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Code § 40-9-1. Persons and property generally (2022)

The following property and persons shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation and none other:

(1) All . . . ​cemeteries, all property, real and personal, used exclusively for religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable; provided, that property, real or personal, owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution, society or corporation let for rent or hire or for use for business purposes shall not be exempt from taxation, notwithstanding that the income from such property shall be used exclusively for education, religious or charitable purposes. . . .

(6) The libraries of ministers of the gospel, all libraries other than those of a professional character and all religious books kept for sale by ministers of the gospel and colporteurs.

Stat. § 29.45.030. Required exemptions (2018)

(a) The following property is exempt from general taxation: . . . ​(3) property used exclusively for nonprofit religious, charitable, cemetery, hospital, or educational purposes. . . .

(b) In (a) of this section, “property used exclusively for religious purposes” includes the following property owned by a religious organization: (1) the residence of an educator in a private religious or parochial school or a bishop, pastor, priest, rabbi, minister, or religious order of a recognized religious organization; for purposes of this paragraph, “minister” means an individual who is (A) ordained, commissioned, or licensed as a minister according to standards of the religious organization for its ministers; and (B) employed by the religious organization to carry out a ministry of that religious organization; (2) a structure, its furniture, and its fixtures used solely for public worship, charitable purposes, religious administrative offices, religious education, or a nonprofit hospital; (3) lots required by local ordinance for parking near a structure defined in (2) of this subsection.

(c) Property described in (a)(3) or (4) of this section from which income is derived is exempt only if that income is solely from use of the property by nonprofit religious, charitable, hospital, or educational groups. If used by nonprofit educational groups, the property is exempt only if used exclusively for classroom space.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-11109. Property subject to taxation; exceptions (2023)

Property or buildings that are used or held primarily for religious worship, including land, improvements, furniture and equipment, are exempt from taxation if the property is not used or held for profit. Within ten days after receiving an initial affidavit of eligibility submitted . . . ​by a nonprofit organization that owns property used primarily for religious worship, the county assessor, on request, shall issue a receipt for the affidavit. If the organization files with the assessor evidence of the organization’s tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . ​the organization is exempt from the requirement of filing subsequent affidavits . . . ​until all or part of the property is conveyed to a new owner or is no longer used for religious worship. At that time the organization shall notify the assessor of the change in writing. If a nonprofit organization that holds title to property used primarily for religious worship fails to file the affidavit required by § 42-11152 in a timely manner, but otherwise qualifies for exemption, the county board of supervisors, on petition by the organization, shall direct the county treasurer to: 1. Refund any property taxes paid by the organization for a tax year if the organization submits a claim for the refund to the county treasurer within one year after the date the taxes were paid. The county treasurer shall pay the claim within thirty days after it is submitted to the treasurer. The county treasurer is entitled to credit for the refund in the next accounting period with each taxing jurisdiction to which the tax monies may have been transmitted. 2. Forgive and strike off from the tax roll any property taxes and accrued interest and penalties that are due but not paid.

Stat. § 26-3-301. Property exempt from taxes generally (2019)

All property described in this section, to the extent limited, shall be exempt from taxation:

(1) Public school buildings and buildings used exclusively for public worship and the grounds attached to these buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment of the buildings, not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit. . . .

(3) All lands used exclusively as graveyards or grounds for burying the dead, except those held by any person, company, or corporation with a view to profit or for the purpose of speculation in the sale of the lands. . . .

(12)(A) Under the provisions of this section, all dedicated church property, including the church building used as a place of worship, buildings used for administrative or missional purposes, the land upon which the church buildings are located, all church parsonages, any church educational building operated in connection with the church including a family life or activity center, a recreation center, a youth center, a church association building, a day-care center, a kindergarten, or private church school shall be exempt. (B) However, in the event any property is used partially for church purposes and partially for investments or other commercial or business purposes, the property shall be exempt from the ad valorem tax.

Stat. § 26-3-303. Parsonages (1945)

Parsonages owned by churches and used as homes for pastors shall be exempt from all taxes on real property, except improvement district taxes.

Rev. & Tax Code § 207. Property used exclusively for religious purposes; religious exemption; effective date (1983)

Property used exclusively for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Property owned and operated by a church and used for religious worship, preschool purposes, nursery school purposes, kindergarten purposes, school purposes of less than collegiate grade, or for purposes of both schools of collegiate grade and schools less than collegiate grade but excluding property used solely for purposes of schools of collegiate grade, shall be deemed to be used exclusively for religious purposes under this section. The exemption provided by this section is granted pursuant to the authority in subdivision (b) of Section 4 of Article XI of the California Constitution, and shall be known as the “religious exemption.” This section shall be effective for the 1977-78 fiscal year and fiscal years thereafter.

Rev. & Tax Code § 207.1. Personal property leased to church; religious purposes (1998)

Personal property leased to a church and used exclusively for the purposes described in Section 207 shall be deemed to be used exclusively for religious purposes under that section.

Rev. Stat. § 39-3-106.5. Tax-exempt property—incidental use—exemption—limitations (2013)

(1) If any property, real or personal, which is otherwise exempt from the levy and collection of property tax pursuant to the provisions of section 39-3-106, is used for any purpose other than the purposes specified in sections 39-3-106 to 39-3-113, such property shall be exempt from the levy and collection of property tax if:

(a) The property is used for such purposes for less than two hundred eight hours, adjusted for partial usage if necessary on the basis of the relationship that the amount of time and space used for such other purpose bears to the total available time and space, during the calendar year; or (b) The use of the property for such purposes results in either: (I) Less than ten thousand dollars of gross income to the owner of such property which is derived from any unrelated trade or business, as determined pursuant to the provisions of sections 511 to 513 of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986”, as amended; or (II) Less than ten thousand dollars of gross rental income to the owner of such property.

(1.5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, for property tax years commencing on or after January 1, 1994, if any property, real or personal, which is otherwise exempt from the levy and collection of property tax pursuant to the provisions of section 39-3-106, is used for any purpose other than the purposes specified in sections 39-3-106 to 39-3-113, such property shall be exempt from the levy and collection of property tax if:

(a) The property is used for such purposes for less than two hundred eight hours, adjusted for partial usage if necessary on the basis of the relationship that the amount of time and space used for such other purpose bears to the total available time and space, during the calendar year; or

(b) The use of the property for such purposes results in:

(I) Less than ten thousand dollars of gross income to the owner of such property which is derived from any unrelated trade or business, as determined pursuant to the provisions of sections 511 to 513 of the federal “Internal Revenue Code of 1986,” as amended; and

(II) Less than ten thousand dollars of gross rental income to the owner of such property.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 39-3-108(3) and subsection (3) of this section, if any property, real or personal, that is otherwise exempt from the levy and collection of property tax pursuant to the provisions of sections 39-3-107 to 39-3-113 is used on an occasional, noncontinuous basis for any purpose other than the purposes specified in sections 39-3-106 to 39-3-113, such property shall be exempt from the levy and collection of property tax if:

(a) The property is used for such purposes for less than two hundred eight hours, adjusted for partial usage if necessary on the basis of the relationship that the amount of time and space used for such other purpose bears to the total available time and space, during the calendar year; or

(b) The use of the property for such purposes results in less than twenty-five thousand dollars of gross rental income to the owner of such property.

(3) The requirement that property be used on an occasional basis in order to qualify for the exemption set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to property, real or personal, that is otherwise exempt from the levy and collection of property tax pursuant to the provisions of section 39-3-111 that is used for any purpose other than the purposes specified in sections 39-3-106 to 39-3-113.

Rev. Stat. § 39-3-109. Residential property—integral part of tax-exempt entities—charitable purposes—exemption—limitation (2002)

(1) Property, real and personal, which is owned and used solely and exclusively for strictly charitable purposes and not for private gain or corporate profit shall be exempt from the levy and collection of property tax if such property is residential and the structure and the land upon which such structure is located are used as an integral part of a church, an eleemosynary hospital, an eleemosynary licensed health care facility, a school, or an institution whose property is otherwise exempt from taxation pursuant to the provisions of this Part 1 and which is not leased or rented at any time to persons other than: (a) Persons who are attending such school as students; or (b) Persons who are actually receiving care or treatment from such hospital, licensed health care facility, or institution for physical or mental disabilities and who, in order to receive such care or treatment, are required to be domiciled within such hospital, licensed health care facility, or institution, or within affiliated residential units.

(2) Persons residing within residential units specified in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section may submit to the administrator, on a form prescribed by the administrator, a certificate signed by a physician licensed to practice in the state of Colorado that the medical condition of such individual requires the individual to reside in such residential unit. If a person residing within such residential unit submits such signed certificate to the administrator pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (2), the portion of such residential property that is utilized by qualified occupants shall be deemed to be property used solely and exclusively for strictly charitable purposes and not for private gain or corporate profit and such portion, but only such portion, shall be exempt under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. The determination as to what portion of such structure is so utilized shall be made by the administrator on the basis of the facts existing on the annual assessment date for such property, and the administrator shall have the authority to determine a ratio which reflects the value of the nonexempt portion of such structure in relation to the total value of the whole structure and the land upon which such structure is located and which is identical to the ratio of the number of residential units occupied by nonqualified occupants to the total number of occupied residential units in such structure.

(2.5) No requirement shall be imposed that use of property which is otherwise exempt pursuant to the provisions of this section shall benefit the people of Colorado in order to qualify for said exemption.

(3) Any exemption claimed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall comply with the provisions of section 39-2-117.

Rev. Stat. § 39-3-106. Property—religious purposes—exemption—legislative declaration (2004)

(1) Property, real and personal, which is owned and used solely and exclusively for religious purposes and not for private gain or corporate profit shall be exempt from the levy and collection of property tax.

(2) In order to guide members of the public and public officials alike in the making of their day-to-day decisions, to provide for a consistent application of the laws, and to assist in the avoidance of litigation, the general assembly hereby finds and declares that religious worship has different meanings to different religious organizations; that the constitutional guarantees regarding establishment of religion and the free exercise of religion prevent public officials from inquiring as to whether particular activities of religious organizations constitute religious worship; that many activities of religious organizations are in the furtherance of the religious purposes of such organizations; that such religious activities are an integral part of the religious worship of religious organizations; and that activities of religious organizations which are in furtherance of their religious purposes constitute religious worship for purposes of section 5 of article X of the Colorado constitution. This legislative finding and declaration shall be entitled to great weight in any and every court.

Gen. Stat. § 12-81. Exemptions (2024)

The following-described property shall be exempt from taxation . . .

(12) Personal property of religious organizations devoted to religious or charitable use. Personal property within the state owned by, or held in trust for, a Connecticut religious organization, whether or not incorporated, if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious or charitable purposes or both;

(13) Houses of religious worship. Subject to the provisions of section 12-88, houses of religious worship, the land on which they stand, their pews, furniture and equipment owned by, or held in trust for the use of, any religious organization;

(14) Property of religious organizations used for certain purposes. Subject to the provisions of section 12-88, real property and its equipment owned by, or held in trust for, any religious organization and exclusively used as a school, a Connecticut nonprofit camp or recreational facility for religious purposes, a parish house, an orphan asylum, a home for children, a thrift shop, the proceeds of which are used for charitable purposes, a reformatory or an infirmary or for two or more of such purposes;

(15) Houses used by officiating clergymen as dwellings. Subject to the provisions of section 12-88, dwelling houses and the land on which they stand owned by, or held in trust for, any religious organization and actually used by its officiating clergymen . . .

(58) Property leased to a charitable, religious or nonprofit organization. Subject to authorization of the exemption by ordinance in any municipality, any real or personal property leased to a charitable, religious or nonprofit organization, exempt from taxation for federal income tax purposes, provided such property is used exclusively for the purposes of such charitable, religious or nonprofit organization.

Gen. Stat. § 12-88. When property otherwise taxable may be completely or partially exempted (1949)

Real property belonging to, or held in trust for, any organization mentioned in subdivision (7), (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), (16) or (18) of section 12-81, which real property is so held for one or more of the purposes stated in the applicable subdivision, and from which real property no rents, profits or income are derived, shall be exempt from taxation though not in actual use therefore by reason of the absence of suitable buildings and improvements thereon, if the construction of such buildings or improvements is in progress. The real property belonging to, or held in trust for, any such organization, not used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes but leased, rented or otherwise used for other purposes, shall not be exempt. If a portion only of any lot or building belonging to, or held in trust for, any such organization is used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes, such lot or building shall be so exempt only to the extent of the portion so used and the remaining portion shall be subject to taxation.

Code Ann. title 9, § 8105. Property owned by governmental, religious, educational or charitable agency (1995)

Property belonging to . . . ​any church or religious society, and not held by way of investment, or any college or school and used for educational or school purposes, except as otherwise provided, shall not be liable to taxation and assessment for public purposes by any county or other political subdivision of this State. Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to ditch taxes, sewer taxes and/or utility fees. Corporations created for charitable purposes and not held by way of investment that are in existence on July 14, 1988, together with existing and future charitable affiliates of such corporations that are also not held by way of investment, shall not be liable to taxation and assessment for public purposes by any county, municipality or other political subdivision of this State.

Stat. § 196.012. Definitions (2023)

(1) “Exempt use of property” or “use of property for exempt purposes” means predominant or exclusive use of property owned by an exempt entity for educational, literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes, as defined in this chapter.

Stat. § 196.192. Exemptions from ad valorem taxation (2008)

Subject to the provisions of this chapter:

(1) All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.

(2) All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use.

(3) All tangible personal property loaned or leased by a natural person, by a trust holding property for a natural person, or by an exempt entity to an exempt entity for public display or exhibition on a recurrent schedule is exempt from ad valorem taxation if the property is loaned or leased for no consideration or for nominal consideration. For purposes of this section, each use to which the property is being put must be considered in granting an exemption from ad valorem taxation, including any economic use in addition to any physical use. For purposes of this section, property owned by a limited liability company, the sole member of which is an exempt entity, shall be treated as if the property were owned directly by the exempt entity. This section does not apply in determining the exemption for property owned by governmental units pursuant to section 196.199.

Stat. § 196.195. Criteria for determining profit or nonprofit status of applicant (2000)

(1) Applicants requesting exemption shall supply such fiscal and other records showing in reasonable detail the financial condition, record of operation, and exempt and nonexempt uses of the property, where appropriate, for the immediately preceding fiscal year as are requested by the property appraiser or the value adjustment board.

(2) In determining whether an applicant for a religious, literary, scientific, or charitable exemption under this chapter is a nonprofit or profit-making venture or whether the property is used for a profit making purpose, the following criteria shall be applied: (a) The reasonableness of any advances or payment directly or indirectly by way of salary, fee, loan, gift, bonus, gratuity, drawing account, commission, or otherwise (except for reimbursements of advances for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred on behalf of the applicant) to any person, company, or other entity directly or indirectly controlled by the applicant or any officer, director, trustee, member, or stockholder of the applicant; (b) The reasonableness of any guaranty of a loan to, or an obligation of, any officer, director, trustee, member, or stockholder of the applicant or any entity directly or indirectly controlled by such person, or which pays any compensation to its officers, directors, trustees, members, or stockholders for services rendered to or on behalf of the applicant; (c) The reasonableness of any contractual arrangement by the applicant or any officer, director, trustee, member, or stockholder of the applicant regarding rendition of services, the provision of goods or supplies, the management of the applicant, the construction or renovation of the property of the applicant, the procurement of the real, personal, or intangible property of the applicant, or other similar financial interest in the affairs of the applicant; (d) The reasonableness of payments made for salaries for the operation of the applicant or for services, supplies and materials used by the applicant, reserves for repair, replacement, and depreciation of the property of the applicant, payment of mortgages, liens, and encumbrances upon the property of the applicant, or other purposes; and (e) The reasonableness of charges made by the applicant for any services rendered by it in relation to the value of those services, and, if such charges exceed the value of the services rendered, whether the excess is used to pay maintenance and operational expenses in furthering its exempt purpose or to provide services to persons unable to pay for the services.

(3) Each applicant must affirmatively show that no part of the subject property, or the proceeds of the sale, lease, or other disposition thereof, will inure to the benefit of its members, directors, or officers or any person or firm operating for profit or for a nonexempt purpose.

(4) No application for exemption may be granted for religious, literary, scientific, or charitable use of property until the applicant has been found by the property appraiser or, upon appeal, by the value adjustment board to be nonprofit as defined in this section.

Stat. § 196.196 Determining whether property is entitled to charitable, religious, scientific, or literary exemption (2023)

(1) In the determination of whether an applicant is actually using all or a portion of its property predominantly for a charitable, religious, scientific, or literary purpose, the following criteria shall be applied:

(a) The nature and extent of the charitable, religious, scientific, or literary activity of the applicant, a comparison of such activities with all other activities of the organization, and the utilization of the property for charitable, religious, scientific, or literary activities as compared with other uses.

(b) The extent to which the property has been made available to groups who perform exempt purposes at a charge that is equal to or less than the cost of providing the facilities for their use. Such rental or service shall be considered as part of the exempt purposes of the applicant.

(2) Only those portions of property used predominantly for charitable, religious, scientific, or literary purposes shall be exempt. In no event shall an incidental use of property either qualify such property for an exemption or impair the exemption of an otherwise exempt property.

(3) Property owned by an exempt organization is used for a religious purpose if the institution has taken affirmative steps to prepare the property for use as a house of public worship. The term “affirmative steps” means environmental or land use permitting activities, creation of architectural plans or schematic drawings, land clearing or site preparation, construction or renovation activities, or other similar activities that demonstrate a commitment of the property to a religious use as a house of public worship. For purposes of this subsection, the term “public worship” means religious worship services and those other activities that are incidental to religious worship services, such as educational activities, parking, recreation, partaking of meals, and fellowship.

(4) Except as otherwise provided herein, property claimed as exempt for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes which is used for profitmaking purposes shall be subject to ad valorem taxation. Use of property for functions not requiring a business or occupational license conducted by the organization at its primary residence, the revenue of which is used wholly for exempt purposes, shall not be considered profit making. In this connection the playing of bingo on such property shall not be considered as using such property in such a manner as would impair its exempt status.

(5)(a) Property owned by an exempt organization qualified as charitable under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is used for a charitable purpose if the organization has taken affirmative steps to prepare the property to provide affordable housing to persons or families that meet the extremely-low-income, very-low-income, low-income, or moderate-income limits, as specified in section 420.0004. The term “affirmative steps” means environmental or land use permitting activities, creation of architectural plans or schematic drawings, land clearing or site preparation, construction or renovation activities, or other similar activities that demonstrate a commitment of the property to providing affordable housing.

(b) 1. If property owned by an organization granted an exemption under this subsection is transferred for a purpose other than directly providing affordable homeownership or rental housing to persons or families who meet the extremely-low-income, very-low-income, low-income, or moderate-income limits, as specified in section 420.0004, or is not in actual use to provide such affordable housing within 5 years after the date the organization is granted the exemption, the property appraiser making such determination shall serve upon the organization that illegally or improperly received the exemption a notice of intent to record in the public records of the county a notice of tax lien against any property owned by that organization in the county, and such property shall be identified in the notice of tax lien. The organization owning such property is subject to the taxes otherwise due and owing as a result of the failure to use the property to provide affordable housing plus 15 percent interest per annum and a penalty of 50 percent of the taxes owed.

2. Such lien, when filed, attaches to any property identified in the notice of tax lien owned by the organization that illegally or improperly received the exemption. If such organization no longer owns property in the county but owns property in any other county in the state, the property appraiser shall record in each such other county a notice of tax lien identifying the property owned by such organization in such county which shall become a lien against the identified property. Before any such lien may be filed, the organization so notified must be given 30 days to pay the taxes, penalties, and interest.

3. If an exemption is improperly granted as a result of a clerical mistake or an omission by the property appraiser, the organization improperly receiving the exemption shall not be assessed a penalty or interest.

4. The 5-year limitation specified in this subsection may be extended if the holder of the exemption continues to take affirmative steps to develop the property for the purposes specified in this subsection.

Code § 48-5-41. Property exempt from taxation (2024)

(a) The following property shall be exempt from all ad valorem property taxes in this state . . . ​(2.1)(A) All places of religious worship; and (B) All property owned by and operated exclusively as a church, an association or convention of churches, a convention mission agency, or as an integrated auxiliary of a church or convention or association of churches, when such entity is qualified as an exempt religious organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and such property is used in a manner consistent with such exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; (3) All property owned by religious groups and used only for single-family residences when no income is derived from the property. . . .

(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, this Code section, excluding paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section, shall not apply to real estate or buildings which are rented, leased, or otherwise used for the primary purpose of securing an income thereon and shall not apply to real estate or buildings which are not used for the operation of religious, educational, and charitable institutions. Donations of property to be exempted shall not be predicated upon an agreement, contract, or other instrument that the donor or donors shall receive or retain any part of the net or gross income of the property.

(2) With respect to paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section, a building which is owned by a charitable institution that is otherwise qualified as a purely public charity and that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and which building is used by such charitable institution exclusively for the charitable purposes of such charitable institution, and not more than 15 acres of land on which such building is located, may be used for the purpose of securing income so long as such income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution.

HAWAII The Hawaii legislature concluded that article VIII, section 3, of the state constitution provides that the taxation of real property in the state has been transferred to the several counties. Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Hawaii’s decision in State ex Anzai v. City & County of Honolulu, 57 P.3d 433 (2002), the need for numerous provisions in the Hawaii Revised Statutes governing the taxation of real property in the State lapsed decades ago, and those provisions are no longer of any force or effect.

Code § 63-602B. Property exempt from taxation—religious corporations or societies (2008)

(1) The following property is exempt from taxation: property belonging to any religious limited liability company, corporation or society of this state, used exclusively for and in connection with any combination of religious, educational, or recreational purposes or activities of such religious limited liability company, corporation or society, including any and all residences used for or in furtherance of such purposes.

(2) If the entirety of any property belonging to any such religious limited liability company, corporation or society is leased by such owner, or if such religious limited liability company, corporation or society uses the entirety of such property for business or commercial purposes from which a revenue is derived, then the same shall be assessed and taxed as any other property. If any such property is leased in part or used in part by such religious limited liability company, corporation or society for such business or commercial purposes, the assessor shall determine the value of the entire exempt property, and the value of the part used or leased for such business or commercial purposes, and that part used or leased for such business or commercial purposes shall be taxed as any other property. The Idaho state tax commission shall promulgate rules establishing a method of determining the value of the part used or leased for such business or commercial purposes. If the value of the part used or leased for such business or commercial purposes is determined to be three percent (3%) or less of the value of the entirety, the whole of said property shall remain exempt. If the value of the part used or leased for such business or commercial purposes is determined to be more than three percent (3%) of the value of the entirety, the assessor shall assess such proportionate part of such property, and shall assess the trade fixtures used in connection with the sale of all merchandise for such business or commercial purposes, provided however, that the use or lease of any property by any such religious limited liability company, corporation or society for athletic or recreational facilities, residence halls or dormitories, meeting rooms or halls, auditoriums, or club rooms for and in connection with the purposes for which such religious limited liability company, corporation or society is organized, shall not be deemed a business or commercial purpose, even though fees or charges be imposed and revenue derived therefrom.

35 Compiled Statutes 200 / 15-40. Religious purposes, orphanages, or school and religious purposes (2024)

(a) Property used exclusively for: (1) religious purposes, or (2) school and religious purposes, or (3) orphanages qualifies for exemption as long as it is not used with a view to profit.

(b) Property that is owned by (1) churches or (2) religious institutions or (3) religious denominations and that is used in conjunction therewith as housing facilities provided for ministers (including bishops, district superintendents and similar church officials whose ministerial duties are not limited to a single congregation), their spouses, children and domestic workers, performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or religious institutions or for such religious denominations, including the convents and monasteries where persons engaged in religious activities reside also qualifies for exemption.

A parsonage, convent or monastery or other housing facility shall be considered under this Section to be exclusively used for religious purposes when the persons who perform religious related activities shall, as a condition of their employment or association, reside in the facility.

Code § 6-1.1-10-16. Buildings and land used for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes (2018)

(a) All or part of a building is exempt from property taxation if it is owned, occupied, and used by a person for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes. . . .

(c) A tract of land . . . ​is exempt from property taxation if: (1) a building that is exempt under subsection (a) or (b) is situated on it; (2) a parking lot or structure that serves a building referred to in subdivision (1) is situated on it; or (3) the tract: (A) is owned by a nonprofit entity established for the purpose of retaining and preserving land and water for their natural characteristics; (B) does not exceed five hundred (500) acres; and (C) is not used by the nonprofit entity to make a profit.

(d) A tract of land is exempt from property taxation if:

(1) it is purchased for the purpose of erecting a building that is to be owned, occupied, and used in such a manner that the building will be exempt under subsection (a) or (b); and

(2) not more than four (4) years after the property is purchased, and for each year after the four (4) year period, the owner demonstrates substantial progress and active pursuit towards the erection of the intended building and use of the tract for the exempt purpose. To establish substantial progress and active pursuit under this subdivision, the owner must prove the existence of factors such as the following:

(A) Organization of and activity by a building committee or other oversight group.

(B) Completion and filing of building plans with the appropriate local government authority.

(C) Cash reserves dedicated to the project of a sufficient amount to lead a reasonable individual to believe the actual construction can and will begin within four (4) years.

(D) The breaking of ground and the beginning of actual construction.

(E) Any other factor that would lead a reasonable individual to believe that construction of the building is an active plan and that the building is capable of being completed within eight (8) years considering the circumstances of the owner. . . .

(e) Personal property is exempt from property taxation if it is owned and used in such a manner that it would be exempt under subsection (a) or (b) if it were a building.

Code § 427.1. Exemptions (2021)

The following classes of property shall not be taxed . . . ​8. Property of religious, literary, and charitable societies. All grounds and buildings used or under construction by . . . ​religious institutions and societies solely for their appropriate objects, not exceeding three hundred twenty acres in extent and not leased or otherwise used or under construction with a view to pecuniary profit.

Stat. Ann. § 79-201. Property exempt from taxation; religious, educational, literary, scientific, benevolent, alumni association, veterans’ organization or charitable purposes; parsonages; community service organizations providing humanitarian services (2015)

The following described property, to the extent herein specified, shall be and is hereby exempt from all property or ad valorem taxes levied under the laws of the state of Kansas:

First. All buildings used exclusively as places of public worship . . . ​with the furniture and books therein contained and used exclusively for the accommodation of religious meetings . . . ​together with the grounds owned thereby if not leased or otherwise used for the realization of profit, except that . . . ​(b) any building, or portion thereof, used as a place of worship, together with the grounds upon which the building is located, shall be considered to be used exclusively for the religious purposes of this section when used as a not-for-profit day care center for children which is licensed pursuant to K.S.A. 65-501 et seq., and amendments thereto, or when used to house an area where the congregation of a church society and others may purchase tracts, books and other items relating to the promulgation of the church society’s religious doctrines.

Second. All real property, and all tangible personal property, actually and regularly used exclusively for . . . ​religious, benevolent or charitable purposes, including property used exclusively for such purposes by more than one agency or organization for one or more of such exempt purposes. Except with regard to real property which is owned by a religious organization, is to be used exclusively for religious purposes and is not used for a nonexempt purpose prior to its exclusive use for religious purposes which property shall be deemed to be actually and regularly used exclusively for religious purposes for the purposes of this paragraph, this exemption shall not apply to such property, not actually used or occupied for the purposes set forth herein, nor to such property held or used as an investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for such . . . ​religious, benevolent or charitable purposes. In the event any such property which has been exempted pursuant to the preceding sentence is not used for religious purposes prior to its conveyance which results in its use for nonreligious purposes, there shall be a recoupment of property taxes in an amount equal to the tax which would have been levied upon such property except for such exemption for all taxable years for which such exemption was in effect. . . . ​This exemption shall not be deemed inapplicable to property which would otherwise be exempt pursuant to this paragraph because an agency or organization: (a) Is reimbursed for the provision of services accomplishing the purposes enumerated in this paragraph based upon the ability to pay by the recipient of such services; or (b) is reimbursed for the actual expense of using such property for purposes enumerated in this paragraph; or (c) uses such property for a nonexempt purpose which is minimal in scope and insubstantial in nature if such use is incidental to the exempt purposes of this paragraph; (d) charges a reasonable fee for admission to cultural or educational activities or permits the use of its property for such activities by a related agency or organization, if any such activity is in furtherance of the purposes of this paragraph; or (e) is applying for an exemption pursuant to this paragraph for a motor vehicle that is being leased for a period of at least one year. . . .

Seventh. All parsonages owned by a church society and actually and regularly occupied and used predominantly as a residence by a minister or other clergyman of such church society who is actually and regularly engaged in conducting the services and religious ministrations of such society, and the land upon which such parsonage is located to the extent necessary for the accommodation of such parsonage. . . .

Tenth. For all taxable years commencing after December 31, 1986, any building, and the land upon which such building is located to the extent necessary for the accommodation of such building, owned by a church or nonprofit religious society or order which is exempt from federal income taxation pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the federal internal revenue code of 1986, and actually and regularly occupied and used exclusively for residential and religious purposes by a community of persons who are bound by vows to a religious life and who conduct or assist in the conduct of religious services and actually and regularly engage in religious, benevolent, charitable or educational ministrations or the performance of health care services.

Const. § 170. Property exempt from taxation (1998)

There shall be exempt from taxation . . . ​real property owned and occupied by, and personal property both tangible and intangible owned by, institutions of religion.

Const. Art. 7, § 21. Other property exemptions (2024)

In addition to the homestead exemption provided for in Section 20 of this Article, the following property and no other shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation . . . ​(B)(1)(a)(i) Property owned by a nonprofit corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, dedicated places of burial, charitable, health, welfare, fraternal, or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or member thereof and which is declared to be exempt from federal or state income tax. . . . ​None of the property listed in Paragraph (B) shall be exempt if owned, operated, leased, or used for commercial purposes unrelated to the exempt purposes of the corporation or association.

Rev. Stat. Ann. title 36, § 652. Property of institutions and organizations (2023)

1. Property of institutions and organizations. The property of institutions and organizations is exempt from taxation as provided in this subsection.

G. Houses of religious worship, including vestries, and the pews and furniture within them; tombs and rights of burial; and property owned and used by a religious society as a parsonage up to the value of $20,000, and personal property not exceeding $6,000 in value are exempt from taxation, except that any portion of a parsonage that is rented is subject to taxation. For purposes of this paragraph, “parsonage” means the principal residence provided by a religious society for its cleric whether or not the principal residence is located within the same municipality as the house of religious worship where the cleric regularly conducts religious services.

H. Real estate and personal property owned by or held in trust for fraternal organizations, except college fraternities, operating under the lodge system that are used solely by those fraternal organizations for meetings, ceremonials or religious or moral instruction, including all facilities that are appurtenant to that property and used in connection with those purposes are exempt from taxation. If a building is used in part for those purposes and in part for any other purpose, only the part used for those purposes is exempt.

Further conditions to the right of exemption under this paragraph are that:

(1) A director, trustee, officer or employee of any organization claiming exemption may not receive directly or indirectly any pecuniary profit from the operation of that organization, except as reasonable compensation for services in effecting its purposes or as a proper beneficiary of its purposes;

(2) All profits derived from the operation of the organization and the proceeds from the sale of its property must be devoted exclusively to the purposes for which it is organized; and

(3) The institution, organization or corporation claiming exemption under this paragraph must file with the assessors upon their request a report for its preceding fiscal year in such detail as the assessors may reasonably require.

Tax-Property Code § 7-204. Religious groups or organizations (2014)

Property that is owned by a religious group or organization is not subject to property tax if the property is actually used exclusively for: (1) public religious worship; (2) a parsonage or convent; or (3) educational purposes.

Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 59, § 5. Persons and property exempt from taxation (2022)

Tenth, Personal property owned by or held in trust within the commonwealth for religious organizations, whether or not incorporated, if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes.

Eleventh, Notwithstanding the provisions of any other general or special law to the contrary, houses of religious worship owned by, or held in trust for the use of, any religious organization, and the pews and furniture and each parsonage so owned, or held in irrevocable trust, for the exclusive benefit of the religious organizations, and including the official residences occupied by district superintendents of the United Methodist Church and the Christian and Missionary Alliance and of the Church of the Nazarene, and by district executives of the Southern New England District of the Assemblies of God, Inc., Unitarian-Universalist Churches and the Baptist General Conference of New England, and the official residence occupied by the president of the New England Synod of the Lutheran Church in America, Inc., and the official residence occupied by a person who has been designated by the congregation of a Hebrew Synagogue or Temple as the rabbi thereof, but such exemption shall not, except as herein provided, extend to any portion of any such house of religious worship appropriated for purposes other than religious worship or instruction. The occasional or incidental use of such property by an organization exempt from taxation under the provisions of 26 USC Sec. 501(c)(3) of the federal Internal Revenue Code shall not be deemed to be an appropriation for purposes other than religious worship or instruction.

Comp. Laws § 211.7s. Houses of public worship, parsonages (1980)

Houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and any parsonage owned by a religious society of this state and occupied as a parsonage are exempt from taxation under this act. Houses of public worship includes buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society.

Stat. § 272.02.6. Exempt property (2023)

All property described in this section to the extent limited in this section shall be exempt from taxation. . . . ​6. All churches, church property, and houses of worship are exempt.

Stat. § 317A.909. Nonprofit Corporations—Special Provisions (2009)

(3) Except for property leased or used for profit, personal and real property that a religious corporation necessarily uses for a religious purpose is exempt from taxation.

Code Ann. § 27-31-1. What property exempt (2024)

The following shall be exempt from taxation . . . ​(d) All property, real or personal, belonging to any religious society, or ecclesiastical body, or any congregation thereof, or to any charitable society . . . ​and used exclusively for such society or association and not for profit; not exceeding, however, the amount of land which such association or society may own as provided in Section 79-11-33 [see below].

Code Ann. § 79-11-33. Religious organizations, property permitted (1978)

Any religious society, ecclesiastical body and/or any congregation thereof may hold and own the following real property, but no other, viz.:

(a) Each house or building used as a place of worship, with a reasonable quantity of ground annexed to such building or house.

(b) Each house or building, together with a reasonable quantity of ground thereto annexed, used: (i) As a parish house; (ii) As a community facility; (iii) As a Sunday school facility; (iv) As an educational facility; (v) For the care of children on a nonprofit basis.

(c) Each house used for a place of residence for its minister, bishop or representative, together with a reasonable quantity of ground thereto annexed. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “minister” shall mean a minister, priest, pastor, rabbi, nun or other clergy who: (i) has been duly ordained, licensed or qualified according to the principles and procedures prescribed by his religious society, (ii) is regularly engaged as a vocation in preaching and teaching the beliefs of his religious society, in administering its rites and sacraments, and in conducting public worship services in the tradition of his religious society, and (iii) who discharges the duties of a minister in the tradition of his religious society. . . .

(e) All buildings used by a school, college or seminary of learning contiguous to and/or a part of the college or seminary plant, for administration, classrooms, laboratories, observatories, dormitories, and for housing the faculty and students thereof, together with a reasonable quantity of land in connection therewith. . . .

(g) All buildings used for a campground or assembly for religious purposes, together with a reasonable quantity of land in connection therewith. . . .

(i) All buildings and grounds used for denominational headquarters and/or administrative purposes, together with a reasonable quantity of ground annexed thereto. The title to any buildings and grounds heretofore acquired under this subsection shall not be hereafter held invalid because of the lack of authority of the owner thereof to obtain or hold such title. Provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection shall not affect any pending litigation.

(j) Any land which is maintained and used as a parking area for the convenience of the members of the congregation, church, cathedral, mission or other unit or administrative unit from which the society receives no revenue, fee, charge or assessment. The land on which the parking area is located may be noncontiguous to the land on which the building used as the place of worship is located.

Rev. Stat. § 137.100. Certain property exempt from taxes (2013)

The following subjects are exempt from taxation for state, county or local purposes . . . ​(5) All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship . . . ​and not held for private or corporate profit, except that the exemption herein granted does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious, educational or charitable purposes.

Code Ann. § 15-6-201. Exempt categories (2017)

(1) The following categories of property are exempt from taxation . . . ​(b) buildings and furnishings in the buildings that are owned by a church and used for actual religious worship or for residences of the clergy, not to exceed one residence for each member of the clergy, together with the land that the buildings occupy and adjacent land reasonably necessary for convenient use of the buildings, which must be identified in the application, and all land and improvements used for educational or youth recreational activities if the facilities are generally available for use by the general public but may not exceed 15 acres for a church or 1 acre for a clergy residence after subtracting any area required by zoning, building codes, or subdivision requirements;

(2)(b) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), the term “clergy” means, as recognized under the federal Internal Revenue Code: (i) an ordained minister, priest, or rabbi; (ii) a commissioned or licensed minister of a church or church denomination that ordains ministers if the person has the authority to perform substantially all the religious duties of the church or denomination; (iii) a member of a religious order who has taken a vow of poverty; or (iv) a Christian Science practitioner.

Rev. Stat. § 77-202. Property taxable; exemptions enumerated (2024)

(1) The following property shall be exempt from property taxes . . . ​(d) Property owned by educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organizations, or any organization for the exclusive benefit of any such educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organization, and used exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery purposes, when such property is not (i) owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user, (ii) used for the sale of alcoholic liquors for more than twenty hours per week, or (iii) owned or used by an organization which discriminates in membership or employment based on race, color, or national origin.

Rev. Stat. § 361.125. Exemption of churches and chapels (2015)

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2 (a) churches, chapels, other than marriage chapels, and other buildings used for religious worship, with their furniture and equipment, and the lots of ground on which they stand, used therewith and necessary thereto; and (b) parcels of land used exclusively for worship, including, without limitation, both developed and undeveloped portions of a parcel, owned by some recognized religious society or corporation, and parsonages so owned, are exempt from taxation.

2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 361.157, when any such property is used exclusively or in part for any other than church purposes, and a rent or other valuable consideration is received for its use, the property must be taxed.

3. The exemption provided by this section must be prorated for the portion of a fiscal year during which the religious society or corporation owns the real property. For the purposes of this subsection, ownership of property purchased begins on the date of recording of the deed to the purchaser.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72:23. Real estate and personal property tax exemption (2025)

The following real estate and personal property shall, unless otherwise provided by statute, be exempt from taxation. . . . ​III. Houses of public worship, parish houses, church parsonages occupied by their pastors, convents, monasteries, buildings and the lands appertaining to them owned, used and occupied directly for religious training or for other religious purposes by any regularly recognized and constituted denomination, creed or sect, organized, incorporated or legally doing business in this state and the personal property used by them for the purposes for which they are established.

Rev. Stat. § 54:4-3.6. Exemption of property of nonprofit organizations (2021)

The following property shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter: all buildings actually used for colleges, schools, academies or seminaries, provided that if any portion of such buildings are leased to profit-making organizations or otherwise used for purposes which are not themselves exempt from taxation, said portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be exempt; . . . ​all buildings actually used in the work of associations and corporations organized exclusively for religious purposes, including religious worship, or charitable purposes, provided that if any portion of a building used for that purpose is leased to a profit-making organization or is otherwise used for purposes which are not themselves exempt from taxation, that portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion shall be exempt from taxation, and provided further that if any portion of a building is used for a different exempt use by an exempt entity, that portion shall also be exempt from taxation; . . . ​the buildings, not exceeding two, actually occupied as a parsonage by the officiating clergymen of any religious corporation of this State, together with the accessory buildings located on the same premises; the land whereon any of the buildings hereinbefore mentioned are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, and which is devoted to the purposes above mentioned and to no other purpose and does not exceed five acres in extent; the furniture and personal property in said buildings if used in and devoted to the purposes above mentioned; . . . ​provided, in case of all the foregoing, the buildings, or the lands on which they stand, or the associations, corporations or institutions using and occupying them as aforesaid, are not conducted for profit, except that the exemption of the buildings and lands used for charitable, benevolent or religious purposes shall extend to cases where the charitable, benevolent or religious work therein carried on is supported partly by fees and charges received from or on behalf of beneficiaries using or occupying the buildings; provided the building is wholly controlled by and the entire income therefrom is used for said charitable, benevolent or religious purposes; and any tract of land purchased pursuant to subsection (n) of section 21 of P.L.1971, c. 199, and located within a city of the first, second, third or fourth class, actually used for the cultivation and sale of fresh fruits and vegetables and owned by a duly incorporated nonprofit organization or association which includes among its principal purposes the cultivation and sale of fresh fruits and vegetables, other than a political, partisan, sectarian, denominational or religious organization or association. The foregoing exemption shall apply only where the association, corporation or institution claiming the exemption owns the property in question and is incorporated or organized under the laws of this State and authorized to carry out the purposes on account of which the exemption is claimed. . . .

N.M. Const. Art. 8, § 3. [Tax-exempt property] (1972)

[A]ll church property not used for commercial purposes, all property used for educational or charitable purposes . . . ​shall be exempt from taxation. Provided, however, that any property acquired by . . . ​churches, property acquired and used for educational or charitable purposes . . . ​where such property was, prior to such transfer, subject to the lien of any tax or assessment or the principal or interest of any bonded indebtedness shall not be exempt from such lien, nor from the payment of such taxes or assessments.

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 420-a. Nonprofit organizations; mandatory class (2019)

1. (a) Real property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, or moral or mental improvement of men, women or children purposes, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or association or by another such corporation or association as hereinafter provided shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.

(b) Real property such as specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall not be exempt if any officer, member or employee of the owning corporation or association shall receive or may be lawfully entitled to receive any pecuniary profit from the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one or more of such purposes, or as proper beneficiaries of its strictly charitable purposes; or if the organization thereof for any such avowed purposes be a guise or pretense for directly or indirectly making any other pecuniary profit for such corporation or association or for any of its members or employees; or if it be not in good faith organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes.

2. If any portion of such real property is not so used exclusively to carry out thereupon one or more of such purposes but is leased or otherwise used for other purposes, such portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be exempt; provided, however, that such real property shall be fully exempt from taxation although it or a portion thereof is used (a) for purposes which are exempt pursuant to this section or sections 420-b, 422, 424, 426, 428, 430, or 450 of this chapter by another corporation which owns real property exempt from taxation pursuant to such sections or whose real property if it owned any would be exempt from taxation pursuant to such sections, (b) for purposes which are exempt pursuant to section 406 or section 408 of this chapter by a corporation which owns real property exempt from taxation pursuant to such section or if it owned any would be exempt from taxation pursuant to such section, (c) for purposes which are exempt pursuant to section 416 of this chapter by an organization which owns real property exempt from taxation pursuant to such section or whose real property if it owned any would be exempt from taxation pursuant to such section . . . ​and provided further that such real property shall be exempt from taxation only so long as it or a portion thereof, as the case may be, is devoted to such exempt purposes and so long as any moneys paid for such use do not exceed the amount of the carrying, maintenance and depreciation charges of the property or portion thereof, as the case may be.

3. Such real property from which no revenue is derived shall be exempt though not in actual use therefor by reason of the absence of suitable buildings or improvements thereon if (a) the construction of such buildings or improvements is in progress or is in good faith contemplated by such corporation or association or (b) such real property is held by such corporation or association upon condition that the title thereto shall revert in case any building not intended and suitable for one or more such purposes shall be erected upon such premises or some part thereof.

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 460. Clergy (2010)

(1) Real property owned by a minister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomination, an actual resident and inhabitant of this state, who is engaged in the work assigned by the church or denomination of which he or she is a member, or who is unable to perform such work due to impaired health or is over seventy years of age, and real property owned by his or her unremarried surviving spouse while an actual resident and inhabitant of this state, shall be exempt from taxation to the extent of fifteen hundred dollars.

(2) An exemption may be granted pursuant to this section only upon application by the owner of the property on a form prescribed or approved by the commissioner. The application shall be filed with the assessor of the appropriate county, city, town or village on or before the taxable status date of such county, city, town or village.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any other provision of law, in a city having a population of one million or more, applications for the exemption authorized pursuant to this section shall be considered timely filed if they are filed on or before the fifteenth day of March of the appropriate year.

N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 462. Religious corporations; property used for residential purposes (2010)

In addition to the exemption provided in section 420-a of this article, property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the officiating clergymen thereof for residential purposes shall be exempt from taxation. An exemption may be granted pursuant to this section only upon application by the owner of the property on a form prescribed or approved by the commissioner. The application shall be filed with the assessor of the appropriate county, city, town or village on or before the taxable status date of such county, city, town or village. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any other provision of law, in a city having a population of one million or more, applications for the exemption authorized pursuant to this section shall be considered timely filed if they are filed on or before the fifteenth day of March of the appropriate year.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-278.3. Real and personal property used for religious purposes (2015)

(a) Buildings, the land they actually occupy, and additional adjacent land reasonably necessary for the convenient use of any such building shall be exempted from taxation if wholly owned by an agency listed in subsection (c), below, and if:

(1) Wholly and exclusively used by its owner for religious purposes as defined in subsection (d)(1), below; or (2) Occupied gratuitously by one other than the owner and wholly and exclusively used by the occupant for religious, charitable, or nonprofit educational, literary, scientific, or cultural purposes.

(b) Personal property shall be exempted from taxation if wholly owned by an agency listed in subsection (c), below, and if:

(1) Wholly and exclusively used by its owner for religious purposes; or (2) Gratuitously made available to one other than the owner and wholly and exclusively used by the possessor for religious, charitable, or nonprofit educational, literary, scientific, or cultural purposes.

(c) The following agencies, when the other requirements of this section are met, may obtain exemption for their properties: (1) A congregation, parish, mission, or similar local unit of a church or religious body; or (2) A conference, association, presbytery, diocese, district, synod, or similar unit comprising local units of a church or religious body.

(d) Within the meaning of this section: (1) A religious purpose is one that pertains to practicing, teaching, and setting forth a religion. Although worship is the most common religious purpose, the term encompasses other activities that demonstrate and further the beliefs and objectives of a given church or religious body. Within the meaning of this section, the ownership and maintenance of a general or promotional office or headquarters by an owner listed in subdivision (2) of subsection (c), above, is a religious purpose and the ownership and maintenance of residences for clergy, rabbis, priests or nuns assigned to or serving a congregation, parish, mission or similar local unit, or a conference, association, presbytery, diocese, district, synod, province or similar unit of a church or religious body or residences for clergy on furlough or unassigned, is also a religious purpose. However, the ownership and maintenance of residences for other employees is not a religious purpose for either a local unit of a church or a religious body or a conference, association, presbytery, diocese, district, synod, or similar unit of a church or religious body. Provided, however, that where part of property which otherwise qualifies for the exemption provided herein is made available as a residence for an individual who provides guardian, janitorial and custodial services for such property, or who oversees and supervises qualifying activities upon and in connection with said property, the entire property shall be considered as wholly and exclusively used for a religious purpose. . . .

(f) The fact that a building or facility is incidentally available to and patronized by the general public, so long as there is no material amount of business or patronage with the general public, shall not defeat the exemption granted by this section.

(g) The following exceptions apply to the exclusive-use requirement of subsection (a) of this section:

(1) If part, but not all, of a property meets the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, the valuation of the part so used is exempt from taxation.

(2) Any parking lot wholly owned by an agency listed in subsection (c) of this section may be used for parking without removing the tax exemption granted in this section if the total charge for parking uses does not exceed that portion of the actual maintenance expenditures for the parking lot reasonably estimated to have been made on account of parking uses. This subsection shall apply beginning with the taxable year that commences on January 1, 1978.

(3) A building and the land occupied by the building is exempt from taxation if it is under construction and intended to be wholly and exclusively used by its owner for religious purposes upon completion. For purposes of this subdivision, a building is under construction starting when a building permit is issued and ending at the earlier of (i) 90 days after a certificate of occupancy is issued or (ii) 180 days after the end of active construction.

N.D. Cent. Code § 57-02-08. Property exempt from taxation (2023)

All property described in this section to the extent herein limited shall be exempt from taxation. . . .

6. All property belonging to schools, academies, colleges, or other institutions of learning, not otherwise used with a view to profit, and all dormitories and boarding halls, including the land upon which they are situated, owned and managed by any religious corporation for educational or charitable purposes for the use of students in attendance upon any educational institution, if such dormitories and boarding halls are not managed or used for the purpose of making a profit over and above the cost of maintenance and operation. . . .

8. All buildings belonging to institutions of public charity, including public hospitals and nursing homes licensed pursuant to section 23-16-01 under the control of religious or charitable institutions, used wholly or in part for public charity, together with the land actually occupied by such institutions not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.

a. The exemption provided by this subsection includes any dormitory, dwelling, or residential-type structure, together with necessary land on which such structure is located, owned by a religious or charitable organization recognized as tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue code which is occupied by members of said organization who are subject to a religious vow of poverty and devote and donate substantially all of their time to the religious or charitable activities of the owner.

b. For purposes of this subsection . . . ​property is not used wholly or in part for public charity or charitable or other public purposes if that property is residential rental units leased to tenants based on income levels that enable the owner to receive a federal low-income housing income tax credit.

9a. All buildings owned by any religious corporation or organization and used for the religious purposes of the organization, and if on the same parcel, dwellings with usual outbuildings, intended and ordinarily used for the residence of the bishop, priest, rector, or other minister in charge of services, land directly under and within the perimeter of those buildings, improved off-street parking or reasonable landscaping or sidewalk area adjoining the main church building, and up to a maximum of two additional acres [.81 hectare] must be deemed to be property used exclusively for religious purposes, and exempt from taxation, whether the real property consists of one tract or more. If the residence of the bishop, priest, rector, or other minister in charge of services is located on property not adjacent to the church, that residence with usual outbuildings and land on which it is located, up to two acres [.81 hectare], is exempt from taxation.

9b. The exemption for a building used for the religious purposes of the owner continues to be in effect if the building in whole, or in part, is rented to another otherwise tax-exempt corporation or organization, provided no profit is realized from the rent.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5709.07. Exemption of schools, churches, and colleges (2023)

(A) The following property shall be exempt from taxation . . . ​(2) Houses used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture in them, and the ground attached to them that is not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit and that is necessary for their proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment; (3) Real property owned and operated by a church that is used primarily for church retreats or church camping, and that is not used as a permanent residence. Real property exempted under division (A)(3) of this section may be made available by the church on a limited basis to charitable and educational institutions if the property is not leased or otherwise made available with a view to profit. . . .(D)(1) As used in this section, “church” means a fellowship of believers, congregation, society, corporation, convention, or association that is formed primarily or exclusively for religious purposes and that is not formed for the private profit of any person.

Okla. Stat. title 68, § 2887. Property exempt from ad valorem taxation (2023)

The following property shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation . . .

7. All property used exclusively and directly for fraternal or religious purposes within this state. For purposes of administering the exemption authorized by this section and in order to determine whether a single family residential property is used exclusively and directly for fraternal or religious purposes, the fair cash value of a single family residential property, for which an exemption is claimed as authorized by this subsection, in excess of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00) for the applicable assessment year shall not be exempt from taxation. . . .

11. All libraries and office equipment of ministers of the Gospel actively engaged in ministerial work in the State of Oklahoma, where said libraries and office equipment are being used by said ministers in their ministerial work, shall be deemed to be used exclusively for religious purposes and are declared to be within the meaning of the term “religious purposes” as used in Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 307.140. Property of religious organizations (2021)

Upon compliance with ORS 307.162, the following property owned or being purchased by religious organizations shall be exempt from taxation:

(1) All houses of public worship and other additional buildings and property used solely for administration, education, literary, benevolent, charitable, entertainment and recreational purposes by religious organizations, the lots on which they are situated, and the pews, slips and furniture therein. However, any part of any house of public worship or other additional buildings or property which is kept or used as a store or shop or for any purpose other than those stated in this section shall be assessed and taxed the same as other taxable property.

(2) Parking lots used for parking or any other use as long as that parking or other use is permitted without charge for no fewer than 355 days during the tax year.

(3) Land and the buildings thereon held or used solely for cemetery or crematory purposes, including any buildings solely used to store machinery or equipment used exclusively for maintenance of such lands.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 307.145 Certain child care facilities, schools and student housing (2013)

(1) If not otherwise exempt by law, upon compliance with ORS 307.162, the child care facilities, schools, academies and student housing accommodations, owned or being purchased by incorporated eleemosynary institutions or by incorporated religious organizations, used exclusively by such institutions or organizations for or in immediate connection with educational purposes, are exempt from taxation.

(2) Property described in subsection (1) of this section which is exclusively for or in the immediate connection with educational purposes shall continue to be exempt when leased to a political subdivision of the State of Oregon, or to another incorporated eleemosynary institution or incorporated religious organization for an amount not to exceed the cost of repairs, maintenance and upkeep.

(3)(a) As used in this section, “child care facility” means a child care center certified by the Office of Child Care under ORS 657A.280 to provide educational child care.

(b) Before an exemption for a child care facility is allowed under this section, in addition to any other information required under ORS 307.162, the statement shall:

(A) Describe the property and declare or be accompanied by proof that the corporation is an eleemosynary institution or religious organization.

(B) Declare or be accompanied by proof that the division has issued a certificate of approval to the child care facility to provide educational child care.

(C) Be signed by the taxpayer subject to the penalties for false swearing.

Pa. Stat. Ann. title 72, § 5020-204. Exemptions from taxation (1992)

(a) The following property shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town, township, road, poor and school tax, to wit: (1) All churches, meeting-houses, or other actual places of regularly stated religious worship, with the ground thereto annexed necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-3-3. Property exempt (2024)

The following property shall be exempt from taxation. . . . ​(5) Buildings for free public schools, buildings for religious worship, and the land upon which they stand and immediately surrounding them, to an extent not exceeding five (5) acres so far as the buildings and land are occupied and used exclusively for religious or educational purposes; (6) Dwellings houses and the land on which they stand, not exceeding one acre in size, or the minimum lot size for zone in which the dwelling house is located, whichever is the greater, owned by or held in trust for any religious organization and actually used by its officiating clergy; provided, further that in the town of Charlestown, where the property previously described in this paragraph is exempt in total, along with dwelling houses and the land on which they stand in Charlestown, not exceeding one acre in size, or the minimum lot size for zone in which the dwelling house is located, whichever is the greater, owned by or held in trust for any religious organization and actually used by its officiating clergy, or used as a convent, nunnery, or retreat center by its religious order. (7) Intangible personal property owned by, or held in trust for, any religious or charitable organization, if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious or charitable purposes. (8) Buildings and personal estate owned by any corporation used for a school, academy, or seminary of learning, and of any incorporated public charitable institution, and the land upon which the buildings stand and immediately surrounding them to an extent not exceeding one acre, so far as they are used exclusively for educational purposes, but no property or estate whatever is hereafter exempt from taxation in any case where any part of its income or profits or of the business carried on there is divided among its owners or stockholders.

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-220. General exemptions from taxes (2024)

(A) Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of Article X of the State Constitution and subject to the provisions of Section 12-4-720, there is exempt from ad valorem taxation . . . ​(3) all property of all public libraries, churches, parsonages, and burying grounds, but this exemption for real property does not extend beyond the buildings and premises actually occupied by the owners of the real property . . .

(B) In addition to the exemptions provided in subsection (A), the following classes of property are exempt from ad valorem taxation subject to the provisions of section 12-4-720 [pertaining to the filing of applications for recognition of exemption] . . .

(16)(a) The property of any religious, charitable, eleemosynary, educational, or literary society, corporation, or other association, when the property is used by it primarily for the holding of its meetings and the conduct of the business of the society, corporation, or association and no profit or benefit therefrom inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.

(16)(b) The property of any religious, charitable, or eleemosynary society, corporation, or other association when the property is acquired for the purpose of building or renovating residential structures on it for not-for-profit sale to economically disadvantaged persons. The total properties for which the religious, charitable, or eleemosynary society, corporation, or other association may claim this exemption in accordance with this paragraph may not exceed fifty acres per county within the State.

(16)(c) The exemption allowed pursuant to subitem (a) of this item extends to real property owned by an organization described in subitem (a) and which qualifies as a tax exempt organization pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), when the real property is held for a future use by the organization that would qualify for the exemption allowed pursuant to subitem (a) of this item or held for investment by the organization in sole pursuit of the organization’s exempt purposes and while held this real property is not rented or leased for a purpose unrelated to the exempt purposes of the organization and the use of the real property does not inure to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. Real property donated to the organization which receives the exemption allowed pursuant to this subitem is allowed the exemption for no more than three consecutive property tax years. If real property acquired by the organization by purchase receives the exemption allowed pursuant to this subitem and is subsequently sold without ever having been put to the exempt use, the exemption allowed pursuant to this subitem is deemed terminated as of December thirty-first preceding the year of sale and the property is subject to property tax for the year of sale to which must be added a recapture amount equal to the property tax that would have been due on the real property for not more than the four preceding years in which the real property received the exemption allowed pursuant to this subitem. The recapture amount is deemed property tax for all purposes for payment and collection.

S.D. Codified Laws § 10-4-9. Property owned by religious society and used exclusively for religious purposes exempt—Sale of property by religious society (1995)

Property owned by any religious society and used exclusively for religious purposes, is exempt from taxation. Property of a religious society is exempt from taxation if such property is a building or structure used exclusively for religious purposes, is a lot owned by a religious society for the exclusive purpose of parking vehicles owned by members of such society and is not rented or leased to nonmembers of such society, is an educational plant owned and operated by a religious society or is a building or structure used to house any cleric of a religious society. However, any property which is sold by a religious society under a contract for deed shall be taxed as other property of the same class, unless such property is sold to an entity which is exempt from taxation pursuant to this chapter and the property is used for an exempt purpose.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-212. Religious, charitable, scientific, educational institutions (2022)

(a)(1) There shall be exempt from property taxation the real and personal property, or any part of the real and personal property, owned by any religious, charitable, scientific, or nonprofit educational institution that is occupied and actually used by the institution or its officers purely and exclusively for carrying out one (1) or more of the exempt purposes for which the institution was created or exists. There shall further be exempt from property taxation the property, or any part of the property, owned by an exempt institution that is occupied and actually used by another exempt institution for one (1) or more of the exempt purposes for which it was created or exists under an arrangement:

(A) In which the owning institution receives no more rent than a reasonably allocated share of the cost of use, excluding the cost of capital improvements, debt service, depreciation, and interest, as determined by the state board of equalization; or

(B) Which is solely between exempt institutions that originated as part of a single exempt institution and that continue to use the property for the same religious, charitable, scientific, or nonprofit educational purposes, whether by charter, contract, or other agreement or arrangement.

(3)(A) The property of such institution shall not be exempt, if:

(i) The owner, or any stockholder, officer, member or employee of such institution shall receive or may be lawfully entitled to receive any pecuniary profit from the operations of that property in competition with like property owned by others that is not exempt, except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one (1) or more of such purposes, or as proper beneficiaries of its strictly religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes; or

(ii) The organization thereof for any such avowed purpose be a guise or pretense for directly or indirectly making any other pecuniary profit for such institution, or for any of its members or employees, or if it be not in good faith organized or conducted exclusively for one (1) or more of these purposes.

(B) The real property of any such institution not so used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one (1) or more of such purposes, but leased or otherwise used for other purposes, whether the income received therefrom be used for one (1) or more of such purposes or not, shall not be exempt; but, if a portion only of any lot or building of any such institution is used purely and exclusively for carrying out thereupon one (1) or more of such purposes of such institution, then such lot or building shall be so exempt only to the extent of the value of the portion so used, and the remaining or other portion shall be subject to taxation.

(4) No church shall be granted an exemption on more than one (1) parsonage, and an exempt parsonage may not include within the exemption more than three (3) acres.

(b)(1) Any owner of real or personal property claiming exemption under this section . . . ​shall file an application for the exemption with the state board of equalization on a form prescribed by the board, and supply such further information as the board may require to determine whether the property qualifies for exemption. No property shall be exempted from property taxes under these sections, unless the application has been approved in writing by the board. A separate application shall be filed for each parcel of property for which exemption is claimed. . . .

(3)(B) If a religious institution acquires property that was duly exempt at the time of transfer from a transferor who had previously been approved for a religious use exemption of the property, or if a religious institution acquires property to replace its own exempt property, then the effective date of exemption shall be three (3) years prior to the date of application, or the date the acquiring institution began to use the property for religious purposes, whichever is later. The purpose of this subdivision is to provide continuity of exempt status for property transferred from one exempt religious institution to another in the specified circumstances. For purposes of this subdivision, property transferred by a lender following foreclosure shall be deemed to have been transferred by the foreclosed debtor, whether or not the property was assessed in the name of the lender during the lender’s possession. . . .

(n) There shall be exempt from property taxation the real and personal property, or any part thereof, that is owned by a religious or charitable institution and that is occupied and used by such institution for a thrift shop; provided, that: (1) The institution is exempt from payment of federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code; (2)(A) The thrift shop is operated as a training venue for persons in need of occupational rehabilitation; or (B) The thrift shop is operated primarily by volunteers; (3) The inventory of the thrift shop is obtained by donation to the institution that owns and operates the shop; (4) Goods are priced at levels generally ascribed to used property; (5) Goods are given to persons whose financial situations preclude payment; and (6) The net proceeds of the thrift shop are used solely for the charitable purposes of the institution that owns and operates the shop.

(o) Land not necessary to support exempt structures or site improvements associated with exempt structures, including land used for recreation, retreats or sanctuaries, shall not be eligible for exemption beyond a maximum of one hundred (100) acres per county for each religious, charitable, scientific or nonprofit educational institution qualified for exemption pursuant to this section. For purposes of applying this limit, land owned by an exempt institution shall be aggregated with land owned by related exempt institutions having common ownership or control. Qualifying land in excess of the limit shall be classified as forest land upon application submitted pursuant to section 67-5-1006, or as open space land upon application submitted pursuant to section 67-5-1007, and the effective date of the classification shall be the date the property might otherwise have qualified for exemption.

Tex. Tax Code § 11.20. Religious organizations (2022)

(a) An organization that qualifies as a religious organization as provided by Subsection (c) is entitled to an exemption from taxation of:

(1) the real property that is owned by the religious organization, is used primarily as a place of regular religious worship, and is reasonably necessary for engaging in religious worship;

(2) the tangible personal property that is owned by the religious organization and is reasonably necessary for engaging in worship at the place of worship specified in Subdivision (1);

(3) the real property that is owned by the religious organization and is reasonably necessary for use as a residence (but not more than one acre of land for each residence) if the property: (A) is used exclusively as a residence for those individuals whose principal occupation is to serve in the clergy of the religious organization; and (B) produces no revenue for the religious organization;

(4) the tangible personal property that is owned by the religious organization and is reasonably necessary for use of the residence specified by Subdivision (3);

(5) the real property owned by the religious organization consisting of: (A) an incomplete improvement that is under active construction or other physical preparation and that is designed and intended to be used by the religious organization as a place of regular religious worship when complete; and (B) the land on which the incomplete improvement is located that will be reasonably necessary for the religious organization’s use of the improvement as a place of regular religious worship;

(6) the land that the religious organization owns for the purpose of expansion of the religious organization’s place of regular religious worship or construction of a new place of regular religious worship if: (A) the religious organization qualifies other property, including a portion of the same tract or parcel of land, owned by the organization for an exemption under Subdivision (1) or (5); and (B) the land produces no revenue for the religious organization; and

(7) the real property owned by the religious organization that is leased to another person and used by that person for the operation of a school that qualifies as a school under section 11.21(d).

(b) An organization that qualifies as a religious organization as provided by Subsection (c) of this section is entitled to an exemption from taxation of those endowment funds the organization owns that are used exclusively for the support of the religious organization and are invested exclusively in bonds, mortgages, or property purchased at a foreclosure sale for the purpose of satisfying or protecting the bonds or mortgages. However, foreclosure-sale property that is held by an endowment fund for longer than the two-year period immediately following purchase at the foreclosure sale is not exempt from taxation.

(c) To qualify as a religious organization for the purposes of this section, an organization (whether operated by an individual, as a corporation, or as an association) must:

(1) be organized and operated primarily for the purpose of engaging in religious worship or promoting the spiritual development or well-being of individuals;

(2) be operated in a way that does not result in accrual of distributable profits, realization of private gain resulting from payment of compensation in excess of a reasonable allowance for salary or other compensation for services rendered, or realization of any other form of private gain;

(3) use its assets in performing the organization’s religious functions or the religious functions of another religious organization; and

(4) by charter, bylaw, or other regulation adopted by the organization to govern its affairs direct that on discontinuance of the organization by dissolution or otherwise the assets are to be transferred to this state, the United States, or a charitable, educational, religious, or other similar organization that is qualified as a charitable organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

(d) Use of property that qualifies for the exemption prescribed by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) or by Subsection (h)(1) for occasional secular purposes other than religious worship does not result in loss of the exemption if the primary use of the property is for religious worship and all income from the other use is devoted exclusively to the maintenance and development of the property as a place of religious worship.

(e) For the purposes of this section, “religious worship” means individual or group ceremony or meditation, education, and fellowship, the purpose of which is to manifest or develop reverence, homage, and commitment in behalf of a religious faith.

(f) A property may not be exempted under Subsection (a)(5) for more than three years.

(g) For purposes of Subsection (a)(5), an incomplete improvement is under physical preparation if the religious organization has engaged in architectural or engineering work, soil testing, land clearing activities, or site improvement work necessary for the construction of the improvement or has conducted an environmental or land use study relating to the construction of the improvement.

(h) Property owned by this state or a political subdivision of this state, including a leasehold or other possessory interest in the property, that is held or occupied by an organization that qualifies as a religious organization as provided by Subsection (c) is entitled to an exemption from taxation if the property: (1) is used by the organization primarily as a place of regular religious worship and is reasonably necessary for engaging in religious worship; or (2) meets the qualifications for an exemption under Subsection (a)(5).

(i) For purposes of the exemption provided by Subsection (h), the religious organization may apply for the exemption and take other action relating to the exemption as if the organization owned the property.

(j) A tract of land that is contiguous to the tract of land on which the religious organization’s place of regular religious worship is located may not be exempted under Subsection (a)(6) for more than six years. A tract of land that is not contiguous to the tract of land on which the religious organization’s place of regular religious worship is located may not be exempted under Subsection (a)(6) for more than three years. For purposes of this subsection, a tract of land is considered to be contiguous with another tract of land if the tracts are divided only by a road, railroad track, river, or stream.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101. Exemption of certain property—Proportional payments for certain property—County legislative body authority to adopt rules or ordinances (2024)

(3)(a) The following property is exempt from taxation . . . ​(iv) property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.

Vt. Stat. Ann. title 32, § 3802. Property tax (2024)

The following property shall be exempt from taxation . . . ​(4) Real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or charitable uses; real property owned by churches or church societies or conferences and used as parsonages and personal property therein used by ministers engaged in full time work in the care of the churches of their fellowship within the state.

Va. Code § 58.1-3606. Property exempt from taxation by classification (2014)

A. Pursuant to the authority granted in Article X, Section 6(a)(6) of the Constitution of Virginia to exempt property from taxation by classification, the following classes of real and personal property shall be exempt from taxation . . . ​2. Real property and personal property owned by churches or religious bodies, including (i) an incorporated church or religious body and (ii) a corporation mentioned in section 57-16.1 [pertaining to unincorporated churches] and exclusively occupied or used for religious worship or for the residence of the minister of any church or religious body, and such additional adjacent land reasonably necessary for the convenient use of any such property. Real property exclusively used for religious worship shall also include the following: (a) property used for outdoor worship activities; (b) property used for ancillary and accessory purposes as allowed under the local zoning ordinance, the dominant purpose of which is to support or augment the principal religious worship use; and (c) property used as required by federal, state, or local law.

Wash. Rev. Code § 84.36.020. Cemeteries, churches, parsonages, convents, and grounds (2022)

The following real and personal property is exempt from taxation:

(1) All lands, buildings, and personal property required for necessary administration and maintenance, used, or to the extent used, exclusively for public burying grounds or cemeteries without discrimination as to race, color, national origin or ancestry;

(2) All churches, personal property, and the ground, not exceeding five acres in area, upon which a church of any nonprofit recognized religious denomination is or will be built, together with a parsonage, convent, and buildings and improvements required for the maintenance and safeguarding of such property. The area exempted in any case includes all ground covered by the church, parsonage, convent, and buildings and improvements required for the maintenance and safeguarding of such property and the structures and ground necessary for street access, parking, light, and ventilation, but the area of unoccupied ground exempted in such cases, in connection with church, parsonage, convent, and buildings and improvements required for the maintenance and safeguarding of such property, does not exceed the equivalent of one hundred twenty by one hundred twenty feet except where additional unoccupied land may be required to conform with state or local codes, zoning, or licensing requirements. The parsonage and convent need not be on land contiguous to the church property. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, to be exempt the property must be wholly used for church purposes. The loan or rental of property otherwise exempt under this subsection to a nonprofit organization, association, or corporation, or school for use for an eleemosynary activity or for use for activities related to a farmers market, does not nullify the exemption provided in this subsection if the rental income, if any, is reasonable and is devoted solely to the operation and maintenance of the property. However, activities related to a farmers market may not occur on the property more than fifty-three days each assessment year. For the purposes of this section, “farmers market” has the same meaning as “qualifying farmers market” as defined in RCW 66.24.170.

Wash. Rev. Code § 84.36.032. Administrative offices of nonprofit religious organizations (2014)

The real and personal property of the administrative offices of nonprofit recognized religious organizations shall be exempt to the extent that the property is used for the administration of the religious programs of the organization and such other programs as would be exempt under RCW 84.36.020 and 84.36.030 as now or hereafter amended. The provisions of RCW 84.36.020(2)(b) apply to this section.

W. Va. Code § 11-3-9. Property exempt from taxation (2023)

(a) All property, real and personal, described in this subsection, and to the extent herein limited, is exempt from taxation . . . ​(5) Property used exclusively for divine worship; (6) Parsonages and the household goods and furniture pertaining thereto; (7) Mortgages, bonds and other evidence of indebtedness in the hands of bona fide owners and holders hereafter issued and sold by churches and religious societies for the purposes of securing money to be used in the erection of church buildings used exclusively for divine worship, or for the purpose of paying indebtedness thereon; (8) Cemeteries. . . .

(d) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, this section does not exempt from taxation any property owned by, or held in trust for, educational . . . ​religious or other charitable corporations or organizations . . . ​unless such property, or the dividends, interest, rents or royalties derived therefrom, is used primarily and immediately for the purposes of the corporations or organizations.

Wis. Stat. § 70.11. Property exempted from taxation (2023)

The property described in this section is exempted from general property taxes. . . . ​Leasing a part of the property described in this section does not render it taxable if the lessor uses all of the leasehold income for maintenance of the leased property, construction debt retirement of the leased property or both and if the lessee would be exempt from taxation under this chapter if it owned the property. Any lessor who claims that leased property is exempt from taxation under this chapter shall, upon request by the tax assessor, provide records relating to the lessor’s use of the income from the leased property. Property exempted from general property taxes is . . .

(4)(a)(1) Property owned and used exclusively by educational institutions offering regular courses 6 months in the year; or by churches or religious, educational or benevolent associations, including benevolent nursing homes and retirement homes for the aged, and also including property owned and used for housing for pastors and their ordained assistants, members of religious orders and communities, and ordained teachers, whether or not contiguous to and a part of other property owned and used by such associations or churches. . . . ​but not exceeding 10 acres of land necessary for location and convenience of buildings while such property is not used for profit. Property owned by churches or religious associations necessary for location and convenience of buildings, used for educational purposes and not for profit, shall not be subject to the 10-acre limitation but shall be subject to a 30-acre limitation. Property that is exempt from taxation under this subsection and is leased remains exempt from taxation only if, in addition to the requirements specified in the introductory phrase of this section, the lessee does not discriminate on the basis of race. . . . ​(11) All real property not exceeding 30 acres and the personal property situated therein, of any Bible camp conducted by a religious nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of this state, so long as the property is used for religious purposes and not for pecuniary profit of any individual.

2. For purposes of subd. 1., beginning with the property tax assessments as of January 1, 2018, property owned by a church or religious association necessary for location and convenience of buildings includes property necessary for the location and convenience of a building that the church or religious association intends to construct to replace a building destroyed by fire, natural disaster, or criminal act, regardless of whether preconstruction planning or construction has begun. This subdivision applies only for the first 25 years after the year in which the building is destroyed.

Wyo. Stat. § 39-11-105. Exemptions (2024)

(a) The following property is exempt from property taxation . . . ​(vii) Real property used (A) Exclusively for religious worship, church schools and church parsonages; or (B) For religious education camps which are used exclusively for religious educational training, associated fellowship activities or worship and are not used for private profit nor for commercial purposes.

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Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as of March 25, 2024): 

(a) Equal access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. 

(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other covered establishments. Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this [title] [42 USCS §§ 2000a–2000a-6] if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;

(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”

A claimant must show the following to successfully move a claim forward: There was state action involved; the public accommodation engages in some form of interstate commerce; and, that there is either direct or prima facie (meaning it is assumed on its face to exist until proven otherwise) evidence of discrimination.

Religious Exemption? Title II lists a number of entities that are automatically considered places of public accommodation, but churches are not included on that list. Conversely, Title II’s exemptions do not explicitly name churches, either. It states: “The provisions of this title [42 USCS §§ 2000a–2000a-6] shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b)” (emphasis added).

Penalty for failing to comply? Injunctive relief is available, but not actual damages (Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (“When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II], he cannot recover damages.”)). Punitive damages are possible (Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843 (N.D. Iowa 2004)) in extreme cases.  

Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Yes, enacted in 1993. It states:

Two key cases related to the federal RFRA are worth noting:

Based on this conclusion, RFRA can only be applied to federal laws and federal government actions. Several states—but not all—have since adopted RFRA-like laws to protect free exercise rights in relation to laws and actions taken by local and state governments. In some states lacking RFRAs, courts have concluded a high standard of judicial review (“strict scrutiny”) should be applied to neutral laws of general applicability when they burden religious exercise. If a law is shown to burden the free exercise rights of a party, the government must show the law advances a compelling government interest in the least-restrictive manner possible in order to remain valid.

Key cases: 

Additionally, the US Supreme Court said the First Amendment right to associate for expressive purposes, though not absolute, has been implicitly understood for the “pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” However, it also noted a state has a compelling interest to forbid discrimination denying equal access to goods, privileges, and advantages, which cause social or personal (“dignitary”) harms. 

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence offers this notable quote: 

The standard for deciding just how much of an association’s involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association’s First Amendment right to control its membership cannot . . . be articulated with simple precision. . . . an association should be characterized as commercial, and therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association’s activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment. It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in protected expression that state regulation of its membership will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard. An association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.

Alabama, along with Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, is one of five states without its own general anti-discrimination statute. This means any complaints regarding alleged discrimination by a place of public accommodation must be made under either the federal government’s anti-discrimination statute found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a local ordinance (if one exists). 

Religious Exemption? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Penalty for failing to comply? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes. In 1998, voters approved the “Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment” for the state’s constitution. [Ala. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3.01] The amendment involves a “compelling interest test/least-restrictive means” standard. If a claimant successfully demonstrates their free exercise rights have been burdened by a state action—such as through the existence of a local or state law or regulation and/or its enforcement—the government must show both that the burden is justified by a compelling state interest and that the action is administered in the least restrictive way possible for furthering that interest.

Key cases: 

Muhammad v. Bethel-Muhammad, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144584 (2013). A county courthouse was not a place of public accommodation for a religious discrimination claim brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the federal district court determined “(c)ourthouses are not mentioned in the statute, nor do they fall anywhere near the categories that are listed.” The logic in Bethel-Muhammad is cited and followed by another federal district court in Tippins v. City of Dadeville, 23 F.Supp. 3d 1393 (2014), which determined a cemetery was not a public accommodation because cemeteries are not listed under Title II. In Tippins, that court also references Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, a Fourth Circuit decision concluding a beauty salon was not a place of public accommodation because it was not set forth in the “comprehensive list of establishments that qualify” under Title II.

Alaska states:

It is unlawful for the owner, lessee, manager, agent, or employee of a public accommodation to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person any of its services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because of sex, physical or mental disability, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, race, religion, color, or national origin. [Alaska Stat. § 18.80.230(a)(1)]

The state defines public accommodation to mean “a place that caters or offers its services, goods, or facilities to the general public and includes a … restaurant, … resort, campground … bathroom, … theater, … cafe, … and all other … business establishments.” [Alaska Stat. § 18.80.300(16)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? A violator is “guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment in a jail for not more than 30 days, or by both.” [Alaska Stat. § 18.80.270]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. Court decisions suggest a lower standard of judicial scrutiny may be used when a party raises a religious freedom defense as long as the law involved is neutral and of general applicability.

Key cases: 

The organization ultimately filed a complaint against the city in federal court on numerous grounds, including violation of its First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of expressive association. The court reviewed two separate ordinances of the city’s code pertaining to public accommodations. The first expressly exempted homeless shelters, prompting the court to conclude the organization was not a place of public accommodation. The second ordinance stated no such exemption, but the court concluded the state’s rules of statutory interpretation “and the structure of the Anchorage Municipal Code as a whole suggest that homeless shelters are not public accommodations.”

The Anchorage Assembly proposed and enacted an amended ordinance to address the legal issues raised by the 2019 case involving the soup kitchen. Notably, the ordinance updated the code’s definition of “public accommodation.” 

The organization again filed a lawsuit, alleging the ordinance’s revised language violated its free exercise, free speech, expressive association, private association, and due process rights under the US Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments because the law blocked it from posting its admissions policies. The organization claimed it was targeted by the revisions and the municipality would soon enforce the revisions against it. The municipality claimed the revised sections did not apply to the organization since the shelter is not a “public accommodation,” and there was no intent to enforce the sections against the organization. 

The court considered a “credible-threat inquiry” multi-factor test in making its decision. Ultimately, the court interpreted the provision’s text (section 5.20.050 of the Anchorage Municipal Code) to find that the organization’s shelter is not a public accommodation. 

Relatedly, under section 5.20.020, the court interpreted the provision’s text to find no clear indication the shelter’s operations would be covered under the provision. 

The court also said there was a “low likelihood of enforcement,” and thus no credible threat of enforcement against the shelter, meaning the shelter lacked standing to pursue a “pre-enforcement challenge” to the ordinance. However, the organization could seek damages for its self-censorship based on a limited time period outlined by the court. 

Arizona’s law states, “(d)iscrimination in places of public accommodation against any person because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or ancestry is contrary to the policy of this state and shall be deemed unlawful.” [A.R.S. § 41-1442(A)]

It defines a place of public accommodation as “all public places of entertainment, amusement or recreation, all public places where food or beverages are sold for consumption on the premises, … and all establishments which cater or offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit patronage from the members of the general public.” [A.R.S. § 41-1441(2)]

Religious Exemption? No. The statute only provides a general, undefined exemption for “any private club, or any place which is in its nature distinctly private.” [A.R.S. § 41-1441(2)]

Penalty for failing to comply? Yes—civil actions brought by a private party may seek actual and compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress, court costs, and preventive relief, such as a permanent or temporary injunction. [A.R.S. § 41-1472(A)] In an action brought by the attorney general, the court may award actual and compensatory damages, court costs, preventive relief, and civil penalties—if deemed appropriate—of $5,000 for a first violation and $10,000 for subsequent violations. [A.R.S. § 41-1472(B)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1999. The 

government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is both: (i)n furtherance of a compelling governmental interest [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [A.R.S. § 41-1493.01]

Key cases: 

Hameen v. Dollar Tree Stores Inc., No. CV-22-00751-PHX-JJT, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218631 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2022). In a race discrimination case, the court affirmed that the requisite standard for discrimination under A.R.S. § 41-1442 is the same as that of 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981, a federal statute addressing equal rights under the law.

The law of Arkansas states 

(t)he right of an otherwise qualified person to be free from discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, gender … is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public … accommodation [or] assemblage. [A.C.A. § 16-123-107(a)(2)]

The law defines a place of public “accommodation [or] assemblage” as “any place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies accommodations, goods, or services to the general public, or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or that is supported directly or indirectly by government funds.” [A.C.A. § 16-123-102(11)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The law provides a general, undefined exemption for “(a)ny private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public.” [A.C.A. § 16-123-102(11)(B)]

Penalty for failing to comply? The law permits “(a)ny person who is injured by an intentional act of discrimination” in violation of A.C.A. § 16-123-107(a)(2) to pursue an injunction seeking to stop such activity through the civil courts. [A.C.A. § 16-123-107(b)]

The law also recognizes a civil right of action for a party to pursue legal and equitable relief, as well as court and attorney fees. [A.C.A. § 16-123-105)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes. In April of 2015, the governor signed into law 2015 Ark. SB 975, which was intended 

(t)o restore the compelling interest test … and to guarantee its application in all cases in which free exercise of religion is substantially burdened … [and] (t)hat this act be interpreted consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, federal case law, and federal jurisprudence; and (t)o provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. In April of 2023, the governor signed into law 2023 Ark. HB 1615, which further broadened free exercise of religion protections. Under the revised law, a person or organization whose “religious exercise has been burdened, or will be burdened, in violation of this

As the National Conference of State Legislatures notes, “California does not specify their anti-discrimination law to public accommodations, but instead extends the protection to ‘all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.’”

California’s law (titled the “Unruh Civil Rights Act”) states the following:

(a)ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. [Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b)]

The law also states

(n)o business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51 … because the person is perceived to have one or more of those characteristics, or because the person is associated with a person who has, or is perceived to have, any of those characteristics. [Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5(a)]

The statute also defines “sex” to include “gender,” “gender identity,” and “gender expression.” [Cal. Civ. Code § 51(e)(5)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? “Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to [the statute], is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than $4,000, and any attorney’s fees.” [Cal. Civ. Code § 52].

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

Colorado states

(i)t is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(2)(a)] 

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to the public.” [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(1)]

Religious Exemption? Yes. The statute states: “‘Place of public accommodation’ shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.” [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601(1)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A minimum fine of $50, with fines of up to $500 for each subsequent violation. An “aggrieved party” also can file in civil court to have any of the fines paid directly to them instead. Alternatively, the aggrieved party can pursue remedies through a state-designated commission. [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-602]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. Common law suggests the state’s courts follow the US Supreme Court’s standard set in Employment Division v. Smith, which held neutral laws of general applicability do not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even when they burden religious exercise. (See, e.g., Ams. United, 648 P.2d at 1072; Conrad, 656 P.2d at 670; Young Life, 650 P.2d at 526; People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 275-76 (Colo. 1982); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., 197 Colo. 455, 458, 593 P.2d 1363, 1364 (1979); Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 416, 509 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1973); Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 187, 147 P.2d 823, 825 (1944); In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1215 (Colo. App. 2006); In the Interest of E.L.M.C., 100

Connecticut’s statute states:

It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability, physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness, status as a veteran or status as a victim of domestic violence, of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64(1)] 

It also says, “(i)t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of such person’s sexual orientation.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-81d(a)(1)]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as “any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-63(1)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—pertaining to marriage ceremonies. It states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and such solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious beliefs and faith. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges in accordance with this section shall not create any civil claim or cause of action, or result in any state action to penalize or withhold benefits from such religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society. [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a] 

Penalty for failing to comply? Violation results in a class D misdemeanor. [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-64(c); 46(a)-81d(b)] 

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1993. “(T)he state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” [Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b]

Key cases: 

Corcoran v. German Soc. Soc’y Frohsinn, Inc., 99 Conn. App. 839 (2007). A Connecticut appellate court, citing a prior state supreme court decision, said “‘(a)lthough no private organization is duty-bound to offer its services and facilities to all comers, once such an organization has determined to eschew selectivity, under statute it may not discriminate among the general public.’ Accordingly, ‘coverage … depends, in each case, upon extent to which a particular establishment has maintained a private relationship with its own constituency or a general relationship with the public at large.’” The court also cited a prior state appellate court decision indicating federal law may have relevance for determining what constitutes a place of public accommodation within the state statute, but said “‘federal law defines the beginning and not the end of [state’s] approach to the subject.’”

Delaware states:

No person being the … manager, director, supervisor … agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation, may directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person, on account of race, age, marital status, creed, religion, color, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin, any of the accommodations, facilities, advantages, or privileges of the public accommodation. [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4504(a)(1)]

In June 2021, Delaware enacted Senate Bill 72 (“The Religious Freedom for All Act”), which added and defined the term “religion” to clarify that discrimination against any person because of religion is illegal. Prior to enactment, the word “creed” had been used in the Code to include religion and religious beliefs. Now, by using both terms—creed and religion—this further clarifies the Delaware Code language under Chapter 45 of Title 6. [2021 Bill Text DE S.B. 72]

The statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as “any establishment which caters to or offers goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to, or solicits patronage from, the general public.” [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4502(19)]

The law also notes:

A place of public accommodation may provide reasonable accommodations based on gender identity in areas of facilities where disrobing is likely, such as locker rooms or other changing facilities, which reasonable accommodations may include a separate or private place for the use of persons whose gender-related identity, appearance or expression is different from their assigned sex at birth, provided that such reasonable accommodations are not inconsistent with the gender-related identity of such persons. [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4504(a)(2)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? A panel appointed by the state human relations commission may receive and investigate complaints. The panel may award actual damages to the “aggrieved person ‘including damages caused by humiliation and embarrassment[,]’ (c)osts, expenses, reasonable attorneys’ fees [and] (i)njunctive or other equitable relief.” Additionally, “(t)o vindicate the public interest, the panel may assess a civil penalty against the respondent or respondents” (up to $5,000 for a first-time violation; up to $15,000 if one or more prior violations occurred within the past five years; and up to $25,000 if two or more prior violations occurred within the past seven years). [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4508(h)]

Also, if the panel determines a complaint to be unfounded, it can dismiss the case—and also can award reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses to the respondent if the panel “determines that the complaint was brought for an improper purpose, such as to harass or embarrass the respondent.” [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4508(g)]

Lastly, if the Attorney General has “reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaging in a pattern of discriminatory public accommodation practices, that any person or group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this chapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance,” the Attorney General may pursue litigation in the civil courts, with a fine of up to $25,000 for first-time violations and up to $50,000 for subsequent violations.” [Del. Code tit. 6, § 4512(a)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

Key cases: None found. 

The District of Columbia Code states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status, family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, place of residence or business, or homeless status of any individual: To deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations. [D.C. Code § 2-1402.31]

The law defines a “place of public accommodation” as the following:

any person or place that provides, to a person in the District, access to an accommodation, service, or good, whether or not that person or place maintains a physical location in the District or charges for those goods or services, such as inns. . . restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; . . . wholesale and retail stores, and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind. [D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(24)]

Religious Exemption? Yes. It states:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to bar any religious or political organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious or political organization, from limiting employment, or admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or political persuasion as is calculated by the organization to promote the religious or political principles for which it is established or maintained. [D.C. Code § 2-1401.03(b)]

Penalty for failing to comply? Injunctive relief may be sought. [D.C. Code § 2-1403.07] Private causes of action are also permitted, with remedies including injunctive relief, extension of “full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges to all persons,” compensatory damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and civil penalties (up to $10,000 for first violation; up to $25,000 if a prior violation within five years; and up to $50,000 for second violation within seven years). [D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a)(1)]

Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. But note Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University (see below). 

Key cases: 

Lastly, the court noted that a party raising a free exercise defense in order to gain an exemption from a government action must show how the forced compliance will impose a burden on religious exercise. Upon doing so, the court said, the exemption must be granted unless the government can demonstrate it has a compelling or overriding interest to enforce the challenged action. If the government can do so, the court then must ensure the action is conducted in the least-restrictive manner necessary for advancing the compelling government interest. 

Florida’s law states, “All persons are entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, handicap, familial status, or religion.” [Fla. Stat. § 760.08]

“‘Public accommodation’ means … place of public accommodation, amusement, or resort; and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.” [Fla. Stat. § 413.08(c)]

“Public accommodation” is further defined in a related code section to include lodgings, restaurants, exhibition/entertainment places, and other covered establishments:

Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this section: (a) any inn. . .or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests; (b) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, . . . or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; (c) any. . .theater, concert hall, . . . or other place of exhibition or entertainment; (d) any establishment . . . physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection. [Fla. Stat. § 760.02]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limitations. The statute indicates membership in a club with 400 or more members, regularly providing meals, and regularly receiving “payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals, or beverages directly or indirectly from nonmembers for business purposes” shall not discriminate. However, “(t)his subsection does not apply to … religious organizations where business activity is not prevalent.” [Fla. Stat. § 760.60(1)] 

Additionally, Florida provides a separate exemption pertaining to churches and religious organizations with respect to marriage ceremonies. It states:   

The following individuals or entities may not be required to solemnize any marriage or provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization, formation, or celebration of any marriage if such an action would cause the individual or entity to violate a sincerely held religious belief of the individual or entity:

– A church;

– A religious organization;

– A religious corporation or association;

– A religious fraternal benefit society;

– A religious school or educational institution;

– An integrated auxiliary of a church;

– An individual employed by a church or religious organization while acting in the scope of that employment;

– A clergy member; or

– A minister.

A refusal to solemnize any marriage or provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods, or privileges … may not serve as the basis for (a) civil cause of action against any entity or individual protected under [this law]; or (a) civil cause of action, criminal cause of action, or any other action by this state or a political subdivision to penalize or withhold benefits or privileges, including tax exemptions or governmental contracts, grants, or licenses, from any entity or individual protected under [this law]. [Fla. Stat. § 761.061(1)(2)]

Penalty for failing to comply? If the state commission appointed to investigate complaints determines a violation occurred, the aggrieved party must either bring a civil lawsuit in court or request an administrative hearing to pursue remedies. A civil court may award compensatory damages, such as mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries, and punitive damages not to exceed $100,000. It also may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees. Under an administrative proceeding, the aggrieved party may be awarded “affirmative relief from the effects of the practice,” and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. [Fla. Stat. § 760.11]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1998. It states:

The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i)s in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (i)s the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Fla. Stat. § 761.03]

Key cases: None found.

Georgia, along with Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, is one of five states without its own general anti-discrimination statute. This means any complaints regarding alleged discrimination by a place of public accommodation must be made under either the federal government’s anti-discrimination statute found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a local ordinance (if one exists). 

Religious Exemption? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Penalty for failing to comply? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. However, as of February 29, 2024, SB 180 (the Georgia Religious Freedom Restoration Act) passed the Georgia Senate in the 2023-2024 Regular Session. The bill largely mirrors the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. As of early March 2024, the bill is in the House for consideration. 

Key cases: 

[s]he (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) attempted to contract for services and afford . . . herself of the full benefits and enjoyment of a public accommodation, (3) was denied the full benefits or enjoyment of a public accommodation, and (4) such services were available to similarly situated persons outside . . . her protected class who received full benefits or were treated better. 
The courts cited to a Seventh Circuit decision (Hornick v. Noyes, 708 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1983)), which determined the four-step analysis created for Title VII cases through the US Supreme Court’s “shifting-burden analysis adopted” in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is also applicable in Title II public accommodations cases.

Hawaii’s law states:

Unfair discriminatory practices that deny, or attempt to deny, a person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation on the basis of race; sex, including gender identity or expression; sexual orientation; color; religion; ancestry; or disability, including the use of a service animal, are prohibited. [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 489-3]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as “a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation … facility of any kind whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the general public as customers, clients, or visitors.” [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 489-2]

Religious Exemption? Yes. It states:

Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a religious organization or nonprofit organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization shall not be required to provide goods, services, or its facilities or grounds for the solemnization or celebration of a civil union that is in violation of its religious beliefs or faith. … A religious organization or nonprofit organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization that, pursuant to this section, fails or refuses to provide goods, services, or its facilities or grounds for the solemnization or celebration of a civil union shall be immune from any fine, penalty, injunction, administrative proceeding, or any other legal or administrative liability for the failure or refusal. [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 572B-9.5]

Penalty for failing to comply? An injured party may sue. Upon prevailing, the injured party “shall be awarded a sum not less than $1,000 or threefold damages by the plaintiff sustained, whichever sum is the greater, and reasonable attorneys’ fees together with the costs of suit; and … (b)ring proceedings to enjoin the unlawful discriminatory practices.” [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 489-7.5]

Violators also face civil penalties of $500 to $10,000. [Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 489-8]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In 2018, a Hawaii appellate court declined to formally require a “strict scrutiny” standard of review for free exercise claims brought under the state constitution. Instead, it found the state’s constitution—and a law prohibiting discrimination by places of public accommodation that provide lodging to overnight guests—was narrowly tailored to achieve Hawaii’s compelling interests, and would survive the strict scrutiny standard regardless in a claim brought by a bed-and-breakfast owner who argued her free exercise rights were burdened by the public accommodations statute with respect to serving same-sex patrons. (Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919 (2018))

Key cases: 

The defendant, the owner of Aloha Bed & Breakfast, said the state’s public accommodations law, and its prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation, imposed on her free exercise of religion because she would be required to provide lodging to the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple. The defendant argued the state should impose a “compelling state interest” requirement and apply strict scrutiny to decide her free exercise claim under the Hawaii Constitution. The court declined to decide whether the higher level of scrutiny should be applied to a free exercise claim—but indicated the law “satisfies even strict scrutiny as applied to Aloha B&B’s free exercise claim.” The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling favoring the plaintiffs.

The Idaho law states:

It shall be a prohibited act … (f)or a person who owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation (t)o deny an individual on the basis of disability the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of a place of public accommodation … because of, or on a basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin. [Idaho Code § 67-5909]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as “a business, accommodation … facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” [Idaho Code § 67-5902(9)]

Religious Exemption? Yes. “The provisions … do not apply to … (r)eligious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship.” [Idaho Code § 67-5910(5)(b)]

Penalty for failing to comply? The commission designated by the state to receive and investigate complaints may seek conciliation with an alleged violator and, if unsuccessful, may file civil action seeking “legal and equitable relief.” [Idaho Code § 67-5907(5)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, Idaho enacted the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (“FERPA”) in 2000. “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is both: (e)ssential to further a compelling governmental interest [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” [Idaho Code § 73-402]

Key cases: 

The Illinois statute states the following:

It is a civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to … (d)eny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of any public place of accommodation. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/5-102]

Effective August 1, 2024, the statute states it is designed 

(t)o secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection status, marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, or unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations, including in elementary, secondary, and higher education. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/1-102(A)]

Further, the term “sexual orientation” is defined to include “gender-related identity.” [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/1-103(O-1)]

“‘Place of public accommodation’ includes, but is not limited to … a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink … an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering … a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.” [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/5-101]

Religious Exemption? Yes. It states:

With respect to a place of public accommodation … the exercise of free speech, free expression, free exercise of religion or expression of religiously based views by any individual or group of individuals that is protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or under Section 3 of Article I, or Section 4 of Article I, of the Illinois Constitution, shall not be a civil rights violation. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/5-102.1(b)]

Additionally, an exemption for private clubs is included in the code as follows:

A private club, or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of another establishment that is a place of public accommodation. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/5-103(A)]

Relatedly, an exemption for “facilities distinctly private” is included:

Any facility, as to discrimination based on sex, which is distinctly private in nature such as restrooms, shower rooms, bath houses, health clubs and other similar facilities for which the Department, in its rules and regulations, may grant exemptions based on bona fide considerations of public policy. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/5-103(B)]

Penalty for failing to comply? Upon finding a violation, the state commission appointed to hear claims may provide relief or penalty, including a cease-and-desist order, actual damages, civil penalties (not more than $16,000 for a first violation, not more than $42,500 for one violation in the previous five years, and not more than $70,000 for two or more violations in the previous seven years), and attorney fees. [Ill. Comp. Stat. Ch. 775, § 5/8B-104]

The Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) “denies an aggrieved party direct access to the courts . . . (i)nstead a plaintiff must first file an action before the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) [and] only when the IDHR issues a final order is judicial review available. (Jablonski v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 888 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). 

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1998. It states:

Government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [775 ILCS § 35/15]

Key cases: 

The inquiry into the private club exception [under Title II] involves a consideration of several factors. The Welshes and the Boy Scouts as well as the district court have relied on Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. at 796-97, which provides a list of seven factors to weigh in determining whether an entity qualifies as a private club. The seven factors are: (1) the genuine selectivity of the group; (2) the membership’s control over the operations of the establishment; (3) the history of the organization; (4) the use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) the club’s purpose; (6) whether the club advertises for members; and, (7) whether the club is nonprofit or for profit.

The Indiana law states:

It is the public policy of the state to provide all of its citizens equal opportunity for … access to public conveniences and accommodations … and to eliminate segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry, since such segregation is an impediment to equal opportunity. … (E)qual access to and use of public accommodations and equal opportunity for acquisition of real property are hereby declared to be civil rights. [Indiana Code § 22-9-1-2]

A “‘public accommodation’ means any establishment that caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public” (emphasis added). [Indiana Code § 22-9-1-3(m)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may investigate complaints. Prior to July 1, 2020, a majority of the commission may appoint an administrative law judge when it deems it necessary; after July 1, 2020, the commission may request the assignment of an administrative law judge. Upon determining a violation has occurred, the commission may issue a cease-and-desist order. [Indiana Code § 22-9-1-6]

Also, civil lawsuits are permitted under certain circumstances. [Indiana Code § 22-9-1-16]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2015. It states in pertinent part:

(A) governmental entity may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability … A governmental entity may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Indiana Code § 34-13-9-8]

Note this specific restriction also stated in the law (but also note Saillant v. City of Greenwood in the “Key Cases” below):

This chapter does not:

In November of 2019, a county court dismissed a lawsuit brought by three groups that argued their religious freedoms were infringed by the inclusion of “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as protected classes in the state law as well as the ordinances of four cities (including Indianapolis). The court said the groups failed to establish “standing” to sue, meaning they did not demonstrate a direct injury or other “real interest” in order to be the proper parties to bring the legal challenge.

Key cases: 

Harless by Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ind. 1996). The federal court determined schools were not places of public accommodation because they were not specifically named under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Iowa’s law states:

It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any owner, lessee, sublessee, proprietor, manager, or superintendent of any public accommodation or any agent or employee thereof (t)o refuse or deny to any person because of race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges thereof, or otherwise to discriminate against any person because of race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability in the furnishing of such accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges. [Iowa Code § 216.7(1)(a)]

The statute defines a public accommodation as 

each and every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods for a fee or charge to nonmembers of any organization or association utilizing the place, establishment, or facility, provided that any place, establishment, or facility that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the nonmembers gratuitously shall be deemed a public accommodation if the accommodation receives governmental support or subsidy. [Iowa Code § 216.2(13)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limited. 

The statute states: “This section shall not apply to (a)ny bona fide religious institution with respect to any qualifications the institution may impose based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose” (emphasis added). [Iowa Code § 216.7(2)(a)]

Then it later states: 

The provisions … shall not apply to (a)ny bona fide religious institution with respect to any qualifications it may impose based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, when the qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose unless the religious institution owns or operates property for a commercial purpose or membership in the religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin (emphasis added) [Iowa Code § 216.12(1)(a)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission can receive, investigate, mediate, and determine the merits of complaints. It has the power to issue temporary injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, and remedial action, including restoring an individual’s admission to a public accommodation and the payment of damages caused by the discriminatory practice, such as actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney fees. [Iowa Code § 216.5 and § 216.15(9)(a)-(b)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes. Iowa enacted  its state “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” in 2024. The Act provides the following in part:

State action shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Further, the Act provides that one whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened “may assert such violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding” and relief may include damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate redress. 

Key cases: 

The Kansas act against discrimination is intended “to eliminate and prevent discrimination, segregation, or separation in all places of public accommodations” based on “race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001]

The statute defines “public accommodations” as “any person who caters or offers goods, services, facilities and accommodations to the public.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002(h)]

Religious Exemption? Yes. “Public accommodations do not include a religious or nonprofit fraternal or social association or corporation.” [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1002(h)]

Of note: In 2020, the Kansas Human Rights Commission on Sex Discrimination in Employment, Public Accommodations, and Housing affirmed this religious exemption in response to the US Supreme Court’s Bostock v. Clayton County decision.

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission can investigate complaints and issue cease-and-desist orders as well as remedial actions, including admission to the public accommodation, and damages of up to $2,000 for “pain, suffering and humiliation.” Unpublished court decisions also suggest civil actions can be pursued for discrimination claims under the act when all administrative remedies have been exhausted. [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes. The Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, enacted in 2013, states in part:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s civil right to exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless such government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that application of the burden to the person (i)s in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-5303]

Key cases: Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of America, 891 P.2d 385 (1995). The court held that the Boy Scouts of America is not a “public accommodation” within the meaning of the Kansas law, and accordingly could exclude the plaintiff, an atheist who refused to profess a belief in a higher being, from positions of adult leadership. The plaintiff argued a broad, expansive view of the term “public accommodations” should be used, but the court said the legislature’s focus on business establishments and business purposes was telling.

Kentucky law states:

(I)t is an unlawful practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement … on the ground of disability, race, color, religion, or national origin. [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.120]

It continues:

It shall be an unlawful practice to deny an individual, because of sex, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a restaurant, … or any facility supported directly or indirectly by government funds. [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.145]

Religious Exemption? Yes. The statute states: 

“Place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” does not include a religious organization and its activities and facilities if the application … would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization, subject to paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection.

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission can receive and investigate complaints, and can issue cease-and-desist orders as well as take affirmative actions, including the “admission of individuals to a place of public accommodation.” The state commission “may publish or caused to be published the names of persons who have been determined to have engaged in an unlawful practice.” [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.190, 344.230]

Local commissions also are authorized to receive and investigate complaints and issue affirmative orders. [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.320]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2013. It states:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A “burden” shall include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from programs or access to facilities. [Ky. Rev. Stat. § 446.350] 

(Editor’s note: A “clear and convincing evidence” standard is not as high the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required in criminal cases, but it is higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required in most civil lawsuits.)

Key cases: 

The court determined the photographer could bring the pre-enforcement claim. The court decided the city ordinance violated the Constitution because the law required the photographer “to photograph same-sex weddings based on her choice to photograph opposite-sex ceremonies.” The court also found the law violated the photographer’s freedom of religion under the state’s religious freedom law.

“(I)t is a discriminatory practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation … on the grounds of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, disability … or national origin.” [La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2247]

The statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as “any place, store, or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public, or which is supported directly or indirectly by government funds.” [La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2232]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? The law allows local municipalities to create human rights commissions (“local commissions”) “to safeguard all individuals within its jurisdiction from discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or age.” The local commissions may receive and investigate complaints, issue remedial orders (including the requirement to cease violations), issue affirmative orders, including admitting individuals to a place of public accommodation, and publish the names of violators. [La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2237-2239; 2261(C)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act  enacted in 2010. It states:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a facially neutral rule or a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is both: (i)n furtherance of a compelling governmental interest … [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5233]

Key cases: 

An AG opinion letter is not binding on any court, but it may prove persuasive to a court during a legal proceeding. This portion of the AG’s letter is of particular relevance to church leaders:

Traditionally, a church has been recognized as “a building for public and especially Christian worship.” When the concept of “church” is compared to the above language, it is unclear whether a church would be included in the definition set forth in [the state law]. In addition, we are unaware of any Louisiana case law that is precisely on point. However, there is ample federal case law interpreting the definition in reference to church institutions. Consistently, the federal courts have held that a church does not qualify as place of “public accommodation” reasoning that churches are distinctly private in nature and generally do not receive governmental assistance. See generally Vargas-Santana v. Boy Scouts of America, 2007 WL 995002, 6 (United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico); Saillant v. City of Greenwood, No. IPO1-1760, 2003 WL 24032987, 7 (S.D.Ind. Apr.17, 2003); Traggis v. St. Barbara’s Greek Orthodox Church, 851 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir.1988). In lending further support, other state courts have followed this position and have declined to interpret a church as a place of public accommodation. See Wazeerud-Din v. Goodwill Home & Missions, Inc., 325 N.J.Super. 3, (N.J.Super.1999) (holding that religious residential addiction program in a church was not a place of public accommodation under New Jersey law).

Maine prohibits “discrimination in … access to public accommodations on account of an individual’s actual or perceived race, color, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry or national origin.” 

Later, it states it is unlawful public accommodations discrimination 

for any public accommodation … to directly or indirectly refuse, discriminate against or in any manner withhold from or deny the full and equal enjoyment to any person, on account of race or color, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity, age, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry or national origin, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, services or privileges of public accommodation, or in any manner discriminate against any person in the price, terms or conditions upon which access to accommodation, advantages, facilities, goods, services and privileges may depend. [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, §§ 4552, 4592]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as 

a public entity or private entity that owns, leases, leases to or operates … a facility … whose operations fall within at least one of the following categories … (a)ny establishment that in fact caters to, or offers its goods, facilities or services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from, the general public. [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4553(8)(N)(8-B)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The statute states an exemption for “a religious corporation, association or organization that does not receive public funds” but only with respect to employment, housing, and educational opportunity situations—not situations involving public accommodations. Additionally, the statute says “(a)ny for-profit  organization owned, controlled or operated by a religious association or corporation and subject to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 United States Code, Section 511(a), is not covered by the exemptions set forth in this paragraph.” [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4553(10)(G)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints and take actions ranging from cease-and-desist orders to payment of penalties and compensatory damages under certain conditions. [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4613)] The state also recognizes a right for a party under certain conditions to file a civil lawsuit against the party who allegedly committed the unlawful discrimination, with the possibility of seeking attorney fees “civil penal damages or compensatory and punitive damages.” [Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 4621, 4622)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

A 2006 decision issued by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which dealt with a challenge to a statute prohibiting the state from funding private religious schools, cited the US Supreme Court’s 1990 ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, concluding “(a) statute that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Only when “(a) statute that is not neutral but either disfavors religion on its face or has been motivated by animosity against religion is [it] subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny and can be justified only upon a demonstration of a compelling governmental interest in the statute.” (Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944)

Key cases: Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944 (see above).

Maryland’s law states:

An owner or operator of a place of public accommodation or an agent or employee of the owner or operator may not refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation because of the person’s race, sex, age, color, creed, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. [Md. Code, State Gov’t § 20-304]

It defines a place of public accommodation to include “… a restaurant … lunchroom … or other facility principally engaged in selling food … for consumption on or off the premises … a retail establishment that is operated by a public or private entity … or … an establishment that holds itself out as serving patrons of the covered establishment.” [Md. Code, State Gov’t § 20-301]

Religious Exemption? No. 

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. It has the power to assess civil penalties (not more than $500 for a first violation, not more than $1,000 for a second violation within five years, and not more than $2,500 for two or more violations within a seven-year period), award fees and costs, and issue temporary injunctions. [Md. Code, State Gov’t §§ 20-1013 – 20-1017] 

No private right of action is “expressly or impliedly” permitted or authorized by the statute (Westray v. Porthole, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1984); Baker v. Greyhound Bus Line, 240 F. Supp. 2d 454 (D. Md. 2003)).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

Key cases: 

The statute prohibits discrimination 

on account of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, which shall not include persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex object, deafness, blindness or any physical or mental disability or ancestry relative to the admission of any person to, or his treatment in any place of public accommodation. [Mass. Gen. Laws, Part IV, Ch. 272, § 98]

The statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as “any place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public.” [Mass. Gen. Laws, Part IV, Ch. 272, § 92A]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? Violators “shall be punished by a fine of not more than $2,500 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and shall be liable to any person aggrieved” for damages (see Mass. Gen. Laws, Part V, Ch. 151(B)). [Mass. Gen. Laws, Part IV, Ch. 272, § 98]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In 1994, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued a decision in a case involving a landlord’s claims that the state’s antidiscrimination statute impermissibly burdened his free exercise rights. The court, citing the US Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), said “(a) [statute] that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Only when the law “is not neutral or is not of general application” must the court apply heightened judicial scrutiny (the “law must advance compelling interests and must be tailored narrowly in pursuit of those interests”). (Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994)).

Key cases: 

Michigan prohibits “deny(ing) an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation … because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or marital status.” [Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2302]

“‘Place of public accommodation’ means a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” [Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2301]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The exemptions provided include:

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints, and has the power to issue cease-and-desist orders; order admittance of persons to a public accommodation; order payment of damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs; order revocation of a violator’s license; order payment of civil fines (up to $10,000 for first violation, up to $25,000 for a second violation within five years, and up to $50,000 for two or more violations within a seven-year period); and, order “other relief the commission deems appropriate.” [Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2605]

A private cause of action also recognized at common law. (See Brewster v. Martin Marietta

Aluminum Sales, Inc., 378 N.W.2d 558 (1985)).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

In 2008, a state appellate court ruled a state action burdening a claimant’s free exercise rights was permissible because the state action was tied to a compelling governmental interest and the state used the least restrictive means possible to further that interest (a “strict scrutiny” standard). (Champion v. Sec’y of State, 761 N.W.2d 747 (2008)). The decision has been cited by at least 15 subsequent decisions in Michigan appellate courts and federal courts in the state.

Key cases: 

Champion v. Sec’y of State, 761 N.W.2d 747 (2008) (see above).

“It is an unfair discriminatory practice to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity.” [Minn. Stat. § 363A.11(1)(a)]

The statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as “a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation … facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” [Minn. Stat. § 363A.03(34)]

It also defines “sexual orientation” as “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.” [Minn. Stat. § 363A.03(44)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but note limitations. It states:

Nothing in this chapter prohibits any religious association, religious corporation, or religious society that is not organized for private profit … from: limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination; in matters relating to sexual orientation, taking any action with respect to education, employment, housing and real property, or use of facilities. This clause shall not apply to secular business activities engaged in by the religious association, religious corporation, or religious society, the conduct of which is unrelated to the religious and educational purposes for which it is organized; or taking any action with respect to the provision of goods, services, facilities, or accommodations directly related to the solemnization or celebration of a civil marriage that is in violation of its religious beliefs. [Minn. Stat. § 363A.26]

Penalty for failing to comply? Yes. A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. [Minn. Stat. § 363A.30]

Civil penalties and damages are at the discretion of an administrative law judge; the administrative law judge also may award reasonable attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages of up to $25,000. [Minn. Stat. § 363A.29] 

A party also may file a civil lawsuit seeking civil penalties, damages, attorney fees, and costs against an alleged violator. [Minn. Stat. § 363A.33]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

However, Minnesota courts recognize a “heightened” four-prong test when evaluating a burden placed on a complainant’s free exercise rights by a government action: 

Minnesota courts employ a heightened compelling state interest balancing test when determining whether a challenged law infringes on or interferes with religious practices. The test has four prongs: (1) whether the objector’s beliefs are sincerely held; (2) whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious beliefs; (3) whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or compelling; and (4) whether the state regulation uses the least restrictive means. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (2008).

Key cases: 

Additionally, the US Supreme Court said the First Amendment right to associate for expressive purposes, though not absolute, has been implicitly understood for the “pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” However, it also noted a state has a compelling interest to forbid discrimination denying equal access to goods, privileges, and advantages, which cause social or personal (“dignitary”) harms. 

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence offers this notable quote: 

The standard for deciding just how much of an association’s involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association’s First Amendment right to control its membership cannot . . . be articulated with simple precision. . . . an association should be characterized as commercial, and therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association’s activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment. It is only when the association is predominantly engaged in protected expression that state regulation of its membership will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard. An association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.

Mississippi, along with Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, is one of five states without its own general anti-discrimination statute. This means any complaints regarding alleged discrimination by a place of public accommodation must be made under either the federal government’s anti-discrimination statute found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a local ordinance (if one exists).

Religious Exemption? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Penalty for failing to comply? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2014. The Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act involves a “compelling interest test,” the highest level of scrutiny a court can give to government action. If a claimant successfully demonstrates their free exercise rights have been burdened by a state action—such as through the existence of a state law and/or its enforcement—the government must show both that the burden is justified by a compelling state interest and that the action is administered in the least restrictive way possible for furthering that interest. If the government cannot make such a showing, the state action is deemed invalid. [Miss. Code § 11-61-1]. 

Additionally, in April of 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act,” which the state’s governor signed into law. The law addresses several matters, including marriage ceremonies, employment, adoption or foster care services, and public accommodations. It first defines “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” as ones involving “the belief or conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman; sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.” It then continues: 

the state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a religious organization wholly or partially on the basis that such organization: (s)olemnizes or declines to solemnize any marriage, or provides or declines to provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization, formation, celebration or recognition of any marriage, based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction.

The law also defines the types of “discriminatory actions” the government cannot take, which include (but are not limited to) altering an organization’s tax-exempt status, levying a monetary fine, or denying a state-funded grant.

Key cases: 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title II, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she attempted to contract for the services of a public accommodation; (3) she was denied those services; and (4) the services were made available to similarly situated persons outside her protected class.” Fahim, 551 F.3d at 350. The Fifth Circuit has noted that some courts have applied a test in which the fourth element is modified. The fourth element in that modified test asks whether (a) the services were made available to similarly situated persons outside the plaintiff’s protected class or (b) the plaintiff “received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” (quoting Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Missouri’s law states:

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation … or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability. [R.S.Mo. § 213.065(2)]

A “place of public accommodation” is defined as “all places or businesses offering or holding out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages or accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and safety of the general public or such public places providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement.” [R.S.Mo. § 213.010(16)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limitations. 

“The provisions of this section shall not apply to … a place of accommodation owned by or

operated on behalf of a religious corporation, association or society … unless the facilities of such establishments are made available to the customers or patrons of a place of public accommodation” (emphasis added). [R.S.Mo. § 213.065(3)]

Penalty for failing to comply? Yes. A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints and issue orders and civil penalties (up to $2,000 for first violation; up to $5,000 for a second violation within five years; and up to $10,000 for two or more violations in the past seven years). [R.S.Mo. § 213.075]

The right to file a civil lawsuit seeking actual damages (as well as pecuniary losses, nonpecuniary losses, and punitive damages), attorney fees, and costs is also recognized. [R.S.Mo. § 213.111]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2003. It states:

A governmental authority may not restrict a person’s free exercise of religion, unless: The restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does not discriminate against religion, or among religions; and (t)he governmental authority demonstrates that application of the restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is not unduly restrictive considering the relevant circumstances. [R.S.Mo. § 1.302]

Also note Our Lady’s Inn v. City of St. Louis, 349 F. Supp. 3d 805 (2018). Though the case addressed one city’s employment discrimination ordinance, the federal court’s reasoning and conclusion provide insights into how religious freedom can be analyzed in relation to an ordinance’s language and the state’s RFRA. Here, the plaintiffs (a nonprofit providing housing to pregnant, low-income women seeking an alternative to abortion; a Catholic school; and a private, closely held corporation) argued the ordinance required them “to provide their employees with health insurance coverage that includes contraception, abortion, and sterilization,” which all of them opposed based on religious-based reasons. The city argued the ordinance provided an exemption only for religious institutions. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding the term “religious” as used in the ordinance also modified a series of entities exempted by the law, including “corporation(s),” “association(s),” and “societ(ies).” Consequently, the enforcement of the ordinance against the for-profit corporation was unlawful under the state’s RFRA.

Key cases: Our Lady’s Inn v. City of St. Louis, 349 F. Supp. 3d 805 (2018) (see above).

Montana’s law states:

Except when the distinction is based on reasonable grounds, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee, manager, agent, or employee of a public accommodation to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person any of its services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because of sex, marital status, race, age, physical or mental disability, creed, religion, color, or national origin. [Mont. Code § 49-2-304(1)(a)]

The state defines a place of public accommodation as one “that caters or offers its services, goods, or facilities to the general public subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons. It includes without limitation a … campground … and business establishments.” [Mont. Code § 49-2-101(20)(a)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

However, the statute provides a general, limited exemption:

Public accommodation does not include an institution, club, or place of accommodation that proves that it is by its nature distinctly private. An institution, club, or place of accommodation may not be considered by its nature distinctly private if it has more than 100 members, provides regular meal service, and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals, or beverages, directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers, for the furtherance of trade or business. [Mont. Code § 49-2-101(20)(b)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. Upon determining discriminatory conduct by a place of public accommodation occurred, the commission may “prescribe conditions on the accused’s future conduct,” require reasonable measures to correct discriminatory practices and “to rectify any harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to the person discriminated against,” but may not award punitive damages. [Mont. Code § 49-2-506]

The statute also states:

A person, educational institution, or financial institution, either public or private … who or which willfully engages in an unlawful discriminatory practice prohibited by this chapter … or who or which willfully violates an order of the commission or willfully violates this chapter in any other manner is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both. [Mont. Code § 49-2-601]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in April 2021 under Mont. Code § 27-33-101 et seq. 

The purpose of the Act is to:

restore the compelling governmental interest test and to guarantee its application in all cases in which the exercise of religion is substantially burdened by state action. . . and to provide a claim or defense to a person or persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by state action.

Further, the free exercise of religion is protected under Section 5 of the Act to indicate:

State action may not substantially burden a person’s right to the exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it is demonstrated that applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion: (a) is essential to furthering a compelling governmental interest; and (b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Those whose exercise of religion has been or is likely to be substantially burdened may assert “the violation or impending violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding.” Appropriate relief includes injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and costs and attorney fees. 

Additionally, in a 2004 decision by the Montana Supreme Court, it held that neutral laws of general applicability that have only an “incidental effect” on the practice of religion (“but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs”) does not imply the government must “bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.” (Valley Christian Sch. V. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 2004 MT 41 (2004)) 

Key cases: Valley Christian Sch. V. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 2004 MT 41 (2004) (see above).

Nebraska’s law states:

Any person who directly or indirectly refuses, withholds from, denies, or attempts to refuse, withhold, or deny, to any other person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges, or who segregates any person in a place of public accommodation on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability, or ancestry, shall be guilty of discriminatory practice. [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-134]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation to “mean all places or businesses offering or holding out to the general public goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages, and accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare, and safety of the general public and such public places providing food, shelter, recreation, and amusement including, but not limited to … any restaurant … [or] theatre.” [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-133]

Also note: A 1998 opinion letter issued by the state’s attorney general further clarified the statute’s definition of a public accommodation, explaining “the Nebraska statute does not limit coverage to only specific categories. . . (r)ather, it. . .extends coverage to ‘all places or businesses offering or holding out to the general public goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages, and accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare, and safety of the general public.’” (1998 Neb. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 10)

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limitations. “Any place of public accommodation owned by or operated on behalf of a religious corporation, association, or society which gives preference in the use of such place to members of the same faith as that of the administering body shall not be guilty of discriminatory practice” (emphasis added). [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-137]

The statute also offers a broader, limited exception, stating it “shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishments are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of [Neb. Rev. Stat.] § 20-133” (emphasis added). [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-138]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. “Any person or place of public accommodation who or which shall … willfully violate an order of the commission shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than 30 days, or be fined not more than $100, or be both so fined and imprisoned.” [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-143] 

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2024. 

It provides:

State action shall not substantially burden a person’s right to the exercise of religion unless it is demonstrated that applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion in this particular instance is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest; or (r)estrict a religious organization from operating and engaging in religious services during a state of emergency to a greater extent than the state restricts other organizations or businesses from operating during a state of emergency.

The First Freedom Act largely mirrors the language in the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but also includes language that hints at the COVID-19 pandemic emergency closures. 

Key cases: LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (1990) (see above).

“All persons are entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity or expression.” [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.070]

Nevada defines a place of public accommodation as 

Any restaurant … theater … auditorium … or other place of public gathering … sales or rental establishment … any nursery, private school … or other place of education … any day care center … homeless shelter, food bank … [or] (a)ny other establishment or place to which the public is invited or which is intended for public use. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.050]

The statute also provides abilities for local municipalities to create public accommodations ordinances, so long as those ordinances do not go beyond the scope of state law or impose penalties harsher than the state law. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.100]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The statute provides this broader, limited exception: “The provisions … do not apply to any private club, private online discussion forum or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment” (emphasis added). [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.060]

Penalty for failing to comply? A complaint may be filed with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.110]

The statute also notes: 

A criminal or civil action … may not be brought after the expiration of (one) year from the date of the act complained of. When a complaint is filed with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission … the limitation provided by this section is tolled … during the pendency of such complaint before the Commission. For the purposes of this section, a complaint is pending before the Commission until the time expires for filing a petition for judicial review of the final decision of the Commission on the complaint or, if proceedings for such review are instituted, then until the proceedings are completed. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 651.120]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In a 1996 case evaluating a prison inmate’s claim that his religious freedom should allow him to self-represent himself in a direct conviction appeal (whereas state law required counsel), the Nevada Supreme Court cited both the US Supreme Court’s 1990 Employment Division v. Smith ruling (a “‘generally applicable and otherwise valid’ law that “only has an ‘incidental effect’ on religious practices” is permissible) and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (government may “‘substantially burden’ an individual’s right to free exercise of religion only if the government asserts a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and the burden is ‘the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest’”). Under Smith, the Nevada Supreme Court held the state’s requirement was permissible; under RFRA, the court said the requirement did not “substantially burden” the inmate. The court did not indicate which method of analysis should be followed with future claims. (Blandino v. State, 914 P.2d 624 (1996)).

Key cases: Blandino v. State, 914 P.2d 624 (1996) (see above). 

New Hampshire’s law states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, because of the age, sex, gender identity, race, creed, color, marital status, physical or mental disability or national origin of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:17]

The statute also says, “no person shall be denied the benefit of the rights afforded by this section on account of that person’s sexual orientation.” [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:16]

The law defines “a place of public accommodation … if its operations affect commerce: … (a)ny restaurant … lunchroom … or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption … (a)ny … theater.” [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 155:39-a]

Separately, the statute defines “place of public accommodation” to include “any restaurant, eating house … theater … music or other public hall, store or other establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.” [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:2.XIV]

Religious Exemption? Yes. The statute states:

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, from limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from making such selection as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained. [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:18]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may “receive, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging violations.” [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:5] Upon finding probable cause for the complaint, the commission “shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice … by conference, conciliation and persuasion.” The commission may issue cease-and-desist orders, the restoration of “full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges,” the payment of compensatory damages and administrative fines ($10,000 for first-time violation; $25,000 for a second violation within five years; and $50,000 for two or more violations within seven years). [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:21(d)]

A “natural person” who “willfully violate(s) an order of the commission” is guilty of a misdemeanor, while any other person is guilty of a felony. [N.H. Rev. Stat. § 354-A:24]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In a 2010 decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to adopt a compelling governmental interest test in relation to a prisoner’s assertion that his sentencing terms restricted his fundamental right of free exercise of religion. The court said:

We note that the condition in this case does not directly infringe on the defendant’s free exercise of his religion: it is instead facially neutral and applies to the defendant’s conduct regardless of whether he is in a church or elsewhere. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to require the State to show a compelling government interest. (State v. Perfetto, 160 N.H. 675 (N.H. 2010)).

Key cases: 

New Jersey’s law states:

It shall be … an unlawful discrimination … (f)or any person to refuse to buy from, sell to, lease from or to, license, contract with, or trade with, provide goods, services or information to, or otherwise do business with any other person on the basis of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States, disability, [or] nationality. [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-12(l)]

The statute defines “(a) place of public accommodation” to 

include, but not be limited to: any … summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, whether for entertainment of transient guests or accommodation of those seeking health, recreation, or rest; any … retail shop, store, establishment, or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant, eating house, or place where food is sold for consumption on the premises … any auditorium, meeting place, or hall; any theatre … and any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or business school, high school, academy, college and university, or any educational institution under the supervision of the State Board of Education or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey. [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-5(l)]

Further, in July 2023, New Jersey’s Division on Civil Rights (DCR) issued guidance that explains how it will enforce the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) considering the US Supreme Court’s ruling in 303 Creative LLC. v. Elenis. The division said the 303 Creative ruling “will not affect how the LAD applies to the vast majority of businesses and vendors open to the public.” The New Jersey guidance highlights that the ruling “exempts only a narrow set of services offered by some places of public accommodation” from laws like the LAD. For instance, a public accommodation must establish the following to assert an exemption from the LAD:

Religious Exemption? Yes. The statute states: 

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization … from limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from making such selection as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained. [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-5(n)]

It also specifies this religious exemption for educational institutions: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to. . .any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution.” [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-5(l)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state division may receive and investigate complaints; a claimant also may file a civil lawsuit. [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-13] 

Anyone found to be a violator through the division investigation shall be liable for penalties (not more than $10,000 if a first violation within five years; not more than $25,000 if a second violation within five years; and not more than $50,000 if two or more violations occur within a seven-year period). [N.J. Stat. § 10:5-14.1a]  

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In a decision shortly after the US Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not apply to the states, the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied the Employment Division v. Smith standard of review for a free exercise claim (the statute need only have a secular legislative purpose; its principal effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion). (South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elem. Sch., 150 N.J. 575 (1997)).

Key cases: 

It has been the consistent construction and interpretation of the [law] that, consonant with constitutional legal barriers respecting legitimate belief and free exercise protected by the First Amendment, the [s]tate was not authorized to regulate or control religious worship, beliefs, governance, practice or liturgical norms, even where ostensibly or colorably at odds with any of the [law’s] prohibited categories of discrimination.

In light of the Ocean Grove outcome, one commentator noted several steps religious organizations should note going forward: 

(“The Ocean Grove Boardwalk Pavilion: A Public Accommodation? New Jersey Finds a Lesbian Couple’s Complaint of Discrimination by a Religious Organization is Supported by Probable Cause: Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association,” 11 Rutgers J. Law & Relig. 252, Dec. 29, 2008, David M. Estes.)

New Mexico’s law states:

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for … any person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any person because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth or condition related to pregnancy or childbirth, spousal affiliation, physical or mental disability or military status. [N.M. Stat. § 28-1-7(F)]

A “‘public accommodation’ means any governmental entity or any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or other place or establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.” [N.M. Stat. § 28-1-2(H)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limitations. It states:

Nothing contained in the Human Rights Act shall … bar any religious or denominational institution or organization that is operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in connection with a religious or denominational organization from limiting admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination; [or] bar any religious or denominational institution or organization that is operated, supervised or controlled by or that is operated in connection with a religious or denominational organization from imposing discriminatory employment or renting practices that are based upon sexual orientation or gender identity; provided, that the provisions of the Human Rights Act with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity shall apply to any other for-profit activities of a religious or denominational institution or religious organization subject to the provisions of Section 511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended or nonprofit activities of a religious or denominational institution or religious organization subject to the provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (emphases added). [N.M. Stat. § 28-1-9(B)(C)]

In 2013, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the subsections containing the religious exemptions in its decision in Elane Photography. The court said “(i)f a religious organization sold goods or services to the general public, neither subsection would allow the organization to turn away same-sex couples while catering to opposite-sex couples of all faiths.”

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. Upon determining probable cause, the director of the commission will seek resolution through “persuasion and conciliation.” The commission may seek injunctive relief. The complainant also “may seek a trial de novo in the district court” rather than “a hearing before the commission.” [N.M. Stat. § 28-1-10] A commission order not followed by a respondent can lead to enforcement by a district court. [N.M. Stat. § 28-1-12]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2000. It states:

A government agency shall not restrict a person’s free exercise of religion unless the restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability and does not directly discriminate against religion or among religions; and the application of the restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [N.M. Stat. § 28-22-3]

Key cases:

The New Mexico Supreme Court, affirming lower court holdings, rejected the photographer’s arguments. The refusal to photograph the wedding ceremony violated the NMHRA, and the photographer’s willingness to photograph a gay person so long as the photos did not reflect the client’s sexual preferences was unpersuasive. The court also cited the US Supreme Court’s decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, in which the US Supreme Court said its prior decisions (e.g. Lawrence v. Texas) have declined to distinguish between status and conduct. Lastly, the court ruled the enforcement of NMHRA did not result in compelled speech to promote a government message (the cited cases involved “specific government-selected messages” not present here, and NMHRA does not enumerate the style of photos or the selection of photos), nor did it result in compelling the photographer to host or accommodate the message of another speaker (the United States Supreme Court “has never found a compelled-speech violation arising from the application of antidiscrimination laws to a for-profit public accommodation,” and in cases involving the government unconstitutionally requiring a speaker to host/accommodate another speaker’s message, the issue involved “direct government interference,” rather than “a message-for-hire”). 

Regarding the free exercise claim, the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to decide whether a limited liability corporation like Elane Photography has free exercise rights, instead holding any such rights would “not [be] offended by enforcement of the NMHRA” since it is a neutral law of general applicability (citing the US Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith). The court’s decision also affirmed the lower court’s holding that the state RFRA applies only when a government agency has restricted a person’s free exercise of religion, and was not meant to apply to lawsuits between private parties.

Also of significant note to church leaders from the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Elane Photography: It said Subsection B of the NMHRA 

allows religious organizations to ‘limit[] admission to or giv[e] preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or [to make] selections of buyers, lessees or tenants’ that promote the organization’s religious principles. In the context of ‘buyers, lessees or tenants,” ‘buyers’ clearly refers to purchasers of real estate rather than retail customers. … Subsection C exempts religious organizations from provisions of the NMHRA governing sexual orientation and gender identity, but only regarding ‘employment or renting.’ If a religious organization sold goods or services to the general public, neither subsection would allow the organization to turn away same-sex couples while catering to opposite-sex couples of all faiths.

New York’s law states:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations . . . No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. [N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40]

The statute prohibits “any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution” from discriminating or harassing a “person … because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or disability.” [N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2)]

The statute contains conflicting definitions of “a place of public accommodation,” as well as differing language. Specifically:

to include … restaurants, or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises … retail stores and establishments … theatres … music halls … gymnasiums … kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities … public halls and public elevators of buildings and structures occupied by two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or more tenants.

include, regardless of whether the owner or operator of such place is … a private individual or entity … such terms as … restaurants, or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises … retail stores and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind … theatres … music halls … trailer camps, resort camps … gymnasiums … and any public areas of any building or structure.

It also exempts the following:

Such term shall not include kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities, extension courses, and all educational institutions under the supervision of the regents of the state of New York; any such kindergarten, primary and secondary school, academy, college, university, professional school, extension course or other education facility, supported in whole or in part by public funds or by contributions solicited from the general public; or any institution, club or place of accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly private. In no event shall an institution, club or place of accommodation be considered in its nature distinctly private if it has more than (100) members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of a nonmember for the furtherance of trade or business. An institution, club, or place of accommodation which is not deemed distinctly private pursuant to this subdivision may nevertheless apply such selective criteria as it chooses in the use of its facilities, in evaluating applicants for membership and in the conduct of its activities, so long as such selective criteria do not constitute discriminatory practices under this article or any other provision of law. For the purposes of this section,

a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under any other law of this state or a religious corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private (emphasis added).

A statute relating to “unlawful discriminatory practices” states the following:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence, of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, including . . . directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of [the above protected classes], . . . or that the patronage or custom thereat of any person of or purporting to be of any particular race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex or marital status, or having a disability is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. [N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2)] (Editor’s note: N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2) has two effective dates—the first is effective until November 16, 2024, and the second is effective November 16, 2024. In both dated versions, the statute’s language specifically relating to public accommodations in § 296(2)(a) is exact.)

Religious Exemption? Yes—see N.Y. Executive Law § 292, as stated above. 

Penalty for failing to comply? New York states:

Any person who shall violate any of the provisions … or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside. In addition, any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section shall be deemed guilty of a class A misdemeanor. At or before the commencement of any action under this section, notice thereof shall be served upon the attorney general. [N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

Court decisions suggest a lesser standard of judicial review for free exercise claims than what typical RFRAs require. In a 2006 decision by New York’s highest state court, it found a lesser standard of scrutiny to be more likely appropriate (hence making it more difficult for a claimant to raise a free exercise defense in relation to government action, such as a public accommodations statute):

Strict scrutiny is not the right approach to constitutionally-based claims for religious exemptions. Where the State has not set out to burden religious exercise, but seeks only to advance, in a neutral way, a legitimate object of legislation, we do not read the New York Free Exercise Clause to require the State to demonstrate a “compelling” interest in response to every claim by a religious believer to an exemption from the law; such a rule of constitutional law would give too little respect to legislative prerogatives, and would create too great an obstacle to efficient government. Rather, the principle stated by the United States Supreme Court in [Employment Division v.] Smith—that citizens are not excused by the Free Exercise Clause from complying with generally applicable and neutral laws, even ones offensive to their religious tenets—should be the usual, though not the invariable, rule. (Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510 (2006))

Key cases: 

North Carolina, along with Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas, is one of five states without its own general anti-discrimination statute. This means any complaints regarding alleged discrimination by a place of public accommodation must be made under either the federal government’s anti-discrimination statute found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a local ordinance (if one exists).

Religious Exemption? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Penalty for failing to comply? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Also of note: In 2016, the North Carolina legislature passed HB2. The law came after the Charlotte City Council expanded the municipality’s non-discrimination ordinance to, among other things, permit transgender people to use the bathroom of the gender with which they self-identify. After national backlash and boycotts resulted from the passage of HB2, the legislature passed HB142, which repealed HB2, but prohibited municipalities from either changing laws governing bathroom access in places of public accommodation or adopting antidiscrimination polices that are broader than what the state recognizes under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“race, color, religion, or national origin”). 

Around 2017, the ACLU and Lambda Legal brought suit in Carcaño v. Cooper to challenge both HB2 and HB142. In July 2019, a federal judge in North Carolina signed a consent decree order that “nothing in Section 2 of H.B. 142 can be construed. . . to prevent transgender people from lawfully using public facilities in accordance with their gender identity.” Further, the order enjoins the defendants from “applying Section 2 of H.B. 142 to bar, prohibit, block, deter, or impede any transgender individuals from using public facilities. . . in accordance with the transgender individual’s gender identity.” [Carcaño v. Cooper, No. 1:16cv236, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123497 (M.D.N.C. July 22, 2019)] In 2020, parts of HB142 expired, thus allowing local governments to pass ordinances relating to LGBTQ protections. 

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68 (1967), the North Carolina Supreme Court said the First Amendment free exercise clause is “so basic and fundamental” that “one may not be compelled by governmental action to do that which is contrary to his religious belief in the absence of a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s Constitutional power to regulate.’” However, in 2006, a state appellate court said the US Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith provides the standard for courts to use when evaluating a neutral law of general applicability that burdens religious exercise (the law still may stand even if it burdens religious exercise).

North Carolina has not adopted a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act, despite attempts by members of its legislature in 2015, 2017, and 2018. 

Key cases: 

Notably … (Title II) contains a comprehensive list of establishments which are considered ‘places of public accommodation.’ Schools, be they public or private, are conspicuously absent from this list. This does not mean, of course, that plaintiffs are barred from bringing any sort of civil rights action against schools with discriminatory practices; it simply means that their cause of action arises under another statute.

The judge also referenced Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), which determined Title II did not reach private schools because the law did not identify them as a place of public accommodation. Similarly, and in support of the US magistrate judge’s conclusion during a subsequent appeal, the appellate judge cited to Harless by Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ind. 1996), which also determined schools were not places of public accommodation under Title II. 

These conclusions potentially suggest courts in this jurisdiction may take a literal reading regarding the definition of a place of public accommodation based on the list of entities named in Title II. As such, it is worth noting churches and religious organizations are not specifically named by Title II.

North Dakota’s law states:

It is a discriminatory practice for a person engaged in the provision of public accommodations to fail to provide to a person access to the use of any benefit from the services and facilities of the public accommodations; or to give adverse, unlawful, or unequal treatment to a person with respect to the availability to the services and facilities, the price or other consideration therefor, the scope and equality thereof, or the terms and conditions under which the same are made available because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, or status with respect to marriage or public assistance. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-14]

A place of “‘public accommodation’ means every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or gratuity.” [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-02(14)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The statute provides this broader exemption, although it is limited and undefined: 

“Public accommodation” does not include a bona fide private club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private; provided, however, the distinctly private place, establishment, or facility is a “public accommodation” during the period it caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or gratuity. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-02(14)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed department may receive and investigate complaints. A person who is allegedly aggrieved may file a complaint with the department, or may file a civil lawsuit, but may not pursue both simultaneously. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-19]

Temporary or permanent injunctions may be sought either through a court or the state department overseeing the public accommodations statute. “Equitable relief” may also be awarded, but the state department cannot award compensatory or punitive damages. A court also may grant reasonable attorney fees and costs. A court also may order a complainant to pay court costs and reasonable attorney fees if an allegation is not made in good faith. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-20]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, effective in 2023.  

It states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a state or local government entity may not: substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion in a particular situation is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest; treat religious conduct more restrictively than any secular conduct of reasonably comparable risk; or treat religious conduct more restrictively than any comparable secular conduct because of alleged economic need or benefit. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-08.1]

Violations may be asserted as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding, and appropriate relief may be available including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. [N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-08.1(2)]

Key cases: None found.

Ohio’s statute states it is illegal 

(f)or any proprietor or any employee, keeper, or manager of a place of public accommodation to deny to any person, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry, the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of the place of public accommodation. [Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(G)]

The statute defines a “place of public accommodation” as “any … restaurant, eating house, … theater, store, other place for the sale of merchandise, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public.” [Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01(A)(9)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. [Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.04] The commission may use “conference, conciliation, and persuasion, or alternative dispute resolution” to attempt to end “any unlawful discriminatory practice” it finds. It also can issue cease-and-desist orders, restore admission to a place of public accommodation, order the payment of actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees, and assess civil penalties (up to $10,000 under certain instances; up to $25,000 under certain instances and one other violation occurred within five years; and up to $50,000 under certain instances and two or more other violations occurred within seven years). If probable cause is not found, the commission may award the party facing the allegations reasonable attorney fees. [Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.05]  

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

In a 2000 Ohio Supreme Court decision, the court interpreted the state’s constitutional protections for religious free exercise, and determined “the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person’s right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest,” a standard similar to typical RFRAs. (Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St. 3d 62 (2000)). 

Key cases: 

Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St. 3d 62 (2000) (see above).

“It is a discriminatory practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a “place of public accommodation” because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability.” [Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1402]

Oklahoma’s statute defines a place of public accommodation as “any place, store or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the general public.” [Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1401(1)]

Religious Exemption? No. 

The statute provides this broader, limited exception: “a private club is not a place of public accommodation, if its policies are determined by its members and its facilities or services are available only to its members and their bona fide guests.” [Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1401(1)(i)]

Penalty for failing to comply? The state’s attorney general’s Office of Civil Rights Enforcement may “receive, investigate, seek to conciliate, hold hearings on, and pass upon complaints alleging violations” of the law. [Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1501] The attorney general also “may file a civil action in district court for appropriate relief” including temporary or permanent injunctions seeking to end the alleged discriminatory practices, the awarding of appropriate relief (including monetary damages, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs), and civil penalties ($50,000 for a first violation and $100,000 for a second or subsequent violation). [Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1506.6]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2000. It states: 

(N)o governmental entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability … unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is (e)ssential to further a compelling governmental interest and (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 253]

Further, seemingly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and related closures or restrictions,  the law was amended in 2021 to state that no governmental entity “shall declare or deem a religious institution and any activity directly related to the institution’s discharge of its mission and purpose to be nonessential.” Thus, no religious institution can be subject to a closure or restriction “for the purposes of health or security that is greater than that imposed upon any private entity facing the same or similar health or security conditions.” [Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 253(C)]

In 2023, the law was amended again to state the following:

It shall be deemed a (s)ubstantial burden to exclude any person or entity from participation in or receipt of government funds, benefits, programs, or exemptions based solely on the religious character or affiliation of the person or entity. [Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 253(D)]

Key cases: Oklahoma Human Rights Commission v. Hotie, Inc., 1973 OK 5, 505 P.2d 1320 (Okla. 1973). The court held that the motion for summary judgment by a club accused of discrimination could not properly be sustained, where there had been an administrative finding that the club’s policies were not determined by its members and that the facilities or services of the club were available to outsiders.

Oregon states it is “unlawful practice for any person to deny full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation … on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, marital status or age.” [Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.403]

Oregon’s statute defines a place of public accommodation as “(a)ny place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation or otherwise.” [Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.400(1)(a)]

Religious Exemption? No.

The statute provides this broader, limited exception: “A place of public accommodation does not include … (a)n institution, bona fide club or place of accommodation that is in its nature distinctly private.” [Or. Rev. Stat. §659A.400(2)(e)]

Penalty for failing to comply? The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries may conduct investigations and “may take all steps necessary to eliminate and prevent unlawful practices.” [Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.800] The commission may file cease-and-desist orders prohibiting the continuation of the alleged unlawful practice, pending the outcome of the investigation. [Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.825] The commissioner may negotiate a settlement with a violator. [Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.840] If substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination is found, and “the matter cannot be settled through conference, conciliation and persuasion … the commissioner may file formal charges.” [Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.845] The commissioner also may impose civil penalties of $1,000 for each violation. [Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.855(1)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

Key cases: 

The Pennsylvania statute states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … (f)or any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employe of any public accommodation … to (r)efuse, withhold from, or deny to any person because of his race, color, sex, religious creed, ancestry, national origin or handicap or disability, or to any person due to use of a guide or support animal because of the blindness, deafness or physical handicap of the user or because the user is a handler or trainer of support or guide animals, either directly or indirectly, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of such public accommodation. [Penn. Stat. tit. 43, § 955(i)]

Pennsylvania defines a place of public accommodation as 

any accommodation … which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but not limited to … restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises … retail stores and establishments, theatres … music halls … gymnasiums … primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities, extension courses and all educational institutions under the supervision of this Commonwealth, nonsectarian cemeteries. [Penn. Stat. tit. 43, § 954(l)]

In separate guidance regarding the state’s antidiscrimination statute issued by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, “sex” is defined to include “sexual orientation” and “gender identity.”

Religious Exemption? No. 

The Pennsylvania statute provides this general, but undefined, exception, stating it “shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature distinctly private.” [Penn. Stat. tit. 43, § 954(l)]
Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may “initiate, receive, investigate and pass upon complaints charging unlawful discriminatory practices.” [Penn. Stat. tit. 43, § 957(f)] The commission may seek preliminary or special injunctions to stop alleged discriminatory activities, pending the outcome of an investigation. [Penn. Stat. tit. 43, § 959.2)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2002. Pennsylvania says “(a)n agency shall not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion, including any burden which results from a rule of general applicability.”

However, it also states the following:

(a)n agency may substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the agency proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the burden is all of the following (i)n furtherance of a compelling interest of the agency [and] (t)he least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest. [Pa. Stat. tit. 71, § 2404]

Key cases: 

Although a religious organization or a religious entity that is controlled by a religious organization has no obligations under the rule, a public accommodation that is not itself a religious organization, but that operates a place of public accommodation in leased space on the property of a religious entity, which is not a place of worship, is subject to the rule’s requirements if it is not under control of a religious organization. When a church rents meeting space, which is not a place of worship, to a local community group or to a private, independent day care center, the ADA applies to the activities of the local community group and day care center if a lease exists and consideration is paid.

Chestnut Hill College v. Pa. Human Rels. Comm’n, 158 A.3d 251 (2017). In the student’s action alleging that he was expelled from a Catholic college based on racial discrimination, the denial of the college’s motion to dismiss (premised on a lack of jurisdiction) was proper because, when the factual record remained undeveloped, the college was not absolutely excluded from the definition of “public accommodation” based on its religious nature. The college did not support its foundational assumption that expulsion involved an ecclesiastical matter. 

Rhode Island’s law states:

No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person on account of race or color, religion, country of ancestral origin, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of that public place. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-2]

A place of public accommodation 

includes, but is not limited to … restaurants, eating houses or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises … retail stores and establishments … theaters … music halls … gymnasiums … public halls and public elevators of buildings occupied by two (2) or more tenants or by the owner and one or more tenants. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-3]

The statute also notes: “Nothing contained in this chapter that refers to ‘sex’ shall be construed to mandate joint use of restrooms, bath houses, and dressing rooms by males and females.” [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-3.1]

Religious Exemption? No. 

Rhode Island also provides this general, but undefined, exemption: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to include any place of accommodation … which is in its nature distinctly private.” [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-3]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-24-4] Before instituting a formal hearing, it may use “conference, persuasion, and conciliation, to induce compliance.” [R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-16] It may award compensatory damages. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24(b)] Judicial proceedings also may be initiated. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-29] Punitive damages also may be awarded when conduct “shown to be motivated by malice or ill will or … the action involves reckless or callous indifference” is found. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-29.1]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1993. It states:

(A) governmental authority may not restrict a person’s free exercise of religion … [unless] (t)he restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does not intentionally discriminate against religion, or among religions; and (t)he governmental authority proves that application of the restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-3]

Key cases: None found.

“No person shall withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive, or attempt to deprive any person of any right or privilege … on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” [S.C. Code § 45-9-10; 45-9-30]

The statute’s “declaration of policy” further expands the classes of people protected from unlawful discrimination, including “race, religion, color, sex, age, national origin, or disability.” [S.C. Code § 1-13-20]

The statute defines a place of public accommodation as “any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom … or other facility principally … engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises … any retail or wholesale establishment … any … theater … or other place of … entertainment.” [S.C. Code § 45-9-10]

Religious Exemption? No.

South Carolina’s statute provides a general, but undefined, exception: “The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the general public.” [S.C. Code § 45-9-20]

Penalty for failing to comply? Upon receiving a report regarding a pattern or practice of discrimination, the state attorney general shall notify the State Law Enforcement Division, which shall investigate. The division also shall notify the State Human Affairs Commission, and it shall determine whether reasonable cause to believe the facts alleged warrant a violation. [S.C. Code § 45-9-40] Relief may include revocation of state or local permits or licenses for at least three years. [S.C. Code § 45-9-80]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1999. The statute states:

The State may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the State demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is: in furtherance of a compelling state interest; and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling state interest. [S.C. Code § 1-32-40]

Key cases: None found.

South Dakota prohibits the following:

any person engaged in the provision of public accommodations … to fail or refuse to provide to any person access to the use of and benefit from the services and facilities of such public accommodations; or to accord adverse, unlawful, or unequal treatment to any person with respect to the availability of such services and facilities, the price or other consideration therefor, the scope and equality thereof, or the terms and conditions under which the same are made available … because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability or national origin. [S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-13-23]

South Dakota defines a “public accommodation” as “any place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or gratuitously.” [S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-13-1(12)] 

Religious Exemption? No.

The statute offers this limited and undefined general exception: 

Public accommodation does not mean any bona fide private club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private, except when such distinctly private place, establishment, or facility caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for fee or charge or gratuitously, it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such period of use (emphasis added). [S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-13-1(12)] 

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed division of human rights “may receive, investigate, and pass upon charges alleging unfair or discriminatory practices.” [S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-28] Upon finding probable cause, the division’s commissioner “shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the discriminatory or unfair practice by conference or conciliation.” [S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-32] If a notice stating charges is issued to an alleged violator, the charging party or alleged victim may instead elect—within 20 days of the notice’s issuance—to pursue civil action, and may pursue compensatory damages and injunctive orders upon prevailing. [S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-13-35.1]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2021. 

The law provides the following:

No state agency, political subdivision, or any elected or appointed official or employee of this state or its political subdivision may: substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion in a particular situation is essential to furthering a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest; (t)reat religious conduct more restrictively than any secular conduct of reasonably comparable risk; or (t)reat religious conduct more restrictively than comparable secular conduct because of alleged economic need or benefit. [S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-1A-4]

Key cases: LaBore v. Muth, 473 N.W.2d 485 (1991). South Dakota’s Human Relations Act in general, and S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-23 in particular, prohibit only the types of discrimination enumerated by the statute, not all possible forms of discrimination.

Tennessee states: 

(I)t is a discriminatory practice for a person to deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, as defined in this chapter, on the grounds of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin. [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-501]

Tennessee defines “(p)laces of public accommodation” as “any place, store or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, that supplies goods or services to the general public or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public.” [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-102(15)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Tennessee provides a general, limited exception for “(a) bona fide private club [that] is not a place of public accommodation … if its policies are determined solely by its members; and (i)ts facilities or services are available only to its members and their bona fide guests.” [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-102(15)(A)(B)]

The state also notes the following with respect to “sex” as a protected class: “Nothing in this part shall prohibit segregation on the basis of sex of bathrooms, health clubs, rooms for sleeping or changing clothes, or other places of public accommodation the commission specifically exempts on the basis of bona fide considerations of public policy.” [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-503]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-302] Upon reviewing a complaint and determining “reasonable cause” exists, the commission “shall endeavor to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practices by conference, conciliation and persuasion.” If an agreement is reached, but the alleged violator does not meet the terms, the commission can take further action. [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-303] If the commission concludes discriminatory practices have occurred, it can issue a cease-and-desist order and take additional action it deems necessary, including admission to a place of public accommodation, and payment of damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-305 and 306] The state also recognizes an alleged victim’s right to pursue civil action, which supersedes any complaint or hearing before the commission. [Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2009. It states:

(N)o government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is: €ssential to further a compelling governmental interest; and (t)he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Tenn. Code § 4-1-407]

In a 2010 decision, a Tennessee appellate court noted a difference between the federal RFRA and the state’s RFRA. Under the federal RFRA, the federal government must demonstrate that the proposed action is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. Under the state’s RFRA, the governmental agency must prove—by clear and convincing evidence—that its proposed course of action is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, a sign the Tennessee general assembly intended to provide greater protection of religious freedom than the federal RFRA. (Editor’s note: The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is not as high as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required in criminal cases, but it is higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required in most civil cases.) (Johnson v. Levy, S.W.3d (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010))

Three years later, in Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 428 S.W.3d 800, (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013), a Tennessee appellate court said the partial denial of a church’s application for tax exemption for areas used for retail and commercial uses did not violate the state’s RFRA because the tax exemption statutes did not substantially burden any apparent religious belief and did not prohibit or coerce any act contrary to religious belief. Additionally, the court said, the state had a compelling interest in ensuring a fair distribution of the tax burden. 

Key cases: 

Sloan v. Community Christian School, 2015 WL 10437824 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). This case addressed the definition of “a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA, rather than a state or local public accommodations law. Nevertheless, its discussion of this key term provides some clarification, even if by inference. It suggests that churches that operate “a day care center, a nursing home, a private school, or a diocesan school system” may be places of public accommodation subject to the nondiscrimination provisions of a local or state public accommodations law.

Texas, along with Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina, is one of five states without its own general anti-discrimination statute. This means any complaints regarding alleged discrimination by a place of public accommodation must be made under either the federal government’s anti-discrimination statute found in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or a local ordinance (if one exists).

Religious Exemption? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

Penalty for failing to comply? See Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or local ordinance (if one exists).

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 1999. “A government agency may not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion” unless it shows the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restricted means of furthering that interest” [Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code §110.001, et seq.].

Key cases:

Lowe v. ViewPoint Bank, 972 F. Supp. 2d 947 (2013). A federal district court in Texas ruled that a bank is not a place of public accommodation because Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically lists entities deemed to be public accommodations and banks are not included on that list.

Utah prohibits “a business establishment or place of public accommodation” from discriminating against “(a)ll persons … on the basis of race, color, sex, pregnancy, religion, ancestry or national origin.” [Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3]

Utah defines a “place of public accommodation” as “every place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge.” [Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(a)(i)]

Notably, in 2015, the Utah legislature approved an amendment modifying portions of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act and the Utah Fair Housing Act to incorporate sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes while also providing religious freedom protections. However, public accommodations were not addressed with the amendment—only employment and housing.

Religious Exemption? Yes—but it appears limited. 

The statute states “(n)othing in this act shall be construed … to deny any religious organization the right to regulate the operation and procedures of its establishments.” [Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3]

However, in its definition of a “place of public accommodation,” the statute—in stating an exemption to the law exists for an institution or church—still limits that exemption “to the extent that the institution [or] church is open to the public” (emphasis added). [Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A violator may be enjoined from continuing a practice deemed discriminatory and may be found guilty by the state of “maintaining a public nuisance.” An aggrieved party also may pursue remedies through a civil lawsuit. Any public accommodation ultimately found not to be in violation of the law “may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses incurred in defending” itself. [Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-4]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, enacted in 2024. The law states “(t)he free exercise of religion is a fundamental right and applies to all government action, including action that is facially neutral.” The law provides that a government entity “may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion of a person, regardless of whether the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” A government entity/action may “substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion only if the government entity. . .demonstrates that the burden on the person’s free exercise of religion is: essential to furthering a compelling governmental interest; and the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest.”

Separately, the “Utah Religious Land Use Act” addresses state or local laws or ordinances “that limit or restrict … use or development of land or a structure affixed to land” by persons, including corporations or legal entities that own interests in real property. [Utah Code Ann. § 63L-5-101 et seq.] It states 

(a) government entity may impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on a person’s free exercise of religion if the government can establish that the imposition of the burden on that person: is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. [Utah Code Ann. § 63L-5-201]

Key cases: 

Vermont’s statute states: 

An owner or operator of a place of public accommodation or an agent or employee of such owner or operator shall not, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, marital status, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity of any person, refuse, withhold from, or deny to that person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of the place of public accommodation. [Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 4502(a)]

Vermont defines a “(p)lace of public accommodation” as “any school, restaurant, store, establishment, or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, benefits, or accommodations are offered to the general public.” [Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 4501(1)]

Vermont further defines a “(p)ublic accommodation” as “an individual, organization … or other entity that owns, leases, leases to, or operates a place of public accommodation.” [Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 4501(8)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—specifically pertaining to marriage ceremonies. It states: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage. Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create any civil claim or cause of action. This subsection shall not be construed to limit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization from selectively providing services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to some individuals with respect to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage but not to others. [Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 4502(l)]

Penalty for failing to comply? 

“A person who violates a provision of this chapter shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 per violation.” [Vt. Stat. tit. 9, § 4507]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

Key cases: 

The statute states in pertinent part:

It is the policy of the Commonwealth to (s)afeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, military status, or disability, in places of public accommodation, including educational institutions and in real estate transactions; . . . in employment; (p)reserve the public safety, health, and general welfare; [and] (f)urther the interests, rights, and privileges of individuals within the Commonwealth. [Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3900(B)]

Further, another related statute section states the following:

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, including the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation, to refuse, withhold from, or deny any individual, or to attempt to refuse, withhold from, or deny any individual, directly or indirectly, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation. . . on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, disability, or military status. [Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3904(B)]

Religious Exemption? The code states that “the provisions. . .shall not apply to a private club, a place of accommodation owned by or operated on behalf of a religious corporation, association, or society that is not in fact open to the public, or any other establishment that is not in fact open to the public.” [Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3904(C)]

Penalty for failing to comply? The Office of Civil Rights may, among other things, receive and investigate complaints, and may “(s)eek through appropriate enforcement authorities, prevention of or relief from an alleged unlawful discriminatory practice.” [Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-520(C)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, originally enacted in 1786 and amended several times since:

No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is (i) essential to further a compelling governmental interest and (ii) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.  [Va. Code Ann. § 57-2.02(B)]

Key cases: 

The “Washington Law Against Discrimination” (WLAD) states:

It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s agent or employee to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or discrimination, or the requiring of any person to pay a larger sum than the uniform rates charged other persons, or the refusing or withholding from any person the admission, patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwelling, staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, status as a mother breastfeeding her child, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability. [Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.215]

Washington defines a place of public accommodation as 

any place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire, or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service, occupancy, or use of any property or facilities … or for the sale of goods, merchandise, services, or personal property, or for the rendering of personal services …  or where food or beverages of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises … or where the public gathers, congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation, or public purposes … or educational institution, or schools of special instruction, or nursery schools, or day care centers or children’s camps. [Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2)] 

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limited. It states:

(N)othing contained in this definition shall be construed to include or apply to any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private …  though where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this chapter; nor shall anything contained in this definition apply to any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution. [Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(2)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints and, upon identifying “an unfair practice has been or is being committed,” the commission “shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the unfair practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” [Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.240]

If the commission’s effort to end an unfair practice is unsuccessful, the commission may appoint an administrative law judge to hear the complaint. Upon a finding the unfair practice occurred, the administrative law judge may issue cease-and-desist orders, reinstatement of admission for the aggrieved party, and award damages, “except that damages for humiliation and mental suffering shall not exceed $20,000.” [Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.250]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

In a June 2019 decision by the Washington Supreme Court, it held that the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) was a neutral law of general applicability, and thus enjoyed a lower standard of judicial review. The Court then rejected a free exercise defense raised by a florist, who had declined to provide custom arrangements for a same-sex couple and was sanctioned by the state for violating WLAD. (Editor’s note: A petition seeking review of this decision by the US Supreme Court was denied in 2021).

Key cases: 

West Virginia’s statute states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice … For any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodations to: (r)efuse, withhold from or deny to any individual because of his or her race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or disability, either directly or indirectly, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or services of the place of public accommodations. [W. Va. Code § 5-11-9(6)(A)]

The state defines “place of public accommodations” to mean “any establishment or person … which offers its services, goods, facilities or accommodations to the general public.” [W. Va. Code § 5-11-3(j)]

Religious Exemption? No.

West Virginia states the statute “shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature private.” [W. Va. Code § 5-11-3(j)] It further explains the “private club exemption” as follows:

Nothing in this article shall prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or guests of members or from giving preference to its members or guests of members (emphases added). [W. Va. Code § 5-11-19]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed commission may receive and investigate complaints. Upon determining probable cause, the commission may seek to resolve the matter through “conference, conciliation and persuasion.” If the commission ultimately concludes a unlawful discriminatory practice has occurred, it may issue a cease-and-desist order, order “admission to full and equal enjoyment of the services, goods, facilities, or accommodations offered by any respondent place of public accommodation.”  [W. Va. Code § 5-11-10] If a violator fails to abide by a commission order, the commission may seek enforcement through a court order. [W. Va. Code § 5-11-10] A violator who willfully violates a commission order shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and either fined $100 to $500, imprisoned 30 days, or both. [W. Va. Code § 5-11-14]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Yes, the “Equal Protection for Religion” Act, as enacted in 2023. 

This law provides that no state action may:

Substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless applying the burden to that person’s exercise of religion in a particular situation is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest; nor (t)reat religious conduct more restrictively than any conduct of reasonably comparable risk; nor (t)reat religious conduct more restrictively than comparable conduct because of alleged economic need or benefit. [W.Va. Code § 35-1A-1] 

Key cases: None found.

Wisconsin’s statute states: 

No person may do any of the following: Deny to another or charge another a higher price than the regular rate for the full and equal enjoyment of any public place of accommodation or amusement because of sex, race, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry … [or] Give preferential treatment to some classes of persons in providing services or facilities in any public place of accommodation or amusement because of sex, race, color, creed, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry. [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(3)(a)]

Wisconsin states a “(p)ublic place of accommodation … shall be interpreted broadly to include, but not be limited to, places of business or recreation … restaurants … and any place where accommodations … goods, or services are available either free or for a consideration.” [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(1)(e)(1)]

Religious Exemption? Yes—but limited. The statute says:

‘Public place of accommodation or amusement’ does not include a place where a bona fide private, nonprofit organization or institution provides accommodations … goods or services during an event in which the organization or institution provides the accommodations … goods or services to the following individuals only: Members of the organization or institution; Guests named by members of the organization or institution; [or] Guests named by the organization or institution (emphasis added).

The statute also states “(n)othing in this subsection prohibits separate treatment of persons based on sex with regard to public toilets, showers, saunas and dressing rooms for persons of different sexes.” [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(3)(c)]

Penalty for failing to comply? A state-appointed department may receive and investigate complaints, and upon finding probable cause “may endeavor to eliminate the act by conference, conciliation and persuasion.” If the activity continues, the department may convene a hearing before an examiner—and if the examiner determines the activity to be discriminatory based on a preponderance of the evidence (meaning more likely than not to have occurred), the examiner may issue an order for the activity to stop. If the examiner determines the activity was not discriminatory, the department must pay costs of up to $100, plus costs associated with the appearances of witnesses. [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(4)(a)]

Additionally, “at any time after a complaint is filed, the department may file a petition in the circuit court for the county in which the act prohibited … allegedly occurred, or for the county in which a respondent resides or transacts business, seeking appropriate temporary relief … including an order or decree restraining the respondent from” continuing the activity. [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(4)(a)]

A violator faces a fine of $100 to $1,000 for a first violation and $1,000 to $10,000 for any subsequent violations within a five-year period. [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(4)(d)]

Wisconsin also recognizes a plaintiff’s private right to file a civil lawsuit seeking “appropriate injunctive relief, for damages including punitive damages and, [should the plaintiff prevail], court costs and reasonable attorney fees.” [Wis. Stat. § 106.52(4)(e)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No. 

In a 2009 ministerial exception case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it restated its long-standing interpretation of the state constitution’s protection of religious freedom, indicating the court generally applies the 

compelling state interest/least restrictive alternative test … [in which] a religious organization [must] prove (1) that it has a sincerely held religious belief, and (2) that such belief is burdened by the application of the state law at issue. Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is based upon a compelling state interest (4) that cannot be served by a less restrictive alternative.” 

Though the test proved “unhelpful” to deciding the case at hand, the court noted it is “appropriate in most circumstances regarding laws burdening the rights of conscience.” (Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868 (2009))

Key cases: 

The Wyoming law states:

All persons … are entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of all accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of all places or agencies which are public in nature, or which invite the patronage of the public, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, religion, color, sex or national origin. [Wyo. Stat. § 6-9-101(a)]

Religious Exemption? No.

Penalty for failing to comply? The statute states “(a) person who intentionally violates this section commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both.” [Wyo. Stat. § 6-9-101(b)]

State Religious Freedom Restoration Act? No.

In a 2017 decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the state’s discipline of a judge who refused to perform same-sex marriages was proper. The judge had raised a religious freedom defense. The court, stating that although it adheres to the US Supreme Court’s Employment Division v. Smith holding (which requires a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny for a government action or law that is valid and neutral and only incidentally burdens religion), it still applied a higher strict scrutiny standard to the present case—and still determined the judge’s defense failed. (Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 390 P.3d 728 (2017)). 

To note, as of February 16, 2024, HB0178 (proposed Wyoming state Religious Freedom Restoration Act) failed after the House did not consider it for introduction. 

Key cases: