evidence of sexual misconduct with adults would be relevant in evaluating a priest’s risk of committing similar acts upon children, the church “had no actual knowledge of [his] sexual activity with [her] or anyone else until it heard [her] mother’s report and [the priest’s] admissions.” In other words, the church could not be responsible for the priest’s molestation of the victim on the basis of negligent hiring if it had no knowledge of any prior misconduct by the priest at the time he was hired or ordained.
The court referred to a prior case in California in which a court ruled that a church could be liable on the basis of negligent hiring for a pastor’s acts of child molestation since there was evidence that the church was aware of prior acts of molestation by the pastor prior to the time he was hired. The court concluded that this case was not relevant since the victim had failed to prove that the church was aware of any prior acts of child molestation by the priest at the time he was employed. Evidence of prior acts of sexual misconduct with adults was not enough.
The court referred to the following testimony by other priests and church officials in support of its conclusion that the church had not been guilty of negligent hiring when it employed the priest:
An assistant to the bishop of the diocese testified that until the day the victim’s mother informed him of her daughter’s accusations, no one in the church had received any report of misconduct or wrongdoing by the priest. The assistant and bishop later met with the priest, who admitted to the molestation of the victim, and affairs with an adult female in California and two adult females in the Philippines. This was the first knowledge anyone in the church had of the priest’s affairs.
A priest who shared a residence with the offending priest for several months prior to the alleged acts of molestation testified that he “never saw any sign that [the priest] had any problems with his celibacy,” had pornographic magazines or that he paid particular attention to any girls in the parish. He never received any complaints about the priest.
Another priest who lived with the offending priest for two years prior to the incidents in question testified he “never saw any signs [the priest] had any problems with his celibacy.” He never received complaints about the priest and “never had any reason to suspect that he had or would engage in sexual conduct with anyone, whether an adult or a minor.”
Another priest who worked closely with the offending priest in 1990 and 1991 testified that he “never became aware of any facts which called for [the priest’s] discipline” or that the priest “had any problems with his promise of chastity as a priest.”
A church official testified that since the priest was ordained in the Philippines before coming to California, “there was no duty on the part of the Diocese of San Diego to screen or test him for matters relating to sexuality, unless and until a sexual problem manifested itself. Under canon law, priests, like the rest of the faithful, have a right to privacy.”
The victim also claimed that the diocese was negligent in hiring the priest because, as part of its voluntarily screening process, it failed to “ask him whether he had problems with his vows of celibacy.” The victim claimed that if the priest had been asked, he “would have admitted that he had two sexual relationships in the Philippines and one here in San Diego with a parishioner. Undoubtedly, armed with this knowledge, any reasonable employer would have done an even more extensive investigation and most certainly would not have entrusted the care of minor girls to him without very close supervision.” The court disagreed. It noted that even if the diocese had learned of the priest’s prior sexual affairs with adults
it is illogical to conclude [it] should have anticipated [he] would commit sexual crimes on a minor. More important, the legal duty of inquiry [the victim] seeks to impose on the church as an employer would violate the employee’s privacy rights. Privacy is a fundamental liberty implicitly guaranteed by the federal Constitution and is explicitly guaranteed under the California Constitution as an inalienable right. The right encompasses privacy in one’s sexual matters and is not limited to the marital relationship. Although the right to privacy is not absolute, it yields only to a compelling state interest. Here there was no compelling state interest to require the employer to investigate the sexual practices of its employee. Moreover, the employer who queries employees on sexual behavior is subject to claims for invasion of privacy and sexual harassment. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 692 (1993).
Similarly [the victim’s] contention the church should have required [the priest] to undergo a psychological evaluation before hiring him is unavailing. An individual’s right to privacy also encompasses mental privacy. We conclude the church did not fail to use due care in hiring [the priest].
Negligent supervision
The victim also claimed that the diocese negligently supervised the priest. The court rejected this argument, noting that “nearly all” of the acts of molestation occurred when the priest took the victim from her home to various public places and hotels.” The court added:
Similarly, there is no special relationship here creating a heightened duty of care based on a priest/parishioner relationship. In the context of a claim for negligent counseling, our Supreme Court explained in Nally v. Grace Community Church, supra, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, that the legislature has exempted clergy from licensing requirements applicable to other counselors. That exemption is in recognition “that access to the clergy for counseling should be free from state imposed counseling standards, and that “the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious organizations.”
Charitable Contributions Addressed in Final IRS Regulations
Important information for church treasurers.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. The rules for substantiating charitable contributions of $250 or more that took effect in 1994 continue to cause confusion. The IRS issued proposed regulations last year that address some of the questions that have arisen. The public was invited to comment on these regulations, and the IRS recently released final regulations based in part on these comments. There are a few provisions in the final regulations that will be of interest to church treasurers, and they are summarized and illustrated in this article.
Key point. Familiarity with the final regulations will help church treasurers properly credit and receipt charitable contributions.
Intent to make a charitable contribution. For many years, the IRS has ruled that persons who receive goods or services in exchange for a payment to a charity are eligible for a charitable contribution deduction only with respect to the amount by which their payment that exceeds the fair rental value of the goods or services they received. The final regulations add an additional condition—donors may not claim a charitable contribution in such a case unless they intended to make a payment in excess of the fair market value of the goods or services.
Example. A church sells tickets to a missions banquet. The cost of each ticket is $100, though the fair market value of the meal is only $20. Persons who purchase tickets are eligible to claim a charitable contribution deduction in the amount of $80—if they intended to make a payment in excess of the amount of the dinner.
How will church treasurers know when donors intend to make a payment in excess of goods or services received in exchange? The final regulations aren’t of much help here. They simply state that “the facts and circumstances” of each case must be considered.
Key point. One rule of thumb may help—the greater the amount by which a payment exceeds the market value of goods or services received in exchange, the more likely the donor intended to make a charitable contribution. In the previous example, it is clear that donors intend to make a contribution since the ticket price ($100) obviously exceeds the value of the dinner. This is a good reason to set ticket prices at a level obviously higher than the value of a meal received at an appreciation banquet.
Key point. Most persons who buy tickets to missions banquets, or who receive a free dinner in appreciation for a contribution, do not make their contribution in order to get a free meal. They would give the same amount whether or not the meal was received. As a result, an argument could be made that charitable contribution deductions should not be reduced by the value of appreciation meals. While there is much merit to this logic, the IRS has rejected it.
Refusal of benefits. What if a member purchases a $100 ticket to a church’s missions banquet (in the above example), but has no intention of attending the banquet? Is the member entitled to a charitable contribution deduction of $100, or $80? In other words, must a charitable contribution be reduced by the amount of goods or services that a donor refuses to accept?
The IRS addressed this issue when it released the final regulations, noting that “a taxpayer who has properly rejected a benefit offered by a charitable organization may claim a deduction in the full amount of the payment to the charitable organization.” How does a donor reject a benefit? The IRS suggested that charities create a form containing a “check-off box” that donors can check at the time they make a contribution if they want to refuse a benefit.
Key point. The IRS distinguishes goods or services that were made available to a donor but not used, from those that were properly rejected. To illustrate, donors who purchase a ticket to a missions banquet for $100 must reduce their contribution by the value of the meal ($20 in the above example) even if they decide not to attend the banquet. However, if at the time a donor purchases a ticket he indicates unequivocally and in writing that he will not be attending the banquet, then the church treasurer can receipt the donor for the full value of the ticket ($100). And, the IRS has noted that in such a case the receipt issued by the church “need not reflect the value of the rejected benefit.”
Timely receipts. The new rules for substantiating charitable contributions that took effect in 1994 deny a deduction for individual contributions of $250 or more unless the donor receives a receipt from the charity that complies with several requirements. One of those requirements is that the donor must receive a “contemporaneous” or timely receipt from the charity. This means that the receipt acknowledging the contribution must be received by the donor on or before the earlier of the following two dates: (1) the date the donor files a tax return claiming a deduction for the contribution, or (2) the due date (including extensions) for filing the return.
Will the IRS actually deny a charitable contribution deduction to a donor simply because she did not receive a timely receipt from the charity? To illustrate, assume that a church issues receipts to donors in February of 1997 reflecting their contributions for 1996. Kathy made weekly contributions of $25 to the church, but in addition made a special contribution to the church building fund of $1,000. If Kathy files her tax return in January (prior to receiving the receipt from the church), is her $1,000 contribution to the building fund jeopardized? The official comments to the final IRS regulations leave no doubt that this contribution may be disallowed if Kathy’s tax return is audited. The IRS stated that a donor who files a return before receiving a receipt from a charity cannot “correct” this situation by filing an amended tax return since “a written acknowledgment obtained after a taxpayer files the original return for the year of the contribution is not contemporaneous within the meaning of the statute.”
Key point. Church treasurers must take the contemporaneous requirement seriously. Donors who file tax returns before receiving a proper receipt from the church may lose a deduction for every individual contribution of $250 or more. Filing an amended return will not help. Our recommendations: (1) Issue receipts as soon as possible after the start of each new year. (2) Advise donors at the end of each year not to file their tax returns until they have received a written acknowledgement of their contributions from the church. This communication should be in writing, and should be placed in the church bulletin or newsletter for the last few weeks of each year or included in a letter to all donors. Here is some sample wording: “IMPORTANT NOTICE: To ensure the deductibility of your church contributions, please do not file your income tax return until you have received a written acknowledgment of your contributions from the church. You may lose a deduction for some contributions if you file your tax return before receiving a written acknowledgement of your contributions from the church.”
Key point. Donors can continue to use canceled checks to substantiate individual contributions of $250 or more.
Multiple contributions. This is the biggest surprise in the final regulations. Let’s say that Don makes ten separate contributions to his church during 1997 of $250 or more. Must the church issue a written receipt that lists each of these contributions separately, or can the ten contributions be lumped together as one amount? The official comments to the final regulations contain the following statement: “[F]or multiple contributions of $250 or more to one charity, one [receipt] that reflects the total amount of the taxpayer’s contributions to the charity for the year is sufficient.” In other words, the church is free to lump all of Don’s contributions together as one amount on its receipt.
Key point. Most churches currently itemize individual contributions on receipts provided to donors, and many will want to continue this practice even though it is not legally required. A receipt that merely provides donors with a lump sum of all their contributions will be of no value to a donor who wants to correct a discrepancy.
Key point. The official comments to the final regulations also confirm that multiple contributions of less than $250 are not combined to trigger the substantiation rules applicable to contributions of $250 or more.
Out-of-pocket expenses. Let’s say that Greg, a member of First Church, participates in a short-term missions project and in the process incurs $300 of unreimbursed out-of-pocket travel expenses. The IRS has long acknowledged that such expenses are deductible as a charitable contribution. But what about the new rules for substantiating charitable contributions of $250 or more? Do they apply to this kind of contribution? Is the church responsible for keeping track of Greg’s travel expenses in order to determine if they are $250 or more? Must it issue a receipt that states the amount of travel expenses incurred?
The proposed regulations issued by the IRS last year specified that where a taxpayer incurs unreimbursed expenses in the course of performing services for a charitable organization, the expenses may be substantiated by an “abbreviated written acknowledgment” provided by the charity containing the following information:
a description of the services provided by the donor
the dates when the services were provided
whether or not the charity provided any goods or services in return, and
if the charity provided any goods or services, a description and good faith estimate of the fair market value of those goods or services
In addition, the abbreviated written acknowledgment must be received by the taxpayer before the earlier of (1) the date he or she files a tax return claiming the contribution deduction, or (2) the due date (including extensions) for the tax return for that year.
In response to several comments, the final regulations drop the requirement that the abbreviated acknowledgment include the dates on which the volunteer services were performed. However, the final regulations keep the other requirements of the abbreviated acknowledgment summarized above.
Example. Here is an example of an abbreviated written acknowledgement that complies with the final regulations:”Greg Jones participated on a missions trip sponsored by First Church in the nation of Panama. His services included working in a medical clinic. The church provided no goods or services in return for these services.” The church should be sure that Greg receives this receipt before the earlier of (1) the date he files a tax return claiming the contribution deduction, or (2) the due date (including extensions) for the tax return for that year.
Form of contribution. In releasing the final regulations the IRS also addressed the question of whether a written receipt acknowledging contributions of $250 or more must be in a particular format. The IRS noted that “as long as it is in writing and contains the information required by law, a contemporaneous written acknowledgment may be in any format.”
The IRS noted that it is authorized by law to issue regulations allowing charities to satisfy the new charitable contribution substantiation requirements (for contributions of $250 or more) by filing a return with the IRS including the necessary information. This kind of reporting has not yet been implemented. However, in releasing the final regulations the IRS noted that it is examining “whether any existing IRS forms can be modified to assist in their use in substantiating charitable contributions.”
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, February 1997.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Can Bankruptcy Trustees Recover Charitable Contributions?
A federal appeals court issues an important ruling.
Can Bankruptcy Trustees Recover Charitable Contributions?
A federal appeals court issues an important ruling.
Richard R. Hammar
In Re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996)
Background. A member of your church suffers a business setback that prompts him to file for bankruptcy. Several weeks later, your church receives an official letter from the bankruptcy trustee, demanding that the church return all contributions the member made within a year of filing his bankruptcy petition. How would you respond? This is an important and practical question that every church treasurer should be prepared to answer. A recent court ruling provides helpful guidance.
Key point. The court’s decision is of utmost importance to churches and church treasurers. The number of persons filing for bankruptcy protection is at an all-time high. It is not uncommon for several members within the same church to have had their debts discharged in bankruptcy. This exposes the church to possible demands from a bankruptcy trustee to return contributions made by a debtor within a year of filing a bankruptcy petition.
A recent case. Bruce was a devoted church member and a faithful giver. Mounting debts caused him to file for bankruptcy in 1992. His church received a letter from a bankruptcy trustee demanding a return of the $13,000 in contributions Bruce made to the church during the year preceding his bankruptcy filing. The church refused to comply, and a bankruptcy court ordered it to do so. The court relied on a provision in the bankruptcy code giving bankruptcy trustees the authority to “avoid” or cancel transfers of money or property by a bankrupt debtor, made within one year of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, unless the debtor received “in exchange” goods or services of “reasonably equivalent value.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent unscrupulous persons from giving away their assets to friends and relatives, filing for bankruptcy and having their debts discharged, and then having their assets returned to them. You are free to transfer property within a year of filing for bankruptcy, but unless you receive in exchange goods or services of reasonably equivalent value, a bankruptcy trustee can cancel your transfer and order the property returned to the bankruptcy court.
The church insisted that Bruce did receive services of “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for his contributions, including worship, teaching, and counsel. Therefore, the bankruptcy trustee could not cancel the contributions and insist that the church return them. The court disagreed. It conceded that Bruce received valuable benefits from the church, but it insisted that these benefits were not provided “in exchange” for Bruce’s contributions. Quite to the contrary, the church would have provided these benefits to Bruce whether or not he contributed anything. As a result, the church failed to establish that Bruce received anything of reasonably equivalent value in exchange for his contributions to the church. This meant that the bankruptcy trustee could recover the $13,000 in contributions Bruce had made during the year prior to his bankruptcy petition.
The church appealed, and a federal appeals court ruled in favor of the church. It agreed that the church failed to prove that it provided anything of reasonably equivalent value in exchange for Bruce’s contributions. It noted that “church services were available to all regardless of whether any contributions were made,” that Bruce’s contributions were “in no way linked to the availability of church services,” and that there had been “no exchange of contributions for church services.” As a result, the bankruptcy trustee could order the church to return Bruce’s contributions since he had received nothing in exchange for his contributions.
However, the court concluded that allowing the trustee to recover Bruce’s contributions from the church would violate the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This Act provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless it “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The court concluded that the bankruptcy trustee’s recovery of Bruce’s contributions would “substantially burden” the exercise of religion of both Bruce and his church, since both believed in the principle of tithing. It further concluded that there was no “compelling governmental interest” that would justify this burden, and therefore the Act would be violated if the trustee were permitted to recover Bruce’s contributions.
Key point. The federal appeals court noted that “finding that the church services had some economic benefit and that the debtor made the contributions in exchange for those services would call into doubt treating those contributions as deductible charitable contributions.”
Relevance to church treasurers. What is the relevance of this case to church treasurers? Given the increasing number of persons who are filing for bankruptcy, it is likely that many churches in the future will receive letters from bankruptcy trustees demanding a return of contributions made by bankrupt debtors. Church treasurers need to be prepared to respond to these demands. The comments listed below will help.
1. Your church is in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota, and considers tithing to be an important religious practice.
You are covered by the federal appeals court decision summarized in this article. This issue has been resolved for churches in your state. Bankruptcy trustees are prohibited by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act from requiring churches to return contributions paid by bankrupt debtors.
Key point. A few federal courts have suggested that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional. So far, two federal appeals courts have addressed the constitutionality of the Act, and both have concluded that it is constitutional. Someday the Supreme Court may decide this issue. If the Supreme Court determines that the Act is unconstitutional, then the federal appeals court ruling discussed in this article would be reversed, and bankruptcy trustees would be empowered to insist that churches return the contributions of bankrupt debtors (made within a year of filing a bankruptcy petition). Churches could still argue that such a practice violates the first amendment’s guaranty of religious freedom. This issue was not addressed by the federal appeals court.
Key point. The bankruptcy trustee in the case discussed in this article has asked the United States Supreme Court to review the case. Any developments will be reviewed in future editions of this newsletter.
2. Your church is in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota, but does not consider tithing to be an important religious practice.
You are not covered by the federal appeals court decision summarized in this article. Since tithing is not an important practice, there would be no “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion, and therefore the Religious Freedom Restoration Act would not be violated. Bankruptcy trustees would not be barred by the appeals court’s decision from insisting that churches return the contributions of bankrupt debtors (made within a year of filing a bankruptcy petition).
3. Your church is not in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota, and considers tithing to be an important religious practice.
You are not covered by the federal appeals court decision summarized in this article. However, the decision may still be of some relevance. While it is not binding, it will be given some weight since it is a federal appellate decision. If you are contacted by a bankruptcy trustee who demands that you return the contributions of a bankrupt church member, you should retain an attorney who can inform the bankruptcy trustee about the ruling discussed in this article. Many trustees would defer to this decision (even though it is not binding upon them) rather than pursue litigation. Others may not.
Lower level federal courts in some states have addressed this issue and reached conflicting results. Most of these rulings occurred before the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was enacted, and so they are of limited significance.
4. Your church is not in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota, and does not consider tithing to be an important religious practice.
You are not covered by the federal appeals court decision summarized in this article. Since tithing is not an important practice, there would be no “substantial burden” on the exercise of religion, and therefore the Religious Freedom Restoration Act would not be violated. Bankruptcy trustees would not be barred by the appeals court’s decision from insisting that churches return the contributions of bankrupt debtors (made within a year of filing a bankruptcy petition).
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, November 1996.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
A Summary of Recent Tax Legislation
Eight key provisions that church treasurers need to know.
Eight key provisions that church treasurers need to know.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. Congress enacted four major tax laws in August. It is essential for church treasurers to be familiar with a number of key provisions in these laws that will have a direct impact on church finances and reporting. This article contains a summary of the eight provisions of most importance to church treasurers.
#1—Liability of board members for noncompliance with payroll tax requirements. The IRS can assess a 100 percent penalty against corporate officers who willfully fail to withhold federal taxes from employees’ wages or who fail to pay over withheld taxes to the government. This law has been applied to church board members and treasurers. A new law clarifies that this penalty is not to be imposed on volunteer, unpaid members of any board of a tax-exempt organization to the extent such members are solely serving in an honorary capacity, do not participate in the day-to-day or financial activities of the organization, and do not have actual knowledge of the failure. However, this provision cannot operate in such a way as to eliminate all responsible persons from responsibility.
The new law also requires the IRS to develop materials to better inform board members of tax-exempt organizations (including voluntary or honorary members) that they may be subject to this penalty. The IRS is required to make such materials routinely available to tax-exempt organizations.
Example. Bill serves as treasurer of his church. Due to financial difficulties, a decision is made by the pastor to use withheld payroll taxes to pay other debts. The IRS later asserts that the church owes $25,000 in unpaid payroll taxes. The church has no means of paying this debt. The IRS later insists that Bill and the other members of the church board are personally liable for the debt. It is likely that Bill is a responsible person who may be liable for the 100 percent penalty since he has authority over the day-to-day financial activities of the church. The new law will not protect him. However, the new law will protect those members of the church board who (1) are volunteer, unpaid members; (2) serve solely in an honorary capacity; (3) do not participate in the day-to-day or financial activities of the organization; and (4) do not have actual knowledge of the failure to pay over withheld taxes to the government.
Example. A church board votes to use withheld taxes to pay other debts of the church. Over a three year period the church fails to deposit $100,000 in withheld taxes. The IRS claims that the board members are personally liable for the 100 percent penalty for failing to deposit withheld taxes. All of the members of the board claim they are protected by the provisions of the new law. They are not correct, since the new law specifies that its provisions cannot operate in such a way as to eliminate all responsible persons from responsibility.
#2—Interim sanctions. The so-called “Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,” signed into law by the president in August of 1996, contains a provision allowing the IRS to assess “intermediate sanctions” (an excise tax) against exempt organizations in lieu of outright revocation of exempt status. The intermediate sanctions may be assessed only in cases of “excess benefit transactions,” meaning one or more transactions that provide unreasonable compensation to an officer or director of the exempt organization. An excess benefit transaction is defined as:
any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided to a “disqualified person” (someone in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization) if the value of the benefit exceeds the value of the services provided by the disqualified person, or
to the extent provided in IRS regulations (to be released later), any transaction in which the amount of an economic benefit provided to a disqualified person is based on the revenues of the organization, if the transaction results in unreasonable compensation being paid
A committee report to the new law clarifies that the parties to a transaction are entitled to rely on a presumption of reasonableness with respect to a compensation arrangement with a disqualified person if such arrangement was approved by a board of directors (or committee of the board) that: (1) was composed entirely of individuals unrelated to and not subject to the control of the disqualified person involved in the arrangement; (2) obtained and relied upon objective “comparability” information, such as (a) compensation paid by similar organizations, both taxable and tax-exempt, for comparable positions, (b) independent compensation surveys by nationally recognized independent firms, or (c) actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person; and (3) adequately documented the basis for its decision.
Key point. A disqualified person who benefits from an excess benefit transaction is subject to a penalty tax equal to 25 percent of the amount of the excess benefit. An exempt organization’s managers who participate in an excess benefit transaction knowing that it is an improper transaction are subject to a penalty tax of 10 percent of the amount of the excess benefit (up to a maximum penalty of $10,000). It is possible that the IRS will assess this penalty against church board members who participate in an excess benefit transaction involving a pastor or other church employee.
This provision generally applies to excess benefit transactions occurring on or after September 14, 1995.
#3—Including telephone numbers on 1099 forms. All 1099 forms issued after December 31, 1996, must contain the name, address, and telephone number of a “contact person” who can answer questions the recipient may have about the form. The purpose of this new requirement is to give recipients of 1099 forms the ability to contact a person who was responsible for preparing the form and who presumably has the ability to answer any questions the recipient may have.
Key point. For many churches, the “contact person” will be the church treasurer. This means that all 1099 forms issued by the church must contain the name, address, and telephone number of the treasurer. In other churches, the contact person will be a business administrator.
#4—Increase in the federal minimum wage. The minimum wage increased to $4.75 on October 1, 1996, and increases to $5.15 on October 1, 1997. Church treasurers often ask if the minimum wage law applies to churches. That depends. Any worker employed in an “enterprise engaged in commerce” must be paid the minimum wage, with certain exceptions. The law specifically includes schools and preschools in the definition of an enterprise engaged in commerce, and so a worker employed by a church-operated school or preschool should be paid the minimum wage. It is also likely that the government would claim that churches engaged in commercial or business activities, or that engage in significant interstate sales or purchases, must pay the minimum wage.
Key point. Employers are not required to pay the minimum wage to “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” if income tests are met. The definitions of these terms are complex, and should not be relied upon without the assistance of legal counsel.
Example. A church operates a preschool, and employs a director and nine workers. The church must pay the nine workers the minimum wage (currently $4.75 per hour). It is possible that the director would qualify as a professional employee. If so, the church would not be required to pay the minimum wage to this person.
#5—Treating workers as self-employed. Churches, like any employer, face substantial penalties if they classify workers as “self-employed” and the IRS later reclassifies those workers as employees.
Example. A church employs three part-time custodians. Each custodian works twenty hours per week. For the past ten years the church has treated these workers as self-employed, and as a result does not withhold taxes from their pay and issues them a 1099 each year. The IRS reclassifies these workers as employees. The church is now subject to a number of possible penalties, including: (1) liability for the full amount of income taxes and FICA taxes not withheld from these workers’ wages; (2) an additional penalty of 1.5% of each worker’s wages, for failure to withhold income taxes; and (3) an additional penalty of 20% of each worker’s share of FICA taxes, for failure to withhold FICA taxes. The cumulative effect of these penalties can be substantial.
Imposing penalties on employers for improperly classifying workers as self-employed is viewed by many as unfair, since the definitions of the terms “employee” and “self-employed” are so vague. In 1978, Congress agreed and enacted a law exempting employers from penalties associated with the classification of workers as self-employed if they have a reasonable basis for doing so based on (1) published IRS rulings or court decisions; (2) past IRS audit practice with respect to the employer; (3) a long-standing recognized practice of a significant segment of the industry in which the worker is engaged; or (4) any other reasonable basis for treating a worker as self-employed. Over the years, the IRS interpreted this provision very narrowly, causing many employers to be ineligible for the relief from penalties that Congress so clearly intended. One of the tax laws enacted by Congress this past summer reaffirms the protections of the 1978 law, and adds a number of provisions making it more likely that employers will receive the relief intended. Here are some of the key provisions:
The new law clarifies that a “long-standing recognized practice” shall not be construed “as requiring the practice to have continued for more than ten years.” The IRS had said that the practice must have existed for at least ten years.
The new law clarifies that “in no event shall the significant segment requirement … be construed to require a reasonable showing of the practice of more than 25 percent of the industry.” The IRS had said that at least 50 percent was required.
The new law specifies that if an employer establishes a “prima facie case” that it was reasonable to treat a worker as self-employed on the basis of precedent (IRS or court rulings), prior audit practice, or a long-standing practice of a significant industry segment, then the burden of proof shifts to the IRS to prove that the worker is an employee.
If an employer changes its treatment of workers from self-employed to employees for employment tax purposes, such a change cannot be considered in evaluating whether or not the workers were employees or self-employed for prior years.
The IRS must, at or before the commencement of an audit involving worker classification issues, provide the employer with written notice of the protections of the 1978 law.
Example. Same facts as the previous example. How will the new law help protect the church from penalties the IRS may attempt to impose as a result of the church’s improper classification of the custodians as self-employed? The church can argue that it is exempt from any penalties because it had a “reasonable basis” for treating its custodians as self-employed. One way for the church to establish a reasonable basis is to prove that its treatment of the custodians as self-employed was based on a “long-standing recognized practice” of a “significant segment of the industry” in which the custodians are engaged. Under the new law, it will be easier for the church to prove these elements. Since it has treated the custodians as self-employed for ten years, it meets the “long-standing recognized practice” requirement. And, in meeting the “significant segment of the industry” test the church will not be required to establish that more than 25 percent of churches (not 50 percent, as had been required by the IRS) treat part-time custodians as self-employed. Note that the 25 percent rule is the maximum, and that a church could argue that the treatment of part-time custodians as self-employed represents the practice of a significant industry segment even if less than 25 percent of churches treat part-time custodians as self-employed. The church should also insist that it has met the “prima facie case” requirement under the new law, which shifts the “burden of proof” to the IRS to prove that the custodians are not self-employed.
Key point. The law requires that all tax forms filed by the employer (1099, 941, etc.) since 1978 must be consistent with self-employed status of the worker. In other words, if a church has treated a worker as self-employed, then it must have issued the worker 1099 forms rather than W-2 forms since 1978 (or since the worker was employed, if later).
#6—New definition of “highly compensated employee.” One of the new tax laws enacted by Congress simplifies the definition of the term “highly compensated employee.” This is a very important provision for church treasurers, because it will determine whether certain fringe benefits provided to church employees are taxable or tax-free. Church treasurers need to know this in order to correctly complete W-2 and 941 forms. The key point is this—certain fringe benefits that “discriminate” in favor of a highly compensated employee are taxable to that employee, even if they otherwise would be nontaxable. The most common examples of these fringe benefits for church workers include cafeteria plans, flexible spending arrangements, qualified tuition reductions, employer-provided educational assistance, and dependent care assistance.
For the past several years there have been two problems associated with the definition of the term “highly compensated employee.” First, the definition has been so complicated that many church treasurers had difficulty applying it. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the definition included the highest paid officer of a church or other employer no matter how little this person was paid. The new definition responds directly to both of these problems. First, it adopts a simple definition of a highly compensated employee—beginning in 1997 a highly compensated church employee is one who had compensation for the previous year in excess of $80,000 (and, if an employer elects, was in the top 20 percent of employees by compensation). The $80,000 figure will be adjusted each year for inflation.
Example. A church operates a private school, and charges annual tuition of $2,000. In 1996, the senior pastor (who also serves as the president of the school) is allowed to send his daughter to the school without charge. The senior pastor’s total compensation for 1996 is $35,000. The church provides no tuition reductions to other school or church employees. The “tuition reduction” granted to the senior pastor ($2,000) is discriminatory, and so the entire amount must be reported as income on the pastor’s W-2. This is because the benefit discriminates in favor of the pastor, who meets the definition of a highly compensated employee (even though he earns only $35,000 for the year) because he is the highest paid officer of the school.
Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the year is 1997. The new definition of a highly compensated employee takes effect in 1997, and under this definition the pastor is not a highly compensated employee since he earns less than $80,000. The fact that he is the highest paid officer (regardless of the amount of his compensation) no longer makes him a highly compensated employee.
#7—Delay in implementing electronic deposit of payroll taxes. Some church treasurers are still not aware that they soon may be required to deposit payroll taxes electronically. Under the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS), employers that deposited at least $50,000 in payroll taxes in 1995 must enroll with a private contractor hired by the IRS and begin making deposits of payroll taxes either by telephone or by computer beginning on January 1, 1997. One of the tax laws recently enacted by Congress postpones the January 1, 1997 deadline for six months. As a result, churches and other employers have until July 1, 1997 to begin depositing payroll taxes electronically—if they made payroll tax deposits of at least $50,000 in 1995.
Example. A church had 6 employees in 1995, with a total payroll of $130,000, and deposited $23,000 in payroll taxes. It is not required to deposit payroll taxes electronically in 1997.
Example. A church had 15 employees in 1995, with a total payroll of $320,000, and deposited $62,000 in payroll taxes. It is required to begin depositing payroll taxes electronically in 1997 as of July 1 of that year.
Example. A church had 6 employees in 1995, with a total payroll of $130,000, and deposited $23,000 in payroll taxes. In 1997 it has 10 employees and expects to deposit more than $50,000 in payroll taxes. It is not required to deposit payroll taxes electronically in 1997 since it did not deposit more than $50,000 in payroll taxes in 1995.
Key point. Future issues of this newsletter will discuss the new electronic filing requirements in more detail.
#8—Medical savings accounts (MSAs). Beginning in 1997, some workers will be allowed to open medical savings accounts (MSAs) as a means of paying for certain health expenses. An MSA will look a lot like an IRA—a worker will be able to make tax-deductible contributions to his or her account, an employer can make nontaxable contributions, and any interest earned by the account is tax-deferred. Funds can be distributed tax-free from an MSA only to pay medical expenses.
MSAs will not be available to everyone. There were many in Congress who were opposed to the idea of “incentivizing” taxpayers to reduce medical spending by allowing them to pay for some medical expenses out of their own funds. A compromise was reached that allows MSAs only during a trial period (from 1997 to 2000); allows no more than 750,000 MSAs; and restricts MSAs to workers who are covered under an employer-sponsored “high deductible” medical plan of a “small employer” (having fewer than 50 employees during either of the two preceding years), or who are self-employed. A “high deductible” plan is a health insurance plan with a deductible of at least $1,500 in the case of single coverage and $3,000 in the case of coverage of more than one individual.
There are limits on the amounts that employees and employers can contribute to an MSA. The maximum annual contribution that can be made to an MSA is 65 percent of the deductible under the high deductible plan in the case of individual coverage and 75 percent of the deductible in the case of family coverage. Contributions for a year can be made until the due date for the individual’s tax return for the year (determined without regard to extensions).
As MSAs receive more attention in early 1997, it is likely that many church employees will be asking their church treasurer for information concerning these accounts and their availability to church workers.
Example. A church has 8 employees, and offers a health insurance plan provided through commercial insurance with a deductible of $500 in the case of single coverage and $1,000 in the case of family coverage. None of the church employees is eligible for an MSA. While they are employed by a small employer (fewer than 50 employees), they are not participating in a “high deductible health plan.”
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, October 1996.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
IRS, SSA Brief Employers on Electronic Filing Initiatives
Both organizations hope to be paperless after 1999.
IRS, SSA Brief Employers on Electronic Filing Initiatives
Both organizations hope to be paperless after 1999.
Richard R. Hammar
Soon, paper documents, such as IRS federal tax deposit payment coupons, will be a thing of the past and, as they develop electronic alternatives, both the Service and the Social Security Administration (SSA) are looking to the employer community. Lillie McCracken, the project manager for the IRS Cash Management System, told employers at an April 10 seminar sponsored by the American Payroll Association that the Service plans to have the paper coupon system eliminated after 1999.
The phase-out of paper is the compliment to the five-year phase-in of a system to electronically collect federal depository taxes. Norman Goldstein, senior financial executive for the SSA, briefed employers on how the move to electronic filing will change the SSA’s guidance for filing wage reporting information.
The shift from paper filing of tax deposits to electronic filing was mandated under the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (PubLNo 103-182) and began at the start of 1995, with employers whose annual employment tax deposits exceeded $78 million. It will become fully phased in by January 1999 when taxpayers who pay $20,000 in deposits each year will be required to file electronically.
McCracken briefed filers on how the Service plans to conduct the transition from the current electronic deposit payment system, TaxLink, a prototype system that was adopted to implement the electronic payment mandate when NAFTA was enacted. The Service’s electronic payment initiative will move from TaxLink to a new Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS), which is scheduled to become fully operational later this year.
According to McCracken, the Service will begin to notify depositors how to switch to or enroll in the EFTPS during May and June. The system is currently under review by an independent auditor, she said. Once it has been validated and certified, the Service will be seeking volunteers to go online in the new system.
The SSA is also gearing up for more electronic communication with filers. In August, when SSA hosts its payroll reporting conference, officials plan to roll out a draft version of the SSA’s revision of its technical information bulletin for submitting wage and tax reports on magnetic media, commonly known as TIB 4. According to Goldstein, the draft will include changes that the SSA plans to implement to make room for an electronic, rather than paper-based, reporting environment. Included in those revisions will be the elimination of unused fields and support for using 8-inch diskettes. The proposed TIB 4 will also consolidate TIBs 5, 6 and 7, which provide guidance to employers in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam, respectively, for submitting wage and tax data to the federal government.
The infrastructure is being put into place to eliminate forms like Form W 3, Transmittal of Income and Tax Statements, and Form 6559, Transmitter Report of Magnetic Media Filing, Goldstein indicated. He predicted that, in the coming tax year, the SSA will initiate a personal identification number system to serve as an alternative to more traditional paper-based signatures.
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, August 1996.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Liability of Churches and Denominational Agencies for the Sexual Misconduct of Ministers
Article summary. A federal court in Connecticut dismissed a lawsuit brought against a church and diocese by two adults who had been sexually molested by a priest when they were minors. The court ruled that the church and diocese were not responsible for the victims’ injuries on the basis of respondeat superior or negligence. The court cautioned that churches and denominational agencies are potentially liable on the basis of negligence for injuries sustained by victims of sexual molestation if they have knowledge of prior sexual misconduct by the molester. However, since the victims could not prove that church officials either knew or should have known of any previous sexual misconduct by the offending priest, the negligence claims had to be dismissed. The court ruled that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom does not necessarily protect a church or denominational agency from liability in a lawsuit based on negligent hiring, retention, or supervision if the victim’s claims do not implicate issues of ecclesiastical concern.
In a decision that will be relevant to both churches and denominational agencies, a federal court in Connecticut dismissed a lawsuit brought by two adults against their church and diocese for injuries they allegedly sustained when they were sexually molested while minors by a priest. The court’s decision addresses a number of important legal issues, including respondeat superior, the statute of limitations, freedom of religion, and the effect of prior notice of inappropriate conduct. This article will summarize the facts of the case, review the court’s ruling, and assess the significance of the case to other churches and denominational agencies.
Facts
Note: All of the facts summarized below are based on the allegations of the victims, and were assumed to be true by the court for purposes of its decision.
In 1977, two brothers began serving as altar boys in a Catholic church. The victims, now both adults, allege that from 1979 through 1985 their priest showed them pornographic movies, and engaged in various forms of sexual contact with them while on out—of—town trips. In 1992, one of the victims and his parents met with church officials and complained about the priest’s sexual misconduct. Shortly after these complaints, the priest was relieved of his duties, pending an investigation. The brothers later filed a lawsuit against the priest, based on reckless assault and battery, negligent assault and battery, negligence, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and unintentional infliction of emotional distress. The brothers also sued their church and diocese. The brothers asserted that these institutional defendants were responsible for their injuries on the basis of respondeat superior and negligence (in hiring, retaining, and supervising the priest).
The court’s ruling
The defendants asked the court to dismiss the case. They claimed that the brothers’ lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. The church defendants claimed that the court was barred from resolving the lawsuit by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom. The court agreed that the respondeat superior claims had to be dismissed, but it refused to dismiss the negligence claims. The court’s decision is summarized below.
respondeat superior
Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine that makes an employer legally responsible for the negligence of an employee committed within the scope of employment. As the court noted, central to the issue of liability under the doctrine is whether the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. If the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment, the employer may be liable for the plaintiff’s acts. The court noted that the test in Connecticut as to whether an employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment rests on whether the employee was furthering the employer’s business.
The brothers claimed that the priest, as an employee of the three Roman Catholic institutional defendants, acted within the scope of his employment as a parish priest when he allegedly sexually assaulted and abused them. The court disagreed: Even if [the priest] committed the acts alleged by the plaintiffs, however, there is no evidence to support a finding that these acts were in furtherance of his employer’s business and therefore within the scope of his employment. It continued:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the alleged sexual abuse by [the priest] was motivated by any purpose or object that would serve his employer. Indeed, as the affidavits submitted by the defendants indicate, the laws and standards of the Roman Catholic Church expressly prohibit priests from engaging in any sexual activity of any kind. Thus, even if [the priest] engaged in sexually abusive conduct, he did so only after abandoning the church’s tenets and his personal commitment to celibacy. Sexually abusive conduct amounts to the abandonment of the Church’s business. As a matter of law, therefore, the alleged sexual abuse, even if true, can not be said to further the defendant’s business and therefore is outside of the scope of employment.
As a result, the court dismissed the brothers’ respondeat superior claims against the church and diocese.
statute of limitations
The three Catholic institutions insisted that the brothers’ negligence claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations. They pointed out that negligence claims under Connecticut law must be brought within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered, but in no event more than three years from the date of the negligent conduct. The court pointed out that another Connecticut statute specifies that no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than seventeen years from the date such person attains the age of majority. The court concluded that this seventeen year statute applied, and that the brothers’ lawsuit was filed before seventeen years had elapsed since their eighteenth birthdays.
free exercise of religion
The church and diocese claimed that even if they were subject to the seventeen—year statute of limitations, the brothers’ claims must be dismissed because the free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits intrusion by the court into the employment practices of [the church or diocese]. Specifically, the church and diocese insisted that the court’s resolution of the brothers’ claims of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of the offending priest would promote exactly that type of state involvement in religion which the first amendment intends to prevent, that is, the intrusion of secular interests into matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. The church and diocese quoted from the ruling of another court in a similar case:
Any inquiry into the policies and practices of church defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy is barred by the first amendment because it might foster excessive state entanglement with religion. It might involve the court in making sensitive judgments about the proprieties of the church defendants’ supervision in light of their religious beliefs. The defendants thus contend that personnel issues involving their clergy must be determined by the laws and policies of the Roman Catholic Church, which are based upon the religious tenets of Roman Catholicism, rather than upon nonecclesiastical law. Dausch v. Ryske, 1993 WL 34873, N.D. Ill. 1993 (unpublished opinion), affirmed, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
The court in the Dausch case (quoted above) relied in part on another federal court decision in Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), in which the court observed:
Furthermore, any inquiry into the policies and practices of the church defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy raises the same kind of first amendment problems of entanglement discussed above, which might involve the court in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the church defendants’ supervision in light of their religious beliefs. Insofar as concerns retention or supervision, the pastor of a Presbyterian church is not analogous to a common law employee. He may not demit his charge nor be removed by the session, without the consent of the presbytery, functioning essentially as an ecclesiastical court. The traditional denominations each have [sic] their own intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no rights of visitation. Church governance is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millennia. As the Supreme Court stated [long ago]: It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to the one which is less so. Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. 679 (1872). It would therefore also be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this court to determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained the [pastor]. Any award of damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result violative of the text and history of the [first amendment].
The brothers strenuously disagreed with this argument. They insisted that to have the protection of the first amendment the church’s claims must be “rooted in religious belief,” and this simply was not the case. Their claim that the church and diocese were negligent in hiring or retaining the priest did not implicate any religious belief or practice, and therefore the first amendment could not be used as a defense.
The court agreed with the brothers. It observed:
Although no Supreme Court decision has determined the applicability of the free exercise clause of the first amendment as a defense for a religious organization’s negligent conduct, the Court has held that the first amendment does not create blanket tort immunity for religious institutions or their clergy, thus allowing clergy and clerical institutions to be sued for the torts they commit. Moreover, the court has “never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.” Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878—79 (1990).
The court quoted from a 1940 decision of the Supreme Court:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs …. We first had occasion to assert that principle in [1879 when] we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice. “Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices …. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
The court noted that other decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law [prohibits] conduct that his religion prescribes.” The court concluded:
Based upon these decisions, it is difficult to see how the [brothers’] claims against the [church and diocese] would foster excessive state entanglement with religion. The common law doctrine of negligence does not intrude upon the free exercise of religion, as it does not “discriminate against [a] religious belief or regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.” The court’s determination of an action against the [church and diocese] based upon their alleged negligent supervision of [the priest] would not prejudice or impose upon any of the religious tenets or practices of Catholicism. Rather, such a determination would involve an examination of the defendants’ possible role in allowing one of its employees to engage in conduct which they, as employers, as well as society in general expressly prohibit. Since the Supreme Court has consistently failed to allow the free exercise clause to “relieve [an] individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs,” the [church and diocese] cannot appropriately implicate the first amendment as a defense to their alleged negligent conduct.
notice of previous misconduct
The church and diocese claimed that even if the free exercise clause does not bar the brothers’ claims, the claims should be dismissed because the church and diocese d”id not owe the [brothers] any duty to prevent the alleged sexual misconduct of [the priest].” Specifically, the church and diocese argued that because of the absence of any notice or knowledge of any alleged sexual misconduct problem by the priest, neither the church nor the diocese owed the brothers any duty to guard against sexual misconduct. Once again, the court rejected the position of the church and diocese. The court acknowledged that negligence is a breach of the duty to exercise “due care,” and that “the ultimate test of the duty is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability of harm resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care.” That is, for the church and diocese to have been negligent they must have owed a “duty” to the brothers to exercise reasonable care with regard to their safety. And, such a duty existed with respect to injuries that were reasonably foreseeable. The court added that “this does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever or foreseeability of the particular injury which happened.” Rather, “[t]he test is: Would the ordinarily prudent man in the position of the defendant, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result?”
The court noted that the brothers alleged in their lawsuit that the church and diocese had notice of the priest’s sexual misconduct by virtue of the fact that he had received treatment sessions for sexual abuse of minors during the period of 1979—1993 at a Catholic treatment centers in New Mexico and Maryland. These allegations were not denied or disproven by the church and diocese in their responses to the brothers’ lawsuit. Accordingly, the court denied the request by the church and diocese to dismiss the brothers’ negligence claims.
However, the court invited the church and diocese to refile their motion to dismiss if they could produce evidence (by affidavit or otherwise) disproving the brothers’ claim that during 1979—1993 the priest received treatment for sexual abuse of minors at Catholic facilities in New Mexico and Maryland. The church and diocese promptly refiled their motion to dismiss, accompanied by affidavits from church officials claiming that they had no knowledge (or reason to suspect) that the priest had ever participated in any retreat or treatment for sexual abuse of any kind. The brothers failed to reply to this new evidence, other than to reaffirm what they had said in their original lawsuit. This was not enough, the court concluded, to rebut the new evidence. Accordingly, since the brothers had failed to refute the claims of the church and diocese that they had no prior knowledge of any sexual misconduct on the part of the offending priest, the negligence claims had to be dismissed.
cause
The church and diocese claimed that, even if they owed a duty to the brothers, the alleged breach of that duty was not the cause of the brothers’ alleged injuries and therefore the church and diocese could not be responsible for those injuries. Specifically, they asserted that it was the alleged sexual misconduct by the priest that caused their injuries “rather than any possible negligence on the part of either [the church or diocese].” The court observed: “Because there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the [church and diocese] had knowledge of [the priest’s] alleged sexual misconduct, the court cannot determine, as a matter of law, that [their] alleged negligence in supervising [him] was not the … cause of the [brothers’] injuries. Accordingly, the defendants’ argument fails.”
The court noted that the church and diocese could refile their motion to dismiss the case if they could produce evidence (by affidavit or otherwise) disproving the brothers’ claim that during 1979—1993 the priest received treatment for sexual abuse of minors at Catholic facilities in New Mexico and Maryland. As noted above, the church and diocese did refile their motion to dismiss, accompanied by affidavits from church officials claiming that they had no knowledge (or reason to suspect) that the priest had ever participated in any retreat or treatment for sexual abuse of any kind. Since the brothers failed to refute this new evidence, the court dismissed the negligence claims against the church and diocese. These agencies not only owed no duty to the brothers under these circumstances and therefore could not have been negligent, but their alleged failure to adequately supervise the priest was not a cause of the brothers’ injuries.
Significance of the case to other churches
What is the significance of this case to other churches and denominational agencies? Obviously, the decision of a federal court in Connecticut has limited effect. It will not be binding on any court outside of the State of Connecticut, and may be rejected by state courts within Connecticut. Nevertheless, the decision represents an extended discussion of the liability of churches for the sexual misconduct of clergy, and accordingly it may be given special consideration by other courts. For this reason, the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:
1. Respondeat superior. This case represents another in a long line of cases that have reached the same conclusion—churches cannot be liable on the basis of respondeat superior for the sexual misconduct of ministers since such misconduct is not within the scope of employment. This basis of liability is so weak that many sexual misconduct victims who sue their church do not even mention it.
2. Free exercise of religion. Many courts have concluded that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom prevents the civil courts from evaluating whether or not a church was negligent in hiring, retaining, or supervising a minister who sexually abuses a minor or adult. Many of these decisions have been addressed in previous issues of this newsletter (including both the Dausch and Schmidt cases, quoted above). This court concluded that the first amendment is not an absolute bar to civil court resolution of such lawsuits—assuming that no inquiry into doctrinal matters is required. Such a ruling will make it easier for other courts to reach the same conclusion. This case should be an incentive for churches to implement and consistently apply adequate screening and supervisory measures with regard to clergy and lay workers.
3. The relevance of prior knowledge of misconduct. The most important aspect of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that a church can be liable on the basis of negligence for the sexual misconduct of a minister if it knew (or, with a reasonable effort, should have known) of facts suggesting that the minister posed a risk of such misconduct. Stated differently, if a church does have such knowledge (or, with a reasonable effort, should have known) then it can be responsible for a victim’s injuries on the basis of negligence—either in the selection, retention, or supervision of the minister. The importance of such a conclusion cannot be overstated. Churches and denominational agencies are assuming significant legal risks in most states when they (1) fail to respond to information suggesting that a minister has engaged in sexual misconduct, or (2) fail to investigate a minister’s background at the time the minister is employed, or granted ministerial credentials by a church or denominational agency. The lesson is this—churches and denominational agencies must not ignore information suggesting that a minister has engaged in sexual misconduct.
The court in this case dismissed the church and diocese from the lawsuit, and found them not to have been guilty of negligence, because the victims could not refute the affidavits of church leaders that they had no knowledge that the priest had received treatment for the sexual abuse of minors. Had church officials been aware of this treatment, the case would not have been dismissed and the church and diocese would have been forced to defend themselves in court.
4. Miscellaneous. There are two other aspects of this case that deserve comment. First, many of the acts of sexual molestation occurred during out—of—town trips when only one of the brothers accompanied the priest. It is startling how willing some parents are to allow their children to accompany an adult under these circumstances. Churches that adopt procedures to reduce the risk of such incidents occurring (for example, by following the two—adult rule) not only reduce the risk of misconduct, but they also reduce if not eliminate the risk of false accusations. Second, the diocese acted immediately to suspend the priest when the brothers’ parents disclosed the acts of molestation. Allowing a church employee or volunteer who is accused of sexual misconduct to remain in his or her position in effect makes the church a guarantor of the safety of others. This is an extraordinary risk. Such a person should never be allowed to remain in his or her position without the advice of an attorney. Of course, the accusation may be unfounded, and a prompt and thorough investigation is essential. If there is clear and convincing evidence that the person is innocent, he or she may be returned to the original position. Again, legal counsel is essential, particularly if the evidence of guilt is inconclusive.
While a number of states require child care center workers to be screened, very few states have responded directly to the National Child Protection Act. As a result, in most states churches are not required to obtain criminal records checks on paid employees and volunteers who work with minors outside of the context of a day care facility. This is an evolving area of law, and we will be returning to it in future issues of this newsletter as necessary to keep you informed.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
The Consequences of Embezzlement
Four unpleasant surprises when fraud is exposed in a church.
Persons who embezzle church funds face a number of consequences. Some of them may come as unpleasant surprises. Here are four of them.
Felony conviction
Embezzling church funds is a felony in most states, and conviction can lead to a term in a state penitentiary. The definition of embezzlement varies slightly from state to state, but in general it refers to the wrongful conversion of property that is lawfully in your possession. The idea is that someone has legal control or custody of property or funds, and then decides to convert the property or funds to his or her own personal use.
Key point. It does not matter that the embezzler intended to pay back the embezzled funds. This intent in no way justifies or excuses the crime. The crime is complete when the funds are converted to one’s own use—whether or not there was an intent to pay them back.
Key point. Sometimes an embezzler, when caught, will agree to pay back embezzled funds. This does not alter the fact that the crime of embezzlement has occurred. Of course, it may be less likely that a prosecutor will prosecute the case under these circumstances. And even if the embezzler is prosecuted, this evidence may lessen the punishment. But the courts have consistently ruled that an actual return of embezzled property does not purge the offense of its criminal nature or absolve the embezzler from punishment for his or her wrongdoing. Also, note that church officials seldom know if all embezzled funds are being returned. They are relying almost entirely on the word of the thief.
Tax evasion
In many cases the embezzler’s biggest concern is not the possibility of being prosecuted for the crime of embezzlement. Rather, it is the possibility of being prosecuted by the IRS for tax evasion. Embezzlers never report their illegally obtained “income” on their tax returns. Nor do they suspect that failure to do so may subject them to criminal tax evasion charges. In fact, in some cases it is actually more likely that the IRS will prosecute the embezzler for tax evasion than the local prosecutor will prosecute for the crime of embezzlement.
Example. A church accountant embezzled $212,000 in church funds. His scheme was to divert to his own use several designated offerings, and to inflate the cost of equipment that he paid for with his own funds and that the church later reimbursed at the inflated amounts. The accountant not only was found guilty of embezzlement, but he was also convicted of tax evasion because he had failed to report any of the embezzled money as taxable income. He was sentenced to a 2-year prison term, followed by 2 years of probation.
Recovery of property purchased with embezzled funds
Here’s a real shocker—persons who receive property purchased by the embezzler with embezzled funds may be required to return the property to the church!
Example. A church bookkeeper embezzled several thousand dollars by issuing checks to a fictitious company. He opened an account in the name of a fictitious company, issued church checks to the company for services that were never performed, and then deposited the checks in the fictitious company’s account. He later withdrew the funds and purchased two automobiles which he gave to a friend. A court ruled that the friend had to give the cars back to the church, since they had been purchased with embezzled church funds. The point here, as noted by the court, is that one who acquires property with embezzled church funds may be required to transfer the property to the church.
Insurance company lawsuits
As if the three consequences summarized above are not enough, embezzlers face an additional consequence—they may be sued by an insurance company that pays a claim based on the embezzlement. Many churches purchase insurance to cover financial losses due to theft or embezzlement. Insurance companies that pay out claims based on such losses are free to sue the persons responsible.
Example. A court ruled that an insurance company that paid out $26,000 to a charity because of an act of embezzlement could sue the embezzler for the full amount that it paid. Such cases illustrate an important point—a church employee or volunteer who embezzles church funds may be sued by the church insurance company if it pays out a claim based on the embezzlement.
Confidentiality and privileged communications
Sometimes ministers learn of embezzlement through a confession by the embezzler in the course of confidential counseling. This presents the minister with a dilemma—either protect the confidentiality of the confession and refuse to disclose it, or ignore confidentiality and disclose the confession. This dilemma is compounded by the fact that some ministers have been sued for disclosing confidential information without the consent of the other person. Embezzlers may claim that they confessed their crime to their minister in confidence and in the course of spiritual counseling, with no thought that the minister would disclose the information to others.
Tip. Ministers who disclose confidential information without permission risk being sued for breaching their duty of confidentiality. When an employee or volunteer approaches a minister and confesses to embezzling church funds, there normally will be an expectation that the minister will keep that information in confidence. There is no sign above the minister’s desk that says, “warning, confessions of criminal activity will be promptly shared with the board or with the civil authorities.” Ministers who violate this expectation need to understand that they face potential legal liability for doing so—unless they have the employee’s permission, in writing.
Ministers who receive a confidential confession of embezzlement from a church employee or volunteer should not disclose this information to others, including the church board, without the person’s written permission. If the embezzler does not consent to the disclosure of the confession, and refuses to meet with the board, the minister should not disclose the information to any other person. Disclosure under these circumstances could result in a lawsuit being brought against the minister and church.
Does this mean that the minister should drop the matter? Not necessarily. The minister is free to gather independent evidence that embezzlement occurred, so long as this is done without disclosing the confession. For example, the minister could persuade the church board to hire a CPA to conduct an audit of the church’s financial records. Such a procedure may reveal that embezzlement has occurred. The minister also should attempt to persuade the embezzler to confess to the board.
Key point. Closely related to the concept of confidentiality is the clergy-penitent privilege. Ministers cannot be compelled to disclose in court the contents of confidential communications shared with them in the course of spiritual counseling.
Example. Late one night, a church treasurer arranged a meeting with her priest after informing him that she “had done something almost as bad as murder.” The treasurer, after requesting that their conversation be kept confidential, informed the priest that she had embezzled $30,000 in church funds. The priest, with the permission of the treasurer, sought the assistance of the church board. The board decided that the embezzlement had to be reported to the local police. The treasurer was later prosecuted for embezzling church funds, and she was convicted and sentenced to 4 months in jail despite the fact that she fully repaid the church prior to her trial. She appealed her conviction on the ground that it had been based on her confidential statements to the priest which, in her opinion, were “penitential communications” that were privileged against disclosure in court. The appeals court concluded that the statements made by the church treasurer to the priest were not privileged since they involved a “problem-solving entreaty” by the treasurer rather than “a request to make a true confession seeking forgiveness or absolution—the very essence of the spiritual relationship privileged under the statute.” That is, the treasurer sought out the priest not for spiritual counseling, but to disclose her embezzlement and to seek his counsel on how to correct the problem. The court also emphasized that the treasurer had “released” the priest from his assurance of confidentiality by consenting to his disclosure of the facts of the case to the church board members.
Informing the congregation
Church leaders often refuse to disclose to the congregation any information about an incident of embezzlement for fear of being sued for defamation. This concern is understandable. However, serious problems can occur when the pastor or church board dismisses a long-term employee or volunteer for embezzlement and nothing is disclosed to the membership. Church leaders under these circumstances often are accused of acting arbitrarily, and there is a demand for an explanation. Refusal to respond to such demands may place the church leadership in an even worse light.
There is a possible answer to this dilemma. Many states recognize the concept of “qualified privilege.” This means that statements made to others concerning a matter of common interest cannot be defamatory unless made with malice. Statements are made with malice if they are made with a knowledge that they are false, or with a reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. In the church context, this privilege protects statements made by members to other members concerning matters of common interest. Such communications cannot be defamatory unless malice is proven. Church leaders who decide to disclose why an embezzler was dismissed can reduce the legal risk to the church and themselves by following a few basic precautions:
Only share information with active voting members of the church—at a membership meeting or by letter. The qualified privilege does not apply if the communication is made to non-members.
Adopt procedures that will confirm that no non-member received the information.
Limit your remarks to factual information and do not express opinions.
Prepare in advance a written statement that is communicated with members, and that is approved in advance by an attorney.
Key point. In some cases, it is helpful to obtain a signed confession from an individual who has been found guilty or who has confessed. If the individual consents to the communication of the confession to church members, then you can quote from the confession in a letter that is sent to members of the congregation, or in a membership meeting. Be sure that this consent is in writing.
Key point. One court ruled that a church could be sued for defamation for sharing suspicions regarding a church treasurer’s embezzlement with members in a congregational meeting. The court concluded that the treasurer should have been investigated and dismissed by the board, without informing the congregation. While no other court has reached a similar conclusion, this case suggests that church leaders should disclose cases of embezzlement to the church membership only if (1) absolutely necessary (for example, to reduce congregational unrest), and (2) an attorney is involved in making this decision.
Avoiding false accusations
In some cases it is not certain that embezzlement has occurred, or that a particular individual is guilty. A church must be careful in how it proceeds in these cases to avoid possible liability for defamation or emotional distress.
Example. A church convened a special business meeting at which the church treasurer was accused of embezzling church funds. Following this meeting the treasurer was shunned by church members who viewed her as guilty. This case is tragic, since the treasurer had been a long and devoted member of the church. Her life was ruined by the allegation, and she had to leave the church. It was later proven that she was completely innocent. She later filed a lawsuit, accusing the pastor and members of the church board of defamation. A court agreed with her, and awarded her a substantial verdict. The court pointed out that the accusation of embezzlement was based on flimsy evidence and could have easily been refuted with any reasonable investigation. The court concluded that church leaders are liable for defamation if they charge a church worker with embezzlement without first conducting a good faith investigation. The court also pointed out that the charges should not have been disclosed to the congregation, but rather should have been discussed among the church board and a decision made at that level on whether or not to dismiss the treasurer.
This case provides church leaders with very helpful guidance in handling suspicions of embezzlement. Do not rush to judgment. Conduct a deliberate and competent investigation, and let the church board resolve the issue without involving or informing the congregation, if possible. In some cases, congregational outrage may occur following the dismissal of an embezzler by the pastor or church board, especially if nothing is communicated to the congregation about the basis for the action. In these cases the board may decide that the membership must be informed. If so, refer to the above discussion on “informing the congregation.”
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
Legal Implications of Reviewing Employees’ E-Mail
Recent case rules in favor of employer, but not all courts may agree.
Recent case rules in favor of employer, but not all courts may agree.
Richard R. Hammar
Background. What happens when a church official or supervisor accesses an employee’s e-mail without permission? Can the church be sued?
A recent ruling. A federal court in Pennsylvania addressed this question in a recent decision. A secular employer maintained an electronic mail communication system in order to promote internal communications between its employees. The employer repeatedly assured its employees that all e-mail communications would remain confidential and privileged. It further assured its employees that e-mail communications could not be intercepted and used against any employee as grounds for termination or reprimand.
Contrary to its own assurances of confidentiality, the employer intercepted private e-mail messages made by one of its employees to another employee. The employer later informed the employee that his employment was being terminated for transmitting what it deemed to be “inappropriate and unprofessional” comments over the e-mail system. The e-mail messages made disparaging comments about a supervisor and referred to a planned holiday party as the “Jim Jones Koolaid affair.”
The court ruled that the employee’s rights had not been violated. It based its ruling on the following factors:
• Pennsylvania recognizes the “employment at will” doctrine meaning that an employer may discharge an “at will employee” (one not hired for a specific term) “with or without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract” or public policy. Many other states follow this rule.
• Employers may not dismiss an “at will employee” if doing so would violate “a clear mandate of public policy.” But the court rejected the dismissed employee’s claim that the employer’s actions amounted to an invasion of his privacy and as such violated public policy. The court observed:
[W]e do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to [another employee] over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted by management …. [B]y intercepting such communications, the company is not … requiring the employee to disclose any personal information about himself or invading the employee’s person or personal effects. Moreover, the company’s interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in those comments.
Conclusions. This case suggests that employers may not be liable for monitoring employees’ e-mail messages, or for dismissing or disciplining employees on the basis of what they read—even if they assure employees that their e-mail messages are confidential. However, other courts may not agree with this ruling. Church leaders should not monitor employees’ e-mail, or dismiss employees, on the basis of e-mail messages without the advice of an attorney. Smith v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1996).
This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, May 1996.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.