Key point 4-02.03. A number of defenses are available to one accused of defamation. These include truth, statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, consent, and self-defense. In addition, statements made to church members about a matter of common interest to members are protected by a “qualified privilege,” meaning that they cannot be defamatory unless they are made with malice. In this context, malice means that the person making the statements knew that they were false or made them with a reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. This privilege will not apply if the statements are made to nonmembers.
An Illinois court ruled that a priest could not sue two adult males who accused him of sexually molesting them when they were minors. Two adult males provided a Catholic archdiocese with written statements recounting how they were sexually molested by the same priest when they were minors. One of the victims alleged that the priest would often have him sleep with him in the same bed at the church rectory, and take him on golf outings and other trips (where they stayed in the same room). The victim also stated that he accompanied the priest to a health club, where the priest insisted that he walk around the locker room naked. The second victim alleged that when he was in the third or fourth grade he spent the night at the church rectory and shared a bed with the priest, who repeatedly fondled him throughout the night. As a result of these complaints the archdiocese initiated an investigation, and a hearing, that resulted in the priest’s removal from the ministry.
The priest responded to these developments by suing the two complainants for defamation and emotional distress. He claimed that plans were announced in various church bulletins that a celebration would be held to commemorate his twenty-fifth anniversary as a priest, and that the complainants decided to retaliate against him by “concocting a false and defamatory story” that he had sexually abused them some 20 years earlier. The priest claimed that as a result of these false statements he sustained injury to his reputation. He sought compensatory damages in excess of $1 million and an undetermined amount of punitive damages.
A state appeals court ruled that the First Amendment guaranty of religious freedom prohibited it from resolving the priest’s lawsuit: “Since the only defamatory publication allegedly made by the [two victims] was made to the church itself within internal disciplinary proceedings, the absolute First Amendment protection for statements made by church members in an internal church disciplinary proceeding precludes the court from exercising jurisdiction in this matter.”
Application. The court concluded that there is an “absolute First Amendment protection for statements made by church members in an internal church disciplinary proceeding,” meaning that complaints of ministerial misconduct made to church officials for investigation ordinarily will not expose the complainants to civil liability for defamation or emotional distress. However, the court cautioned that there is no absolute privilege to make accusations of ministerial misconduct to persons outside of the church disciplinary process, and as a result such accusations may expose the complainants to civil liability. Stepek v. Doe, 910 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. 2009).
This Recent Development first appeared in Church Law & Tax Report, March/April 2010.
