State Religious Freedom Survey

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution says, “Congress shall make no law respect ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting  the free exercise thereof.” This language has been  foundational to the religious liberty that millions  of people have enjoyed in this country for nearly  250 years.  

In those nearly 250 years, though, two key  developments have unfolded through numerous  decisions made in our nation’s courts.  

First, the protection of religious belief is consid ered absolute. The government cannot make an  individual or church believe something, nor can it  create or enforce a law to do so.  

But second, the protection of religious exercise has limitations. Individuals and churches are free  to believe whatever they wish, but when actions  associated with those beliefs begin to clash with  the rights and interests of others, courts say the  government has more power to regulate.  

This latter point—the limitations on religious  exercise—has been a source of much debate and  disagreement in American society, especially  throughout the second half of the 20th century  and the early part of the 21st century. For many,  religious belief and religious exercise are insep arable, and the ability for the government to  regulate religious exercise constitutes an attack  on their beliefs. For others, religious exercise left  unchecked represents threats to the rights of  others who do not share those same beliefs.  

This clash has led to a maze of laws and court  decisions across the country that raise a number  of questions regarding how far religious freedoms  extend. Understanding these developments—and  their ramifications—is the purpose of this resource.

When a government law or action intentionally  targets religious exercise, courts apply a high  standard of judicial review known as “strict scruti ny.” This means when a party’s free exercise rights  have been burdened by such intentional target ing, the government bears the burden of showing  the law or action is both necessary to advance a  compelling government interest and was craft ed in the least-restrictive manner possible. This  high standard makes it challenging for the law  or action to be upheld, making it a significantly  valuable protection to the free exercise rights of  individuals, churches, and organizations.  

For years, this high standard also was used by  courts to evaluate neutral laws of general appli cability when they happened to burden religious  exercise. In other words, when a neutral law  incidentally (not intentionally) interfered with an  individual or party’s free exercise rights, the gov ernment still had to meet the burden of showing  the law possessed a compelling governmental  interest and was advanced in the least-restric tive way. Again, this same high standard offered  significant protection to the free exercise rights of  individuals, churches, and organizations.  

However, in 1990, the US Supreme Court issued  a controversial decision in a case called Employ ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Through this decision, the Court’s majority held  that neutral laws did not need to be justified by  a compelling government interest/least-restric tive means standard whenever they burdened  religious exercise. This conclusion made it more  likely a neutral law would remain valid, even when it burdened a party’s religious exercise.  

In 1993, a near-unanimous Congress responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restored the compelling  governmental interest/least-restrictive means standard for neutral laws or actions.  

But confusion and concern returned in 1997 when the Supreme Court decided a case called City of  Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court’s majority concluded Congress overstepped its legislative powers with RFRA when it attempted  

to apply it to federal laws and federal government actions as well as those of local and state governments. The Constitution, the Court’s majority noted, only gives Congress the power to make laws addressing federal actions and activities.  

As a result, City of Boerne rendered the federal RFRA moot when it comes to laws and actions at the local and state levels.  

Following City of Boerne, Congress adopted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000 as a way to reinforce certain protections for houses of worship related to where they build and operate.  

Additionally, some states—but not all—began adopting their own versions of RFRA, each designed to establish a compelling government interest/least-restrictive means standard for evaluating substantial burdens incidentally placed on religious exercise by neutral laws or actions. In some states where a RFRA has not been adopted, a high-level court has issued a decision mirroring the federal RFRA’s standards.  

In other states, though, a high-level court has decided the standard announced through the Smith decision in 1990 should be used. And in about a dozen other states, no law or court decision announces a specific standard to follow, making it difficult to predict the outcomes to challenges to local or state laws or actions that incidentally burden religious exercise. 

Also in 1993, a separate Supreme Court decision in a different case further defined the standards with which all courts should evaluate attempts by the government to regulate religious exercise. The Court acknowledged there still can be times when a law or regulation appears on the surface to be  neutral, but in actuality still intentionally targets  religious activity—and thus still deserves “strict  scrutiny.”  

In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court determined  the city’s ordinance, though described on the  surface to be a neutral law of general applicability,  was really designed to halt the animal sacrifice  practices of a local church. The Court reached this  conclusion by noting the city ordinance exempt ed other, similar types of conduct carried on by  secular entities (i.e., butchers), and by noting the  notes and transcripts recorded during the adop tion of the ordinance showed city councilmem bers intended to specifically address the church’s  activities.  

Because the ordinance was not truly neutral, and  targeted religious activity, the Court said the  strict scrutiny standard of review applied. It then  deemed the ordinance unconstitutional, finding  the ordinance did not advance a compelling gov ernment interest in the least-restrictive manner possible.  

For churches, the First Amendment—and the  comparable religious protections found in every  state constitution—are the first lines of defense  when government laws or actions intersect with their activities.  

But the presence of the federal RFRA, a state  RFRA, or a judicially created RFRA-like protection  is important to note. When a RFRA or RFRA-like  protection exists, it may offer a church additional  protections if it faces a claim arguing it falls under  a neutral law of general applicability at the local,  state, or federal level and violated it—and the  precise applicability of the First Amendment is  challenged.  

CAUTION. Note that a RFRA defense only emerges when a government agency, com mission, or other entity initiates or pursues a  claim against a church. A RFRA or judicially  created RFRA-like protection is less likely,  if at all, to apply to a civil lawsuit filed by a private party.

Church leaders should consult with qualified local counsel in the event it potentially faces any local, state, or federal actions, or a civil lawsuit by a private party. 

This resource is designed to help individuals and churches understand the protections available to them based upon where they live and operate.  

Below is a chart detailing which states have a  RFRA or a high-level court decision addressing religious exercise. The remainder of this resource  provides individual state reports detailing additional insights.  

This information is useful for churches and church leaders as they seek to understand how legal protections for their religious exercise work based on where they are located. 

Of note: 

With the passage of a RFRA in Iowa in April of 2024, 27 states, plus the federal government, now have RFRAs. Among the 27 states is Utah, which passed a religious land use act in 2005 designed to offer  churches RFRA-like protections in property related matters. 

Numerous jurisdictions have high-level state  court decisions (either at the state supreme  court level or a state appellate court level)  addressing religious exercise claims. Of those,  five (5) used the compelling government  interest/least restrictive means standard, while  seven (7) appeared to use a standard similar  to the US Supreme Court’s Smith decision. One  (1)—the District of Columbia—announced a  standard in 1987 that leaves uncertainty in light  of Smith; and, 

Ten (10) states offer no RFRA or RFRA-like  protections for free exercise claims made in  response to state or local government actions  incidentally burdening religious exercise. 

This chart should be read left to right, with the  first column noting whether a RFRA exists in  the state. If not, then the second column notes  whether state court decisions offer any RFRA-like  protections. If not, then the third column confirms  no statutory or judicial protections rising to the  level of a RFRA formally exist, leaving the greatest  uncertainty about how a religious exercise case  would be decided in that state.

State-specific information is below. Jump ahead to your state by clicking on its name in the following list:
ALABAMA
ALASKA
ARIZONA
ARKANSAS
CALIFORNIA
COLORADO
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
HAWAII
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
MISSISSIPPI
MISSOURI
MONTANA
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OHIO
OKLAHOMA
OREGON
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH CAROLINA
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
UTAH
VERMONT
VIRGINIA
WASHINGTON
WEST VIRGINIA
WISCONSIN
WYOMING

FEDERAL

In 1998, voters approved the “Alabama Religious Freedom  Amendment” for the state’s constitution. [Ala. Const. Art. I,  Sec. 3.01] It states its purpose “is to guarantee the freedom  

of religion is not burdened by state and local law; and to pro vide a claim or defense to persons whose religious freedom  is burdened by government.” [Ala. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3.01,  Section III] 

The amendment involves a “compelling interest test/least-re strictive means” standard—the highest a court can apply to  a local or state law or action burdening religious exercise. If a  claimant successfully demonstrates their free exercise rights  have been burdened by a state action—such as through the  existence of a state law or regulation and/or its enforce ment—the government must show both that the burden is  justified by a compelling state interest and that the action is  administered in the least restrictive way possible for further ing that interest. [Ala. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3.01, Section V] 

The amendment defines “freedom of religion” to mean the  “free exercise of religion” as found under the state’s constitu tion. It defines “government” to mean “(a)ny branch, depart ment, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person  acting under the color of law) of the State of Alabama, any  political subdivision of a state, municipality, or other local  government.” It also says it applies to “(a)ny government  statute, regulation, ordinance, administrative provision, ruling  guideline, requirement, or any state of law whatever.” [Ala.  Const. Art. I, Sec. 3.01, Section IV] 

Key cases: None found.

Alaska does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (1979): The Alaska Supreme  Court concluded the free exercise clause of the First  Amendment of the US Constitution and the state constitu tion protects a claimant’s religious beliefs absolutely, and  also protects a claimant’s freedom to act on their religious  beliefs—“but such protection may be overcome by com pelling state interests.”  

• Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274  (1994): The Alaska Supreme Court held that a law that is  neutral and of general applicability need not be justified  

by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has  the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious  practice. Only when a law is not neutral, or generally appli cable, or both, must it then be justified by a compelling  governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance  that interest. The court also noted: “Voluntary commer cial activity does not receive the same status accorded to  directly religious activity.” 

• Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937  (2004): The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed that a law that  is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified  by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has  the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious  practice. Only when a law is not neutral, or generally appli cable, or both, must it then be justified by a compelling  governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance  that interest.  

• Huffman v. State, 2014 P.3d 339 (2009)): The Alaska  Supreme Court again affirmed the rationales used in Swan ner and Thomas.  

• Phillip v. State, 347 P.3d 128 (2015): The Alaska Supreme  Court affirmed its prior free exercise holdings, stating the  religious interest raised by thirteen defendant fishermen  from a Native American tribe was overcome by the state’s  compelling interest to preserve a certain type of king  salmon. 

Arizona has a religious freedom law. It states the government shall not substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule  of general applicability. … Government may substantially  burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demon strates that application of the burden to the person is  both (i)n furtherance of a compelling governmental  interest [and] (t)he least restrictive means of further ing that compelling governmental interest. [A.R.S. §  41-1493.01(B)(C)] 

It also says “the term substantially burden is intended solely  to ensure that this article is not triggered by trivial, technical  or de minimis infractions.” [A.R.S. § 41-1493.01(E)] 

Arizona defines the “exercise of religion” to mean “the ability  to act or refusal to act in a manner substantially motivated by  a religious belief, whether or not the exercise is compulsory  or central to a larger system of religious belief.” It defines  “government” to mean “this state and any agency or political  subdivision of this state.” [A.R.S. § 41-1493] 

Key cases: 

• Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 2019 Ariz. LEXIS  280 (Ariz. Sept. 16, 2019). The state supreme court held the  city of Phoenix could not apply its Human Relations Ordi nance to force an art studio’s owners, in violation of their  sincerely held religious beliefs, to create custom wedding  invitations celebrating same-sex wedding ceremonies.  The HRO prohibits discrimination based on sexual orienta tion. The court said the ordinance impermissibly coerced  the owners to abandon their religious belief because it  imposed severe civil and criminal sanctions upon a finding  of prohibited discrimination. 

In April of 2015, the governor signed the “Religious Freedom  Restoration Act” into law. It is intended  

(t)o restore the compelling interest test … and to guaran tee its application in all cases in which free exercise of  religion is substantially burdened … [and] (t)hat this act  be interpreted consistent with the Religious Freedom  Restoration Act of 1993, federal case law, and federal  jurisprudence; and (t)o provide a claim or defense to  persons whose religious exercise is substantially bur dened by government. [A.C.A. § 16-123-402] 

Under the law, a person or organization whose “religious  exercise has been burdened in violation of this section  may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial  proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the govern ment.” The government can prevail if it shows the substantial  burden “results from a rule of general applicability that fur 

thers “a compelling governmental interest and [is] (t)he least  restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental  interest.” [A.C.A. § 16-123-404] 

The Arkansas RFRA defines “exercise of religion” to mean  “religious exercise.” It defines “government” to mean “a  branch, department, agency, instrumentality, political sub division, official, or other person acting under color of state  law.” It also says “state law” means “without limitation a law  of a political subdivision.” [A.C.A. § 16-123-403] 

Key cases: None found.

California does not have a religious freedom law and no judi cial decisions provide any standards similar to those found  in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or those of  other states.  

Key cases: 

• Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (2007).  A federal district court rejected the First Amendment  religious freedom defense raised by the operators of an  Arizona adoption-related website who rejected a California  same-sex couple’s application to post their profile on the  

website. The court concluded the Unruh Civil Rights Act  could apply to the business because: California had the  constitutional authority to bar discrimination on the basis  of sexual orientation in public accommodations; Califor nia’s interest in combating discrimination on the basis  of sexual orientation was compelling; and the Unruh Act  prohibited such discrimination in order to eliminate the  harms caused by the discriminatory conduct, not to silence  particular viewpoints. 

Colorado does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Numerous court decisions suggest the state’s courts follow  the US Supreme Court’s standard set in Employment  Division v. Smith, which held that neutral laws of general  applicability do not necessarily offend the Free Exercise  Clause, even when they substantially burden a party’s  religious exercise. (See, e.g., Ams. United, 648 P.2d at 1072;  

Conrad, 656 P.2d at 670; Young Life, 650 P.2d at 526; Peo ple in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 275-76 (Colo. 1982);  Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458, 593 P.2d  

1363, 1364 (1979); Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal  Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 416, 509 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1973); Zavilla  v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 187, 147 P.2d 823, 825 (1944); In re  Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1215 (Colo. App. 2006);  In the Interest of E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 563 (Colo. App.  2004)).

Connecticut adopted a religious freedom law in 1993.  

It says the state “may burden a person’s exercise of religion  only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the  person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental  interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering  that compelling governmental interest.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. §  52-571b(b)] Otherwise “the state shall not burden a person’s  exercise of religion … even if the burden results from a rule of  general applicability.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b(a)] 

The law applies to the “state or any political subdivision of  the state,” and says it includes “any agency, board, com mission, department, officer or employee of the state or  any political subdivision of the state.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. §  52-571b(f)] 

However, the Connecticut law also carves out this exception: 

Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect, inter pret or in any way address that portion of article seventh  of the Constitution of the state that prohibits any law  giving a preference to any religious society or denom ination in the state. The granting of government fund ing, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible  under the Constitution of the state, shall not constitute  a violation of this section. As used in this subsection, the  term “granting” does not include the denial of govern ment funding, benefits or exemptions. [Conn. Gen. Stat.  § 52-571b(e)] 

Key cases: None found.

Delaware does not have a religious freedom law and no court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review similar to  those found in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the RFRAs of other states.  

Key cases: None found.

The District of Columbia does not have a religious freedom  law and no court decisions provide any high judicial stan dards of review similar to those found in the federal Religious  Freedom Restoration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center  v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (1987)): A private  Catholic university, despite its presence as a secular learn ing institution, met requirements to assert a free exercise  of religion defense against the District of Columbia’s civil  rights statute forbidding discrimination on basis of sexual  

orientation. The court noted that a party raising a free  exercise defense in order to gain an exemption from a  government action must show how the forced compliance  will impose a burden on religious exercise. Upon doing so,  the court said, the exemption must be granted unless the  government can demonstrate it has a compelling or over riding interest to enforce the challenged action. If the gov ernment can do so, the court then must ensure the action  is conducted in the least-restrictive manner necessary for  advancing the compelling government interest. 

Florida’s “Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998” states: 

The government shall not substantially burden a per son’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from  a rule of general applicability, except that government  may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion  only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to  the person (i)s in furtherance of a compelling govern mental interest and (is) the least restrictive means of  furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Fla.  Stat. § 761.03] 

It also says “‘(g)overnment’ or ‘state’ includes any branch,  department, agency, instrumentality, or official or other per 

son acting under color of law of the state, a county, special  district, municipality, or any other subdivision of the state.” It  defines “exercise of religion” to mean “an act or refusal to act  that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether  or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a  larger system of religious belief.” [Fla. Stat. § 761.02] 

Key cases: None found.

Georgia does not have a religious freedom law, despite mul tiple attempts over the years. No court decisions in Georgia  provide any high judicial standards of review similar to those  found in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or  the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: None found.

Hawaii does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states.  

Key cases: 

• Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919 (2018). A  state appellate court reiterated the US Supreme Court’s  1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which held  a neutral state law of general applicability that has the  incidental effect of burdening a particular religious prac tice need not be justified by a compelling state interest,  but need only satisfy a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny  (making it more likely to survive a free exercise challenge).  

The defendant, the owner of Aloha Bed & Breakfast, said  the state’s public accommodations law, and its prohibi tion against discrimination based on sexual orientation,  imposed on her free exercise of religion because she would  be required to provide lodging to the plaintiffs, a same-sex  couple. The defendant argued the state should impose a  

“compelling state interest” requirement and apply strict  scrutiny to decide her free exercise claim under the Hawaii  Constitution. The court declined to decide whether the  higher level of scrutiny should be applied to a free exercise  claim—but indicated the law “satisfies even strict scrutiny  as applied to Aloha B&B’s free exercise claim.” The court  affirmed the lower court’s ruling favoring the plaintiffs. 

The Hawaii Supreme Court declined to review the defen dant’s appeal, and the defendant took her case to the US  Supreme Court by asking it to review the appellate court’s  decision under federal constitutional claims. In March of  2019, the Supreme Court declined to do so.

Idaho adopted its religious freedom law in 2000. It states  “government shall not substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of  general applicability.” It then continues, “(g)overnment may  substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it  demonstrates that application of the burden to the person  is both (e)ssential to further a compelling governmental  interest [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that  compelling governmental interest.” It also says the term  “‘substantially burden’ is intended solely to ensure that this  chapter is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis  infractions.” [Idaho Code § 73-402] 

The Idaho law defines “(e)xercise of religion” to mean “the  ability to act or refusal to act in a manner substantially  

motivated by a religious belief, whether or not the exercise is  compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.”  It defines “government” to mean “this state and any agency  or political subdivision of this state” and specifies “political  subdivision” to include “any county, city, school district,  taxing district, municipal corporation, or agency of a county,  city, school district, or municipal corporation.” And it defines  “substantially burden” to mean “to inhibit or curtail religious ly motivated practices.” [Idaho Code § 73-401] 

Lastly, the law applies to “all state laws and local ordinanc es and the implementation of those laws and ordinances,  whether statutory or otherwise.”  

Key cases: None found.

Illinois adopted the “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” in  1998. It states: 

Government may not substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a  rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that  application of the burden to the person is in furtherance  of a compelling governmental interest and is the least  restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern mental interest. [775 ILCS § 35/15] 

It defines “(e)xercise of religion” to mean “an act or refusal to  act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether  or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a  larger system of religious belief.” The Act defines “govern ment” to include “a branch, department, agency, instrumen tality, and official (or other person acting under color of law)  of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision of the State,  including a home rule unit.” [775 ILCS § 35/5] 

The law states it applies “to all State and local (including  home rule unit) laws, ordinances, policies, procedures,  practices, and governmental actions and their implemen tation, whether statutory or otherwise.” It also says a local  government may adopt a religious freedom law, but only if  it meets or exceeds the protections provided in the Act. The  Act also limits its scope, “prohibiting laws respecting the  establishment of religion” as defined in the First Amendment  of the US Constitution. Lastly, it says “(g)ranting government  funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible . .  . does not constitute a violation of this Act. In this subsection,  ‘granting’, used with respect to government funding, ben efits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of govern ment funding, benefits, or exemptions.” [775 ILCS § 35/25] 

Key cases: None found.

Indiana adopted its “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” in  2015. It states: 

(A) governmental entity may not substantially burden a  person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results  from a rule of general applicability … A governmental  entity may substantially burden a person’s exercise of  religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates  that application of the burden to the person is in fur therance of a compelling governmental interest, and is  the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest. [Indiana Code § 34-13-9-8] 

The law “applies to all governmental entity statutes, ordi nances, resolutions, executive or administrative orders, reg ulations, customs, and usages, including the implementation  or application thereof.” [Indiana Code § 34-13-9-1] 

It states “‘granting’ used with respect to government fund ing, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of  government funding, benefits, or exemptions.” It also says  

“(g)ranting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to  the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, does  not constitute a violation of this chapter.” [Indiana Code §  34-13-9-3] 

The law defines “exercise of religion” to include “any exer cise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a  system of religious belief.” [Indiana Code § 34-13-9-5] 

It defines “governmental entity” to include  

the whole or any part of a branch, department, agency,  instrumentality, official, or other individual or entity  acting under color of law of any of the following: 

(1) State government. 

(2) A political subdivision. 

(3) An instrumentality of a governmental entity  described in subdivision (1) or (2), including a  

state educational institution, a body politic, a  

body corporate and politic, or any other similar  entity established by law. [Indiana Code § 34-13- 9-6] 

Note this specific restriction also stated in the law: This chapter does not: 

(1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide  services, facilities, use of public accommoda 

tions, goods, employment, or housing to any  

member or members of the general public on  

the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, age,  

national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation,  gender identity, or United States military service; 

(2) establish a defense to a civil action or criminal  prosecution for refusal by a provider to offer or  provide services, facilities, use of public accom modations, goods, employment, or housing to  any member or members of the general public  on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, age,  national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation,  gender identity, or United States military service.  [Indiana Code § 34-13-9-0.7] 

Key cases: 

• In November of 2019, a county court dismissed a lawsuit  brought by three groups that argued their religious free doms were infringed by the inclusion of “sexual orienta tion” and “gender identity” as protected classes in the  state law as well as the ordinances of four cities (including  Indianapolis). The court said the groups failed to establish “standing” to sue, meaning they did not demonstrate a  direct injury or other “real interest” in order to be the prop er parties to bring the legal challenge. It remained unclear  whether the decision would be appealed at the time this  resource was published. (Indiana Family Institute Inc.,  

Indiana Family Action Inc., American Family Association of  Indiana Inc. v. City of Carmel Indiana, City Attorney for the  City of Carmel Indiana)

Iowa adopted its “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” in 2024. It states: 

State action shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of  general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion  is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest. (675.4(1)) 

The law also says a person can seek relief in a judicial or administrative proceeding, including damages and injunctive relief. If  victorious, the person can recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. (675.4(2)) 

Key cases: None found. 

Kansas adopted its religious freedom law in 2013. It states: 

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s  civil right to exercise of religion even if the burden  results from a rule of general applicability, unless such  government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evi dence, that application of the burden to the person  (i)s in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest  and is the least restrictive means of furthering that  compelling governmental interest. [Kan. Stat. Ann. §  60-5303(a)] 

The law also states “(t)he religious liberty interest protected  by this act is an independent liberty that occupies a preferred  position, and no encroachments upon this liberty shall be  permitted, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear  and compelling governmental interests of the highest order.”  [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5304] 

The law defines “(e)xercise of religion” to mean “the practice  or observance of religion under [the state and federal con stitutions] and includes the right to act or refuse to act in a  manner substantially motivated by a sincerely-held religious  tenet or belief, whether or not the exercise is compulsory or a  central part or requirement of the person’s religious tenets or  beliefs.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5302(c)] 

It defines “burden” to mean “any government action that  directly or indirectly constrains, inhibits, curtails or denies  the exercise of religion by any person or compels any action  contrary to a person’s exercise of religion, and includes, but is  not limited to, withholding benefits, assessing criminal, civil  or administrative penalties, or exclusion from government  programs or access to government facilities.” [Kan. Stat. Ann.  § 60-5302(a)] 

The law says “‘compelling government interest’ includes,  but is not limited to, protecting the welfare of a child from  abuse and neglect as defined by state law.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. §  60-5302(b)] 

It also defines “(g)overnment” to include “the executive,  legislative and judicial branches and any and all agencies,  boards, commissions, departments, districts, authorities or  other entities, subdivisions or parts whatsoever of state and  local government as well as any person acting under color of  law.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5302(e)] 

Key cases: None found.

Kentucky adopted its religious freedom law in 2013. It states: 

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s  freedom of religion. The right to act or refuse to act in  a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief  may not be substantially burdened unless the govern ment proves by clear and convincing evidence that it  has a compelling governmental interest in infringing  the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least  restrictive means to further that interest. A “burden”  shall include indirect burdens such as withholding ben efits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from programs  or access to facilities. [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.350]  

(Editor’s note: A “clear and convincing evidence” evidentiary  standard is not as high the “beyond a reasonable doubt”  standard used in most criminal cases, but it is higher than the  “preponderance of the evidence” standard (a greater than 50  percent chance the claim is true) used in most civil lawsuits.) 

Key cases: None found.

Louisiana adopted its religious freedom law in 2010. It states: 

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a  facially neutral rule or a rule of general applicability,  unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to  the person is both (i)n furtherance of a compelling gov ernmental interest … [and] (t)he least restrictive means  of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [La.  Rev. Stat. § 13:5233] 

The law defines a “(b)urden” to mean the government, directly or indirectly, does any of the  following: 

(a) Constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious  tenet or belief. 

(b) Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express adherence to the person’s religious faith. 

(c) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to  engage in activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion. 

(d) Compels conduct or expression which violates a  tenet or belief of a person’s religious faith. [La.  Rev. Stat. § 13:5234(2)] 

It defines “(c)ompelling state interest” to include “the inter est of the state to protect the best interest of a child and  the health, safety, and welfare of a child.” [La. Rev. Stat. §  13:5234(3)] 

The law defines “exercise of religion” to mean “the practice  or observance of religion under [the state and federal con stitutions] and includes the ability to act or refuse to act in a manner substantially motivated by a sincerely-held religious  belief, whether or not the exercise is compulsory or a central  part or central requirement of the person’s religious belief.”  [La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5234(5)] 

It also says “Government” or “government agency” means any of  the following: 

(a)  Any board, commission, court, department,  agency, special district, authority, or other entity  of the state. 

(b)  Any political subdivision of this state including  any parish, municipality, special district, school  board, sheriff, public board, institution, depart ment, commission, district, corporation, agency, court, or authority. 

(c)  Any other public or governmental body of any  kind which is not a state agency. 

(d)  Any official or other person acting under color  of law. [La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5234(6)] 

The law applies  to all state laws and local ordinances and the implemen tation of those laws and ordinances, whether statuto ry or otherwise … Nothing in this Part shall create or  preclude a right of any religious organization to receive  funding or other assistance from a government, or of  any person to receive government funding for a religious  activity. [La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5236] 

Key cases: None found. 

Maine does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states.  

Key cases: 

• Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944 (2006). The  Maine Supreme Court, dealing with a challenge to a statute  prohibiting the state from funding private religious schools,  cited the US Supreme Court’s 1990 ruling in Employment  

Division v. Smith, concluding “(a) statute that is neutral and  of general applicability need not be justified by a compel ling governmental interest, even if the law has the inciden tal effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Only  when “(a) statute that is not neutral but either disfavors  religion on its face or has been motivated by animosity  against religion is [it] subjected to heightened judicial  scrutiny and can be justified only upon a demonstration of  a compelling governmental interest in the statute.”

Maryland does not have a religious freedom law and no court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review similar to  those found in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: None found.

Massachusetts does not have a religious freedom law and no  court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review  similar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Res toration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994). The  Massachusetts Supreme Court issued a decision in a case  involving a landlord’s claims that the state’s antidiscrim ination statute impermissibly burdened his free exercise  rights. The court, citing the US Supreme Court’s decisions  

in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) and Church of the  Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993),  said “(a) statute that is neutral and of general applicability  need not be justified by a compelling governmental inter est, even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening  a particular religious practice.” Only when the law “is not  neutral or is not of general application” must the court  apply heightened judicial scrutiny (the “law must advance  compelling interests and must be tailored narrowly in pur suit of those interests”).

Michigan does not have a religious freedom law. But court  decisions suggest a high judicial standard of review is used for evaluating neutral laws of general applicability when they  burden religious exercise. 

Key cases: 

• Champion v. Sec’y of State, 761 N.W.2d 747 (2008). A state  appellate court ruled a state action burdening a claimant’s free exercise rights was permissible because the state action was tied to a compelling governmental interest and  the state used the least restrictive means possible to fur ther that interest (a “strict scrutiny” standard of review). 

The decision has been cited by at least 11 subsequent decisions in Michigan appellate courts and federal courts in the state.

Minnesota does not have a religious freedom law. But court  decisions suggest a high judicial standard of review is used  for evaluating neutral laws of general applicability when they  burden religious exercise. 

Key cases: 

• Minnesota courts recognize a “heightened” four-prong test  when evaluating a burden placed on a complainant’s free  exercise rights by a government action:  

Minnesota courts employ a heightened compelling state  interest balancing test when determining whether a  challenged law infringes on or interferes with religious  

practices. The test has four prongs: (1) whether the  objector’s beliefs are sincerely held; (2) whether the  state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs;  (3) whether the state interest in the regulation is overrid ing or compelling; and (4) whether the state regulation  uses the least restrictive means. Edina Cmty. Lutheran  Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (2008).

The “Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act” was  adopted in 2014. It involves a “compelling interest test,” the  highest level of scrutiny a court can give to government  action. If a claimant successfully demonstrates their free  exercise rights have been burdened by a state action—such  as through the existence of a state law and/or its enforce ment—the government must show both that the burden is  justified by a compelling state interest and that the action is  administered in the least restrictive way possible for fur thering that interest. If the government cannot make such  a showing, the state action is deemed invalid. [Miss. Code §  11-61-1(5)]  

The law says it “applies to all state laws, rules, regulations  and any municipal or county ordinances, rules or regulations  and the implementation of those laws, whether statutory or  otherwise.” [Miss. Code § 11-61-1(7)] 

It also says: 

Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect,  interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First  Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establish ment of religion. Granting government funding, bene fits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the  Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation  of this section. As used in this subsection, the term  “granting,” used with respect to government funding,  benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of  government funding, benefits, or exemptions. [Miss.  Code § 11-61-1(9)] 

Additionally, in April of 2016, the Mississippi legislature  passed the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Govern ment Discrimination Act,” which the state’s governor signed  into law. The law addresses several matters, including mar riage ceremonies, employment, adoption or foster care ser vices, and public accommodations. It first defines “sincerely  held religious beliefs or moral convictions” as ones involv ing “the belief or conviction that marriage is or should be  recognized as the union of one man and one woman; sexual  relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and male  (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable  biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and  genetics at time of birth.” It then continues:  

the state government shall not take any discriminatory  action against a religious organization wholly or par tially on the basis that such organization: (s)olemnizes  or declines to solemnize any marriage, or provides or  declines to provide services, accommodations, facilities,  goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solem nization, formation, celebration or recognition of any  marriage, based upon or in a manner consistent with a  sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction. 

The law also defines the types of “discriminatory actions” the  government cannot take, which include (but are not limited  to) altering an organization’s tax-exempt status, levying a  monetary fine, or denying a state-funded grant. 

Key cases: None found.

Missouri adopted its religious freedom law in 2003. It states: 

A governmental authority may not restrict a person’s  free exercise of religion, unless: The restriction is in the  form of a rule of general applicability, and does not  discriminate against religion, or among religions; and (t) he governmental authority demonstrates that applica tion of the restriction to the person is essential to further  a compelling governmental interest, and is not unduly  restrictive considering the relevant circumstances. [R.S. Mo. § 1.302(1)] 

It defines “exercise of religion” as “an act or refusal to act  that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or  not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger  system of religious belief.” [R.S.Mo. § 1.302(2)] 

Key cases: 

• Our Lady’s Inn v. City of St. Louis, 349 F. Supp. 3d 805  (2018). The case, heard by a federal district court,  

addressed one city’s employment discrimination ordi nance. The plaintiffs (a nonprofit providing housing to  pregnant, low-income women seeking an alternative to  abortion; a Catholic school; and a private, closely held  corporation) argued the ordinance required them “to pro vide their employees with health insurance coverage that  includes contraception, abortion, and sterilization,” which  all of them opposed based on religious-based reasons. The  city argued the ordinance provided an exemption only for  religious institutions. The court agreed with the plaintiffs,  concluding the term “religious” as used in the ordinance  also modified a series of entities exempted by the law,  including “corporation(s),” “association(s),” and “soci et(ies).” Consequently, the enforcement of the ordinance  against the for-profit corporation was unlawful under the  state’s RFRA.

In April of 2021, Montana adopted its religious freedom law. It  says the state “may not substantially burden a person’s right  to the exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a  rule of general applicability, unless it is demonstrated” the  burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and  “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest.” MCA §27-33-105 

Key cases: 

• Valley Christian Sch. v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 2004 MT 41  (2004). The Montana Supreme Court held that neutral  laws of general applicability that have only an “incidental effect” on the practice of religion (“but which have no  tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their  religious beliefs”) does not imply the government must  “bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise  lawful actions.” The decision is now superseded by the  state legislature’s passage of a religious freedom law in  April of 2021.

Nebraska does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (1990). The Nebraska  Supreme Court referenced the US Supreme Court’s deci sion in Sherbert v. Verner in discussing how to evaluate  a complainant’s free exercise challenge to a government  burden: 

Although the prohibition against infringement of reli gious belief is absolute, the immunity afforded religious  practices by the first amendment is not so rigid. A state may abridge religious practices upon a demonstration  that some compelling state interest outweighs a com plainant’s interests in religious freedom. 

However, the court did not further elaborate on the factors  to use to determine whether the “complainant’s interests  in religious freedom” outweigh “some compelling state  interest.” And the US Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in  Employment Division v. Smith set a lower standard of judi cial scrutiny than Sherbert v. Verner to evaluate govern ment action challenged by a free exercise claim (meaning  the government action stands a better chance of surviving  the free exercise challenge).

Nevada does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Blandino v. State, 914 P.2d 624 (1996). In a case evaluating  a prison inmate’s claim that his religious freedom should  allow him to self-represent himself in a direct conviction  appeal (whereas state law required counsel), the Nevada  Supreme Court cited both the US Supreme Court’s 1990  Employment Division v. Smith ruling (a “‘generally appli cable and otherwise valid’ law that “only has an ‘incidental effect’ on religious practices” is permissible) and the fed eral Religious Freedom Restoration Act (government may “‘substantially burden’ an individual’s right to free exercise  of religion only if the government asserts a ‘compelling  governmental interest’ and the burden is ‘the least restric tive means of furthering that compelling governmental  interest’”). Under Smith, the Nevada Supreme Court held the state’s requirement was permissible; under RFRA, the  court said the requirement did not “substantially burden”  the inmate. The court did not indicate which method of  analysis should be followed with future claims.

New Hampshire does not have a religious freedom law and  no court decisions provide any high judicial standards of  review similar to those found in the federal Religious Free dom Restoration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• State v. Perfetto, 160 N.H. 675 (N.H. 2010). The New Hamp shire Supreme Court declined to adopt a “compelling gov ernmental interest” test in relation to a prisoner’s assertion that his sentencing terms restricted his fundamental right  of free exercise of religion. The court said: 

We note that the condition in this case does not directly  infringe on the defendant’s free exercise of his religion:  it is instead facially neutral and applies to the defen dant’s conduct regardless of whether he is in a church or  elsewhere. Under these circumstances, we see no reason  to require the State to show a compelling government  interest.

New Jersey does not have a religious freedom law and no  court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review  similar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Res toration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of  the Infant Jesus Church Elem. Sch., 150 N.J. 575 (1997).  In a decision shortly after the US Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act  did not apply to the states, the Supreme Court of New  Jersey applied the Employment Division v. Smith standard  of review for a free exercise claim (the statute need only  have a secular legislative purpose; its principal effect must  neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not foster  an excessive government entanglement with religion). 

The “New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act” was  adopted in 2000. [N.M. Stat. § 28-22-1] 

It states: 

A government agency shall not restrict a person’s free  exercise of religion unless the restriction is in the form  of a rule of general applicability and does not directly discriminate against religion or among religions; and the  application of the restriction to the person is essential  to further a compelling governmental interest and is  the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest. [N.M. Stat. § 28-22-3] 

The law provides the following definitions: 

• “‘Free exercise of religion’ means an act or refusal to act  that is substantially motivated by religious belief.” [N.M.  Stat. § 28-22-2(A)] 

• “‘Government agency’ means the state or any of its  political subdivisions, institutions, departments, agencies,  commissions, committees, boards, councils, bureaus, or  authorities.” [N.M. Stat. § 28-22-2(B)] 

Key cases: 

• Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (2013). A  for-profit wedding photography business did not dispute  it was a public accommodation under the New Mexico  Human Rights Act (NMHRA), but instead argued its refusal  to photograph a same-sex couple’s wedding ceremony  was based on its sincerely held religious beliefs and thus  protected by the First Amendment guarantees of free  speech and free exercise. The photographer also argued  the refusal was based on the conduct of the couple, not  the status of the couple, and also noted she would provide  other photography services to the couple so long as they  did not require reflecting the couple’s sexual preferences.  

The New Mexico Supreme Court, affirming lower court  holdings, rejected the photographer’s arguments. The  refusal to photograph the wedding ceremony violated the  NMHRA, and the photographer’s willingness to photograph  a gay person so long as the photos did not reflect the cli ent’s sexual preferences was unpersuasive. The court also  cited the US Supreme Court’s decision in Christian Legal  Society v. Martinez, in which the US Supreme Court said its  prior decisions (e.g., Lawrence v. Texas) have declined to  distinguish between status and conduct. Lastly, the court  ruled the enforcement of NMHRA did not result in com pelled speech to promote a government message (the cit ed cases involved “specific government-selected messag es” not present here, and NMHRA does not enumerate the  style of photos or the selection of photos), nor did it result  in compelling the photographer to host or accommo date the message of another speaker (no “United States  Supreme Court case has ever found a compelled-speech  violation arising from the application of antidiscrimination  laws to a for-profit public accommodation,” and in cases  involving the government unconstitutionally requiring a  speaker to host/accommodate another speaker’s message,  the issue involved “direct government interference,” rather  than “a message-for-hire”).  

Regarding the free exercise claim, the New Mexico  Supreme Court declined to decide whether a limited  liability corporation like Elane Photography has free  exercise rights, instead holding any such rights would “not  [be] offended by enforcement of the NMHRA” since it is a  neutral law of general applicability (citing the US Supreme  Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith).  The court’s decision also affirmed the lower court’s holding  that the state RFRA applies only when a government  agency has restricted a person’s free exercise of religion,  and was not meant to apply to lawsuits between private  parties.

Also of significant note to church leaders from the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Elane Photography: It  said Subsection B of the NMHRA allows religious organizations to ‘limit[] admission to  or giv[e] preference to persons of the same religion or  denomination or [to make] selections of buyers, lessees  or tenants’ that promote the organization’s religious  principles. In the context of ‘buyers, lessees or tenants,” ‘buyers’ clearly refers to purchasers of real estate rather than retail customers. … Subsection C exempts religious  organizations from provisions of the NMHRA governing sexual orientation and gender identity, but only regarding ‘employment or renting.’ If a religious organization  sold goods or services to the general public, neither  subsection would allow the organization to turn away  same-sex couples while catering to opposite-sex couples  of all faiths.

New York does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states.  

Key cases: 

• Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d  510 (2006). New York’s highest state court found a lesser  standard of judicial scrutiny to be more likely appropriate  for evaluating free exercise claims than what the federal  RFRA requires (hence making it more difficult for a claim ant to raise a free exercise defense in relation to govern ment action, such as a public accommodations statute).  

The court said: 

Strict scrutiny is not the right approach to constitution ally-based claims for religious exemptions. Where the State has not set out to burden religious exercise, but  seeks only to advance, in a neutral way, a legitimate  object of legislation, we do not read the New York Free  Exercise Clause to require the State to demonstrate a  “compelling” interest in response to every claim by a  religious believer to an exemption from the law; such a  rule of constitutional law would give too little respect to  legislative prerogatives, and would create too great an  obstacle to efficient government. Rather, the principle  stated by the United States Supreme Court in [Employ ment Division v.] Smith—that citizens are not excused by  the Free Exercise Clause from complying with generally  applicable and neutral laws, even ones offensive to their  religious tenets—should be the usual, though not the  invariable, rule.

North Carolina does not have a religious freedom law, despite  attempts by members of its legislature in 2015, 2017, and  2018. A 1967 state supreme court decision indicated the  government must show a compelling state interest when  evaluating a law that burdens religious exercise. Howev er, a 2006 state appellate court decision indicates the US  Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v.  Smith provides a lower standard of review for courts to use. 

Key cases: 

• In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68 (1967). The case pre-dates the  US Supreme Court’s Employment Division v. Smith decision  delivered in 1990. However, it is worth noting the North  Carolina Supreme Court said the First Amendment free exercise clause is “so basic and fundamental” that “one  may not be compelled by governmental action to do that  which is contrary to his religious belief in the absence of  a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject  within the State’s Constitutional power to regulate.’” 

• State v. Carignan, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2006). A  state appellate court said the US Supreme Court’s 1990  decision in Employment Division v. Smith provides a lower  standard of review for courts to use when evaluating a  neutral law of general applicability that burdens religious  exercise (the law still may stand even if it burdens religious  exercise).

North Dakota passed its religious freedom law in the spring  of 2023. It took effect on August 1, 2023. [N.D. Cent. Code, §  14-02.4-08.1] 

It says a state or local government entity “may not [s]ubstan tially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless applying  the burden to that person’s exercise of religion” furthers a  compelling government interest in the least restrictive means  possible.  

The law also says religious conduct cannot be treated more  restrictively “than any secular conduct of reasonably compa rable risk … or of alleged economic need or benefit.” 

Key cases: None found.

Ohio does not have a religious freedom law, but a 2000  decision from its supreme court said a high judicial standard  of review should be used to evaluate a neutral law of general  applicability when a free exercise claim is raised.  

Key cases: 

• Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St. 3d 62 (2000). The Ohio  Supreme Court interpreted the state’s constitutional  protections for religious free exercise, and determined “the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person’s right  to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves  a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.” This standard of review  is similar to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act  (RFRA) as well as RFRAs found in several other states. 

Oklahoma adopted the “Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act”  in 2000. [Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 251]  

The Act states:  

(N)o governmental entity shall substantially burden  a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden  results from a rule of general applicability … unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the per son is (e)ssential to further a compelling governmental  interest and (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Okla. Stat. tit. 51,  § 253] 

The law generally defines the “exercise of religion” to mean  religious exercise falling under the state constitution, the  Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, and the First Amendment  of the US Constitution. It defines a governmental entity to  mean “any branch, department, agency, or instrumentality  of state government, or any official or other person acting  under color of state law, or any political subdivision of this  state.” Lastly, it defines “substantially burden” to mean “to  inhibit or curtail religiously motivated practice.” [Okla. Stat.  tit. 51, § 252] 

Key cases: None found.

Oregon does not have a religious freedom law and no court  decisions provide any high judicial standards of review sim ilar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Resto ration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: 

• Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (2017), vacated, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4150 (U.S. June 17, 2019). This  Oregon appellate court decision was remanded by the  

US Supreme Court in 2019, so the final outcome remained  uncertain at the time this resource was published. How ever, the holding from 2017 is worth noting for the time being.  

The court referenced the Supreme Court’s Employment  Division v. Smith decision from 1990, which said neutral  laws of general applicability do not need to be evaluat ed with a high judicial standard of review (a compelling  governmental interest advanced in the least-restrictive  manner possible) when a free exercise claim is raised. The Oregon court then determined the state’s public accom modations law was a neutral law of general applicability.  It then applied a lower judicial standard of review and  found that enforcement of the public accommodations law  against a floral shop for its refusal to provide arrangements  for a same-sex couple’s wedding ceremony was proper— and not a violation of the floral shop owners’ free exercise  rights.  

The court separately rejected the floral shop owners’  argument that the enforcement of the law burdened their  “hybrid rights”—their free exercise rights along with other  constitutional rights—and thus would create an exception  to Smith that triggered a higher standard of judicial review  (“strict scrutiny”). The court said it viewed the “hybrid rights doctrine” discussed at one point in the Smith opinion to be “dictum”—a legal term that means a court  makes a noteworthy, but non-precedential, statement in a  decision—and nothing more.

Pennsylvania adopted the “Religious Freedom Protection  Act” in 2002. [Pa. Stat. tit. 71, § 2401] 

It says “(a)n agency shall not substantially burden a person’s  free exercise of religion, including any burden which results  from a rule of general applicability.” However, it also says (a)n agency may substantially burden a person’s free  exercise of religion if the agency proves, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the burden is all of the following (i)n furtherance of a compelling interest of the  agency [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering  the compelling interest. [Pa. Stat. tit. 71, § 2404] 

(Editor’s note: “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard used in most civil lawsuits decided by a jury or a judge without a jury. A party need only convince the jury or judge that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that the claim is true. This is a lower threshold than the “clear  and convincing evidence” standard used in some civil and criminal cases, and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in most criminal cases.) 

The Act provides the following definitions: 

• “Agency” means both state agencies (including the execu tive department, its boards and commissions, independent  administrative departments, boards and commissions, and  public officials, all “acting under the color of state law) and non-state agencies (including political subdivisions, municipal authorities or other local government authori ties, or local public officials, all “acting under the color of state law”). But it does not include state courts or state  grand juries acting under investigative powers granted by  state law;  

• “Substantially burden” means an agency action which does any of the following:  

1. Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expres sion mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious  beliefs. 

2. Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express  adherence to the person’s religious faith. 

3. Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage  in activities which are fundamental to the person’s  religion. 

4. Compels conduct or expression which violates a  specific tenet of a person’s religious faith. [Pa. Stat.  tit. 71, § 2403] 

Key cases: None found.

Rhode Island adopted its “Religious Freedom Restoration  Act” in 1993. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-1] 

It states: 

(A) governmental authority may not restrict a person’s  free exercise of religion … [unless] (t)he restriction is  in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does  not intentionally discriminate against religion, or among  religions and (t)he governmental authority proves that  application of the restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is  the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-3] 

The Act defines “governmental authority” to mean “any  department, agency, commission, committee, board, council,  bureau or authority or any subdivision of state or municipal  government.” [R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-2] 

Key cases: None found.

South Carolina adopted the “South Carolina Religious Free dom Act” in 1999. [S.C. Code § 1-32-10] 

The statute states: 

The State may not substantially burden a person’s exer cise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of  general applicability, unless the State demonstrates that  application of the burden to the person is in furtherance  of a compelling state interest and the least restrictive  means of furthering that compelling state interest. [S.C.  Code § 1-32-40] 

The law defines “exercise of religion” to mean religious exer cise under both the state constitution and the First Amend ment of the US Constitution. It also defines “state” to mean  “the State of South Carolina and any political subdivision of the State and includes a branch, department, agency, board,  commission, instrumentality, entity, or officer, employee, official of the State or a political subdivision of the State, or any  other person acting under color of law.” [S.C. Code § 1-32-20] 

Key cases: None found.

In March of 2021, South Dakota passed its religious freedom  law. It says the state may not “substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion unless applying the burden … is essential  to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least  restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” 

The law also says the state may not “(t)reat religious conduct more restrictively than any secular conduct of reasonably comparable risk,” or “treat religious conduct more restrictively than comparable secular conduct because of alleged economic need or benefit.” [S.D. Codified Laws §1-1A-4] 

Key cases: None found.

Tennessee adopted its religious freedom law in 2009.  

It states “no government entity shall substantially burden a  person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results  from a rule of general applicability.” [Tenn. Code § 4-1- 407(b)] It then says, “(n)o government entity shall substan tially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless it  demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is  (e)ssential to further a compelling governmental interest and  (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling  governmental interest.” [Tenn. Code § 4-1-407(c)] 

It defines “exercise of religion” to mean religious exercise  as found under the state constitution and the First Amend ment of the US Constitution. It defines “government entity”  to mean “any branch, department, agency, commission or  instrumentality of state government, any official or other  person acting under color of state law or any political sub division of the state.” It also defines “substantially burden”  to mean “to inhibit or curtail religiously motivated practice.”  [Tenn. Code § 4-1-407(a)] 

The statute also says: 

• “Nothing in this section shall create or preclude a right  of any religious organization to receive funding or other  assistance from a government or of any person to receive  government funding for a religious activity.” [Tenn. Code §  4-1-407(d)(2)] 

• “A government entity, excluding courts, shall not sub poena a clergy member’s sermon, including notes used  to prepare a sermon or an audio or video recording of a  sermon, or subpoena a clergy member’s attendance to tes tify regarding a sermon, for use in a civil or administrative  action.” [Tenn. Code § 4-1-407(g)] 

Key cases: 

• Johnson v. Levy, S.W.3d (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010). A  Tennessee appellate court noted a difference between the  federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the state’s  RFRA. Under the federal RFRA, the federal government  must demonstrate that the proposed action is in further ance of a compelling governmental interest. Under the  state’s RFRA, the court said, the governmental agency  must prove—by clear and convincing evidence—that its  proposed course of action is essential to further a compel ling governmental interest, a sign the Tennessee general  assembly intended to provide greater protection of reli gious freedom than the federal RFRA. (Editor’s note: The  “clear and convincing evidence” standard is not as high  as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required in  criminal cases, but it is higher than the “preponderance of  the evidence” standard required in most civil cases.)  

• Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization,  428 S.W.3d 800, (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013). A Tennes see appellate court said the partial denial of a church’s  application for tax exemption for areas used for retail and  commercial uses did not violate the state’s RFRA because  the tax exemption statutes did not substantially burden  any apparent religious belief and did not prohibit or coerce  any act contrary to religious belief. Additionally, the court  said, the state had a compelling interest in ensuring a fair  distribution of the tax burden. 

Texas adopted its religious freedom law in 1999.  

It says, “(a) government agency may not substantially  burden a person’s free exercise of religion” unless it shows  the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental  interest” and “is the least restricted means of furthering that  interest” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 110.003]. 

The law defines “free exercise of religion” to mean an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated  by sincere religious belief. In determining whether an  act or refusal to act is substantially motivated by sincere  religious belief under this chapter, it is not necessary  to determine that the act or refusal to act is motivated  by a central part or central requirement of the person’s  sincere religious belief. [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code  § 110.001(1)] 

It defines “government agency” to mean the state gov ernment, a municipality, or other political subdivision, or a  related entity, including “a department, bureau, board, com mission, office, agency, council, or public institution of higher  education.” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 110.001(2)] 

The law says it applies “to any ordinance, rule, order, deci sion, practice, or other exercise of governmental authority”  

as well as “an act of a government agency, in the exercise of  governmental authority, granting or refusing to grant a gov ernment benefit to an individual.” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies  Code § 110.002] 

It also notes the law: 

• “(D)oes not establish or eliminate a defense to a civil  action or criminal prosecution under a federal or state  civil rights law” and “is fully applicable to claims regard ing the employment, education, or volunteering of those  who perform duties, such as spreading or teaching faith,  performing devotional services, or internal governance, for  a religious organization.” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code  § 110.011] 

• “(D)oes not affect the grant or denial of an appropriation  or other grant of money or benefits to a religious organiza tion, nor does it affect the grant or denial of a tax exemp tion to a religious organization.” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies  Code § 110.012] 

Key cases: None found.

Utah does not have a religious freedom law, but it adopted  the “Utah Religious Land Use Act” in 2005. It addresses state  or local laws or ordinances “that limit or restrict … use or  development of land or a structure affixed to land” by per sons, including corporations or legal entities that own inter ests in real property. [Utah Code Ann. § 63L-5-101 et seq.]  

It states  

(a) government entity may impose or implement a land  use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on a person’s free exercise of religion if the gov ernment can establish that the imposition of the burden  on that person is in furtherance of a compelling gov ernmental interest and is the least restrictive means of  furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Utah  Code Ann. § 63L-5-201] 

Key cases: None found.

Vermont does not have a religious freedom law and no court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review similar to  those found in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the RFRAs of other states. 

Key cases: None found.

Virginia’s general assembly adopted the “Virginia Statute  for Establishing Religious Freedom,” written by Thomas  Jefferson, in 1786. The language influenced the language  later used in the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Its  guarantees became part of Virginia’s second state constitu tion adopted in 1830. [Va. Code Ann. § 57-1] The state later  reaffirmed those rights through its code of laws. [Va. Code  Ann. § 57-2] 

In 2007 and 2009, the state incorporated numerous amend ments providing further definition and scope to the statute.  Specifically: 

• No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s  free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a  rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that  application of the burden to the person is essential to  further a compelling governmental interest and the least  restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern mental interest. [Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(B)] 

• “Exercise of religion” is defined to mean religious exercise  under the state’s constitution, the state’s religious freedom  law, and the First Amendment to the US Constitution. [Va.  Code Ann. § 57-2.02(A)] 

• “Government entity” includes “any branch, department,  agency, or instrumentality of state government, or any  official or other person acting under color of state law, or  any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.” [Va. Code  Ann. § 57-2.02(A)] 

• “‘Substantially burden’ means to inhibit or curtail religious ly motivated practice.” [Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(A)] 

The amendments also provide this additional guidance: 

• “Granting government funds, benefits or exemptions, to  the extent permissible … shall not constitute a violation  of this section. As used in this subsection, ‘granting’ used  with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemp tions shall not include the denial of government funding,  benefits, or exemptions.” [Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(D)] 

• “Nothing in this section shall prevent any governmental  institution or facility from maintaining health, safety, secu rity or discipline.” [Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(E)] 

Key cases: None found. 

Washington does not have a religious freedom law and no  court decisions provide any high judicial standards of review  similar to those found in the federal Religious Freedom Res toration Act or the RFRAs of other states.  

Key cases: 

• State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 469 (2019).  The Washington Supreme Court held the Washington  Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) was a neutral law of  general applicability, and thus enjoyed a lower standard  

of judicial review. It then rejected a free exercise defense  raised by a florist, who had declined to provide custom  arrangements for a same-sex couple and was sanctioned  by the state for violating WLAD. The defendant asked the  US Supreme Court to review the decision. The Supreme  Court sent the case back to the state supreme court for  reconsideration. In 2019, the state supreme court again  ruled against the defendant. The defendant again request ed the Supreme Court’s review, which was denied. The  case was later settled.

West Virginia passed the “Equal Protection for Religion Act”  in March of 2023. It took effect on May 29, 2023. [W. Va.  Code § 35-1A-1] 

It says “no state action may (s)ubstantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion” unless it furthers “a compelling govern mental interest” in “the least restrictive means” possible.  

The law also says religious conduct cannot be treated more  restrictively “than any secular conduct of reasonably compa rable risk … or of alleged economic need or benefit.”  

Key cases: None found.

Wisconsin does not have a religious freedom law. But a court  decision suggests a high judicial standard of review is used  for evaluating neutral laws of general applicability when they  burden religious exercise. 

Key cases: 

• Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768  N.W.2d 868 (2009). In a ministerial exception case (decid ed before the US Supreme Court’s foundational 2012 ruling  about the ministerial exception), the Wisconsin Supreme  Court restated its long-standing interpretation of the state  constitution’s protection of religious freedom, indicating  the court generally applies the compelling state interest/ 

least restrictive alternative test … [in which] a religious  organization must prove (1) that it has a sincerely held  religious belief, and (2) that such belief is burdened by the  application of the state law at issue. Upon this showing, the  burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is based  upon a compelling state interest (4) that cannot be served  by a less restrictive alternative.” Though the test proved  “unhelpful” to deciding the case at hand, the court noted  it is “appropriate in most circumstances regarding laws  burdening the rights of conscience.” 

Wyoming does not have a religious freedom law and a state  supreme court decision leaves uncertainty about the stan dard of judicial review to use with evaluating a free exercise  defense raised in response to a neutral law of general appli cability.  

Key cases: 

• Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 390  P.3d 728 (2017). The Wyoming Supreme Court held that  the state’s discipline of a judge who refused to perform  

same-sex marriages was proper. The judge had raised a  religious freedom defense. The court, stating that although  it adheres to the US Supreme Court’s 1990 Employment  Division v. Smith holding (which requires a lesser standard  of judicial scrutiny for a government action or law that is  valid and neutral and only incidentally burdens religion), it applied a higher strict scrutiny standard to the present  case anyway—and still determined the judge’s defense failed. 

The federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act was adopted  in 1993. It states: 

• “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s  exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of  general applicability.” [42 USCS § 2000bb-1(a)] 

• “Government may substantially burden a person’s exer cise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of  the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling  governmental interest and is the least restrictive means  of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” [42  USCS § 2000bb-1(b)] 

Key cases: 

• Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508  U.S. 520 (1993). The US Supreme Court determined a city’s  ordinance, though described on the surface to be a neutral  law of general applicability, was truly designed to target  the animal sacrifice practices of a local church. The Court  reached this conclusion by noting the ordinance exempted  other similar conduct by secular entities (i.e., butchers),  and by noting the legislative history during the adoption  of the ordinance showed city council members intended to  specifically target the church’s activities. Because the ordi nance was not truly neutral, and targeted religious activity,  the Court said a high standard of judicial review (“strict  scrutiny”) should be applied. It deemed the ordinance unconstitutional, finding the ordinance did not advance  a compelling government interest in the least-restrictive  manner possible.  

• City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The US  Supreme Court held Congress exceeded its constitutional  powers when it adopted RFRA and applied it to local and  state laws and government actions (not just federal laws  and federal government actions).  

Based on this conclusion, RFRA can only be applied to fed eral laws and federal government actions. Several states— but not all—have since adopted RFRA-like laws to protect  free exercise rights in relation to laws and actions taken  by local and state governments. In some states lacking  RFRAs, courts have concluded a high standard of judicial  review (“strict scrutiny”) should be applied to neutral  laws of general applicability when they burden religious  exercise. Under strict scrutiny, if a court determines a law  burdens the free exercise rights of a party, the government  must show the law advances a compelling governmental  interest in the least-restrictive manner possible in order to  remain valid as applied against a party’s religious exercise.