The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Key point 13-09. Competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment on the basis of their religious beliefs, including potentially life-saving treatment. However, they do not have the right to withhold life-saving medical treatment from their minor children.
Several courts have dealt with the right of an individual to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. Such cases often involve treatment that is apparently necessary to save the diseased or injured person's life. In a majority of cases, courts have upheld the right of an adult to refuse potentially life-saving medical treatment on religious grounds, unless the individual is (1) mentally incompetent, (2) the parent and sole provider of young children, or (3) a pregnant woman. The majority rule was well-summarized by a New York court:
As a general rule, every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body and cannot be subjected to medical treatment without his consent. Specifically, where there is no compelling state interest which justifies overriding an adult patient's decision not to receive blood transfusions because of religious beliefs, such transfusions should not be ordered. Such an order would constitute a violation of the First Amendment's freedom of exercise clause.
However, judicial power to order compulsory medical treatment over an adult patient's objection exists in some situations. It may be the duty of the court to assume the responsibility of guardianship for a patient who is not compos mentis [mentally competent] to the extent of authorizing treatment necessary to save his life even though the medical treatment authorized may be contrary to the patient's religious beliefs. Furthermore, the state's interest, as parens patriae [i.e., protector of its citizens] in the welfare of children may justify compulsory medical care where necessary to save the life of the mother of young children or of a pregnant woman.[81] In re Melidio, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1976). Accord Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972); People v. Duncan, 205 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1965).
Such cases generally involve Jehovah's Witnesses who refuse potentially life-saving blood transfusions, Christian Scientists who refuse any form of medical care, or fundamentalist Christians who rely solely on faith healing. The result generally is the same in all three cases: the courts will honor the individual's desire to refuse medical treatment so long as he or she is mentally competent, even if such a decision will result in what otherwise would have been a preventable death. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in a case involving a fundamentalist Christian's refusal to receive life-saving medical treatment on the basis of his reliance on prayer, "the state may not compel a legally competent adult to submit to medical treatment which would violate that individual's religious beliefs even though the treatment is arguably life-extending." This is so no matter how "unwise, foolish, or ridiculous" those beliefs may seem to others.[82] In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987).
While some courts have limited a competent adult's right to refuse potentially life-saving medical treatment when the individual is a parent of minor children, other courts have rejected such a limitation.
Example
• The Florida Supreme Court ruled that a civil court could not force a mother to receive a life-saving blood transfusion against her will and contrary to her religious beliefs.[83] Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1989). See also In re Dubreuil, 603 So.2d 538 (Fla. App.1992). The woman entered a public hospital suffering from "dysfunctional uterine bleeding," and was informed by doctors that she would die if she did not receive a blood transfusion. The woman, a practicing Jehovah's Witness and mother of two minor children, refused the transfusion on the ground that it would violate her religious beliefs (she was competent at the time of her decision). The hospital asked a civil court to force the woman to undergo a blood transfusion. The court granted the hospital's request and ordered the woman to undergo a transfusion (she was by then unconscious) on the ground that "minor children have a right to be reared by two loving parents, a right which overrides the mother's right of free exercise [of religion] and privacy." Upon regaining consciousness, the woman appealed the court's order to a state appeals court, which ruled in favor of the woman. The hospital appealed the case to the state supreme court, which also ruled in favor of the woman. The court cited four factors to consider in deciding whether or not a patient's constitutional right to religious freedom outweighs the state's interest in requiring potentially life-saving medical treatment: "(1) preservation of life, (2) protection of innocent third parties, (3) prevention of suicide, and (4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession." The court disagreed with the hospital's claim that the state's interest in maintaining a home with two parents for minor children outweighed any constitutional right of the mother to terminate her life by refusing medical treatment. It concluded, "[This case involves] a delicate balancing analysis in which the courts weigh, on the one hand, the patient's constitutional right of privacy and right to practice one's religion, as against certain basic societal interests. Obviously, there are no preordained answers to such problematic questions and the results reached in these cases are highly debatable. Running through all of these decisions, however, is the courts' deeply imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable governmental interference. Surely nothing, in the last analysis, is more private or more sacred than one's religion or view of life, and here the courts, quite properly, have given great deference to the individual's right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life according to his own conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is, without exaggeration, the very bedrock on which this country was founded."
The courts have consistently held that life-saving medical treatment can be administered to a minor child despite his or her parents' refusal to consent to such treatment on religious grounds, unless the treatment itself poses a significant danger to the child. One court observed:
[P]arents … have a perfect right to worship as they please and believe what they please. They enjoy complete freedom of religion. The parents also have the right to use all lawful means to vindicate this right. … But this right of theirs ends where somebody else's right begins. Their child is a human being in his own right with a soul and body of his own. He has rights of his own — the right to live and grow up and live without disfigurement. The child is a citizen of the State. While he "belongs" to his parents, he belongs also to his State. Their rights in him entail many duties. Likewise, the fact the child belongs to the State imposes upon the State many duties. Chief among them is the duty to protect his right to live and to grow up with a sound mind in a sound body. … When a religious doctrine espoused by the parents threatens to defeat or curtail such a right of their child, the State's duty to step in and preserve the child's right is immediately operative.[84] In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ill. 1962). Accord In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972); Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. 1974); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970); Matter of Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. 1983) ("[w]here a child is dying with cancer and experiencing pain which will surely become more excruciating as the disease progresses … we believe is one of those times when humane considerations and life-saving attempts outweigh unlimited practices of religious belief").
Another court has observed that "it does not follow that parents who wish to be martyrs for their religious beliefs have a right to impose such martyrdom upon their offspring. …"[85] Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 1974). When a minor child's life is not in danger, some courts have permitted the child's parents to refuse consent to medical treatment on religious grounds. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, "We are of the opinion that as between a parent and the state, the state does not have an interest of sufficient magnitude outweighing a parent's religious beliefs when the child's life is not immediately imperiled by his physical condition."[86] In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972). Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion.[87] See, e.g., In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
Some parents have been prosecuted for manslaughter (or other crimes) when their minor child dies because the parents refused life-saving medical treatment and relied exclusively on divine healing.
Case studies
• The California Supreme Court ruled that a mother could be prosecuted for manslaughter when her child died of meningitis after being treated by prayer instead of medical therapy.[88] Walker v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. 1988). Accord People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982). The victim was a 4-year-old girl who fell ill with flu-like symptoms and a stiff neck. Consistent with the tenets of her religion, the child's mother chose to treat the illness with prayer rather than medical care. Members of the mother's church prayed with the child on two occasions. Nevertheless, the child lost weight, grew disoriented and irritable, and her breathing became heavy and irregular. She died of acute meningitis 17 days after her symptoms first appeared. The child's mother was charged with involuntary manslaughter, and she moved to dismiss the prosecution on the ground that her conduct was protected by law. Specifically, the mother argued that involuntary manslaughter is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice "in the commission of an unlawful act … or without due caution or circumspection," and that her child had not died "in the commission of an unlawful act." She pointed out that the only "unlawful act" for which she could have been charged was the criminal neglect of a child, and that California law exempted "treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone" from the definition of criminal neglect. The state supreme court rejected the mother's arguments, concluding that she could be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that the exemption of "treatment by spiritual means by prayer alone" from the definition of criminal neglect did not necessarily exempt such treatment from the crime of manslaughter. The court also rejected the mother's claim that her actions were protected by the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. It observed that the mother's constitutional rights were outweighed by a "compelling state interest" of "unparalleled significance" —the protection of children. It further noted that "parents may be free to become martyrs themselves … but it does not follow that they are free … to make martyrs of their children."
• A parent was prosecuted for manslaughter when his 5-week-old daughter died from bronchial pneumonia. The parent lived with his wife and 9 children in a small cabin in the mountains. He had been on a "walk of faith," which he described as a total reliance on God for all needs and for healing in times of illness or injury. One of the tenets of his church was healing of the sick through prayer. When the baby developed cold symptoms, her parents and another church member anointed the baby with oil, laid their hands on her head, and prayed for her healing. The next day, the baby's symptoms worsened. Because the mother was exhausted from caring for several sick children, and because the family's wood-burning stove seemed to aggravate the baby's condition, the baby was moved to a neighbor's home. The neighbor (who was a nurse) informed the parents that the baby might be suffering from pneumonia, and she urged them to take the baby to a hospital at once. The father declined, stating that "we can't, this is our walk and this is our life." The next morning, the baby seemed better. Later in the day, however, the symptoms worsened again, and the baby died that evening. An autopsy revealed that the baby had died from "acute necrotizing bronchial pneumonia." The father was later prosecuted for child abuse resulting in death. At the trial, a pediatrician testified that the baby would have survived had she received proper medical care. The father was convicted, and he was sentenced to 6 years of probation. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the father's conviction on the basis of a technicality, and sent the case back to the trial court for another trial.[89] Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991). The court noted that state law provided a defense to child abuse in cases of "treatment by spiritual means," and that the trial court had improperly let the jury decide if this defense were available rather than compelling the prosecutor to establish the crime, and the unavailability of the "treatment by spiritual means" defense, with evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt." The court cautioned that the "treatment by spiritual means" defense to child abuse was not available under state law when a child is suffering from a condition that would create a danger to the child's life if left untreated.
• A Pennsylvania court upheld the criminal convictions of two parents for criminal neglect of their 2-year-old son because of their reliance on prayer and divine healing rather than medical care for a life-threatening medical condition. The parents insisted that they did not commit criminal neglect. To the contrary, they prayed for their son and had him anointed. The court rejected the parents' defense. It observed: "Regardless of the label attached to their course of conduct, their failure to seek medical care constituted a breach of their duties as parents. The law imposes an affirmative duty on parents to seek medical help when the life of a child is threatened, regardless, and in fact despite, their religious beliefs. … Every parent … has a duty of care to their child, at the very least, to avert the child's untimely death. … The validity and sincerity of the religious beliefs of [the parents] were not relevant to the issues presented. They had no choice but to seek help, despite their religious beliefs, when they were faced with a condition which threatened their child's life."[90] Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 1076 (Pa. App. 2000).
Table of Contents
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1Definitions and Status
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§ 1.01Distinctions Between the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister
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§ 1.02Definition of the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister — In General
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§ 1.03Status—Employee or Self Employed
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§ 1.03.01Social Security
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§ 1.03.02Income Taxes
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§ 1.03.03Retirement Plans
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§ 1.03.04Legal Liability
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§ 1.03.05Miscellaneous Federal and State Statutes
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§ 1.04Status—Ordained, Commissioned, or Licensed
2The Pastor-Church Relationship
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§ 2.01Initiating the Relationship—In General
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§ 2.01.01Congregational Churches
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§ 2.01.02Hierarchical Churches
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§ 2.01.03Compliance with a Church's Governing Instrument in the Selection of a Minister
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§ 2.01.04Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—the General Rule of Non-Intervention
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§ 2.01.05Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—Limited Exceptions to the General Rule
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§ 2.01.06Negligent Selection
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§ 2.02The Contract
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§ 2.03Compensation
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§ 2.04Termination
3Authority, Rights, and Privileges
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§ 3.01General Scope of a Minister's Authority
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§ 3.02Officer of the Church Corporation
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§ 3.03Property Matters
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§ 3.04Performance of Marriage Ceremonies
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§ 3.05Exemption from Military Duty
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§ 3.06Exemption From Jury Duty
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§ 3.07The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—In General
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§ 3.07.01A "Communication"
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§ 3.07.02Made in Confidence
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§ 3.07.03To a Minister
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§ 3.07.04Acting in a Professional Capacity as a Spiritual Adviser
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§ 3.07.05In the Course of Discipline
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§ 3.08The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—Miscellaneous Issues
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§ 3.08.01Clergy-Parishioner Relationship
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§ 3.08.02Marriage Counseling
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§ 3.08.03Who May Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.04When to Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.05Waiver of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.06The Privilege in Federal Courts
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§ 3.08.07Constitutionality of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.08Child Abuse Reporting
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§ 3.08.09Confidentiality
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§ 3.08.10Disclosure to Civil Authorities
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§ 3.08.11Church Records
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§ 3.08.12Death of the Counselee
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§ 3.09Visiting Privileges at Penal Institutions
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§ 3.10Immigration of Alien Ministers, Religious Vocations, and Religious Occupations
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§ 3.11Miscellaneous Benefits
4Liabilities, Limitations, and Restrictions
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§ 4.01Negligence
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§ 4.02Defamation—In General
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§ 4.02.01Pastors Who Are Sued for Making Defamatory Statements
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§ 4.02.02Pastors Who Are Victims of Defamation
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§ 4.02.03Defenses
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§ 4.03Undue Influence
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§ 4.04Invasion of Privacy
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§ 4.05Clergy Malpractice
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§ 4.06Contract Liability
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§ 4.07Securities Law Violations
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§ 4.08Failure to Report Child Abuse
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§ 4.09Diversion of Church Funds
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§ 4.10State Regulation of Psychologists and Counselors
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§ 4.11Sexual Misconduct
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§ 4.11.01Theories of Liability
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§ 4.11.02Defenses to Liability
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5Definitions
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§ 5.01Tax Legislation—Federal
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§ 5.01.01Churches
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§ 5.01.02Mail Order Churches
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§ 5.01.03Other Religious Organizations
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§ 5.01.04Tax Legislation—State
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§ 5.02Zoning Law
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§ 5.02.01Churches
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§ 5.02.02Accessory Uses
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6Organization and Administration
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§ 6.01Unincorporated Associations
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§ 6.01.01Characteristics
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§ 6.01.02Personal Liability of Members
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§ 6.01.03Creation and Administration
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§ 6.02Corporations
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§ 6.02.01The Incorporation Process
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§ 6.02.02Charters, Constitutions, Bylaws, and Resolutions
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§ 6.03Church Records
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§ 6.03.01Inspection
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§ 6.03.02“Accountings” of Church Funds
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§ 6.03.03Public Inspection of Tax-Exemption Applications
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§ 6.03.04Government Inspection of Donor and Membership Lists
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§ 6.03.05The Church Audit Procedures Act
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§ 6.03.06Who Owns a Church’s Accounting Records?
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§ 6.04Reporting Requirements
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§ 6.04.01State Law
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§ 6.04.02Federal Law
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§ 6.05Church Names
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§ 6.06Officers, Directors, and Trustees—In General
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§ 6.06.01Election or Appointment
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§ 6.06.02Authority
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§ 6.06.03Meetings
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§ 6.06.04Removal
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§ 6.07Officers, Directors, and Trustees—Personal Liability
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§ 6.07.01Tort Liability
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§ 6.07.02Contract Liability
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§ 6.07.03Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Care
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§ 6.07.04Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
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§ 6.07.05Violation of Trust Terms
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§ 6.07.06Securities Law
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§ 6.07.07Wrongful Discharge of an Employee
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§ 6.07.08Willful Failure to Withhold Taxes
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§ 6.07.09Exceeding the Authority of the Board
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§ 6.07.10Loans to Directors
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§ 6.08Immunity Statutes
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§ 6.08.01Directors and Officers Insurance
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§ 6.09Members—In General
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§ 6.09.01Selection and Qualifications
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§ 6.09.02Authority
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§ 6.10Members—Discipline and Dismissal
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§ 6.10.01Judicial Nonintervention
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§ 6.10.02“Marginal” Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.03Preconditions to Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.04Remedies for Improper Discipline or Dismissal
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§ 6.11Members—Personal Liability
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§ 6.12Meetings of Members
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§ 6.12.01Procedural Requirements
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§ 6.12.02Minutes
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§ 6.12.03Parliamentary Procedure
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§ 6.12.04Effect of Procedural Irregularities
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§ 6.12.05Judicial Supervision of Church Elections
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§ 6.12.06Who May Attend
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§ 6.13Powers of a Local Church
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§ 6.14Merger and Consolidation
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§ 6.15Dissolution
7Church Property
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§ 7.01Church Property Disputes—In General
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§ 7.02Church Property Disputes—Supreme Court Rulings
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§ 7.03State and Lower Federal Court Rulings
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§ 7.04Church Property Disputes—Dispute Resolution Procedures
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§ 7.05Transferring Church Property
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§ 7.06Zoning Law
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§ 7.07Restricting Certain Activities Near Church Property
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§ 7.08Building Codes
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§ 7.08.01Lead Paint on Church Property
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§ 7.09Nuisance
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§ 7.10Landmarking
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§ 7.11Eminent Domain
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§ 7.12Defacing Church Property
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§ 7.13Restrictive Covenants
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§ 7.14Reversion of Church Property to the Prior Owner
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§ 7.15Materialmen’s Liens
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§ 7.16Religious Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Church Property
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§ 7.17Removing Disruptive Individuals
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§ 7.18Adverse Possession
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§ 7.19Accounting for Depreciation
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§ 7.20Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.01Liability Based on Status as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser
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§ 7.20.02Defenses to Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.03Use of Church Property by Outside Groups
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§ 7.20.04Assaults on Church Property
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§ 7.20.05Skate Ramps
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§ 7.20.06Sound Rooms
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§ 7.21Embezzlement
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§ 7.22Places of Public Accommodation
8Employment Law
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§ 8.01Introduction: Selection of Employees
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§ 8.02New Hire Reporting
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§ 8.03Employment Eligibility Verification
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§ 8.04Immigration
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§ 8.05Negligent Selection
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§ 8.06Introduction: Compensation and Benefits
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§ 8.07Workers Compensation
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§ 8.08Fair Labor Standards Act
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§ 8.08.01Enterprises
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§ 8.08.02Individual Coverage
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§ 8.08.03Federal Court Rulings
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§ 8.08.04Department of Labor Opinion Letters
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§ 8.08.05Exemptions
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§ 8.08.06Ministers
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§ 8.08.07State Laws
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§ 8.08.08Case Studies
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§ 8.09Introduction to Federal Employment and Civil Rights Laws—The “Commerce” Requirement
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§ 8.09.01Counting Employees
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§ 8.10The “Ministerial Exception” under State and Federal Employment Laws
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§ 8.11Procedure for Establishing a Discrimination Claim
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§ 8.12Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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§ 8.12.01Application to Religious Organizations
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§ 8.12.02Application to Religious Educational Institutions
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§ 8.12.03Religion as a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"
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§ 8.12.04Discrimination Based on Religion or Morals
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§ 8.12.05Sexual Harassment
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§ 8.12.06The Catholic Bishop Case
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§ 8.12.07Failure to Accommodate Employees’ Religious Practices
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§ 8.12.08The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 8.12.09The Civil Rights Act of 1991
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§ 8.13The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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§ 8.14The Americans with Disabilities Act
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§ 8.14.01Discrimination in Employment
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§ 8.14.02Discrimination in Public Accommodations
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§ 8.15Family and Medical Leave Act
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§ 8.16Employer “Retaliation” Against Victims of Discrimination
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§ 8.17Discrimination Based on Military Status
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§ 8.18Employee Polygraph Protection Act
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§ 8.19Occupational Safety and Health Act
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§ 8.20Display of Posters
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§ 8.21Discrimination under State Laws
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§ 8.22Termination of Employees
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§ 8.22.01Severance Agreements
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§ 8.23National Labor Relations Act
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§ 8.24Reference Letters
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§ 8.25Employee Evaluations
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§ 8.26Employment Interviews
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§ 8.27Arbitration
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§ 8.28Employee Handbooks
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§ 8.29Employee Privacy
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§ 8.30Insurance
9Government Regulation of Churches
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§ 9.01Introduction
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§ 9.02Regulation of Charitable Solicitations
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§ 9.03Limitations on Charitable Giving
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§ 9.04Federal and State Securities Law
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§ 9.05Copyright Law
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§ 9.05.01Copyright Ownership
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§ 9.05.02Works Made for Hire
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§ 9.05.03Exclusive Rights
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§ 9.05.04Infringement
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§ 9.05.05The "Religious Service" Exemption to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.05.06Electronic Media
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§ 9.05.10Other Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.06Government Investigations
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§ 9.07Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes
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§ 9.08Political Activities by Churches and Other Religious Organizations
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§ 9.09Bankruptcy Law
10Church Legal Liability
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§ 10.01Negligence as a Basis for Liability—In General
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§ 10.02Vicarious Liability (Respondeat Superior)
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§ 10.02.01The Requirement of Employee Status
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§ 10.02.02Negligent Conduct
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§ 10.02.03Course of Employment
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§ 10.02.04Inapplicability to Nonprofit Organizations
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§ 10.03Negligent Selection of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.04Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.05Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.05.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.03Risk Management
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§ 10.06Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.07Negligent Retention of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.07.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.03Risk Management
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§ 10.08Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.09Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.09.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.03Risk Management
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§ 10.10Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.10.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.03Risk Management
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§ 10.11Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.11.01Risk Management
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§ 10.12Counseling—In General
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§ 10.12.01Risk Management
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§ 10.13Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
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§ 10.13.01Court Decisions Recognizing Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.02Court Decisions Rejecting Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.03Risk Management
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§ 10.14Ratification
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§ 10.15Defamation
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§ 10.16Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.16.01Contributory and Comparative Negligence
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§ 10.16.02Assumption of Risk
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§ 10.16.03Intervening Cause
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§ 10.16.04Statutes of Limitations
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§ 10.16.05Charitable Immunity
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§ 10.16.06Release Forms
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§ 10.16.07Insurance
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§ 10.16.08Other Defenses
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§ 10.17Damages—In General
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§ 10.17.01Punitive Damages
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§ 10.17.02Duplicate Verdicts
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§ 10.18Denominational Liability—In General
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§ 10.18.01Court Decisions Recognizing Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.02Court Decisions Rejecting Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.03Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.18.04Risk Management
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§ 10.18.05The Legal Effect of a Group Exemption Ruling
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§ 10.19Risks Associated with Cell Phones
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§ 10.20Risks Associated with the Use of 15-Passenger Vans
12The Present Meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
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§ 12.01The Establishment Clause
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§ 12.01.01The Lemon Test
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§ 12.02The Free Exercise Clause
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§ 12.02.01The Smith Case
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§ 12.02.02The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 12.02.03The City of Boerne Case
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§ 12.02.04Conclusions
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13Significant First Amendment Issues
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§ 13.01The Right to Witness
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§ 13.02Prayer on Public Property other than Schools
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§ 13.03Prayer During Public School Activities
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§ 13.04Display of Religious Symbols on Public Property
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§ 13.05Recurring Use of Public Property by Religious Congregations for Religious Services
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§ 13.06Nonrecurring Use of Public Property by Adults for Religious Events and Activities
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§ 13.07Use of Public School Property by Students for Religious Purposes
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§ 13.08Sunday Closing Laws
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§ 13.09The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
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§ 13.10Definition of "Religion" and "Religious"
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