Mail Order Churches
Key point 5-01.02. A "mail order church" is a sham organization that is created in order to reduce or eliminate the founder's tax liability. Often, such organizations purchase a "church charter" through the mail from an organization that also offers ministerial "credentials." Such organizations are not recognized as "churches" by the IRS.
In recent years, many taxpayers have attempted to exclude all or part of their income from federal taxation through the creation of a mail order church. The IRS Internal Revenue Manual addresses the subject of mail order churches as follows:
The term "mail order church" refers to organizations set up pursuant to "church charters" purchased through the mail from organizations that claim that the charters and other "ministerial credentials" can be used to reduce or eliminate an individual's federal income tax liability. Although a "mail order church" is not precluded from exemption, because it is possible for one to be organized operated exclusively for religious purposes, Service experience, as reflected in numerous court decisions, has shown that many are operated for the private benefit of those who control the organization.[56] IRS INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.25.3.6.11 (1999).
The IRS has challenged the tax-exempt status of several mail order churches on the ground that they fail to meet one or more of the prerequisites of exempt status. The IRS often asserts that mail order churches are ineligible for tax-exempt status since they are not organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes. This assertion often is based on the following provision in the income tax regulations:
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more [exempt purposes] unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, to meet [this] requirement … it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.[57] Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(i)(ii).
A church that exists primarily to serve the private interests of its creator is not serving a public interest and therefore is not organized or operated for exempt purposes. Such a finding will be made whenever a church exists primarily as a means for handling the personal financial transactions of its founder.
Case study. In Revenue Ruling 81-94,[58] Rev. Rul. 81-94, 1981-1 C.B. 330. The IRS has stated that its position regarding mail order churches is set forth in this ruling, and, that "numerous court cases have held that, in situations similar to that described in Rev. Rul. 81–94, an organization that serves the private interests of a designated individual rather than a public interest does not qualify for exemption under IRC 501(c)(3)." See IRS INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.25.3.6.11 (1999). the IRS denied exempt status to a mail order church founded by a nurse. Following a vow of poverty, the nurse had transferred all of her assets, including her home and automobile, to her church and assigned her secular income to the church's checking account. In return, all of her expenses, such as her home mortgage and all outstanding credit card balances, were assumed by the church. The nurse also was provided with a full living allowance sufficient to maintain her previous standard of living. The church permitted her to use the home and automobile for personal uses. While the church's charter stated that it was organized exclusively for religious and charitable purposes, including a religious mission of healing the spirit, mind, emotions, and body, the church conducted few if any religious services and performed virtually no religious functions. The IRS concluded that the church existed primarily as a vehicle for handling the nurse's personal financial transactions and thus it was operated for the private interests of a designated individual rather than for a public interest.[59] See also New Life Tabernacle v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. 309 (1982); Solander v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. 934 (1982); Self v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 1465 (1981); Basic Bible Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 846 (1980); Southern Church of Universal Brotherhood Assembled, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1223 (1980).
The IRS often asserts that a mail order church is ineligible for exempt status since its net earnings inure to the benefit of private individuals. A church cannot be exempt from federal income taxes if any part of its net earnings inures to the benefit of a private individual (other than as reasonable compensation for services rendered). Prohibited inurement may be indicated by a number of circumstances, including the following: (1) compensation paid by an exempt organization is excessive in light of services rendered; (2) the value of services performed and of the corresponding compensation paid cannot be established objectively; (3) payments are not compensation for services rendered; (4) material benefits are provided in addition to regular wages; (5) compensation is based on a percentage of a church's gross receipts; (6) substantially all of a church's gross receipts come from its minister and are returned to him or her in the form of compensation and reimbursement of personal expenses; or (7) a church exists primarily to facilitate the personal financial transactions of its founder.
To illustrate, inurement has been found in the following contexts: church ministers received fees, commissions, royalties, loans, a personal residence, and a car, in addition to ordinary wages;[60] Founding Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). a church devised a formula for determining the percentage of its gross receipts that would be payable to its minister, under which formula the minister received 63 percent of the church's gross receipts in one year and 53 percent in the next;[61] People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127 (1981). The court concluded that "paying over a portion of gross earnings to those vested with the control of a church organization constitutes private inurement. …" a boilermaker was ordained and chartered as "a church personally" by a mail order organization, took a vow of poverty, continued to work full time in secular employment, assigned his salary to his church account over which he maintained complete control, paid all of his personal expenses out of the church account, and claimed the maximum charitable contribution deduction for the amounts he transferred to the church account;[62] Hall v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 1169 (1981). See also McGahen v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468 (1981). a married couple was ordained by and received a church charter from a mail order organization, established a church in their home, conducted religious services for between 3 and 10 persons, paid all of their secular income to the church, and received such income back in the form of compensation and a housing allowance;[63] Church of the Transfiguring Spirit v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1 (1981). In all of the following cases, individuals were ordained by and received a church charter from a mail order organization, established a church in their homes, conducted few if any religious services, assigned their secular income to the church checking account out of which they paid most of their personal expenses, and attempted to claim the maximum charitable contribution deduction allowable for the income assigned. An IRS finding of inurement was upheld in each case. Basic Unit Ministry of Schurig v. Commissioner, 670 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Solander v. Commissioner 43 T.C.M. 934 (1982); Riemers v. Commissioner 42 T.C.M. 838 (1981); Southern Church of Universal Brotherhood Assembled v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1223 (1980); Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980); Rev. Rul. 81-94, 1981-12 I.R.B. 15. a married couple took a vow of poverty and established a religious order in which they and their children were the only members, assigned all of their secular income to the order, and claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the income assigned;[64] Greeno v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1112 (1981); Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1984). a taxpayer was ordained by and received a church charter from a mail order organization, established a church in his home, declared himself and two others to be its ministers, assigned all of his secular income to the church, and received substantially all of it back in the form of wages, a housing allowance, loans, and travel allowances;[65] Unitary Mission Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507 (1980). Besides finding the amount of ministerial wages paid by the church to be excessive, the court observed that housing allowances also may be so excessive as to constitute unreasonable compensation. In either case, inurement occurs. The court rejected the church's argument that the First Amendment prohibits the courts from inquiring into the reasonableness of church salaries, at least where such inquiries involve no analysis of religious doctrine. See also Universal Life Church v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 292 (1984); Church of Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20 (1984); Self-Realization Brotherhood, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 344 (1984). a church made substantial cash grants to its officers without provision for repayment;[66] Church in Boston v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102 (1978). and a mail order church could not support substantial payments made to its founder.[67] Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980). See also Truth Tabernacle v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 1405 (1981).
Predictably, standards that are comprehensive enough to deal effectively with the abuses of mail order churches may be sufficiently broad to affect adversely some legitimate churches. For example, the Tax Court denied exempt status to a church having 56 members that conducted regular evangelistic worship services, performed baptisms, communion services, weddings, and burials; whose beliefs included the infallibility of the Bible; and whose pastor testified that "we do not have a creed but Christ; no law but love, no book but the Bible."[68] Truth Tabernacle v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 1405 (1981). But cf. Truth Tabernacle, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 1989-451. The IRS contended that the church was not entitled to exempt status since it had not established that (1) its charter or bylaws provided for the distribution of church property to another exempt organization upon dissolution, (2) it was operated exclusively for religious purposes, (3) it was operated for public rather than private interests, and (4) its net earnings did not inure to the benefit of private individuals. In another case, the Tax Court observed: "Until recent years, a mere declaration that an organization was a church was almost enough to assure its treatment as such under the revenue laws. The cynical abuse of the church concept for tax purposes in recent years, however, has made necessary the same critical analysis of organizations claiming exemption on that ground as organizations engaged in admittedly secular activities."[69] Church of Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 27 (1984). An excellent summary of the abuses of mail order churches is contained in the congressional history to the Church Audit Procedures Act.
Key point. Churches, like any other exempt organization, have the burden of proving that they meet each of the prerequisites to exempt status. The burden of proof is not on the IRS to disprove eligibility for exempt status. Many mail order churches have been denied exempt status because they could not prove that they in fact were organized or operated exclusively for exempt purposes or that none of their net earnings inured to the benefit of private individuals.
Many mail order church schemes involve the assignment of a founder's secular income to his church's checking account, and the founder's claiming the largest allowable charitable contribution deduction on his or her federal income tax return. Since a charitable contribution deduction is available only to donors who make contributions to an exempt organization, the deductibility of charitable contributions to mail order churches often is challenged by the IRS. Unless taxpayers can prove that their contributions were made to a church that satisfies the prerequisites to exempt status listed in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, their deductions will be disallowed. Occasionally, the IRS challenges a charitable contribution to a mail order church on the ground that such a transfer does not constitute a contribution.
To illustrate, in Revenue Ruling 78-232,[70] Rev. Rul. 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69 (citations omitted). the IRS disallowed a charitable contribution deduction for any part of a taxpayer's secular income that he assigned to his mail order church's checking account, since
[s]ection 170 of the Code provides … a deduction for charitable contributions to or for the use of [exempt] organizations. … Section 170(c)(2) of the Code provides, in part, that the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious or other charitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
The term "charitable contribution," as used in section 170 of the Code, has been held to be synonymous with the word "gift." A gift for purposes of section 170 is a voluntary transfer of money or property that is made with no expectation of procuring a commensurate financial benefit in return for the transfer. It follows that if the benefits the donor can reasonably expect to obtain by making the transfer are sufficiently substantial to provide a quid pro quo for it, then no deduction under section 170 is allowable.
In the instant case the money deposited by the taxpayer in the … church account was used or available for use for the taxpayer's benefit. … Accordingly, the amount of the salary checks deposited by the taxpayer in the bank account maintained in the name of the … church is not deductible as a "charitable contribution" under section 170 of the Code.
The Tax Court has observed that "our tolerance for taxpayers who establish churches solely for tax avoidance purposes is reaching a breaking point. Not only do these taxpayers use the pretext of a church to avoid paying their fair share of taxes, even when their brazen schemes are uncovered many of them resort to the courts in a shameless attempt to vindicate themselves."[71] Miedaner v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 272 (1982) Similarly, a federal appeals court has lamented that "we can no longer tolerate abuse of the judicial review process by irresponsible taxpayers who press stale and frivolous arguments, without hope of success on the merits, in order to delay or harass the collection of public revenues or for other nonworthy purposes."[72] Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984). The court ordered a mail order church to pay the government's costs and attorneys' fees incurred in contesting the church's claim of exemption, and warned that in the future it would "deal harshly" with frivolous tax appeals involving mail order churches. Other courts have sustained additions to tax for negligence or intentional disregard of tax laws pursuant to section 6653(a) of the Code.[73] See, e.g., Hall v. Commissioner, 729 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.1984); Davis v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 806 (1983).
There are many potentially adverse consequences that can befall the founder of a mail order church. These include civil fraud penalties, criminal penalties, sanctions and costs of up to $25,000 for claiming a frivolous position, and substantial understatement penalties.[74] All of these penalties are discussed in R. HAMMAR, CHURCH AND CLERGY TAX GUIDE chapter 1 (published annually by the publisher of this text).
The IRS is strictly construing the requirements of section 501(c)(3) when assessing the eligibility of a mail order church for exempt status, and it is threatening criminal prosecution of taxpayers who persist in using these tax evasion schemes.
Mail order clergy encounter difficulties in other contexts as well. For example, they have been denied eligibility to conduct marriage ceremonies by some states.[75] See section 3-04, supra.
Table of Contents
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1Definitions and Status
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§ 1.01Distinctions Between the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister
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§ 1.02Definition of the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister — In General
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§ 1.03Status—Employee or Self Employed
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§ 1.03.01Social Security
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§ 1.03.02Income Taxes
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§ 1.03.03Retirement Plans
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§ 1.03.04Legal Liability
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§ 1.03.05Miscellaneous Federal and State Statutes
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§ 1.04Status—Ordained, Commissioned, or Licensed
2The Pastor-Church Relationship
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§ 2.01Initiating the Relationship—In General
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§ 2.01.01Congregational Churches
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§ 2.01.02Hierarchical Churches
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§ 2.01.03Compliance with a Church's Governing Instrument in the Selection of a Minister
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§ 2.01.04Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—the General Rule of Non-Intervention
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§ 2.01.05Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—Limited Exceptions to the General Rule
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§ 2.01.06Negligent Selection
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§ 2.02The Contract
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§ 2.03Compensation
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§ 2.04Termination
3Authority, Rights, and Privileges
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§ 3.01General Scope of a Minister's Authority
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§ 3.02Officer of the Church Corporation
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§ 3.03Property Matters
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§ 3.04Performance of Marriage Ceremonies
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§ 3.05Exemption from Military Duty
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§ 3.06Exemption From Jury Duty
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§ 3.07The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—In General
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§ 3.07.01A "Communication"
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§ 3.07.02Made in Confidence
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§ 3.07.03To a Minister
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§ 3.07.04Acting in a Professional Capacity as a Spiritual Adviser
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§ 3.07.05In the Course of Discipline
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§ 3.08The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—Miscellaneous Issues
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§ 3.08.01Clergy-Parishioner Relationship
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§ 3.08.02Marriage Counseling
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§ 3.08.03Who May Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.04When to Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.05Waiver of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.06The Privilege in Federal Courts
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§ 3.08.07Constitutionality of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.08Child Abuse Reporting
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§ 3.08.09Confidentiality
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§ 3.08.10Disclosure to Civil Authorities
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§ 3.08.11Church Records
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§ 3.08.12Death of the Counselee
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§ 3.09Visiting Privileges at Penal Institutions
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§ 3.10Immigration of Alien Ministers, Religious Vocations, and Religious Occupations
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§ 3.11Miscellaneous Benefits
4Liabilities, Limitations, and Restrictions
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§ 4.01Negligence
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§ 4.02Defamation—In General
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§ 4.02.01Pastors Who Are Sued for Making Defamatory Statements
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§ 4.02.02Pastors Who Are Victims of Defamation
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§ 4.02.03Defenses
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§ 4.03Undue Influence
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§ 4.04Invasion of Privacy
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§ 4.05Clergy Malpractice
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§ 4.06Contract Liability
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§ 4.07Securities Law Violations
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§ 4.08Failure to Report Child Abuse
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§ 4.09Diversion of Church Funds
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§ 4.10State Regulation of Psychologists and Counselors
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§ 4.11Sexual Misconduct
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§ 4.11.01Theories of Liability
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§ 4.11.02Defenses to Liability
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5Definitions
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§ 5.01Tax Legislation—Federal
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§ 5.01.01Churches
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§ 5.01.02Mail Order Churches
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§ 5.01.03Other Religious Organizations
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§ 5.01.04Tax Legislation—State
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§ 5.02Zoning Law
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§ 5.02.01Churches
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§ 5.02.02Accessory Uses
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6Organization and Administration
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§ 6.01Unincorporated Associations
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§ 6.01.01Characteristics
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§ 6.01.02Personal Liability of Members
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§ 6.01.03Creation and Administration
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§ 6.02Corporations
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§ 6.02.01The Incorporation Process
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§ 6.02.02Charters, Constitutions, Bylaws, and Resolutions
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§ 6.03Church Records
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§ 6.03.01Inspection
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§ 6.03.02“Accountings” of Church Funds
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§ 6.03.03Public Inspection of Tax-Exemption Applications
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§ 6.03.04Government Inspection of Donor and Membership Lists
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§ 6.03.05The Church Audit Procedures Act
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§ 6.03.06Who Owns a Church’s Accounting Records?
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§ 6.04Reporting Requirements
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§ 6.04.01State Law
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§ 6.04.02Federal Law
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§ 6.05Church Names
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§ 6.06Officers, Directors, and Trustees—In General
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§ 6.06.01Election or Appointment
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§ 6.06.02Authority
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§ 6.06.03Meetings
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§ 6.06.04Removal
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§ 6.07Officers, Directors, and Trustees—Personal Liability
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§ 6.07.01Tort Liability
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§ 6.07.02Contract Liability
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§ 6.07.03Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Care
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§ 6.07.04Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
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§ 6.07.05Violation of Trust Terms
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§ 6.07.06Securities Law
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§ 6.07.07Wrongful Discharge of an Employee
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§ 6.07.08Willful Failure to Withhold Taxes
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§ 6.07.09Exceeding the Authority of the Board
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§ 6.07.10Loans to Directors
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§ 6.08Immunity Statutes
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§ 6.08.01Directors and Officers Insurance
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§ 6.09Members—In General
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§ 6.09.01Selection and Qualifications
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§ 6.09.02Authority
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§ 6.10Members—Discipline and Dismissal
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§ 6.10.01Judicial Nonintervention
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§ 6.10.02“Marginal” Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.03Preconditions to Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.04Remedies for Improper Discipline or Dismissal
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§ 6.11Members—Personal Liability
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§ 6.12Meetings of Members
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§ 6.12.01Procedural Requirements
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§ 6.12.02Minutes
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§ 6.12.03Parliamentary Procedure
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§ 6.12.04Effect of Procedural Irregularities
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§ 6.12.05Judicial Supervision of Church Elections
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§ 6.12.06Who May Attend
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§ 6.13Powers of a Local Church
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§ 6.14Merger and Consolidation
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§ 6.15Dissolution
7Church Property
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§ 7.01Church Property Disputes—In General
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§ 7.02Church Property Disputes—Supreme Court Rulings
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§ 7.03State and Lower Federal Court Rulings
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§ 7.04Church Property Disputes—Dispute Resolution Procedures
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§ 7.05Transferring Church Property
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§ 7.06Zoning Law
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§ 7.07Restricting Certain Activities Near Church Property
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§ 7.08Building Codes
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§ 7.08.01Lead Paint on Church Property
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§ 7.09Nuisance
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§ 7.10Landmarking
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§ 7.11Eminent Domain
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§ 7.12Defacing Church Property
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§ 7.13Restrictive Covenants
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§ 7.14Reversion of Church Property to the Prior Owner
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§ 7.15Materialmen’s Liens
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§ 7.16Religious Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Church Property
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§ 7.17Removing Disruptive Individuals
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§ 7.18Adverse Possession
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§ 7.19Accounting for Depreciation
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§ 7.20Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.01Liability Based on Status as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser
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§ 7.20.02Defenses to Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.03Use of Church Property by Outside Groups
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§ 7.20.04Assaults on Church Property
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§ 7.20.05Skate Ramps
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§ 7.20.06Sound Rooms
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§ 7.21Embezzlement
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§ 7.22Places of Public Accommodation
8Employment Law
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§ 8.01Introduction: Selection of Employees
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§ 8.02New Hire Reporting
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§ 8.03Employment Eligibility Verification
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§ 8.04Immigration
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§ 8.05Negligent Selection
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§ 8.06Introduction: Compensation and Benefits
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§ 8.07Workers Compensation
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§ 8.08Fair Labor Standards Act
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§ 8.08.01Enterprises
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§ 8.08.02Individual Coverage
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§ 8.08.03Federal Court Rulings
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§ 8.08.04Department of Labor Opinion Letters
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§ 8.08.05Exemptions
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§ 8.08.06Ministers
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§ 8.08.07State Laws
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§ 8.08.08Case Studies
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§ 8.09Introduction to Federal Employment and Civil Rights Laws—The “Commerce” Requirement
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§ 8.09.01Counting Employees
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§ 8.10The “Ministerial Exception” under State and Federal Employment Laws
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§ 8.11Procedure for Establishing a Discrimination Claim
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§ 8.12Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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§ 8.12.01Application to Religious Organizations
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§ 8.12.02Application to Religious Educational Institutions
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§ 8.12.03Religion as a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"
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§ 8.12.04Discrimination Based on Religion or Morals
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§ 8.12.05Sexual Harassment
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§ 8.12.06The Catholic Bishop Case
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§ 8.12.07Failure to Accommodate Employees’ Religious Practices
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§ 8.12.08The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 8.12.09The Civil Rights Act of 1991
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§ 8.13The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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§ 8.14The Americans with Disabilities Act
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§ 8.14.01Discrimination in Employment
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§ 8.14.02Discrimination in Public Accommodations
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§ 8.15Family and Medical Leave Act
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§ 8.16Employer “Retaliation” Against Victims of Discrimination
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§ 8.17Discrimination Based on Military Status
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§ 8.18Employee Polygraph Protection Act
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§ 8.19Occupational Safety and Health Act
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§ 8.20Display of Posters
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§ 8.21Discrimination under State Laws
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§ 8.22Termination of Employees
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§ 8.22.01Severance Agreements
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§ 8.23National Labor Relations Act
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§ 8.24Reference Letters
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§ 8.25Employee Evaluations
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§ 8.26Employment Interviews
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§ 8.27Arbitration
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§ 8.28Employee Handbooks
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§ 8.29Employee Privacy
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§ 8.30Insurance
9Government Regulation of Churches
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§ 9.01Introduction
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§ 9.02Regulation of Charitable Solicitations
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§ 9.03Limitations on Charitable Giving
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§ 9.04Federal and State Securities Law
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§ 9.05Copyright Law
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§ 9.05.01Copyright Ownership
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§ 9.05.02Works Made for Hire
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§ 9.05.03Exclusive Rights
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§ 9.05.04Infringement
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§ 9.05.05The "Religious Service" Exemption to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.05.06Electronic Media
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§ 9.05.10Other Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.06Government Investigations
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§ 9.07Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes
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§ 9.08Political Activities by Churches and Other Religious Organizations
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§ 9.09Bankruptcy Law
10Church Legal Liability
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§ 10.01Negligence as a Basis for Liability—In General
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§ 10.02Vicarious Liability (Respondeat Superior)
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§ 10.02.01The Requirement of Employee Status
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§ 10.02.02Negligent Conduct
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§ 10.02.03Course of Employment
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§ 10.02.04Inapplicability to Nonprofit Organizations
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§ 10.03Negligent Selection of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.04Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.05Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.05.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.03Risk Management
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§ 10.06Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.07Negligent Retention of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.07.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.03Risk Management
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§ 10.08Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.09Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.09.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.03Risk Management
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§ 10.10Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.10.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.03Risk Management
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§ 10.11Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.11.01Risk Management
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§ 10.12Counseling—In General
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§ 10.12.01Risk Management
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§ 10.13Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
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§ 10.13.01Court Decisions Recognizing Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.02Court Decisions Rejecting Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.03Risk Management
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§ 10.14Ratification
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§ 10.15Defamation
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§ 10.16Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.16.01Contributory and Comparative Negligence
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§ 10.16.02Assumption of Risk
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§ 10.16.03Intervening Cause
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§ 10.16.04Statutes of Limitations
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§ 10.16.05Charitable Immunity
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§ 10.16.06Release Forms
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§ 10.16.07Insurance
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§ 10.16.08Other Defenses
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§ 10.17Damages—In General
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§ 10.17.01Punitive Damages
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§ 10.17.02Duplicate Verdicts
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§ 10.18Denominational Liability—In General
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§ 10.18.01Court Decisions Recognizing Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.02Court Decisions Rejecting Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.03Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.18.04Risk Management
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§ 10.18.05The Legal Effect of a Group Exemption Ruling
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§ 10.19Risks Associated with Cell Phones
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§ 10.20Risks Associated with the Use of 15-Passenger Vans
12The Present Meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
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§ 12.01The Establishment Clause
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§ 12.01.01The Lemon Test
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§ 12.02The Free Exercise Clause
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§ 12.02.01The Smith Case
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§ 12.02.02The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 12.02.03The City of Boerne Case
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§ 12.02.04Conclusions
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13Significant First Amendment Issues
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§ 13.01The Right to Witness
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§ 13.02Prayer on Public Property other than Schools
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§ 13.03Prayer During Public School Activities
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§ 13.04Display of Religious Symbols on Public Property
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§ 13.05Recurring Use of Public Property by Religious Congregations for Religious Services
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§ 13.06Nonrecurring Use of Public Property by Adults for Religious Events and Activities
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§ 13.07Use of Public School Property by Students for Religious Purposes
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§ 13.08Sunday Closing Laws
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§ 13.09The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
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§ 13.10Definition of "Religion" and "Religious"
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