Building Codes §7.08
Key point 7-08. Most cities have enacted building codes that prescribe minimum standards in the construction of buildings. The courts have ruled that these laws may be applied to churches so long as they are reasonably related to the promotion of public health and safety.
Many municipalities have enacted building codes prescribing minimum standards in the construction of buildings. Such codes typically regulate building materials, construction methods, building design, fire safety, and sanitation. The validity of such codes has consistently been upheld by the courts.[173] See YOKLEY, supra note 126, at § 31-2.
The courts consistently hold that churches must comply with municipal building codes that are reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. To illustrate, one court ruled that "the building of churches is subject to such reasonable regulations as may be necessary to promote the public health, safety, or general welfare."[174] Board of Zoning v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind. 1954). Accord City of Solon v. Solon Baptist Temple, Inc., 457 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio App. 1982); City of Sherman v. Simms, 183 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1944); Wojtanowski v. Franciscan Fathers Minor Conventuals, 148 N.W.2d 54 (Wis. 1967); Hintz v. Zion Evangelical United Brethren Church, 109 N.W.2d 61 (Wis. 1961). In another case, a municipality brought an action against a church in order to prevent the continued use of a church school that did not comply with the building code.[175] City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982). The church school was allegedly deficient in several respects, including inadequate floor space, inadequate ventilation, no approved fire alarm system, no fire extinguishers, no fire detectors, no sprinkler system, no fire-retardant walls, no exit signs, uneven stairs, and doors that did not open outward. The Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged that application of the building code to the church school would result in a closing of the school, and that this in turn would impair the church members' constitutional right to guide the education of their children by sending them to a church-operated school. However, the court observed that this constitutional right was not absolute, but could be limited by a showing that the building code was supported by a compelling state interest and that it was the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interest.
Similarly, another court upheld the action of a municipality in ordering substantial renovations in a church-operated school to bring it into compliance with the building code.[176] Faith Assembly of God v. State Building Code Commission, 416 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1981). The court rejected the church's claims that the less stringent building code provisions applicable to church buildings should apply to the school, and that application of the more stringent building code provisions applicable to schools would infringe upon the church's right to freely exercise its religion. The court observed:
This is not a case where application of the Code forces a choice between abandoning one's religious principles and facing criminal charges. … The Code does not restrict or make unlawful any religious practice of the plaintiff; the Code simply regulates the condition of the physical facility if it functions as a school. …
It is also clear that state laws establishing minimum standards for the safety of children in child care facilities and enforcing such standards through inspections and licensing does not violate the religious freedom of a children's home administered by a religious organization.[177] Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. 1977), appeal denied, 439 U.S. 803 (1978). See also Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 621 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1980); State Fire Marshall v. Lee, 300 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. 1980); State v. Fayetteville Street Christian School, 258 S.E.2d 459 (N.C. 1979), vacated, 261 S.E.2d 908 (N.C. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
In 2015 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a city ordinance containing strict limitations on the display of signs by churches and some other charities constituted a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the First Amendment's free speech clause.[178] Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218(U.S. 2015). The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has adopted a comprehensive "Sign Code" governing the manner in which people may display outdoor signs. The Sign Code prohibits the display of outdoor signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but it then exempts 23 categories of signs from that requirement. These exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to flying banners. One exemption is for "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event." This includes any "Temporary Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other passersby to a qualifying event." A "qualifying event" is defined as any "assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other similar non-profit organization." Temporary directional signs may be no larger than six square feet. They may be placed on private property or on a public right-of-way, but no more than four signs may be placed on a single property at any time. And, they may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the "qualifying event" and no more than 1 hour afterward. Other exemptions, such as signs communicating a political or ideological message, were much less stringent.
The Good News Community Church (Church) and its pastor wanted to advertise the time and location of their Sunday church services. The Church is a small, cash-strapped entity that owns no building, so it holds its services at elementary schools or other locations in or near the Town. In order to inform the public about its services, which are held in a variety of different locations, the Church began placing 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town, frequently in the public right-of-way abutting the street. The signs typically displayed the Church's name, along with the time and location of the upcoming service. Church members would post the signs early in the day on Saturday and then remove them around midday on Sunday. The display of these signs requires little money and manpower, and thus has proved to be an economical and effective way for the Church to let the community know where its services are being held each week.
This practice caught the attention of the Town's Sign Code compliance manager, who twice cited the Church for violating the Code. The first citation noted that the Church exceeded the time limits for displaying its temporary directional signs. The second citation referred to the same problem, along with the Church's failure to include the date of the event on the signs. Town officials even confiscated one of the Church's signs, which the pastor had to retrieve from the municipal offices.
The pastor contacted the Sign Code Compliance Department in an attempt to reach an accommodation. His efforts proved unsuccessful. The Town's Code compliance manager informed the Church that there would be "no leniency under the Code" and promised to punish any future violations.
Shortly thereafter, the Church and its pastor (the "plaintiffs") filed a complaint in a federal district court in Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of speech in violation of the federal Constitution. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, as did a federal appeals court. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court began its opinion by noting that "the First Amendment … prohibits the enactment of laws abridging the freedom of speech." As a result, a city "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Content-based laws that target speech based on its communicative content "are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests."
The Court concluded:
The Town's Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines "Temporary Directional Signs" on the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some other qualifying event. … Because the Town's Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if [the Town] proves that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. … Thus, it is the Town's burden to demonstrate that the Code's differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. The Town cannot do so. It has offered only two governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code draws: preserving the Town's aesthetic appeal and traffic safety. Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling governmental interests, the Code's distinctions fail. …
The Court observed that its decision "will not prevent governments from enacting effective sign laws" since the Town "has ample content-neutral options available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics." For example, the Town's current Code "regulates many aspects of signs that have nothing to do with a sign's message: size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. And on public property, the Town may go a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner." Further, "a sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private houses—well might survive strict scrutiny." But "the signs at issue in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those purposes. They are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly tailored."
Key point. Justice Kagan's concurring opinion noted that "the Town of Gilbert's defense of its sign ordinance—most notably, the law's distinctions between directional signs and others—does not pass … the laugh test."
Case studies
- An Alabama court rejected a church's argument that a state law prohibiting it from erecting a sign larger than 8 square feet without a special permit violated its constitutional rights. The Alabama Highway Beautification Act prohibits the erection of signs along a "primary highway" that do not meet certain requirements pertaining to size, location, lighting, and spacing. Among other things, a church sign cannot exceed 8 square feet unless a special permit is issued. A church erected a sign on the property of a private business that was located on a state highway. The sign gave the name of the church, an arrow indicating where motorists should turn to find the church, and three crosses. The state department of transportation ordered the church to remove the sign on the ground that it exceeded 8 square feet. The church protested, claiming that removal of the sign would violate its constitutional right of religious freedom. A state appeals court rejected the church's argument, and upheld the removal of the sign. The court noted that the Highway Beautification Act "makes no reference to the content of the sign. It merely regulates the manner in which churches may display signs … by limiting their signs to no more than 8 square feet in area. The [Act] does not attempt to regulate the views of the various churches. It simply regulates the size of the signs."[179] Corinth Baptist Church v. State Department of Transportation, 656 So.2d 868 (Ala. App. 1995). Accord Wilson v. City of Louisville, 957 F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Ky. 1997).
- A Colorado court ruled that a church had to demolish or "modify" a new addition that it built in violation of a local building code. The court noted that in determining whether the church had to remove the new addition, three factors had to be considered: (1) good faith reliance on the building permit; (2) the neighbors' injury compared to the builder's investment; and (3) general respect for municipal ordinances. However, the court noted that these three factors are considered only if a builder acted in good faith. The court concluded that the facts in this case did not demonstrate that the church acted in good faith, and therefore the principle of relative hardship could not be applied to protect its new addition from demolition. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the church started construction without investigating building requirements; it was notified of a thirty-foot height restriction prior to issuance of a building permit; when neighbors learned of this violation, they promptly notified the church; and, the church began construction before obtaining a necessary building permit. Moreover, it continued construction even after the city finally notified it of the thirty-foot height limit.[180] Olson v. Hillside Community Church, 42 P.3d 52 (Colo. App. 2001).
- A Missouri court ruled that a city did not violate the First Amendment guaranty of religious freedom in refusing to grant a church's request for a permit to construct a sign on its property. A church applied for a sign permit to construct a monument sign near the entrance of its property. A city engineer denied the permit request for the following reasons: (1) the proposed sign exceeded the maximum allowable height of 10 feet; (2) the proposed sign exceeded the maximum sign face area; and (3) the proposed sign included a changeable letter area in excess of that allowed under code, and included moving letters or characters, which the sign code strictly prohibited. A zoning board affirmed the denial of the sign permit, and the church appealed to the courts, claiming that the city's sign regulations were an "unconstitutional infringement on the church's right to freely exercise its religious mission." A state appeals court concluded that "a mere requirement that a church obtain a special use permit before building … does not infringe on the free exercise of religion."[181] St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Ellisville, 122 S.W.3d 635 (Mo. App. 2003).
- A New York court ruled that a applying a city's sign ordinance to a church did not violate the First Amendment. The court concluded that "it is wholly appropriate to impose limitations on a church property and its accessory uses when reasonably related to the general welfare of the community, including the community's interest in preserving its appearance." The court noted that because the restrictions imposed on the construction of the church's sign were not arbitrary and capricious, and because the city sought to balance the church's request with aesthetic and safety concerns, the city did not act wrongly in regulating the church's sign request.[182] Lakeshore Assembly of God Church v. Village Board, 508 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. 1986).
- A Texas court ruled that a city could compel a church-operated school to close because it failed to comply with various safety provisions in a city building code. A church-operated private school applied to the city for a permit to add a stairwell to its basement so that it could be used for a lunchroom. When reviewing this application, a city building official noticed that the school was not in compliance with the city building code and did not have a certificate of occupancy. The building official inspected the building to determine if it complied with the building code. She concluded that it did not because it did not meet the minimal life-safety requirements. She also concluded that the building posed a substantial danger to its students from fire and smoke because of the inadequate smoke detection system, the narrow corridors, the hollow doors, and the chipboard and wood construction. The city ordered the school to cease operations until it complied with the building code. A state court affirmed this ruling. The court acknowledged that the building complied with the code as long as it was being used as a church, but concluded that "a building being used for church and Sunday school is classified differently than one being used as a school. In determining that a school must comply with stricter safety requirements, the drafters of the building code may have considered the extended amount of time a child spends at school, the use of various appliances to cook lunch, and the increased use of electrical equipment." The court also rejected the school's argument that the city's order violated the First Amendment guaranty of religious freedom. The court noted that the building code is a "religion-neutral" law that is presumably valid even without proof of a compelling government interest. However, even if a compelling government interest were required, the court noted that "as a matter of law, the state has a compelling interest of the highest order in protecting the health and safety of children."[183] Christian Academy of Abilene v. City of Abilene, 62 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App. 2001).
Table of Contents
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1Definitions and Status
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§ 1.01Distinctions Between the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister
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§ 1.02Definition of the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister — In General
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§ 1.03Status—Employee or Self Employed
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§ 1.03.01Social Security
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§ 1.03.02Income Taxes
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§ 1.03.03Retirement Plans
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§ 1.03.04Legal Liability
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§ 1.03.05Miscellaneous Federal and State Statutes
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§ 1.04Status—Ordained, Commissioned, or Licensed
2The Pastor-Church Relationship
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§ 2.01Initiating the Relationship—In General
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§ 2.01.01Congregational Churches
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§ 2.01.02Hierarchical Churches
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§ 2.01.03Compliance with a Church's Governing Instrument in the Selection of a Minister
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§ 2.01.04Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—the General Rule of Non-Intervention
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§ 2.01.05Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—Limited Exceptions to the General Rule
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§ 2.01.06Negligent Selection
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§ 2.02The Contract
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§ 2.03Compensation
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§ 2.04Termination
3Authority, Rights, and Privileges
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§ 3.01General Scope of a Minister's Authority
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§ 3.02Officer of the Church Corporation
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§ 3.03Property Matters
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§ 3.04Performance of Marriage Ceremonies
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§ 3.05Exemption from Military Duty
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§ 3.06Exemption From Jury Duty
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§ 3.07The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—In General
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§ 3.07.01A "Communication"
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§ 3.07.02Made in Confidence
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§ 3.07.03To a Minister
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§ 3.07.04Acting in a Professional Capacity as a Spiritual Adviser
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§ 3.07.05In the Course of Discipline
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§ 3.08The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—Miscellaneous Issues
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§ 3.08.01Clergy-Parishioner Relationship
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§ 3.08.02Marriage Counseling
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§ 3.08.03Who May Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.04When to Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.05Waiver of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.06The Privilege in Federal Courts
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§ 3.08.07Constitutionality of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.08Child Abuse Reporting
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§ 3.08.09Confidentiality
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§ 3.08.10Disclosure to Civil Authorities
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§ 3.08.11Church Records
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§ 3.08.12Death of the Counselee
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§ 3.09Visiting Privileges at Penal Institutions
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§ 3.10Immigration of Alien Ministers, Religious Vocations, and Religious Occupations
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§ 3.11Miscellaneous Benefits
4Liabilities, Limitations, and Restrictions
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§ 4.01Negligence
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§ 4.02Defamation—In General
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§ 4.02.01Pastors Who Are Sued for Making Defamatory Statements
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§ 4.02.02Pastors Who Are Victims of Defamation
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§ 4.02.03Defenses
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§ 4.03Undue Influence
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§ 4.04Invasion of Privacy
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§ 4.05Clergy Malpractice
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§ 4.06Contract Liability
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§ 4.07Securities Law Violations
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§ 4.08Failure to Report Child Abuse
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§ 4.09Diversion of Church Funds
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§ 4.10State Regulation of Psychologists and Counselors
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§ 4.11Sexual Misconduct
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§ 4.11.01Theories of Liability
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§ 4.11.02Defenses to Liability
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5Definitions
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§ 5.01Tax Legislation—Federal
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§ 5.01.01Churches
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§ 5.01.02Mail Order Churches
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§ 5.01.03Other Religious Organizations
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§ 5.01.04Tax Legislation—State
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§ 5.02Zoning Law
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§ 5.02.01Churches
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§ 5.02.02Accessory Uses
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6Organization and Administration
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§ 6.01Unincorporated Associations
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§ 6.01.01Characteristics
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§ 6.01.02Personal Liability of Members
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§ 6.01.03Creation and Administration
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§ 6.02Corporations
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§ 6.02.01The Incorporation Process
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§ 6.02.02Charters, Constitutions, Bylaws, and Resolutions
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§ 6.03Church Records
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§ 6.03.01Inspection
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§ 6.03.02“Accountings” of Church Funds
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§ 6.03.03Public Inspection of Tax-Exemption Applications
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§ 6.03.04Government Inspection of Donor and Membership Lists
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§ 6.03.05The Church Audit Procedures Act
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§ 6.03.06Who Owns a Church’s Accounting Records?
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§ 6.04Reporting Requirements
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§ 6.04.01State Law
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§ 6.04.02Federal Law
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§ 6.05Church Names
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§ 6.06Officers, Directors, and Trustees—In General
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§ 6.06.01Election or Appointment
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§ 6.06.02Authority
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§ 6.06.03Meetings
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§ 6.06.04Removal
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§ 6.07Officers, Directors, and Trustees—Personal Liability
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§ 6.07.01Tort Liability
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§ 6.07.02Contract Liability
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§ 6.07.03Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Care
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§ 6.07.04Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
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§ 6.07.05Violation of Trust Terms
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§ 6.07.06Securities Law
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§ 6.07.07Wrongful Discharge of an Employee
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§ 6.07.08Willful Failure to Withhold Taxes
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§ 6.07.09Exceeding the Authority of the Board
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§ 6.07.10Loans to Directors
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§ 6.08Immunity Statutes
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§ 6.08.01Directors and Officers Insurance
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§ 6.09Members—In General
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§ 6.09.01Selection and Qualifications
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§ 6.09.02Authority
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§ 6.10Members—Discipline and Dismissal
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§ 6.10.01Judicial Nonintervention
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§ 6.10.02“Marginal” Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.03Preconditions to Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.04Remedies for Improper Discipline or Dismissal
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§ 6.11Members—Personal Liability
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§ 6.12Meetings of Members
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§ 6.12.01Procedural Requirements
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§ 6.12.02Minutes
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§ 6.12.03Parliamentary Procedure
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§ 6.12.04Effect of Procedural Irregularities
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§ 6.12.05Judicial Supervision of Church Elections
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§ 6.12.06Who May Attend
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§ 6.13Powers of a Local Church
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§ 6.14Merger and Consolidation
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§ 6.15Dissolution
7Church Property
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§ 7.01Church Property Disputes—In General
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§ 7.02Church Property Disputes—Supreme Court Rulings
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§ 7.03State and Lower Federal Court Rulings
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§ 7.04Church Property Disputes—Dispute Resolution Procedures
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§ 7.05Transferring Church Property
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§ 7.06Zoning Law
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§ 7.07Restricting Certain Activities Near Church Property
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§ 7.08Building Codes
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§ 7.08.01Lead Paint on Church Property
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§ 7.09Nuisance
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§ 7.10Landmarking
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§ 7.11Eminent Domain
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§ 7.12Defacing Church Property
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§ 7.13Restrictive Covenants
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§ 7.14Reversion of Church Property to the Prior Owner
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§ 7.15Materialmen’s Liens
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§ 7.16Religious Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Church Property
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§ 7.17Removing Disruptive Individuals
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§ 7.18Adverse Possession
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§ 7.19Accounting for Depreciation
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§ 7.20Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.01Liability Based on Status as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser
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§ 7.20.02Defenses to Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.03Use of Church Property by Outside Groups
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§ 7.20.04Assaults on Church Property
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§ 7.20.05Skate Ramps
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§ 7.20.06Sound Rooms
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§ 7.21Embezzlement
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§ 7.22Places of Public Accommodation
8Employment Law
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§ 8.01Introduction: Selection of Employees
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§ 8.02New Hire Reporting
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§ 8.03Employment Eligibility Verification
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§ 8.04Immigration
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§ 8.05Negligent Selection
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§ 8.06Introduction: Compensation and Benefits
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§ 8.07Workers Compensation
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§ 8.08Fair Labor Standards Act
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§ 8.08.01Enterprises
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§ 8.08.02Individual Coverage
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§ 8.08.03Federal Court Rulings
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§ 8.08.04Department of Labor Opinion Letters
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§ 8.08.05Exemptions
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§ 8.08.06Ministers
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§ 8.08.07State Laws
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§ 8.08.08Case Studies
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§ 8.09Introduction to Federal Employment and Civil Rights Laws—The “Commerce” Requirement
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§ 8.09.01Counting Employees
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§ 8.10The “Ministerial Exception” under State and Federal Employment Laws
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§ 8.11Procedure for Establishing a Discrimination Claim
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§ 8.12Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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§ 8.12.01Application to Religious Organizations
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§ 8.12.02Application to Religious Educational Institutions
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§ 8.12.03Religion as a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"
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§ 8.12.04Discrimination Based on Religion or Morals
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§ 8.12.05Sexual Harassment
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§ 8.12.06The Catholic Bishop Case
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§ 8.12.07Failure to Accommodate Employees’ Religious Practices
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§ 8.12.08The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 8.12.09The Civil Rights Act of 1991
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§ 8.13The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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§ 8.14The Americans with Disabilities Act
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§ 8.14.01Discrimination in Employment
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§ 8.14.02Discrimination in Public Accommodations
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§ 8.15Family and Medical Leave Act
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§ 8.16Employer “Retaliation” Against Victims of Discrimination
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§ 8.17Discrimination Based on Military Status
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§ 8.18Employee Polygraph Protection Act
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§ 8.19Occupational Safety and Health Act
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§ 8.20Display of Posters
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§ 8.21Discrimination under State Laws
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§ 8.22Termination of Employees
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§ 8.22.01Severance Agreements
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§ 8.23National Labor Relations Act
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§ 8.24Reference Letters
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§ 8.25Employee Evaluations
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§ 8.26Employment Interviews
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§ 8.27Arbitration
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§ 8.28Employee Handbooks
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§ 8.29Employee Privacy
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§ 8.30Insurance
9Government Regulation of Churches
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§ 9.01Introduction
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§ 9.02Regulation of Charitable Solicitations
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§ 9.03Limitations on Charitable Giving
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§ 9.04Federal and State Securities Law
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§ 9.05Copyright Law
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§ 9.05.01Copyright Ownership
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§ 9.05.02Works Made for Hire
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§ 9.05.03Exclusive Rights
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§ 9.05.04Infringement
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§ 9.05.05The "Religious Service" Exemption to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.05.06Electronic Media
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§ 9.05.10Other Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.06Government Investigations
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§ 9.07Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes
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§ 9.08Political Activities by Churches and Other Religious Organizations
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§ 9.09Bankruptcy Law
10Church Legal Liability
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§ 10.01Negligence as a Basis for Liability—In General
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§ 10.02Vicarious Liability (Respondeat Superior)
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§ 10.02.01The Requirement of Employee Status
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§ 10.02.02Negligent Conduct
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§ 10.02.03Course of Employment
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§ 10.02.04Inapplicability to Nonprofit Organizations
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§ 10.03Negligent Selection of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.04Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.05Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.05.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.03Risk Management
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§ 10.06Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.07Negligent Retention of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.07.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.03Risk Management
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§ 10.08Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.09Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.09.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.03Risk Management
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§ 10.10Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.10.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.03Risk Management
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§ 10.11Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.11.01Risk Management
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§ 10.12Counseling—In General
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§ 10.12.01Risk Management
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§ 10.13Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
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§ 10.13.01Court Decisions Recognizing Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.02Court Decisions Rejecting Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.03Risk Management
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§ 10.14Ratification
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§ 10.15Defamation
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§ 10.16Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.16.01Contributory and Comparative Negligence
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§ 10.16.02Assumption of Risk
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§ 10.16.03Intervening Cause
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§ 10.16.04Statutes of Limitations
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§ 10.16.05Charitable Immunity
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§ 10.16.06Release Forms
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§ 10.16.07Insurance
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§ 10.16.08Other Defenses
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§ 10.17Damages—In General
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§ 10.17.01Punitive Damages
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§ 10.17.02Duplicate Verdicts
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§ 10.18Denominational Liability—In General
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§ 10.18.01Court Decisions Recognizing Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.02Court Decisions Rejecting Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.03Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.18.04Risk Management
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§ 10.18.05The Legal Effect of a Group Exemption Ruling
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§ 10.19Risks Associated with Cell Phones
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§ 10.20Risks Associated with the Use of 15-Passenger Vans
12The Present Meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
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§ 12.01The Establishment Clause
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§ 12.01.01The Lemon Test
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§ 12.02The Free Exercise Clause
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§ 12.02.01The Smith Case
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§ 12.02.02The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 12.02.03The City of Boerne Case
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§ 12.02.04Conclusions
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13Significant First Amendment Issues
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§ 13.01The Right to Witness
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§ 13.02Prayer on Public Property other than Schools
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§ 13.03Prayer During Public School Activities
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§ 13.04Display of Religious Symbols on Public Property
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§ 13.05Recurring Use of Public Property by Religious Congregations for Religious Services
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§ 13.06Nonrecurring Use of Public Property by Adults for Religious Events and Activities
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§ 13.07Use of Public School Property by Students for Religious Purposes
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§ 13.08Sunday Closing Laws
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§ 13.09The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
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§ 13.10Definition of "Religion" and "Religious"
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