

State →	RFRA →	RFRA-Like Protections Via State Court Decision(s) →	No RFRA-Like Protections Exist (either by statute or by state court decision(s))
Alabama	Yes— <i>Ala. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3.01</i> (1998).		
Alaska	No.	Several court decisions indicate judicial scrutiny exists for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
Arizona	Yes— <i>A.R.S. § 41-1493.01</i> (1999).		
Arkansas	Yes— <i>A.C.A. § 16-123-401 et. seq.</i> (2015).		
California	No.	No.	Yes.
Colorado	No.	Several court decisions indicate judicial scrutiny exists for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
Connecticut	Yes— <i>Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b</i> (1993).		
Delaware	No.	No.	Yes.
Florida	Yes— <i>Fla. Stat. § 761.03</i> (1998).		
Georgia	No.	No.	Yes.
Hawaii	No.	No.	Yes.
Idaho	Yes— <i>Idaho Code § 73-402</i> (2000).		
Illinois	Yes— <i>775 ILCS § 35/15</i> (1998).		
Indiana	Yes— <i>Indiana Code § 34-13-9-8</i> (2015), but note possible restrictions.		
Iowa	No.	No.	Yes.
Kansas	Yes— <i>Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5303</i> (2013).		
Kentucky	Yes— <i>Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.350</i> (2013).		
Louisiana	Yes— <i>La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5233</i> (2010).		
Maine	No.	A 2006 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
Maryland	No.	No.	Yes.
Massachusetts	No.	A 1994 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
Michigan	No.	Yes—court decisions suggest RFRA-like protections possible for churches.	
Minnesota	No.	Yes—court decisions suggest RFRA-like protections possible for churches.	
Mississippi	Yes— <i>Miss. Code §11-61-1</i> (2014).		
Missouri	Yes— <i>R.S.Mo. § 1.302</i> (2003).		

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Montana	Yes—SB 215 (statute citation pending) (2021).	A 2004 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail). The passage of a RFRA in 2021 supersedes this ruling.	
Nebraska	No.	No.	Yes.
Nevada	No.	No.	Yes.
New Hampshire	No.	A 2010 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
New Jersey	No.	A 1997 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
New Mexico	Yes— <i>N.M. Stat. § 28-22-3</i> (2000). But a state supreme court decision emphasized the state RFRA does not apply to lawsuits brought by private parties.		
New York	No.	A 2006 state supreme court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
North Carolina	No.	A 2006 state appellate court decision indicates judicial scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise exists, but at a lesser standard than the federal RFRA (meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail).	
North Dakota	No.	No.	Yes.
Ohio	No.	Yes—a state supreme court decision says RFRA-like protections possible for churches.	
Oklahoma	Yes— <i>Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 253</i> (2000).		
Oregon	No.	No.	Yes.
Pennsylvania	Yes— <i>Pa. Stat. tit. 71, § 2404</i> (2002).		
Rhode Island	Yes— <i>R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-3</i> (1993).		
South Carolina	Yes— <i>S.C. Code § 1-32-40</i> (1999).		
South Dakota	Yes—SB 124 (statute citation pending) (2021).		
Tennessee	Yes— <i>Tenn. Code § 4-1-407</i> (2009).		
Texas	Yes— <i>Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code §110.001</i> (1999).		
Utah	The “Utah Religious Land Use Act,” <i>Utah Code Ann. § 63L-5-101 et seq.</i> (2005).		
Vermont	No.	No.	Yes.

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Virginia	Yes— <i>Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(B)</i> (1786).		
Washington	No.	No.	Yes, but uncertainty looms. A 2019 state supreme court decision found the state's antidiscrimination law was a neutral law of general applicability, enjoyed a lower standard of judicial review, and survived a free exercise defense brought by a private business sanctioned for violating the law. The decision in <i>Arlene's Flowers v. State of Washington/Arlene's Flowers v. Ingersoll</i> was reviewed by the US Supreme Court and sent back to the state supreme court for reconsideration. In 2019, the state supreme court again ruled against the defendant. The defendant again requested the Supreme Court's review; that request remains pending as of April 2021.
West Virginia	No.	No.	Yes.
Wisconsin	No.	Yes—a 2009 state supreme court decision suggests RFRA-like protections possible for churches.	
Wyoming	No.	No.	Uncertainty—a 2017 state supreme court decision indicates lesser judicial scrutiny, meaning state action (such as the existence of a law or its enforcement) is more likely to prevail. However, the court retained the flexibility to apply a higher standard in the future if it wishes.
District of Columbia	No.	Uncertainty—a 1987 court decision suggests a party that successfully shows their free exercise rights have been violated by government action shifts the burden to the government to show a compelling state interest exists. If the government successfully shows a compelling state interest, the court then must ensure the interest is advanced in the least-restrictive manner necessary.	
Federal	Yes— <i>42 USCS § 2000bb</i> (1993). However, it applies only to federal government laws and actions (per <i>City of Boerne v. Flores</i> , 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).	N/A	N/A