Treatment of Churches
Key Point 8-07.01. All states have enacted workers compensation laws to provide benefits to employees who are injured or become ill in the course of their employment. Benefits generally are financed through insurance premiums paid by employers. Workers compensation laws were enacted to give injured workers a quicker, less costly, and more certain recovery than was possible by suing an employer directly for negligence. Prior to the general acceptance of workers compensation statutes in the early part of the twentieth century, injured employees were often unsuccessful in collecting damages from their employers. When they did collect, the awards were sometimes so high that they threatened the solvency of the employer. In every case, the costs to the injured employee of suing an employer were high. Churches are subject to workers compensation laws in most states.
Some state workers compensation laws contain one or more of the following religious exemptions:
- Employees of religious organizations are exempted from mandatory coverage.
- Ministers are exempted from the definition of covered employee.
- Employees are exempted from coverage who are members of a religious sect that is doctrinally opposed to the acceptance of public insurance benefits.
In addition, some states exempt activities not carried on for monetary gain, or exempt any employer having fewer than a specified number of employees.
Are churches exempt from workers compensation laws that contain no specific exemption for churches, nonprofit organizations, or organizations employing less than a specified number of employees? Although few courts have considered the question, the prevailing view is that religious organizations are subject to workers compensation laws unless specifically exempted.[6] Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Industrial Accident Commission, 230 P. 1 (Cal. App. 1924); Gardner v. Trustees of Main St. Methodist Episcopal Church, 250 N.W. 740 Iowa App. 1933); Meyers v. Southwest Region Conference Assoc., 88 So.2d 381 (La. App. 1956); Schneider v. Salvation Army, 14 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. App. 1944); Victory Baptist Temple v. Industrial Commission, 442 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio App. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1086 (1982). One court stated the rule as follows:
The fact that [a religious organization] is a purely charitable enterprise does not of itself release [it] from the obligations of our workers compensation act, which, unlike the acts of some states, does not except charitable or religious institutions, as such, from its operation, nor exclude their employees from its benefits. Where the relationship of employer and employee actually exists between a charitable institution and an injured workman, the latter is entitled to the benefits of our act, otherwise not.[7] Schneider v. Salvation Army, 14 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Minn. App. 1944). See also Hope v. Barnes Hospital, 55 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. App. 1932).
A federal court in Ohio rejected the claim that subjecting churches to workers compensation laws violates their constitutional rights.[8] South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission, 676 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1987).A church argued that the state of Ohio, through its workers compensation system, had "assumed lordship over the church in direct contravention to the biblical principle that Jesus is 'head over all things to the church' (Eph. 1:22) and that 'in all things [Christ] might have preeminence' (Col. 1:18)." In addition, the church argued that "it would be a sin to contribute to workers compensation out of church funds designated for biblical purposes and that tithe and offering money … belongs to God." The court concluded that these allegations were "sufficient to allege infringement of [the church's] religious beliefs." However, "the mere fact that a religious practice is burdened by a governmental program does not mean that an exemption accommodating the practice must be granted," since "the state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."
The court concluded that a state's interest in assuring the efficient administration and financial soundness of the workers compensation fund, and in protecting the interests of injured workers, amounted to a compelling interest that overrode the church's religious beliefs. The court noted that the Ohio law did exempt clergy from coverage under the workers compensation, and this limited exemption sought "to obviate excessive interference with the religious ministry of churches." Also rejected was the church's claim that the workers compensation program would impermissibly "entangle" government and church, since other courts had upheld even greater reporting requirements as constitutionally permissible. The court observed that exempting churches from coverage under the workers compensation law would force injured workers to sue churches in the civil courts, "an even more undesirable result from a scriptural standpoint."
An Ohio state appeals court, in upholding the coverage of church employees under a state workers compensation law, observed:
The workers compensation law has been characterized by the broadest possible coverage with frequent amendments to insure that no class of employers or employees was unintentionally excluded. If the legislature had intended to exclude religious institutions, it had ample opportunity to do so. We believe that the legislature intended for employees of religious institutions to come under the protections of the [law].[9] Victory Baptist Temple v. Industrial Commission, 442 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1086 (1982). But see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
The court rejected the church's claim that subjecting it to the workers compensation law violated the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. It relied on a 1982 decision of the United States Supreme Court rejecting the claim of Amish employers that their constitutional rights were violated by subjecting them to Social Security taxes.[10] United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). The Supreme Court had agreed that the religious beliefs and practices of Amish employers were burdened by the Social Security tax, but it concluded that "because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." The Ohio court concluded:
The state has an "overriding governmental interest" in compensating workers and their dependents for death, occupational disease, and injury arising out of and occurring during the course of employment. To accomplish this purpose, the state has enacted comprehensive legislation creating a system that requires support by mandatory contributions by covered employers. Widespread voluntary coverage would undermine the soundness of the program and be difficult, if not impossible, to administer with a myriad of exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The assessments imposed on employers to support the system are uniformly applicable to all, except as the [legislature] provides explicitly otherwise. Thus, we find no constitutionally required exemption for [a church] from the operation of the Workers Compensation Act.[11] 442 N.E.2d at 822.
This same rationale has been articulated by many of the courts finding that churches are covered by workers compensation laws. As one commentator has observed: "The basic reamp;hellip; is straightforward. It is that the compensation act expressly covers all employers, then specifically exempts such employers as it wants to exempt, so that if charitable [or religious] employers are not expressly exempted the only possible conclusion is that they are covered[12] ARTHUR. LARSON, LEX K. LARSON & THOMAS A. ROBINSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 72.04[2] (2018) [hereinafter referred to as LARSON].
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in determining whether or not the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) could assert jurisdiction over parochial school teachers, the courts must first ask whether an assertion of jurisdiction would give rise to serious constitutional questions under the First Amendment.[13] NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). If serious constitutional questions would arise, then the agency cannot assert jurisdiction over religious institutions without demonstrating an "affirmative intentions of the Congress clearly expressed" to confer such jurisdiction. Arguably, this same analysis could apply to the application of workers compensation laws to churches that are opposed, on the basis of doctrinal considerations, to coverage. Few state workers compensation laws expressly include churches among the employers that are covered, and so there is no "affirmative intention of [the legislature] clearly expressed" to cover churches. This argument has never been addressed by any court, and should not be used without legal counsel.
Some have maintained that workers compensation laws were intended to apply only to commercial businesses and should not be extended to non-business activities such as the operation of a church. Many courts have rejected this reasoning as a basis for exempting charitable organizations from workers compensation laws, largely on the ground that the term business is so broad that it encompasses charitable activities.[14] LARSON, supra note 12, at §§ 72.04[4][a-d]. One court has observed: "It is well to remember that in His earthly career the Head of the Christian Church seriously declared, 'I must be about my Father's business.' Wherefore does not church activity qualify as business? This term has such recognition apart from pecuniary gain."[15] Tepesch v. Johnson, 296 N.W. 740, 745 (Iowa App. 1941). See also Hope v. Barnes Hospital, 55 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Mo. App. 1932) ("[T]here is nothing about the act as a whole which discloses a legislative purpose to have limited its application solely to industries and businesses within the ordinary sense of the word."). Another court, in holding that a church is engaged in a "business" subject to the state's workers compensation law when constructing a new sanctuary, observed: "The business of a church is not strictly confined to charitable purposes, spiritual uplift, and the saving of souls. Such, no doubt, is the ultimate object and purpose of all church associations; but it is a matter of common knowledge that, in order to attain such ends, it is also necessary to construct and maintain houses of worship in which the business of the church is carried on."[16] Greenway Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission, 636 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Ariz. App. 1981). The court also noted that a church could be a business under a state workers compensation law since there was no requirement that a business be "profit seeking."
If a church is not exempt from workers compensation law, what is the effect of its failure to obtain workers compensation insurance? Most workers compensation laws are compulsory. The employer has no prerogative to remain outside the system. In a "compulsory" jurisdiction, a covered employer that fails to obtain workers compensation insurance will ordinarily be subject to a direct action by an injured employee, or may be treated as a "self-insurer" and accordingly be liable for the damages prescribed by the workers compensation law.[17] LARSON, supra note 12, at §§ 67.21-67.29. A few states permit employers to elect coverage under workers compensation law. To coerce employers into electing coverage, these states impose various legal disabilities upon employers that do not elect coverage.
Workers compensation laws only cover injuries and illnesses suffered by employees on the job. The term employee generally is defined very broadly to effectuate the objectives of the workers compensation law.[18] Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, 785 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. App. 1990). As a result, persons whom a church may deem self-employed for income tax purposes may be deemed employees for purposes of the workers compensation law. In some cases, however, a court may conclude that a particular worker in fact is self-employed and accordingly not covered by the workers compensation law.
Case studies
- A Kansas court ruled that a volunteer worker who was injured while removing a tree from church property was not an employee of the church and therefore was not eligible for workers compensation benefits.[19] Miller, 2015 WL 5458679 (Kansas App. 2015).
- A South Carolina state appeals court ruled that a construction company president who donated his labor in constructing a new church was not eligible for workers compensation benefits following an injury on the job.[20] McCreery v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, 383 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. App. 1989).The court noted that workers compensation benefits are available only to "employees," and that state law defined the term employee as one who works for wages under a written or oral contract of hire. The injured worker in this case "donated his labor in the construction of the church. There is no evidence he was paid wages or had a right to demand payment. There is also no evidence [that he] entered into a tithing agreement with [the church] so that his work could be considered as a credit toward his tithe obligation. We find no evidence of an employment relationship between [him and the church]. He was not hired by [the church] and he was not performing any paid service for [the church]." As a result, the court concluded that the worker "was a volunteer and not an employee" under the state workers compensation law. Accordingly, the church, through its workers compensation insurance carrier, was not obligated to pay benefits to the injured worker.
Churches are subject to workers compensation laws in most states. Yet, many churches have not procured workers compensation insurance. This may expose them to an uninsured risk for injuries sustained by employees in the course of their employment. Churches should review their liability insurance policies to ascertain what, if any, coverage exists for injured employees. Often, general liability policies exclude the insured's employees on the assumption that they are covered under a workers compensation policy. This can create a dangerous gap in coverage.
Is a homeless person who is paid $10 per hour by a church for performing miscellaneous services as part of a "charitable work program" an employee covered by state workers compensation law? Yes, concluded a California appeals court. A church operated a charitable program for homeless or transient persons. Sometimes, the church made small payments directly to needy individuals. In other cases, when persons "wished to maintain their dignity and asked to do work," the church would attempt to find work for them to do (generally at a rate of $5 per hour). Most persons worked at most a day. However, one individual worked for nearly 4 weeks, performing a variety of tasks including roofing, gardening, digging, drywall work, painting, and laying a carpet. This individual sustained serious injuries when he fell off a ladder while doing roofing work. The victim later asserted that he had been an "employee" of the church and accordingly was entitled to workers compensation benefits. The church vigorously rejected this position, claiming that the victim was a volunteer who was paid an "honorarium" for participating in the church's charitable work program. A state agency ruled in favor of the church, noting that private charities should not be discouraged from providing aid by requiring them to pay workers compensation. The agency noted that "in fact, [the church] has apparently discontinued its benevolence fund program due to the litigation and liability issues raised in this case." The victim appealed, and a state appeals court concluded that he was an employee of the church, and as such was entitled to workers compensation benefits. The court concluded: "[The victim] worked shoulder to shoulder with covered employees, did the same work, received wages, and ran the same risks. … He worked at a set hourly rate, for cash wages. … They were hourly wages, indistinguishable in any way from the wages paid to any laborer, except that they were probably considered below the prevailing wage rate for the kind of work done."[21] Hoppmann v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 277 Cal. Rptr. 116 (Cal. App. 1991).
Case studies
- The Delaware Superior Court ruled that workers compensation was the sole remedy available to a teenage counselor at a church camp who was sexually molested by an older counselor, and so the teenage counselor could not sue the church camp for damages based on negligent hiring or negligent supervision.[22] Murdoch v. Camp Arrowhead Church Camp, 2003 WL 21526993 (Del. Super. 2003).The court noted that the state workers compensation law specifies that "every employer and employee, adult and minor, shall be bound by the [workers' compensation statute] to pay and to accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of the question of negligence and to the exclusion of all other rights and remedies." Based on this language, the victim's lawsuit had to be dismissed if the camp and church could prove that (1) she was an employee, (2) she suffered a personal injury, and (3) the injury arose in the course of employment. Under these circumstances, workers compensation would be the counselor's sole remedy and her negligence claim would have to be dismissed. The court concluded that all three requirements were met, and so the counselor's sole remedy was workers compensation. This case suggests that a church employee who is a victim of sexual misconduct in the course of employment cannot sue his or her employing church based on negligence or any other "common law" theory of liability. The employee's sole remedy is workers compensation. However, note that this defense may be unavailable to a church that fails to secure workers compensation insurance.
- A New York court ruled that workers compensation insurance is an exclusive benefit for job-related injuries, and therefore a worship leader who was injured when she tripped over a bass guitar cable could not being a civil lawsuit against her church.[23] Aprile-Sci v. St. Raymond Church, 151 A.D.3d 671 (N.Y. App. 2017).
- A Pennsylvania court ruled that the widow of a man who suffered a heart attack as a result of stress he experienced while working at a church was entitled to workers compensation benefits.[24] Merva v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 784 A.2d 222 (Pa. App. 2001). A man suffered a heart attack while performing repairs at a church, and his heart attack eventually led to his death. The deceased worker's widow filed a claim for workers compensation, in which she requested compensation for her husband's death plus an additional $256,000 to reimburse Medicare for monies it expended for medical care of the worker following the accident. A workers compensation judge ruled that the widow had proven that her husband's activities at work substantially contributed to his heart attack, and therefore she was entitled to benefits. This case demonstrates an important principle. While most church leaders continue to believe that churches are "exempt" from state workers compensation laws, the opposite is often the case. Failure to purchase workers compensation insurance can result in a significant uninsured risk, as this case illustrates. In the case of a fatality, the damages can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that workers compensation benefits are an exclusive remedy, and therefore a church employee who received workers compensation benefits could not sue her church as a result of serious injuries she suffered when she fell down a church stairway.[25] Deus v. S.S. Peter and Paul Church, Deus v. S.S. Peter and Paul Church, 820 A.2d 974 (R.I. 2003). The state workers compensation law provides that the right of employees to receive workers compensation benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses "shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents, or employees." As a result, the court ruled that the woman could not sue for damages in addition to the workers compensation benefits she received.
Table of Contents
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1Definitions and Status
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§ 1.01Distinctions Between the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister
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§ 1.02Definition of the Terms Pastor, Clergy, Minister — In General
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§ 1.03Status—Employee or Self Employed
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§ 1.03.01Social Security
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§ 1.03.02Income Taxes
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§ 1.03.03Retirement Plans
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§ 1.03.04Legal Liability
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§ 1.03.05Miscellaneous Federal and State Statutes
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§ 1.04Status—Ordained, Commissioned, or Licensed
2The Pastor-Church Relationship
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§ 2.01Initiating the Relationship—In General
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§ 2.01.01Congregational Churches
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§ 2.01.02Hierarchical Churches
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§ 2.01.03Compliance with a Church's Governing Instrument in the Selection of a Minister
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§ 2.01.04Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—the General Rule of Non-Intervention
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§ 2.01.05Civil Court Review of Clergy Selection Disputes—Limited Exceptions to the General Rule
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§ 2.01.06Negligent Selection
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§ 2.02The Contract
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§ 2.03Compensation
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§ 2.04Termination
3Authority, Rights, and Privileges
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§ 3.01General Scope of a Minister's Authority
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§ 3.02Officer of the Church Corporation
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§ 3.03Property Matters
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§ 3.04Performance of Marriage Ceremonies
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§ 3.05Exemption from Military Duty
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§ 3.06Exemption From Jury Duty
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§ 3.07The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—In General
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§ 3.07.01A "Communication"
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§ 3.07.02Made in Confidence
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§ 3.07.03To a Minister
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§ 3.07.04Acting in a Professional Capacity as a Spiritual Adviser
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§ 3.07.05In the Course of Discipline
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§ 3.08The Clergy-Penitent Privilege—Miscellaneous Issues
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§ 3.08.01Clergy-Parishioner Relationship
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§ 3.08.02Marriage Counseling
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§ 3.08.03Who May Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.04When to Assert the Privilege
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§ 3.08.05Waiver of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.06The Privilege in Federal Courts
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§ 3.08.07Constitutionality of the Privilege
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§ 3.08.08Child Abuse Reporting
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§ 3.08.09Confidentiality
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§ 3.08.10Disclosure to Civil Authorities
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§ 3.08.11Church Records
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§ 3.08.12Death of the Counselee
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§ 3.09Visiting Privileges at Penal Institutions
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§ 3.10Immigration of Alien Ministers, Religious Vocations, and Religious Occupations
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§ 3.11Miscellaneous Benefits
4Liabilities, Limitations, and Restrictions
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§ 4.01Negligence
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§ 4.02Defamation—In General
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§ 4.02.01Pastors Who Are Sued for Making Defamatory Statements
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§ 4.02.02Pastors Who Are Victims of Defamation
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§ 4.02.03Defenses
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§ 4.03Undue Influence
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§ 4.04Invasion of Privacy
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§ 4.05Clergy Malpractice
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§ 4.06Contract Liability
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§ 4.07Securities Law Violations
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§ 4.08Failure to Report Child Abuse
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§ 4.09Diversion of Church Funds
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§ 4.10State Regulation of Psychologists and Counselors
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§ 4.11Sexual Misconduct
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§ 4.11.01Theories of Liability
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§ 4.11.02Defenses to Liability
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5Definitions
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§ 5.01Tax Legislation—Federal
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§ 5.01.01Churches
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§ 5.01.02Mail Order Churches
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§ 5.01.03Other Religious Organizations
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§ 5.01.04Tax Legislation—State
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§ 5.02Zoning Law
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§ 5.02.01Churches
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§ 5.02.02Accessory Uses
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6Organization and Administration
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§ 6.01Unincorporated Associations
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§ 6.01.01Characteristics
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§ 6.01.02Personal Liability of Members
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§ 6.01.03Creation and Administration
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§ 6.02Corporations
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§ 6.02.01The Incorporation Process
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§ 6.02.02Charters, Constitutions, Bylaws, and Resolutions
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§ 6.03Church Records
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§ 6.03.01Inspection
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§ 6.03.02“Accountings” of Church Funds
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§ 6.03.03Public Inspection of Tax-Exemption Applications
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§ 6.03.04Government Inspection of Donor and Membership Lists
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§ 6.03.05The Church Audit Procedures Act
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§ 6.03.06Who Owns a Church’s Accounting Records?
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§ 6.04Reporting Requirements
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§ 6.04.01State Law
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§ 6.04.02Federal Law
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§ 6.05Church Names
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§ 6.06Officers, Directors, and Trustees—In General
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§ 6.06.01Election or Appointment
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§ 6.06.02Authority
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§ 6.06.03Meetings
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§ 6.06.04Removal
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§ 6.07Officers, Directors, and Trustees—Personal Liability
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§ 6.07.01Tort Liability
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§ 6.07.02Contract Liability
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§ 6.07.03Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Care
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§ 6.07.04Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
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§ 6.07.05Violation of Trust Terms
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§ 6.07.06Securities Law
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§ 6.07.07Wrongful Discharge of an Employee
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§ 6.07.08Willful Failure to Withhold Taxes
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§ 6.07.09Exceeding the Authority of the Board
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§ 6.07.10Loans to Directors
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§ 6.08Immunity Statutes
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§ 6.08.01Directors and Officers Insurance
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§ 6.09Members—In General
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§ 6.09.01Selection and Qualifications
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§ 6.09.02Authority
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§ 6.10Members—Discipline and Dismissal
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§ 6.10.01Judicial Nonintervention
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§ 6.10.02“Marginal” Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.03Preconditions to Civil Court Review
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§ 6.10.04Remedies for Improper Discipline or Dismissal
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§ 6.11Members—Personal Liability
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§ 6.12Meetings of Members
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§ 6.12.01Procedural Requirements
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§ 6.12.02Minutes
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§ 6.12.03Parliamentary Procedure
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§ 6.12.04Effect of Procedural Irregularities
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§ 6.12.05Judicial Supervision of Church Elections
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§ 6.12.06Who May Attend
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§ 6.13Powers of a Local Church
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§ 6.14Merger and Consolidation
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§ 6.15Dissolution
7Church Property
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§ 7.01Church Property Disputes—In General
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§ 7.02Church Property Disputes—Supreme Court Rulings
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§ 7.03State and Lower Federal Court Rulings
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§ 7.04Church Property Disputes—Dispute Resolution Procedures
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§ 7.05Transferring Church Property
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§ 7.06Zoning Law
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§ 7.07Restricting Certain Activities Near Church Property
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§ 7.08Building Codes
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§ 7.08.01Lead Paint on Church Property
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§ 7.09Nuisance
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§ 7.10Landmarking
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§ 7.11Eminent Domain
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§ 7.12Defacing Church Property
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§ 7.13Restrictive Covenants
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§ 7.14Reversion of Church Property to the Prior Owner
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§ 7.15Materialmen’s Liens
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§ 7.16Religious Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Church Property
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§ 7.17Removing Disruptive Individuals
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§ 7.18Adverse Possession
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§ 7.19Accounting for Depreciation
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§ 7.20Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.01Liability Based on Status as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser
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§ 7.20.02Defenses to Premises Liability
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§ 7.20.03Use of Church Property by Outside Groups
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§ 7.20.04Assaults on Church Property
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§ 7.20.05Skate Ramps
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§ 7.20.06Sound Rooms
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§ 7.21Embezzlement
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§ 7.22Places of Public Accommodation
8Employment Law
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§ 8.01Introduction: Selection of Employees
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§ 8.02New Hire Reporting
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§ 8.03Employment Eligibility Verification
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§ 8.04Immigration
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§ 8.05Negligent Selection
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§ 8.06Introduction: Compensation and Benefits
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§ 8.07Workers Compensation
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§ 8.07.01Treatment of Churches
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§ 8.07.02Compensating Employees Who Are Receiving Workers Compensation Benefits
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§ 8.07.03Dismissing Employees for Filing a Workers Compensation Claim
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§ 8.08Fair Labor Standards Act
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§ 8.08.01Enterprises
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§ 8.08.02Individual Coverage
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§ 8.08.03Federal Court Rulings
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§ 8.08.04Department of Labor Opinion Letters
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§ 8.08.05Exemptions
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§ 8.08.06Ministers
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§ 8.08.07State Laws
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§ 8.08.08Case Studies
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§ 8.09Introduction to Federal Employment and Civil Rights Laws—The “Commerce” Requirement
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§ 8.09.01Counting Employees
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§ 8.10The “Ministerial Exception” under State and Federal Employment Laws
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§ 8.11Procedure for Establishing a Discrimination Claim
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§ 8.12Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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§ 8.12.01Application to Religious Organizations
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§ 8.12.02Application to Religious Educational Institutions
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§ 8.12.03Religion as a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"
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§ 8.12.04Discrimination Based on Religion or Morals
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§ 8.12.05Sexual Harassment
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§ 8.12.06The Catholic Bishop Case
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§ 8.12.07Failure to Accommodate Employees’ Religious Practices
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§ 8.12.08The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 8.12.09The Civil Rights Act of 1991
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§ 8.13The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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§ 8.14The Americans with Disabilities Act
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§ 8.14.01Discrimination in Employment
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§ 8.14.02Discrimination in Public Accommodations
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§ 8.15Family and Medical Leave Act
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§ 8.16Employer “Retaliation” Against Victims of Discrimination
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§ 8.17Discrimination Based on Military Status
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§ 8.18Employee Polygraph Protection Act
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§ 8.19Occupational Safety and Health Act
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§ 8.20Display of Posters
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§ 8.21Discrimination under State Laws
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§ 8.22Termination of Employees
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§ 8.22.01Severance Agreements
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§ 8.23National Labor Relations Act
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§ 8.24Reference Letters
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§ 8.25Employee Evaluations
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§ 8.26Employment Interviews
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§ 8.27Arbitration
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§ 8.28Employee Handbooks
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§ 8.29Employee Privacy
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§ 8.30Insurance
9Government Regulation of Churches
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§ 9.01Introduction
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§ 9.02Regulation of Charitable Solicitations
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§ 9.03Limitations on Charitable Giving
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§ 9.04Federal and State Securities Law
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§ 9.05Copyright Law
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§ 9.05.01Copyright Ownership
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§ 9.05.02Works Made for Hire
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§ 9.05.03Exclusive Rights
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§ 9.05.04Infringement
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§ 9.05.05The "Religious Service" Exemption to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.05.06Electronic Media
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§ 9.05.10Other Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
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§ 9.06Government Investigations
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§ 9.07Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes
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§ 9.08Political Activities by Churches and Other Religious Organizations
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§ 9.09Bankruptcy Law
10Church Legal Liability
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§ 10.01Negligence as a Basis for Liability—In General
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§ 10.02Vicarious Liability (Respondeat Superior)
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§ 10.02.01The Requirement of Employee Status
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§ 10.02.02Negligent Conduct
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§ 10.02.03Course of Employment
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§ 10.02.04Inapplicability to Nonprofit Organizations
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§ 10.03Negligent Selection of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.04Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.05Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.05.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Selection Claims
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§ 10.05.03Risk Management
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§ 10.06Negligent Selection of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.07Negligent Retention of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.07.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Retention Claims
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§ 10.07.03Risk Management
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§ 10.08Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—In General
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§ 10.09Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Minor Victims
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§ 10.09.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.09.03Risk Management
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§ 10.10Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Sexual Misconduct Cases Involving Adult Victims
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§ 10.10.01Court Decisions Recognizing Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.02Court Decisions Rejecting Negligent Supervision Claims
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§ 10.10.03Risk Management
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§ 10.11Negligent Supervision of Church Workers—Other Cases
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§ 10.11.01Risk Management
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§ 10.12Counseling—In General
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§ 10.12.01Risk Management
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§ 10.13Breach of a Fiduciary Duty
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§ 10.13.01Court Decisions Recognizing Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.02Court Decisions Rejecting Fiduciary Duty Claims
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§ 10.13.03Risk Management
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§ 10.14Ratification
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§ 10.15Defamation
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§ 10.16Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.16.01Contributory and Comparative Negligence
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§ 10.16.02Assumption of Risk
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§ 10.16.03Intervening Cause
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§ 10.16.04Statutes of Limitations
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§ 10.16.05Charitable Immunity
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§ 10.16.06Release Forms
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§ 10.16.07Insurance
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§ 10.16.08Other Defenses
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§ 10.17Damages—In General
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§ 10.17.01Punitive Damages
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§ 10.17.02Duplicate Verdicts
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§ 10.18Denominational Liability—In General
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§ 10.18.01Court Decisions Recognizing Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.02Court Decisions Rejecting Vicarious Liability
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§ 10.18.03Defenses to Liability
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§ 10.18.04Risk Management
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§ 10.18.05The Legal Effect of a Group Exemption Ruling
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§ 10.19Risks Associated with Cell Phones
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§ 10.20Risks Associated with the Use of 15-Passenger Vans
12The Present Meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
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§ 12.01The Establishment Clause
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§ 12.01.01The Lemon Test
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§ 12.02The Free Exercise Clause
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§ 12.02.01The Smith Case
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§ 12.02.02The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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§ 12.02.03The City of Boerne Case
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§ 12.02.04Conclusions
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13Significant First Amendment Issues
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§ 13.01The Right to Witness
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§ 13.02Prayer on Public Property other than Schools
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§ 13.03Prayer During Public School Activities
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§ 13.04Display of Religious Symbols on Public Property
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§ 13.05Recurring Use of Public Property by Religious Congregations for Religious Services
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§ 13.06Nonrecurring Use of Public Property by Adults for Religious Events and Activities
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§ 13.07Use of Public School Property by Students for Religious Purposes
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§ 13.08Sunday Closing Laws
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§ 13.09The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
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§ 13.10Definition of "Religion" and "Religious"
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