10 Common Payroll Tax Errors

Richard Hammar walks church leaders through 10 common payroll tax errors churches make, and how to avoid them.

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In the six minute video below, Richard Hammar reviews what he considers the ten most common payroll tax errors made by churches. Hammar, along with Christianity Today, publishes a comprehensive tax review in his annual book the Church & Clergy Tax Guide, available at ChurchLawAndTaxStore.com.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Concealed Weapons in Church

Video Series: Does a state law prohibiting concealed weapons in church violate church member’s constitutional rights to bear arms and practice their religion?

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Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Turning the Key on Tech Buys

A guide—and a grid—to process options before you choose one.

With more technologies available in the information age, the number of choices to sort through can feel overwhelming. For many church leaders, the same likely is true—for instance, one list available online shows 180 different options for church management software alone.

What makes these decisions even more complicated is how the term “technology” now refers to many different kinds of technologies. In the pre-Internet days, “technology” in churches mostly referred to audio/visual and lighting. Now, as the Internet and personal computers have become mainstream, “technology” also refers to social media, websites, mobile applications, and computer hardware and software, all spanning office uses and personal uses.

With so many options available for so many things, here are three critical factors to consider. These can give your church leaders practical principles for evaluating and choosing whether or not your church should buy a new and innovative technology. Context and personnel are important factors, as is a thorough evaluation of the products themselves. Included is a grid you can use for such an evaluation to determine which products hold the best potential for your church.

1. Knowing Your Context

This is the most important factor in a church’s decision-making about technologies. Just because other churches use popular technologies doesn’t mean your church should. Here are essential aspects of your church context to consider:

  • Your church’s vision and mission. While every church is about the Great Commission and Great Commandment, each church goes about it in different ways, with different groups of people, and thus, different technologies. A liturgical church probably uses fewer technologies than a church reaching and ministering to the online generation.
  • Key question:Does the technology solution align with your church’s vision and mission?
  • Goals and objectives. Part of organizational planning includes setting goals and objectives. These are useful for deciding what resources to use for reaching specific results. Certain technologies can get you the desired results more efficiently and effectively. And different churches will use the same technology in different ways.
  • Key question:How does the technology solution support your church’s specific goals and objectives?
  • People in your church and community. The audience your church ministers to is a significant consideration regarding whether a particular technology will engage or distract your people. Stereotypically, an older demographic might use personal technology less than a younger demographic, but that may not be the case in your particular church. A church’s culture, community, communications, and technologies are all inter-woven and connected. For example, teaching from a tablet computer like an iPad would be engaging to a tech-savvy audience while it would probably offend some traditional people who prefer their pastor to use a leather-bound Bible. The pastor at Calvary of Albuquerque uses a printed Bible during a traditional worship service and then preaches from an iPad during the church’s contemporary worship service.
  • Key question:How does the technology solution strengthen your church’s community relationships and meet people where they’re at?
  • Openness to new technology. Corporately and individually, people have different levels of readiness to use a new technology. A group of people will typically adopt a new technology along a curve based on the diffusion of innovations theory developed by Everett Rogers. Rogers classified individuals into five groups on a graph: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Insert a graph like the one. This graph shouldn’t be used as a value judgment; it helps to discern whether a new technology is appropriate for your church and how much effort it may take to incorporate a new technology. While your church may have individuals who fall across the entire spectrum of affinity to technology, you’ want to be considerate of the church as a whole when deciding on new technology.
  • Key question:How ready is your church to adopt the technology solution?

2. Knowing the Technology Options

There are many technology solutions, both custom and off-the-shelf, from different vendors. Knowing your context is an initial filter to those many options. Knowing the options will filter them even more:

  • What technology are you evaluating? Here are the general categories:
  • Sanctuary tech: sound, light, video, web, mobile, musical instruments, recording/ broadcasting;
  • Office tech: Hardware: PCs, Internet, client/server, backup, land-area network, telephone; Software: operating system (OS), office software (word processor, presentation, spreadsheet), church management software (ChMS), communications, reporting, publishing, scheduling, registration/event management, finances;
  • Production tech: Tech arts, video editor, audio editor, multimedia production, image editor;
  • Interactive tech: social media, mobile phone, Twitter, Facebook, website, e-mail newsletter, podcast, media, texting, and collaboration through things like file sharing and video conferencing.
  • What level of technology maturity is appropriate? Since technology constantly evolves and matures, usually with declining costs over time, one major factor is deciding on when to adopt a new technology. Technological maturity can be broken down into five distinct stages:
  • Bleeding edge: A high-potential technology that hasn’t yet demonstrated its value or become a consensus winner among competing options. There is a high level of risk to adopt. Example: holographic imaging;
  • Leading edge: A technology with proven value in the marketplace, but it’s still new enough that challenges come with implementing or supporting it. Example: online church;
  • State of the art: A technology that is the consensus winner, commonly considered a popular mainstream solution. Example: wireless microphones;
  • Dated: A technology that still may be useful, but a leading-edge technology is available to replace it. Example: wired microphones;
  • Obsolete: A technology superseded by state-of-the-art technology. Example: cassette tapes.
  • How do you evaluate the different technology solutions? Most technology solutions have multiple companies and vendors that provide solutions with a different set of features. This grid is a good way to sort through the various factors. I’ll present the grid and then explain how it can be used:

How to use the evaluation grid:

List your options: Find the technology options by researching them in any of these ways:

• Using an Internet search engine;

• Connecting with online communities on blogs, Facebook, Twitter, or message boards;

• Browsing this buyer’s guide;

• Checking with vendors;

• And contacting several churches of a similar size using similar technologies. Take a fellow church leader out for lunch or meet for coffee. There are others who have already done research and there are people using a technology that can give honest feedback. As you’re researching technology options, filter them based on whether a solution fits your church context.

In the next four columns, put down a score from 1 (doesn’t fit) to 10 (fits best) regarding whether a technology fits your church:

• For the Features Set score, you can break down the various features offered in the solution and match them against three lists of the features that your church requires: must-have features, nice-to-have features, and undesired features. Put a score in this column ranging from 1 (least matches to desired features) to 10 (most matches to desired features).

• For the Cost score, put a score down from 1 (most expensive) to 10 (cheapest) based on various aspects of cost: initial cost (fixed), recurring cost (subscription or license fees), maintenance cost, and support cost.

• For the Personnel score, put a score down from 1 (most costly) to 10 (least costly) indicating the manpower required for using, maintaining, and supporting the technology solution. Personnel should include staff and volunteers, as well as outsourced staff. Technology does not run itself and it’s not a fixed cost. Technology requires people to use it and support it. Factor in the people resources needed for a specific technology solution.

• For the Adoption Time score, put a score down from 1 (slowest) to 10 (quickest) denoting how long it would take to launch and incorporate that technology solution. Factor in installation time, launch time, and training time.

Then, add the score for each row. The highest scores tend to indicate a better fit for your technology needs. This grid may oversimplify the process, and many other outside factors may affect what to consider in your evaluation. You may modify the grid by adding extra columns to factor in other things that are important to your church.

3. Involving the Right People

The right team of people can decide on the best new technologies for the church. The ideal team involves at least two key members in the process of due diligence: a church leader and a technical expert. Additionally, it will involve an end user (a staff member or volunteer who will use the technology on a regular basis). And, depending on the church’s governance, it may involve someone from the pastoral staff, senior leadership team, or elder board—someone who can contribute to the decision-making because he (or she) knows the church’s context best.

The technical expert (I use the label “tech steward”), whether staff or volunteer, should be someone who is able to sort through technical specifications and jargon and know what best fits the church’s ability to receive, understand, and use the new technology. The technical expert doesn’t need to know all about researching, installing, training, or supporting various technologies, but will coordinate and ensure that these important tasks get done.

In my conversations with church leaders, the collaboration between the church leader and the technical expert is crucial. A church leader without technical proficiency may be persuaded by an attractive ad and buy a new technology that doesn’t fit the church, while a technical expert might choose a new technology that’s too challenging for the church’s staff and volunteer to use effectively. This relationship works well when the church leader can trust the recommendations of the technical expert while the technical expert humbly submits to the input and authority of the church leader.

After the Buy

Regularly schedule an evaluation once or twice a year to determine the benefits of the technology to your church’s goals and objectives. Also, make certain someone stays informed of technological developments so that obsolete technologies get retired and new ones take their place in a timely fashion. Since these three aspects are constantly changing—context, technology, and people—technology buys are not a once-and-for-all project. Consider it more of a part of the process for doing ministry effectively.

When the IRS Comes Knocking

New guide identifies key audit issues.

The new “Audit Technique Guide for Ministers,” which was released on June 30, 2009, provides important insight into the key issues the IRS will scrutinize when they audit ministers. The new guide begins by noting that “ministers are accorded some unique tax benefits for income, social security and Medicare taxes, which present several potential examination issues on ministers’ tax returns in addition to income and expense issues found in most examinations.” The guidelines list the following topics that are “unique to ministers”:

  1. Introduction: Overview Of Issues
  2. Who Qualifies For Special Tax Treatment As A Minister
  3. Income Issues:
    • Income To Be Reported
    • Gift or Compensation for Services
    • The Parsonage Allowance
    • Retired Ministers
    • Members of Religious Orders and Vow of Poverty
  4. Business Expenses
    • Determination of Deductible Expenses Where Some Income is Tax Exempt
  5. Self-Employment Tax: Exemption
  6. Computing Self-Employment Tax
  7. Employee versus Independent Contractor
  8. The guidelines’ treatment of each of these issues is summarized below.
  9. 1. Introduction: Overview of Issues
  10. The guidelines include the following overview of tax issues for ministers:
  11. Although a minister is considered an employee under the common law rules, payments for services as a minister are considered income from self employment …. A minister, unless exempt, pays social security and Medicare taxes under the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) and is not subject to Federal Insurance Compensation Act (FICA) taxes or income tax withholding.

    Payment for services as a minister, unless statutorily exempt, is subject to income tax, therefore the minister should make estimated tax payments to avoid potential penalties for not paying enough tax as the minister earns the income. If the employer and employee agree, an election can be made to have income taxes withheld. Even though a minister may receive a Form 1099-MISC for the performance of services, he or she may be a common law employee and should in fact be receiving a Form W-2.

    The determination of whether a minister is an employee or an independent contractor follows the same rules as any other industry determination. The challenge with a minister is the same as with any professional. The control test must be applied only after taking into account the nature of the work to be performed.

    How a minister is classified for income tax purposes effects how they treat their expenses. A minister that is a common law employee must claim their trade or business expenses incurred while working as an employee as an itemized deduction on Form 1040 Schedule A, which is subject to the 2%-of-adjusted-gross-income (AGI) limitation and alternative minimum tax.

    A minister is frequently provided a parsonage or is paid a housing allowance, which is exempt from income tax …. The “allowable” allowance is subject to self-employment tax …. The “allowable” allowance is computed subject to limitations imposed by law as to the amount and the required designation by the employing church which is discussed in detail under the section on the parsonage allowance. Please be aware of the special rules for retired ministers.

    Because of the exemption from income tax for the “allowable” parsonage or housing allowance, the [tax code] requires business expenses to be allocated between taxable and non taxable income. Other business expenses discussed in this guide are common to all other professionals.

  12. 2. Who Qualifies For Special Tax Treatment As A Minister
  13. The tax code contains several references to ministers, but the four major references are the following:
  14. (1) The exclusion (for income tax purposes only) for housing allowances or the fair rental value of church-owned parsonages provided to the minister rent-free;
  15. (2) The exemption of some ministers from social security coverage;
  16. (3) Treatment of ministers (who are not exempt) as self-employed for social security tax purposes with respect to ministerial services; and
  17. (4) Exemption of ministerial wages from income tax withholding (unless elected by the minister).
  18. The guidelines correctly point out that these special provisions apply to “ministers” with respect to services performed in the exercise of ministry. The guidelines state: “To qualify for the special tax provisions available to ministers, an individual must be a ‘minister’ and must perform services ‘in the exercise of his ministry.'” It is very important, then, to clarify the meaning of the terms minister and service performed in the exercise of ministry. The guidelines provide IRS agents with the following assistance in defining these critical terms:
  19. Minister
  20. The guidelines provide the following clarification on the meaning of the term minister:
  21. The income tax regulations require that an individual be a “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church.”
  22. The Tax Court, in Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190 (1966), ruled that the phrase “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church” must be interpreted “disjunctively.” By this it meant that a person Qualifies as a minister for tax purposes if he or she meets any of these three categories. Ordained status, therefore, is not required.
  23. Service performed in the exercise of ministry
  24. The guidelines state that the income tax regulations provide that “service performed by a minister in the exercise of the ministry” includes:
  25. Ministration of sacerdotal functions;
  26. Conduct of religious worship;
  27. Control, conduct, and maintenance of religious organizations (including the religious boards, societies, and other integral agencies of such organizations), under the authority of a religious body constituting a church or denomination.”
  28. Observation. It is very significant that the guidelines do not require that all three categories of ministry be met in order for one to be a minister for tax purposes or engaged in the performance of services in the exercise of ministry. Many ministers do not satisfy all three categories of ministry, and to suggest (as the IRS and Tax Court have in the past) that all three are required is inappropriate and naive.

    The guidelines note that the income tax regulations specify that whether service performed by a minister constitutes conduct of religious worship or ministration of sacerdotal functions depends on the tenets and practices of the particular religious body constituting the church or denomination.

    The guidelines note that the income tax regulations associated with section 107 of the tax code (pertaining to the housing allowance) provide the following examples of services considered duties of a minister:

    1. Performance of sacerdotal functions;
    2. Conduct of religious worship;
    3. Administration and maintenance of religious organizations and their integral agencies;
    4. Performance of teaching and administrative duties at theological seminaries.
    5. Observation. Once again, this list does not suggest or require that a person satisfy all of the categories to be a minister or be engaged in service performed in the exercise of ministry. To illustrate, a theology professor at a church-controlled seminary who seldom if ever conducts religious worship or performs sacerdotal functions would still be considered a minister engaged in ministry under the approach taken both in the regulations and the guidelines. This is an important clarification, since some previous IRS and Tax Court rulings have suggested that all categories of ministerial services must be performed.

      The guidelines add that “the duties performed by the individual are also important to the initial determination whether he or she is a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister. Because religious disciplines vary in their formal procedures for these designations, whether an individual is duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed depends on these facts and circumstances.”

      The guidelines then refer to the following legal authorities:

      (1) Salkov v. Commissioner (noted above) and Silverman v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727 (1972). The Tax Court, in holding that a cantor of the Jewish faith was a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister, looked to “the systematic manner the cantor was called to his ministry and the ecclesiastical functions he carried out in concluding that he was a minister ….”

      (2) Revenue Ruling 78-301. The IRS followed the Tax Court decisions in Salkov and Silverman and held that a Jewish cantor who is not ordained but has a bona fide commission and is employed by a congregation on a full-time basis to perform substantially all the religious worship, sacerdotal, training, and educational functions of the Jewish denomination’s religious tenets and practices is a minister of the gospel for federal tax purposes. The audit guidelines state that this ruling “revoked and modified prior revenue rulings to the extent that they required that an individual must be invested with the status and authority of an ordained minister fully qualified to exercise all of the ecclesiastical duties of a church denomination to be considered ministers ….”

      (3) Knight v. Commissioner 92 T.C. 199 (1989). The guidelines, in commenting on the Knight case, note:

      The Tax Court considered whether a licentiate of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church (a status that was less than full ordination), who had not filed a timely exemption from self-employment tax, was a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister in the exercise of required duties who was thus liable for self-employment tax. The petitioner argued that he was not formally ordained as a minister and could not administer church sacraments or participate in church government. Thus, he could not be a minister subject to IRC §1402(c). The court rejected this view, and looked at all the facts. In concluding that he was a licensed minister, it cited the facts that he was licensed by the church, he conducted worship services, and he was considered by the church to be a spiritual leader. The court also noted the petitioner preached, performed funerals, visited the sick, and ministered to the needy within the context of his duties for the church.

      Observation. The guidelines’ reference to the Knight case is significant. The Knight case contains perhaps the best analysis of the terms “minister” and “exercise of ministry.” The court applied a “balancing test,” noting that a minister need not actually perform every category of ministerial service described in the income tax regulations. In prior rulings the IRS omitted any reference to this important decision. The guidelines take a different view. IRS agents will now consider this ruling. As a result, more bona fide ministers will in fact be considered “ministers” for tax purposes. This is an important clarification, and one of the most important aspects of the guidelines.

      (4) Lawrence v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 494 (1968). The guidelines, in commenting on the Lawrence case, note the Tax Court found that

      A “minister of education” in a Baptist church was not a “duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed” minister for purposes of IRC §107. The petitioner held a Master’s Degree in Religious Education from a Baptist Theological Seminary, but was not ordained. Although his church “commissioned” him after he assumed the position, the court interpreted the commissioning to be for tax purposes, as it did not result in any change in duties. Most significant, however, was the court’s analysis of petitioner’s duties or rather, the duties he did not perform. He did not officiate at Baptisms or the Lord’s Supper, two Ordinances that closely resembled sacraments, nor did he preside over or preach at worship services. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish that the prescribed duties of a minister of education were equivalent to the duties of a Baptist minister.

      Observation. The guidelines contain no reference to the Tax Court’s decision in Wingo v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 922 (1987). In the Wingo case, the Court adopted the totally untenable conclusion that a “minister” is one who must satisfy all of the following fi ve conditions: (1 administer sacraments, (2) conduct worship services, (3) perform services in the “control, conduct, or maintenance of a religious organization,” (4) be ordained, commissioned, or licensed, and (5) be considered a spiritual leader by one’s religious body. This test was so narrow that it denied ministerial status to many bonafide ministers who worked for seminaries, para-church ministries, or as associate pastors within local congregations. Fortunately, the guidelines do not even mention this ruling (despite the fact that the IRS relied on it in some earlier rulings). This is good news, and makes it more likely that IRS agents will consider those claiming to be ministers to be ministers for federal tax purposes.

      Observation. Unfortunately, the guidelines do not adequately distinguish between the terms “minister” and “service performed in the exercise of ministry.” The failure to distinguish between these key terms has produced much confusion, and the guidelines provide little assistance. This will mean that agents auditing ministers’ tax returns will continue to experience confusion. The guidelines’ disregard of the Wingo case will help.

      3. Taxable Income

      With regard to the income to be reported by a minister, the guidelines provide agents with the following list of items that represent reportable income:

      • Compensation from an employing church or church agency
      • Bonuses
      • “Special gifts”
      • Fees received by a minister directly from parishioners for performing weddings, funerals, baptisms and masses (the guidelines clarify however that “fees for weddings, funerals, etc., which are given directly to the church rather than to the minister, are not considered compensation to the minister”)
      • Expense allowances for travel, transportation, or other business expenses received under a non-accountable reimbursement arrangement
      • Amounts paid to ministers in addition to salary to cover self-employment tax or income tax
      • Distributions made to or for the support of individual missionaries to further the objectives of their missions

      Observation. While this list will provide IRS agents with some assistance, it does not adequately address a number of critical points. For example, not all “special gifts” to clergy are reportable as taxable income. Also, the guidelines miss an opportunity to inform agents about a number of other items of possible income, including personal use of a church-owned vehicle; property purchased from a church at below market value; low-interest and no-interest loans to clergy; and some forms of ministers’ “discretionary funds.” These are all common sources of ministerial income, and there is considerable confusion as to the correct tax status of these items.

      Gift or Compensation for Services

      The guidelines inform IRS agents that “gifts given to a minister, other than retired ministers, may actually be compensation for services, hence includable in gross income” for tax purposes. The guidelines provide agents with the following assistance in deciding if a church’s payment to a minister is a tax-free gift or taxable compensation for services rendered:

      • The tax code provides that taxable income includes all income from whatever source derived unless specifically excluded. Section 102(a) of the tax code excludes the value of property acquired by gift. The guidelines state: “Whether an item is a gift is a factual question and the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. The most significant fact is the intention of the taxpayer.”
      • The issue of differentiating tax-free gifts and taxable compensation has been addressed in the following court rulings:

      (1) In Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) the United States Supreme Court stated the governing principles in this area: The mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make such a payment does not establish that it is a gift. And, importantly, if the payment proceeds primarily from “the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,” or from “the incentive of anticipated benefit” of an economic nature, it is not a gift. And, conversely, “where the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it.” A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a “detached and disinterested generosity,” “out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.” And in this regard, the most critical consideration, is the transfer-or’s “intention.” “What controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made.”

      (2) In Bogardus v. Commissioner , 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937), the United States Supreme Court provided the following guidance in distinguishing between a taxfree gift and taxable compensation: “What controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made. Has it been made with the intention that services rendered in the past shall be requited more completely, though full acquittance has been given? If so, it bears a tax. Has it been made to show good will, esteem, or kindliness toward persons who happen to have served, but who are paid without thought to make requital for the service? If so, it is exempt.”

      (3) In Banks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-641, the United States Tax Court addressed a “structured and organized” transfer of cash from members of a church to their pastor on four special days of each year. Prior to making the transfers, members of the church met to discuss the transfers. The amounts of the transfers were significant. The testimony of several members indicated that “the primary reason for the transfers at issue was not detached and disinterested generosity, but rather, the church members’ desire to reward petitioner for her services as a pastor and their desire that she remain in that capacity.” The court ruled the transfers were compensation for services hence included in taxable income.

      (4) In Lloyd L. Goodwin v. U.S., 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995), a federal appeals court addressed the tax status of offerings collected from a church congregation on special occasion days. The collections were done by congregational leaders in a structured manner. The congregation knew that it probably could not retain the pastor’s service at his relatively low salary without the additional payments. The court ruled that the funds were compensation for services, not gifts.

      (5) The Tax Court had ruled in Potito v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1975-187, aff’d 534 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1976), that the) value of a boat, motor and boat trailer was included in taxable income as payment for services. The taxpayer, a minister, had not produced any evidence regarding the intention of the donors that the transfer of the property was out of “detached and disinterested generosity”.

      Retirement Gifts

      Perhaps the biggest surprise in the new guidelines is the following statement:

      There are numerous court cases that ruled the organized authorization of funds to be paid to a retired minister at or near the time of retirement were gifts and not compensation for past services. Revenue Ruling 55-422 discusses the fact pattern of those cases which would render the payments as gifts and not compensation.

      In 1955 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 55-422, in which it endorsed four federal appeals court cases holding that retirement distributions from a church to a pastor were tax-free gifts due to the following facts in each case:

      • “The payments were not made in accordance with any enforceable agreement, established plan, or past practice”
      • The minister “did not undertake to perform any further services for the congregation and was not expected to do so” following his retirement
      • “There was a far closer personal relationship between the [minister] and the congregation than is found in lay employment relationships,” and
      • “The available evidence indicated that the amount paid was determined in light of the financial position of the congregation and the needs of the recipient, who had been adequately compensated for his past services.”

      The four federal appeals court rulings endorsed by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 55- 422 are summarized below:

      (1) Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949). A federal appeals court ruled that a church’s retirement gift to its pastor represented a tax-free gift rather than taxable compensation. The pastor was forced to retire on the advice of his physician as a result of a long illness. He made no request of the congregation that any amount be paid to him after his resignation, and he had no knowledge that the church would agree to do so. He did not agree to render any services in exchange for the gift and in fact did not do so. The court concluded:

      We are of opinion the Tax Court clearly erred in holding that the payments to [the pastor] were taxable income. Where, as here, all the facts and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the [gift] clearly prove an intent to make a gift, the mere use of the terms “salary” and “honorarium” do not convert the gift into a payment for services. Moreover, “a gift is none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for past faithful service of the recipient ….” Manifestly, these payments to [the pastor] were non-taxable gifts, within the orbit of the rule defining same, as enunciated by this court in [another case]: “That only is a gift which is purely such, not intended as a return of value or made because of any intent to repay another what is his due, but bestowed only because of personal affection or regard or pity, or from general motives of philanthropy or charity.”

      (2) Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1954). A federal appeals court ruled that monthly retirement gifts made by a church to its retired pastor were tax-free gifts rather than taxable compensation. The court noted that the church’s action in providing for the monthly honor-aria “was motivated solely and sincerely by the congregation’s love and affection for [the pastor].” The court described the church’s action as a “free gift of a friendly, well-to-do group who as long as they were able and because they were, wished their old minister to live in a manner comparable to that which he had enjoyed while actively associated with them.” The court also observed:

      [The pastor] had been adequately compensated as far as money could for his services in the past. He was not being tied into any promise of services in the future. The installment gift, while it could be stopped or changed at any time by the trustees, had no conditions attached to its acceptance.” The court concluded that no other ruling “justifies the taxing of this bona fide gift given [the pastor] with love and affection by his old congregation.

      (3) Kavanagh v. Hershman, 210 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1954). A federal appeals court, in a one-paragraph opinion, ruled that a distribution of funds to a minister was a tax-free gift rather than taxable compensation. The court based its decision on the Mutch decision (summarized above).

      (4) Abernathy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Abernathy case was a one-paragraph decision issued by a federal appeals court in 1954. The ruling addressed the question of whether a $2,400 retirement gift paid by a church to its pastor “as a token of its gratitude and appreciation” and “in appreciation of his long and faithful service” represented taxable income or a tax-free gift. The federal court concluded that the transfer was a tax-free gift. It cited (without explanation) the Schall, Mutch, and Kavanagh decisions (summarized above).

      Key point. The Abernathy case was referred to, with approval, by a federal court in 1994 in a ruling addressing the tax status of congregational gifts to a minister. Goodwin v. United States, 94-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,597 (S.D. Iowa 1994), affirmed, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995).

      The Schall, Mutch, Kavanagh, and Abernathy cases, summarized above, and Revenue Ruling 55-422, suggest that retirement gifts to ministers can, under limited circumstances, be treated as tax-free gifts rather than as taxable compensation so long as the conditions specified in Revenue Ruling 55-422 are satisfied. The IRS has never officially revoked or even modified Revenue Ruling 55-422, and none of the four federal appeals court rulings has been qualified or overturned. However, three considerations have made such a conclusion questionable:

      1. The position of the IRS national office

      The IRS national office has sent the editor of this newsletter a letter stating that “Revenue Ruling 55-422 ceased to represent the Service’s position on or before the date the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Duberstein [in 1960].” The Duberstein case is summarized above. The IRS also informed the author that (1) “for years after 1986, section 102(c) ensures that [retirement] payments are not excludable” by ministers who are employees for income tax reporting purposes; and (2) retirement gifts to self-employed ministers are now evaluated under the Duberstein and Stanton cases (summarized above). The IRS’s repudiation of Revenue Ruling 55-422, and the four federal appeals court rulings summarized above, is belied by the following considerations:

      First, in Revenue Procedure 89-14, the IRS provided the following information concerning revenue rulings:

      A revenue ruling is an official interpretation by the IRS of the internal revenue laws and related statutes, treaties, and regulations …. Revenue rulings are issued only by the IRS national office and are published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, IRS officials, and others concerned …. Taxpayers generally may rely upon revenue rulings and revenue procedures in determining the tax treatment of their own transactions and need not request specific rulings applying the principles of a published revenue ruling or revenue procedure to the facts of their particular cases. However, taxpayers, IRS personnel, and others concerned are also cautioned to determine whether a revenue ruling or revenue procedure on which they seek to rely has been revoked, modified, declared obsolete, distinguished, clarified or otherwise affected by subsequent legislation, treaties, regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures or court decisions.

      The IRS has never revoked, modified, declared obsolete, or distinguished Revenue Ruling 44-422.

      Second, Revenue Ruling 55-422 was quoted with approval as recently as 1995 by the United States Tax Court. Osborne v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. 1895 (1995). This is several years after the Duberstein case (1960) and effective date of section 102(c) of the tax code (1987), both of which events were previously cited by the IRS as its rationale for no longer following Revenue Ruling 55-422.

      Third, other federal courts have affirmed the tax-free status of gifts made to ministers. To illustrate, in Brimm v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 1148 (1968), the United States Tax Court ruled that a severance gift made by a church-affiliated school to a professor was a nontaxable gift rather than taxable compensation. The professor (the “taxpayer”) was employed by a church-related, two-year graduate school supported by the Southern Baptist Convention. It became apparent that, because of the small student body and the high cost of operations, the school would have to be closed. Prior to the school’s dissolution, its board of trustees adopted a resolution authorizing “a gift equivalent to one year’s salary to each faculty member and staff member upon termination of his or her services with the school.” Pursuant to this policy, the taxpayer received a “gift” of $8,600 in two annual installments bearing the notation “severance gift.” The taxpayer did not report the two installments as taxable income on his tax returns since he regarded them to be a tax-free gift rather than taxable compensation for services rendered.

      The IRS audited the taxpayer’s tax returns and determined that the severance gifts constituted taxable income. On appeal, the Tax Court concluded that the severance payments were in fact nontaxable gifts: “It is clear from the evidence that the board of trustees of the school took their action in declaring and making a severance gift to the taxpayer, as well as to other members of the small staff, because they were grateful and appreciative of the past faithful and dedicated service rendered to the school.” The court noted that the presence of affection, respect, admiration, and a deep sense of appreciation in the minds of trustees was demonstrated by the testimony of a member of the board who testifi ed that the severance gifts were not intended to represent additional compensation, that were authorized solely as a means of showing appreciation to the faculty, and that there was no expectation of additional services being performed in return for the severance gifts. The court concluded:

      There is no doubt that the school’s trustees were motivated by gratitude for the taxpayer’s past faithful services, but, as the Supreme Court said in [the Bogardus case] “a gift is none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for past faithful service of the recipient.” Indeed, long and faithful service may create the atmosphere of goodwill and kindliness toward the recipient which tends to support a finding that a gift rather than additional compensation was intended …. We hold that the school intended to make, and did make, a gift which was made gratuitously and in exchange for nothing.

      2. Tax-exempt status

      Neither Revenue Ruling 55-422 nor any of the four court decisions from the 1950s explains how a church can distribute any of its assets as a tax-free gift without jeopardizing its tax exempt status. To be exempt from federal income taxation, a church must satisfy a number of requirements. One of these requirements is that none of its assets or income be distributed to any individual except as reasonable compensation for services rendered or for a charitable or religious purpose. IRC 501(c)(3). Treating a retirement gift as a tax-free gift would appear to violate this requirement if the gift is paid out of church funds. The effect of this would be to call into question the tax-exempt status of the church itself. Significantly, the courts have consistently ruled that any amount of income distributed to an individual (other than as reasonable compensation or in furtherance of charitable or religious purposes) will jeopardize a church’s tax-exempt status. This problem is avoided by characterizing the retirement gift as taxable compensation, assuming that the gift is reasonable in amount.

      3. Section 102(c) of the tax code

      Section 102(c) of the tax code, which took effect in 1987, specifi es that the defi nition of the term “gift” shall not include “any amount transferred by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” The tax code does permit employees to exclude from income certain employee achievement awards and de minimis fringe benefits whose value is so insignificant that accounting for them would be unreasonable or administratively impracticable. IRC 132(e).

      Key point. A federal appeals court in 1995 made the following observation regarding section 102(c) of the tax code: “Although the legislative history suggests that [this section] was enacted to address other fact situations, its plain meaning may not be ignored in this case. That meaning seems far from plain, however. The church members are not [the pastor’s] ’employer,’ and the question whether their payments to the [pastor] were made ‘for’ his employer seems little different than the traditional gift inquiry under Duberstein and Bogardus. We therefore decline the government’s belated suggestion that we affirm on the alternative ground of section 102(c).” Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995).

      Key point. Taxpayers generally are not liable for penalties if they rely on a published court decision in support of a tax position. Since the four 1950s cases summarized above have never been overruled, they probably would prevent a minister from being assessed penalties as a result of treating a retirement gift as nontaxable. However, it is virtually certain that the IRS would insist that the entire value of the retirement gift represents taxable income, requiring the minister to pay the additional taxes due on this unreported income. However, if the minister’s position is supported by any one or more of the 1950s cases, it is doubtful that the IRS could impose penalties.

      Conclusion

      For unknown reasons, the IRS, in its recently-issued audit guidelines for ministers, has seemingly changed course in its treatment of gifts to clergy as a result of the following statement:

      There are numerous court cases that ruled the organized authorization of funds to be paid to a retired minister at or near the time of retirement were gifts and not compensation for past services. Revenue Ruling 55-422 discusses the fact pattern of those cases which would render the payments as gifts and not compensation.

      The Parsonage Allowance

      Federal tax law treats ministers’ housing arrangements very favorably. Consider the following rules:

      • Ministers can exclude from their income for federal income tax reporting purposes the fair rental value of a parsonage provided to them as compensation for ministerial services.
      • Ministers who live in a church-provided parsonage can exclude from their income for federal income tax reporting purposes the portion of their ministerial compensation designated by their employer as a “parsonage allowance”- to the extent that it is used to pay for parsonage-related expenses such as utilities, repairs, and furnishings.
      • Ministers who own or rent their homes can exclude from their income for federal income tax reporting purposes the portion of their ministerial income designated by their employer as a “housing allowance”- to the extent that the allowance is used to pay for housingrelated expenses such as rent, mortgage payments, utilities, repairs, furnishings, insurance, property taxes, additions, and maintenance. In addition, a housing allowance exclusion for ministers who own their home may not exceed the fair rental value of their home (furnished, including utilities).

      How do the new IRS audit guidelines address these tax benefits? They basically restate the three rules summarized above. To illustrate, the audit guidelines’ treatment of parsonage allowances begins with the following paragraph:

      [The tax code] provides an exclusion from gross income for a “parsonage allowance,” housing specifically provided as part of the compensation for the services performed as a minister of the gospel. This includes the rental value of a home furnished to him or her as part of compensation or a housing allowance, to the extent that the payment is used to rent or provide a home and to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value (FRV) of the home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage and the cost of utilities. The term “parsonage allowance” includes church provided parsonages, rental allowances with which the minister may rent a home and housing allowances with which the minister may purchase a home. A minister can receive a parsonage allowance for only one home.

      The guidelines make the following additional clarifications:

      (1) The housing allowance is subject to self-employment tax. This is not a problem for ministers who own or rent their home, since they simply add the amount of their housing allowance exclusion to their earnings subject to the self-employment tax. But what about ministers who live in a church-provided parsonage? How much should they add to their earnings subject to the self-employment tax? This has been a difficult question for ministers living in parsonages, and there has been very little guidance from the IRS or the courts. Unfortunately, the guidelines provide little clarification:

      If a church-owned parsonage is provided to the minister, instead of an allowance, the fair rental value of the housing must be determined. Determining the fair rental value is a question of all facts and circumstances based on the local market, but the church and minister have often already agreed on a figure and can provide documentary evidence.

      (2) The guidelines note that the housing allowance “only applies if the employing church designates the amount of the allowance in advance of the tax year,” and that “the designation may appear in the minister’s employment contract, the church minutes, the church budget, or any other document indicating official action.”

      Observation. It is unfortunate that the guidelines state that the housing allowance “only applies if the employing church designates the amount of the allowance in advance of the tax year,” since this statement is simply not true. It is true that a church’s housing allowance designation may never be made retroactively, and only operates prospectively. But this does not mean that it has to be made in advance of a tax year. To illustrate, many churches fail to designate a housing allowance by the end of a calendar year and discover the omission a few months into the new year. The church can still designate a housing allowance for the minister for the remainder of the new year. Unfortunately, unless the guidelines are amended, IRS agents may unnecessarily disallow any housing allowance exclusion under these facts.

      (3) Ministers who own their homes cannot necessarily exclude from taxable income the housing allowance designated by their employing church. The guidelines correctly note that the excludable amount is “the least of (1) the amount actually used to provide a home, (2) the amount officially designated as a housing allowance, or (3) the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings appurtenances such as a garage plus the cost of utilities.”

      Observation. The guidelines provide agents with the following list of expenses that can be considered in computing the housing allowance: rent, house payments, furnishings, repairs, insurance, taxes, utilities, other expenses (including down payments, interest, etc. but not food or servants or entertainment).

      (4) Even though a minister’s home mortgage interest and real estate taxes have been paid with money excluded from income as a housing allowance, he or she “may still claim itemized deductions for these items.” This is the so-called “double deduction,” and it is one reason why home ownership is especially attractive for ministers.

      (5) The guidelines address the eligibility of retired ministers for a housing allowance as follows:

      A retired minister may receive part of his or her pension benefits as a designated housing allowance based on past services. Trustees of a minister’s retirement plan may designate a portion of each pension distribution as a housing allowance that is excluded from income for federal income tax reporting purposes.

      Observation. The IRS has stated in recent years that the issue of “whether amounts distributed to a retired minister from a pension or annuity plan should be excludable from the minister’s gross income as a parsonage allowance” is “an area under extensive study in which rulings or determination letters will not be issued until the Service resolves the issue through publication of a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, regulations, or otherwise.” Such statements have caused some confusion regarding the continuing availability of housing allowances to retired ministers. The guidelines suggest that this is no longer an immediate concern.

      (6) Housing allowances paid to retired ministers are excludable from income for federal income tax reporting purposes, but what about self-employment taxes? The guidelines instruct IRS agents as follows:

      The retired minister may exclude from his/her net earnings from self-employment the rental value of the parsonage or the parsonage allowance received after retirement. The entire amount of parsonage allowance received is excludible from net earnings from self employment, even if a portion of it is not excludible for income tax purposes. In addition, the retired minister may exclude from net earnings from self-employment any retirement benefits received from a church plan. Rev. Rul. 58-359.

      Observation. This is one of the most significant provisions in the guidelines. In the original audit guidelines for ministers published in 1995, the IRS stated that housing allowances paid to retired ministers by their retirement plans represented taxable earnings for self-employment tax purposes, since “amounts received by a retired minister as a parsonage allowance relate to the performance of prior services as a minister.” The IRS position was overruled by Congress in the Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, which amended the tax code to include the following provision: “An individual who is a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church or a member of a religious order shall compute his net earnings from self-employment derived from the performance of [ministerial] service without regard to [a parsonage or housing allowance] but shall not include in such net earnings from self-employment the rental value of any parsonage or any parsonage allowance provided after the individual retires, or any other retirement benefit received by such individual from a church plan ….” This change in the law was one of the main reasons that the IRS needed to update its audit guidelines for ministers, albeit 12 years too late.

      (7) The guidelines instruct agents to enforce the so-called Deason allocation rule. They explain this rule as follows:

      A minister may deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, if a minister’s compensation includes a parsonage or housing allowance which is exempt from income under IRC §107, the prorated portion of the expenses allocable to the tax exempt income is not deductible, per IRC §265, Deason v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 465 (1964), Dalan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-106, and McFarland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-440. Before this allocation is made, the total amount of business expenses must be determined. Ministers are subject to the same substantiation requirements as other taxpayers.

      Key point. The guidelines state that a “parsonage allowance” does not refer to “housing specifically provided as part of the compensation for the services performed as a minister.” Rather, it refers to that portion of a minister’s compensation that is designated in advance by his or her employing church, and that is used by the minister to pay for parsonage-related expenses (i.e., utilities, furnishings, insurance). The term parsonage refers to housing provided to a minister.

      (8) The guidelines contain the following 6 examples to assist agents in understanding the application of the housing allowance exclusion. The examples are introduced with the statement that “for simplification assume that mortgage payments include property taxes and insurance.” Further, “FRV” means annual fair rental value.

      Additional Considerations

      The IRS audit guidelines for ministers contain the following additional clarifications:

      (1) The term “parsonage allowance” includes church provided parsonages, rental allowances with which the minister may rent a home and housing allowances with which the minister may purchase a home. A minister can receive a parsonage allowance for only one home.

      (2) A housing allowance must be included in a minister’s taxable income in the year in which it is received to the extent that it is not used during the year to rent or otherwise provide a home or exceeds the fair rental value of the home including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage and the cost of utilities.

      (3) The value of the “allowed” parsonage allowance is not included in computing the minister’s income subject to income tax and should not be included in W-2 wages. However, the parsonage allowance is subject to self-employment tax along with other earnings.

      (4) If a church-owned parsonage is provided to the minister, instead of a housing allowance, the fair rental value of the housing must be determined. Determining the fair rental value “is a question of all facts and circumstances based on the local market, but the church and minister have often already agreed on a figure and can provide documentary evidence.”

      (5) An additional requirement “is that the fair rental value of the parsonage or parsonage allowance is not more than reasonable pay for the ministerial services performed.”

      Example 1. A is an ordained minister. She receives an annual salary of $36,000 and use of a parsonage which has a FRV of $800 a month, including utilities. She has an accountable plan for other business expenses such as travel. A’s gross income for arriving at taxable income for Federal income tax purposes is $36,000, but for self-employment tax purposes it is $45,600 ($36,000 salary + $9,600 FRV of parsonage).

      Example 2. B, an ordained minister, is vice president of academic affairs at Holy Bible Seminary. His compensation package includes a salary of $80,000 per year and a $30,000 housing allowance. His housing costs for the year included mortgage payments of $15,000, utilities of $3,000, and $3,600 for home maintenance and new furniture. The fair rental value of the home, as furnished, is $18,000 per year.

      The three amounts for comparison are:

      1. Actual expenses of $21,600 ($15,000 mortgage payments + $3,000 utilities + $3,600 other costs)
      2. Designated housing allowance of $30,000
      3. FRV plus utilities of $21,000 ($18,000 + $3,000 utilities)
      4. B may exclude $21,000 from gross income but must include in income the other $9,000 of the housing allowance. The entire $30,000 will be considered in arriving at net self-employment income.

        Example 3. C is an ordained minister and has been in his church’s employ for the last 20 years. His salary is $40,000 and his designated parsonage allowance is $15,000. C’s mortgage was paid off last year. During the tax year he spent $2,000 on utilities, and $3,000 on real estate taxes and insurance. The FRV of his home, as furnished, is $750 a month.

        The three amounts for comparison are:

        1. Actual housing costs of $5,000 ($2,000 utilities + $3,000 taxes and insurance)
        2. Designated housing allowance of $15,000
        3. FRV + utilities of $11,000 ($9,000 FRV + $2,000 utilities)
        4. C may only exclude his actual expenses of $5,000 for Federal income tax purposes. He may not exclude the FRV of his home even though he has paid for it in previous years. Swaggart v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1984-409. $15,000 will be included in the computation of net self-employment income.

          Example 4. Assume the same facts as in Example 3, except that C takes out a home equity loan and uses the proceeds to pay for his daughter’s college tuition. The payments are $300 per month. Even though he has a loan secured by his home, the money was not used to “provide a home” and can’t be used to compute the excludible portion of the parsonage allowance. The results are the same as for Example 3. The interest on the home equity loan may be deducted as an itemized deduction subject to the limitations, if any, of IRC §163.

          Example 5. D is an ordained minister who received $40,000 in salary plus a designated housing allowance of $12,000. He spent $12,000 on mortgage payments, $2,400 on utilities, and $2,000 on new furniture. The FRV of his home as furnished is $16,000. D’s exclusion is limited to $12,000 even though his actual cost ($16,400) and FRV and utilities ($18,400) are more. He may not deduct his housing costs in excess of the designated allowance.

          Example 6. E’s designated housing allowance is $20,000. She and her husband live in one half of a duplex which they own. The other half is rented. Mortgage payments for the duplex are $1,500 per month. E’s utilities run $1,800 per year, and her tenant pays his own from a separate meter. During the year E replaced carpeting throughout the structure at a cost of $6,500 and did minor repairs of $500. E must allocate her mortgage costs, carpeting, and repairs between her own unit and the rental unit in determining the amount of the excludible parsonage allowance. Amounts allocable to the rented portion for mortgage interest, taxes, etc., would be reported on Schedule E as usual. Her actual costs to provide a home were $14,300 ($9,000 mortgage payments, $1,800 utilities, and $3,500 for half the carpeting and repairs). The FRV for her unit is the same as the rent she charges for the other half, which is $750 a month, and she estimates that her furnishings add another $150 per month to the FRV. Her FRV plus utilities is $12,600 ($10,800 FRV + $1,800 utilities). E may exclude $12,600 for Federal income tax purposes.

          Pursuant to IRC §265(a)(6) and Rev. Rul. 87-32, 1987-1 C.B. 131 even though a minister’s home mortgage interest and real estate taxes have been paid with money excluded from income as a housing allowance, he or she may still claim itemized deductions for these items. The sale of the residence is treated the same as that of other taxpayers, even though it may have been completely purchased with funds excluded under IRC §107.

          Because expenses attributable to earned income which is exempt from tax are not ordinarily deductible, a minister’s business expenses related to his or her earnings must be allocated and become partially nondeductible pursuant to IRC §265 This is discussed in detail in the section on Business Expenses.

          Exhibit 1 provides a worksheet for the computation of the amount that is excludible as a parsonage allowance.

          Exhibit 1

          Exclusion of Parsonage Allowance under Internal Revenue Code §107

          Home Owned Or Rented/ Housing Allowance Received

          The exclusion is limited to the least of:

          1. Amount designated as housing allowance

          2. Amount actually used to provide a home which is composed of the following items:

          Rent
          House payments
          Furnishing
          Repairs
          Insurance
          Taxes
          Utilities
          Other Expenses

          3. Fair rental value of home, including furniture, utilities, garage

          Amount excludible from income tax liability is the least of 1,2, or 3 above.

          If Parsonage provided, you can deduct only the fair rental value.

          The entire designated housing allowance is subject to self-employment tax unless you have been approved for exemption or are retired.

          4. Business Expenses

          Ministers’ business expenses often are examined by the IRS in an audit, and so information in the guidelines on this topic is of special interest. Here are the key points made in the guidelines:

          (1) Ministers who are employees may deduct the following expenses on Schedule A as miscellaneous expenses to the extent that they exceed two percent of adjusted gross income:

          • Unreimbursed employee business expenses (that is, expenses for which the minister is not reimbursed under an accountable plan) and
          • “Nonaccountable” reimbursed business expenses

          (2) The limitations on deductibility of employee business expenses may be avoided if the church adopts an “accountable plan.” An accountable plan is an arrangement that meets all of the following requirements:

          • Business purpose
          • Substantiation within a reasonable period of time
          • Return of amounts in excess of substantiated expenses within a reasonable period of time

          Key point. The income tax regulations mention a fourth requirement for an accountable plan. In order for an employer’s reimbursement arrangement to be accountable, it must meet a “reimbursement requirement,” meaning that its reimbursements of an employee’s business expenses come out of the employer’s funds and not by reducing the employee’s salary.

          The guidelines explain the reimbursement requirement as follows:

          If the church has a salary reduction arrangement which “reimburses” the minister for employee business expenses by reducing his or her salary, the arrangement will be treated as a nonaccountable plan because it does not meet the reimbursement requirement …. This is the result regardless of whether a specific portion of the minister’s compensation is designated for employee expenses or whether the portion of the compensation to be treated as the expense allowance varies from pay period to pay period depending on the minister’s expenses. As long as the minister is entitled to receive the full amount of annual compensation, regardless of whether or not any employee business expenses are incurred during the taxable year, the arrangement does not meet the reimbursement requirement.

          Observation. The guidelines instruct IRS agents to be alert to salary reduction arrangements that are used to fund reimbursements under an accountable arrangement. According to the IRS, accountable plans cannot reimburse employee business expenses out of salary reductions. In 1993 the IRS ruled that the same principle applies to “salary restructuring” arrangements. The IRS noted that “an employer may not recharacterize a portion of an employee’s salary as being paid under a reimbursement arrangement or other expense allowance arrangement. [I]n order to have an accountable plan the reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement provided by an employer should be amounts paid to an employee in addition to salary.” Based on this precedent, the best approach is for churches to adopt accountable reimbursement policies that reimburse clergy (and other church workers) out of church funds. Churches that are concerned with unlimited reimbursement arrangements can set a maximum amount that will be reimbursed per employee.

          (3) If an arrangement meets all the requirements for an accountable plan, the amounts paid under the arrangement are excluded from the minister’s gross income and are not required to be reported on his or her Form W-2. If, however, the arrangement does not meet one or more of the requirements, all payments under the arrangement are included in the minister’s gross income and are reported as wages on the Form W-2, even though no withholding at the source is required.

          Observation. This language is misleading. The income tax regulations specify that if an employer establishes an accountable arrangement, but an employee fails to return within a reasonable period of time any reimbursements in excess of substantiated expenses, “only the amounts paid under the arrangement that are not in excess of the substantiated expenses are treated as paid under an accountable plan.”

          (4) Typical business expenses for ministers include the following:

          Transportation

          The guidelines describe transportation expenses as follows:

          Many ministers receive a non-accountable auto allowance, which is includible in income. Transportation costs which may be deductible include trips for hospital and nursing home visits, attendance at conferences, or other church business. However trips between the minister’s personal residence and the church are considered nondeductible commuting expenses. Hamblen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 53 (1982).

          Travel

          The guidelines specify that “a minister may incur travel away from home occasionally for special conferences or other duties out of the area. The same rules regarding the deductibility of meals, entertainment, and lodging apply as for other taxpayers.”

          Business use of a home

          The guidelines provide IRS agents with the following information regarding the business use of a home:

          In order for a home to qualify as a principal place of business the functions performed and the time spent at each location where the trade or business is conducted are the primary considerations and must be compared to determine the relative importance of each.

          The church often provides an office on the premises for the minister, so the necessity of an office in the home should be questioned closely. Furthermore, since the total cost to provide the home is used in computing the exempt housing allowance, home office deductions for taxes, insurance, mortgage interest, etc. would be duplications. (Note that itemized deductions are allowable for mortgage interest and taxes.)

          Observation. The guidelines instruct agents to “question closely” the necessity of a home office. This is a business expense that invites scrutiny. It should not be claimed unless there is a reasonable basis for it.

          Observation. The guidelines take the view that a minister who excludes all of his or her housing expenses as a housing allowance exclusion has in effect already “deducted” all of the expenses associated with an office in the home, and accordingly should not be able to claim any additional deduction of such expenses as an itemized (home office) deduction on Schedule A.

          Supplies and publications

          The audit guidelines specify:

          Ministers may incur some out-of-pocket costs for office supplies and job-related books and periodicals for which they are not reimbursed. This may be more common in small churches. Increasingly, ministers are using computers for writing sermons, correspondence, and record-keeping. Personal use should be determined.

          Observation. Ministers often use equipment for both personal and business use, and do not realize that the value of the personal use may represent taxable income. It is advisable to keep records documenting all business use so that you can establish this important information if requested.

          Dues versus contributions

          Some ministers pay a fee to a denominational agency to renew their credentials, and most contribute to their employing church. The guidelines provide IRS agents with the following information regarding the tax treatment of these transactions:

          Ministers often pay a small annual renewal fee to maintain their credentials, which constitutes a deductible expense. However, ministers’ contributions to the church are not deductible as business expenses. They may argue that they are expected to donate generously to the church as part of their employment. This is not sufficient to convert charitable contributions to business expenses. The distinction is that charitable contributions are given to a qualifying organization (such as a church) for the furtherance of its charitable activities. Dues, on the other hand, are usually paid with the expectation that a financial benefi t will result to the individual, as in a realtor’s multi-list dues or an electrician’s union dues. A minister’s salary and benefits are not likely to directly depend on the donations made to the church. They may still be deducted as contributions on Schedule A but may not be used as a business expense to reduce self-employment tax.

          Observation. The guidelines acknowledge that annual renewal fees that are required to maintain a minister’s credentials are deductible. This is an important clarification, since the IRS has challenged this proposition in several audits of ministers. There is no doubt that mandatory contributions to a denominational agency to maintain ones professional credentials represent a business expenses, whether the taxpayer is a minister or an attorney or any other professional.

          Observation. The guidelines inform agents that ministers’ contributions to an employing church are not deductible as business expenses. They can be claimed only as charitable contributions. The Tax Court, in a 1992 unpublished decision, ruled that tithes paid by a minister to her employing church represented a business expense rather than a charitable contribution since the church had instituted a “tithing policy” that required all employees to tithe as a condition of their employment. This ruling is discussed in chapter 7, Section C.17, in Richard Hammar’s Church and Clergy Tax Guide. Ministers who treat contributions to their employing church as a business expense are taking an aggressive position that is now more likely to be scrutinized and questioned.

          Other expenses

          A minister may incur expenses for special vestments that would qualify as “uniforms.” Their reasonable cost and care is deductible. Ordinary street clothes or suits for church are not deductible. Unreimbursed long distance phone calls made for business purposes are deductible.

          (5) The guidelines instruct agents to apply the so-called Deason allocation rule. They explain this rule as follows:

          A minister may deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, if a minister’s compensation includes a parsonage or housing allowance which is exempt from income under IRC §107, the prorated portion of the expenses allocable to the tax exempt income is not deductible, per IRC §265, Deason v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 465 (1964), Dalan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-106, and McFarland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-440.

          Before this allocation is made, the total amount of business expenses must be determined. Ministers are subject to the same substantiation requirements as other taxpayers.

          Stated simply, if a minister has $40,000 of total compensation, consisting of salary ($30,000) and housing allowance ($10,000), then one-fourth of the minister’s income is tax-exempt for income tax purposes. Accordingly, if the minister has $4,000 of business expenses, then one-fourth ($1,000) of the business expenses are not deductible since they are “allocated” to the tax-exempt income.

          Observation. Of course, the Deason rule makes no sense when applied to ministers, since their housing allowance is “tax exempt” only to the extent it is actually used to pay for housing expenses. As a result, it is impossible to use any portion of this income to pay for business expenses. The IRS has rejected this reasoning.

          How do ministers reduce their business expenses to properly reflect this rule? The guidelines provide IRS agents with the following procedure:

          Once total business expenses have been determined, the nondeductible portion can be computed using the following formula. Exhibit 2 provides a computation worksheet.

          Step 1

          Divide the allowable housing allowance or fair rental value (FRV) of parsonage by the total ministry income to get the nontaxable income percentage.

          Total ministry income includes salary, fees, expense allowances under non-accountable plans plus the allowable housing allowance or FRV of the parsonage.

          Step 2

          Multiply the total business expenses times the nontaxable income percentage from step 1 to get the expenses allocable to nontaxable income which is not deductible.

          These examples illustrate the computation:

          Example 7. F receives a salary of $36,000, an exempt housing allowance of $18,000 and an auto expense allowance of $6,000 for his services as an ordained minister. F incurs business expenses as follows: auto, $7,150; vestments, $350; dues, $120; publications and supplies, $300; totaling $7,920. His nondeductible expenses are computed as follows:

          Step 1: $18,000 housing allowance/nontaxable income divided by $60,000 total ministry income ($36,000 salary, $18,000 housing and $6,000 car allowance) equals 30 percent nontaxable income percentage.

          Step 2: Total business expenses of $7,920 times 30 percent, the nontaxable income percentage equals $2,376 the nondeductible expenses.

          Total expenses $7,920 less the nondeductible expenses of $2,376 equals the deductible expenses of $5,544.

          F’s deductible expenses are reported as Schedule A miscellaneous deductions since his church considers him an employee and issues a W-2. These expenses, along with any other miscellaneous deductions are subject to a further reduction of two percent of his adjusted gross income.

          Example 8. G received a salary of $12,000, a housing allowance of $9,000, and earned $3,000 for various speaking engagements, weddings, funerals, etc., all related to her ministry. She reports her salary as “wages” on page 1 of her Form 1040 and her fees on Schedule C. Because her actual housing costs ($6,000) were less than her housing allowance and the FRV of her home for the year, she must include $3,000 of her housing allowance as “other income” for income tax purposes. Her total business expenses are $4,500. The computation of deductible expenses is shown below:

          Step 1: $6,000 (housing allowance actually exempt from income tax) divided by $24,000 total ministry income ($12,000 salary + $9,000 housing + $3,000 fees) equals 25 percent nontaxable income percentage.

          Step 2: Total expenses $4,500 times 25 percent nontaxable income percentage equals $1,125 nondeductible expenses.

          Total expenses $4,500 less $1,125 equals $3,375 deductible expenses.

          Note that this $3375 would further be allocable between Schedule A miscellaneous deductions (related to salary) and Schedule C (related to other fees).

          However, this allocation will not change G’s self-employment tax, since all ministry income and ministry expenses are included in the computation, regardless of where they are reported on the return for income tax purposes. The allocation between Schedule A and Schedule C will also affect any AGI-dependent computations.

          Exhibit 2

          Computation of Allowable Expenses When Tax-Exempt Income Is Received

          Step 1: Enter amount of tax-exempt income (housing allowance or fair rental value of parsonage).

          Step 2: Total income from ministry computed by adding the following:

          • Salary
          • Fees
          • Allowances
          • Step 1 Amount

          Step 3: Divide step 1 amount by total step 2 amount to obtain the nontaxable income percentage.

          Step 4: Compute total business expenses substantiated by adding the following items:

          • Auto
          • Travel
          • M & E
          • Other

          Step 5: Multiply step 4 total by step 3 percentage to obtain nondeductible expenses allocable to tax exempt income.

          Step 6: Subtract step 5 amount from step 4 amount to obtain the deductible expenses for Federal Income tax purposes.

          5. Self-Employment Tax Exemption

          The guidelines note that to claim exemption from self-employment tax, a minister must satisfy the following requirements:

          1. Be an ordained, commissioned or licensed minister of a church or denomination.
          2. File Form 4361. This is an application for exemption from self-employment tax for use by ministers, members of religious orders, and Christian Science practitioners.
          3. Be conscientiously opposed to public insurance (Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security benefits) because of religious beliefs.

            Observation. The guidelines fail to clarify that a minister must be opposed to the acceptance of benefits under a public insurance program. Opposition to the program is not sufficient.

          4. File for exemption for reasons other than economic.
          5. Notify the church or order that he or she is opposed to public insurance.
          6. Establish that the organization that ordained, licensed, or commissioned the minister is a tax-exempt religious organization.
          7. Establish that the organization is a church or a convention or association of churches.
          8. Observation. Another requirement, not mentioned in the IRS audit guidelines, is that the application must sign and return the statement that the IRS mails to him or her to verify that he or she has requested an exemption based on the grounds listed on the statement.

            The guidelines further clarify that:

            Form 4361 must be filed by the due date of the Form 1040 (including extensions) for the second tax year in which at least $400 in self-employment ministerial earnings was received. The 2 years do not have to be consecutive. An approved Form 4361 is effective for all tax years after 1967 for which a minister received $400 or more of self-employed income for ministerial services.

            The exemption from self-employment tax applies only to services performed as a minister. The exemption does not apply to other self-employment income. To determine if a minister is exempt from self-employment tax, request that he or she furnish a copy of the approved Form 4361 if it is not attached to the return. If the taxpayer cannot provide a copy, order a transcript for the year under examination. The ADP and IDRS Information handbook shows where the ministers’ self-employment exemption codes are located on the transcripts and what the codes mean. Transcripts will not show exemption status prior to 1988. If the transcript does not show a MIN SE indicator and the taxpayer still claims that he or she is exempt from self-employment tax, the Taxpayer Relations Branch at the Service Center where the Form 4361 was filed can research this information and provide the taxpayer with a copy. The Social Security Administration in Baltimore also can provide the information on exemption for an individual.

            Observation. Many ministers who claim they are exempt from self-employment tax cannot prove that they are exempt. Ministers who file a timely application for exemption that is approved by the IRS will be sent a copy of their exemption application marked “approved.” A surprisingly large number of ministers who have filed a timely exemption application cannot produce the approved copy of their application. If they are audited and asked to verify their exemption from self-employment tax, they are unable to do so. The guidelines contain some helpful information for ministers in this situation, for they reveal the procedure that IRS agents are instructed to follow if a minister who claims to be exempt from self-employment taxes cannot produce an approved application. There are a number of recommendations that agents can pursue in verifying the exempt status of a minister who cannot produce a copy of an approved exemption application.

            The guidelines contain the following examples:

            Example 9. H has ministerial earnings of $400 in 2007 and $1800 in 2008. He has until April 15, 2009 (if no extension has been filed) to file Form 4361. If the approved Form 4361 is not received by the due date for the 2007 return, the self-employment tax for 2007 is still due by that date. If he later receives the approved 4361, he may amend his 2007 return.

            Example 10. J earned $500 in 2006, $300 in 2007, and $6,000 in 2008 from her ministry. She has until April 15, 2009 (if no extension has been filed) to file Form 4361. If the approval of the exemption is not be received by April 15, 2007, J must pay the self-employment tax with her 2006 return, but may amend it after the exemption is approved. J may file a claim for refund (an amended tax return) within three years from the time the return was filed or within two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later.

            Example 11. K, ordained in 2007, has $7,500 in net earnings as a minister in both 2007 and 2008. He files Form 4361 on March 5, 2009. If the exemption is granted, it is effective for 2007 and all following years.

            Example 12. L, an ordained minister, has applied for and received exemption from self-employment tax for his services as a minister. In 2008 he has ministerial income of $12,000 and income from his shoe repair business, a sole proprietorship, of $9,000. He must compute self-employment tax on the $9,000.

            6. Computing Self-Employment Tax

            Ministers who have not exempted themselves from self-employment taxes must compute and pay the self-employment tax on their ministerial income. Remember that ministers always are considered self-employed for social security purposes with respect to service performed in the exercise of their ministry.

            The guidelines specify that “to compute self-employment tax, allowable trade or business expenses are subtracted from gross ministerial earnings, then the appropriate rate is applied.” The guidelines instruct agents to include the following items in a minister’s gross income for self-employment tax:

            1. Salaries and fees for services, including offerings and honoraria received for funerals, baptisms, etc. Include gifts which are considered income.
            2. Any housing allowance or utility allowances.
            3. Annual fair rental value (FRV) of a parsonage, if provided, including the cost of utilities and furnishings provided.
            4. Any amounts received for business expenses treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan, such as an auto allowance.
            5. Income tax or self-employment tax obligation of the minister which is paid by the church.
            6. The guidelines provide the following additional examples.:

              Example 13. M receives a salary from the church of $20,000. His parsonage/housing allowance is $12,000. The church withholds Federal income tax (by mutual agreement) and issues him a Form W-2. He has unreimbursed employee business expenses (before excluding nondeductible amounts attributable to his exempt income) of $5,200. His net earnings for self-employment tax are $26,800 ($20,000 + $12,000 – $5,200). Note that all of M’s unreimbursed business expenses are deductible for self-employment tax purposes, although the portion attributable to the exempt housing allowance is not deductible for Federal income tax purposes. IRC §265 regarding the allocation of business expenses related to exempt income relates to income tax computations but not self-employment tax computations..

              Example 14. G, as shown in Example 8, computes her self-employment taxable income as follows: $12,000 salary plus $9,000 housing allowance plus $3,000 Schedule C income less ($4,500) total business expenses equals $19,500 self-employment income.

              Observation. Example 13 illustrates a very important point. Ministers’ business expenses should not be reduced in computing their self-employment taxes, since the housing allowance does not represent tax-exempt income when computing self-employment taxes. The so called Deason reduction rule applies only to the computation of income taxes.

              7. Employee or Self-Employed for Federal Income Tax Purposes

              The question of whether a minister is an employee or self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes is a question that has vexed many ministers and church treasurers. The IRS audit guidelines introduce this important topic with the following observations:

              A minister can be a common law employee for income tax purposes even though the payments for services as a minister is statutorily considered income from self employment for social security and medical taxes and the minister can even apply to be exempt from social security tax.

              The handling of business expenses for income tax purposes is determined by whether the minister is classified as an employee or an independent contractor. If an independent contractor, then the business expenses are reported on the Schedule C. If an employee, then the expenses are reportable subject to statutory limitations as an employee business expense itemized deduction. To be properly reported on Schedule C, a minister’s expense must come from a trade or business of his own, other than that of being an employee.

              How, then, can a minister’s correct reporting status be determined? The guidelines provide the following clarifications:

              • The tax code defines an employee as one who is such “under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship.”
              • This subject is complex and dependent on the facts and circumstances in each case, which is why it is highly litigated.
              • IRS agents are instructed to conduct research on litigation that has occurred in their region to assist in making the correct classifi cation. The guidelines note that litigation “has generally occurred where the minister claims independent contractor status and the Internal Revenue Service determines the minister was an employee.”
              • The Internal Revenue Services looks at factors that fall within three categories, namely behavioral control, financial control and the relationships of the parties. Behavioral control deals with facts that substantiate the right to direct or control the detail and means by which a worker performs the required services. Financial control deals with facts of the economic aspects of the relationship of the parties and if the worker has the opportunity for the realization of profit or loss. Some factors are: significant investment, un-reimbursed expenses, making services available, and methods of payments. Relationship of the parties is important because it reflects the parties’ intent concerning control.
              • The courts consider various factors to determine an employment relationship between the parties. Relevant factors include: (1) the degree of control exercised by the principal over the details of the work; (2) which party invests in the facilities used in the work; (3) the opportunity of the individual for profit or loss; (4) whether or not the principal has the right to discharge the individual; (5) whether the work is part of the principals regular business; (6) the permanency of the relationship; and (7) relationship the parties believe they are creating.

              The question of whether a minister is an employee or self-employed for federal income tax reporting purposes is a question that has vexed many ministers and church treasurers.

              • In Weber v. Commissioner, 60 F.3rd 1104 (4th Cir. 1995), a federal appeals court addressed the issue of whether a minister was an employee or independent contractor. The court stated: “The right-to-control test is the crucial test to determine the nature of the working relationship …. The degree of control is one of great importance, though not exclusive …. Accordingly, we must examine not only the control exercised by the alleged employer, but also the degree to which an alleged employer may intervene to imposed control …. In order for an employer to retain the requisite control over the details of an employee’s work, the employer need not stand over the employee and direct every move made by that employee …. Also, the degree of control necessary to fi nd employee status varies according to the nature of the services provided.”
              • The threshold level of control necessary to fi nd employee status is generally lower when applied to professional services than when applied to nonprofessional service. In James v. Commissioner 25 T.C. 1296 (1956), the Tax Court stated that “despite this absence of direct control over the manner in which professional men shall conduct their professional activities, it cannot be doubted that many professional men are employees.” In Azad v. United States, 388 F.2d 74 (8th Circuit, 1968), a federal appeals court said that “from the very nature of the services rendered by professionals, it would be wholly unrealistic to suggest that an employer should undertake the task of controlling the manner in which the professional conducts his activities.” Generally a lower level of control applies to professional.”
              • The absence of the need to control the manner in which the minister conducts his or her duties should not be confused with the absence of the right to control. The right to control contemplated by the common law as an incident of employment requires only such supervision as the nature of the work requires. McGuire v. United States, 349 F.2d 644 (9th Circuit 1965).
              • Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 does not apply to ministers “since they are statutorily exempt from FICA and are subject to SECA.”

              Observation. The guidelines do not say that all ministers are employees for federal income tax reporting purposes. This flexible approach leaves open the possibility that some ministers will not be employees under the applicable tests. Note, however, that self-employed status will be the exception, and that any minister reporting income taxes as selfemployed must expect to have his or her status challenged if audited.

              Conclusions

              What is the significance of the new IRS audit guidelines for ministers? The guidelines represent official guidance to IRS agents who will be auditing ministers’ tax returns. As a result, the guidelines provide ministers with helpful insight into the positions the IRS will take on a series of tax issues when auditing ministers’ tax returns.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Your Finance Questions, October 2008

Q: A member of our church is being audited by the IRS. The IRS auditor

Q: A member of our church is being audited by the IRS. The IRS auditor is telling her that the church’s contribution receipts are not acceptable because they do not list the church’s employer identification number. Would you be aware of any such requirement?

A: There is no such requirement. Note the following considerations:

1. Many smaller churches that employ a pastor and no other staff do not have an employer identification number. Does this mean that every contribution made by members of the church is non-deductible? Of course not.

2. IRS Publication 526 (“Charitable Contributions”) states:

You cannot deduct a cash contribution, regardless of the amount, unless you keep one of the following. (1) A bank record that shows the name of the qualified organization, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution. . . . (2) A receipt (or a letter or other written communication) from the qualified organization showing the name of the organization, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution.

If you made more than one contribution of $250 or more, you must have either a separate acknowledgment for each or one acknowledgment that lists each contribution and the date of each contribution and shows your total contributions. . . . The acknowledgment must meet these tests. (1) It must be written. (2) It must include: (a) the amount of cash you contributed, (b) whether the qualified organization gave you any goods or services as a result of your contribution (other than certain token items and membership benefits), (c) a description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services described in (b) (other than intangible religious benefits), and (d) a statement that the only benefit you received was an intangible religious benefit, if that was the case. The acknowledgment does not need to describe or estimate the value of an intangible religious benefit.

3. The tax code and regulations contain almost identical language. Neither Publication 526, nor the tax code or regulations, requires churches to list their employer identification number on contribution receipts.

4. In no reported case has any court ever interpreted the tax code and regulations to require that a charity’s employer identification number be listed on contribution receipts.

5. The only reference to employer identification numbers in the tax code or regulations pertains to “qualified appraisals” of donated property valued by the donor at more than $5,000. Donors must attach a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283) to their tax return to substantiate such a gift, and this form requires the employer identification number of the appraiser to be listed.

6. The employer identification number is used by the IRS to track employers’ compliance with the payroll tax reporting requirements. It has nothing to do with charitable contributions.

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Simple Tips for Creating An Emotionally Safe Children’s Ministry

An emotionally safe environment allows children to make friends and trust their teachers.

None of us intend to cause or allow a child to get hurt emotionally. Ideally, when a child comes to our classroom, we want them to feel safe to make friends with other children and trust the leaders. Above all, we want to create a safe haven where children can come to explore the mysteries of God, and discover his goodness.

Use these simple tips to help you create an emotionally safe environment in your children’s and youth ministry.

What to Avoid

  • Ignoring. Whether physically or psychologically, the parent or caregiver is not present to respond to the child. A child feels ignored when his teacher fails to make eye contact or call him by name.
  • Rejecting. This is an active refusal to respond to a child’s needs (e.g., refusing to touch a child, denying the needs of a child, ridiculing a child).
  • Verbally assaulting. Children feel verbally assaulted if they are belittled, shamed, ridiculed or verbally threatened.
  • Neglecting the child. This abuse may include educational neglect, where a parent or caregiver fails or refuses to provide the child with necessary educational services; mental health neglect, which denies or ignores a child’s need for treatment for psychological problems; or medical neglect, in which a parent or caregiver denies or ignores a child’s need for treatment for medical problems.

What You Can Do

  • Promote emotional literacy. Emotional literacy is the ability to identify, understand, and respond to emotions in oneself and others in a healthy manner. Children who have a strong foundation in emotional literacy tolerate frustration better, get into fewer fights, and engage in less self-destructive behavior than children who do not have a strong foundation.
  • Never be afraid to apologize. If you lose your temper and say something in anger that you shouldn’t have said, apologize. Children need to know that adults can admit when they are wrong. These situations are also a great time to explain how Jesus asks us to forgive—and that even adults need his help.
  • Bolster self-worth and confidence. Kids need adults who can identify and encourage their strengths. The message “I believe in you” can serve as needed affirmation today and an investment in a more confident tomorrow.

Would a Criminal Background Check Have Protected Katie?

A mother alleged that a Sunday School teacher (“John”) sexually molested her minor daughter, Katie,

A mother alleged that a Sunday School teacher (“John”) sexually molested her minor daughter, Katie, on two occasions. One of the incidents allegedly happened during a lock-in on church property. During the lock-in John and the members of his Sunday School class stayed at church all night, watching movies and playing games. Katie claimed that while she was sleeping in the middle of the room, John began fondling her under her blanket. When Katie’s mother arrived in the morning to pick her up, she found John sleeping next to Katie, sharing her blanket. John was later arrested for molesting Katie and another child. He pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty years in a state penitentiary.

At the time John began teaching Sunday School at the church, he had a criminal history that included three felony convictions (two for burglary of a building and one for possession of a controlled substance) and five misdemeanors (public intoxication, possession of marijuana, unlawful carrying of a weapon, and two for evading arrest or detention). There was also a protective order issued against him pursuant to allegations by his ex-wife that he had physically abused their child. The church did not perform a criminal background check on John before allowing him to teach Sunday School, although one pastor testified that they routinely performed such checks on volunteers.

Based on the fact that the church failed to perform both a criminal and civil background check on John, Katie’s mother sued the church. She claimed that the church was liable for John’s acts of molestation on the basis of negligent hiring. That is, the church was negligent in not conducting a criminal records check on John before using him to teach a children’s Sunday School class, and the church’s negligence resulted in Katie’s injuries. A trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and Katie’s mother appealed.

On appeal, Katie’s mother claimed that, under the doctrine of negligent hiring, the church’s duty to exercise reasonable care in the selection of its Sunday School teachers included the duty to perform a criminal background check. She insisted that if the church had fulfilled this duty, it would have known John was unfit and created an unreasonable risk of harm to the children in the Sunday School class. She also noted that the church had a policy of conducting criminal background checks on volunteers and employees who would be alone with children, but that it failed to conduct such a background check on John.

The court concluded that the church had a “self-imposed duty” to check the criminal background of children’s workers because it adopted a policy requiring such checks. Since it failed to check John’s criminal background, it breached this duty. However, the fact that the church had a duty to conduct a criminal records check on John before selecting him as a Sunday School teacher, and it breached this duty, did not necessarily mean that the church was responsible for John’s molestation of Katie. Rather, the church’s duty to inquire into John’s criminal background “was but one component of the duty to protect Katie from John’s conduct. The existence of a duty to protect is dependent on the type of knowledge the church would have gained from John’s criminal record. The issue is whether, if the church had used reasonable care in discovering John’s criminal background, it should have foreseen that hiring John could result in his molesting Katie.” The court concluded that even if the church had checked John’s criminal record, the crimes it would have discovered would not have suggested that he might molest minors. It observed:

While we agree that John’s criminal background probably should have called into question his moral fitness as a Sunday School teacher, we cannot conclude John’s background would have put the church on notice that he might sexually assault a child. While true that “it is not required that the particular accident complained of should have been foreseen,” the injury must be “of such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated,” and “the injured party should be so situated with relation to the wrongful act that injury to him or to one similarly situated might reasonably have been foreseen.” Here, none of John’s convictions were for violent or sexual crimes, and nothing in his background indicated that he might sexually assault a child. . . . We conclude there is no evidence in this record that the harm that befell Katie was reasonably foreseeable to the church when it hired John.

As a result, Katie’s mother failed to establish that the church owed a duty to Katie to protect her from John’s criminal acts, and since there was no duty there could be no negligence. Frith v. Church, 2002 WL 1565664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002)

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Church “Sound Rooms”

Many churches have sound rooms in which a volunteer or employee operates and controls sound

Many churches have sound rooms in which a volunteer or employee operates and controls sound equipment during religious services and other events. Such rooms are often enclosed, and are magnets for minors who are attracted to the technical equipment. A number of cases of child molestation have occurred in church sound rooms. Often, the sound technician invites minors to “assist” him in operating the equipment, and arranges “training” at times when the room is isolated and unsupervised. It is a perfect arrangement for a child molester.

In a recent case in Georgia, a church choir director also operated the church’s audiovisual equipment during various events. He sexually molested two minors who were assisting him in the sound room. The offender was charged with aggravated child molestation, and was convicted. A state appeals court concluded that there was ample evidence for conviction, but ordered a new trial due to ineffective trial counsel. 2007 WL 738753 (Ga. App. 2007).

This case demonstrates the risk posed by sound rooms. Church leaders should recognize this risk, and take steps to manage it. Here are ten precautions to consider:

  1. Do a thorough background check on any persons who have access to the sound room.
  2. Prohibit any “training” of minors in the sound room at any time, unless there are two prescreened adults present at all times. Risk is reduced even more if all training of minors is prohibited, even with two adults present.
  3. Do not let minors “assist” sound technicians in the sound room unless there are two prescreened adults present at all times. Risk is reduced even more if minors are prohibited from helping in the sound room, even with two adults present.
  4. “Training” of minors in the sound room during times when few if any persons are present at the church should be strictly forbidden.
  5. Display a large and conspicuous summary of your restrictions in the sound room.
  6. Any sound technician who violates any of your restrictions should immediately be relieved of all responsibilities in the sound room.
  7. The sound room should be locked except when needed for church use (services and other events, repairs, installation of new equipment, etc.).
  8. Check with a local attorney for additional recommendations.
  9. Check with your insurance agent for additional recommendations.
  10. Check with other churches and charities in your area to see what kind of restrictions they have implemented.
Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Tax Court Applies “Deason Rule” to Minister’s Business Expenses

Rule reduces ministers’ business expense deduction.

Church Finance Today

Tax Court Applies “Deason Rule” to Minister’s Business Expenses

Rule reduces ministers’ business expense deduction.

Young v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-76.

Background. Under the so-called “Deason rule” (named after a 1964 court case) ministers must reduce their business expense deduction for unreimbursed expenses as well as expenses reimbursed under a nonaccountable arrangement by the percentage of their total church income that consists of a tax-exempt housing allowance.

For example, assume that Pastor Brad has total church income of $40,000, which includes a $10,000 housing allowance. He also incurs unreimbursed business expenses of $4,000. Since one-fourth of his church income is tax-exempt ($10,000 out of $40,000) he must reduce his business expense deduction by one-fourth. This means that only $3,000 of his expenses will be deductible.

The Tax Court applied the Deason rule in a recent case. A pastor was paid compensation of $78,000 consisting of a salary of $36,000 and a housing allowance of $42,000. He also received self-employment earnings of $21,000 for the performance of miscellaneous religious services (including weddings, funerals, and guest speaking). The pastor also incurred business expenses of $25,000 that were not reimbursed by the church, including car expenses, books, office expenses, and business trips. The IRS audited the pastor’s tax return, and claimed that his deduction for business expenses had to be reduced by the percentage of his total church income that consisted of a housing allowance. The pastor insisted that his business expense deduction should not be reduced by the percentage of his total income that was tax-exempt.

The court’s ruling. On appeal, the Tax Court noted that section 265 of the tax code provides that “no deduction shall be allowed for any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income wholly exempt from taxes.” The court noted that the pastor “received both nonexempt income and a tax-exempt parsonage allowance for his ministry work. The ministry expenses he attempts to deduct were incurred while he was earning both nonexempt income and a tax-exempt parsonage allowance. This is precisely the situation section 265 targets… . The parsonage allowance is a class of income wholly exempt from tax and section 265 expressly disallows a deduction to the extent that the expenses are directly or indirectly allocable to his nontaxable ministry income.”

The court noted that since the pastor “failed to provide evidence that would allow the court to determine which of his ministry activities generated which expenses, the court will allocate the expenses on a pro rata basis. The court concludes that the pastor’s Schedule C ministry activities generated 22% of his total ministry income, and therefore allocates 22% of his ministry expenses to Schedule C, and the balance to Schedule A. Because 54% of his ministry salary was his parsonage allowance ($42,000/$78,000), 54% of his Schedule A deductions are rendered nondeductible because of section 265. The pastor may deduct (subject to the 2% floor) the balance as itemized miscellaneous deductions on Schedule A.”

The court concluded that the reduced deduction for business expenses applied to both income taxes and self-employment taxes. It has generally been assumed that the Deason rule does not apply to the computation of a minister’s self-employment taxes since the housing allowance is not “tax-exempt” in computing self-employment taxes. This understanding is contained in the IRS audit guidelines for ministers. However, the court ignored this logic and applied the Deason rule to the pastor’s self-employment taxes. It observed, “In computing his net earnings from self-employment, a pastor must include all his earnings from his ministry, including his parsonage allowance, and may claim the deductions ‘allowed by chapter 1 of the tax code which are attributable to such trade or business.’ Because a portion of the pastor’s deductions is allocable to his parsonage allowance, and is disallowed as a deduction by section 265, it may not be deducted in computing his net earnings from self-employment.” Fortunately, this case is a “small case” meaning that it cannot be cited as precedent.

This article first appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, November 2005.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Schools

A federal appeals court ruled that state employees violated the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures when they searched a church school’s property.

Church Law and Tax 2004-03-01

Schools

Key point. The fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable governmental searches and seizures applies to churches and church schools.

* A federal appeals court ruled that state employees violated the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures when they searched a church school’s property and seized an 11-year-old boy who was a suspected victim of child abuse, but the caseworkers could not be personally liable because of “governmental immunity.” Several weeks after learning that administrators of a church-operated elementary school used corporal punishment as a form of discipline, caseworkers for a state child welfare agency initiated an investigation for child abuse. Over the objection of the school’s principal, and without a warrant or parental notification or consent, the caseworkers removed an 11-year-old boy (“Mark”) from his fourth-grade classroom and interviewed him about corporal punishment that he and other students may have received and certain family matters. Thereafter, the caseworkers unsuccessfully attempted to interview Mark’s parents and sister, and threatened to remove the children from their parents’ custody. The caseworkers also attempted, on a separate occasion, to interview other students at the school, whom Mark had identified as having been spanked, but the principal at the school flatly refused to grant them access to the children without a court order or parental consent. The state eventually ended its investigation due to lack of information, and the school and parents (the “plaintiffs”) filed suit against three caseworkers alleging that the manner in which they handled the investigation violated their constitutional rights. The caseworkers asked a court to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that as government employees they were entitled to immunity from liability. A federal district court dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed.

A federal appeals court ruled that some of the caseworkers’ actions were unconstitutional, but it agreed with the district court that the caseworkers were entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The court concluded that the caseworkers violated the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures by searching the school’s premises and seizing Mark. The court noted that warrantless searches and seizures on private property are “presumptively unreasonable.” It observed, “When parents place minor children in private schools for their education, the teachers and administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them. In our view, there is no basis for concluding that when a minor child is entrusted to the care of a private school in loco parentis his reasonable expectation of privacy, vis-á-vis government officials, differs in any material respect from that which he would otherwise expect to receive at home. In both cases, the child is in an enclosed structure that is not open to the general public, and is cared for and looked after by individuals with parental authority.” Further, “when, as in this case, the government conducts a warrantless search of a religious or parochial school, or seizes a minor child on the premises of such a school without a warrant, these actions implicate the constitutional rights of the school, child, and parents under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.”

The court concluded, “While the caseworkers are undoubtedly correct in asserting that private schools are subject to reasonable regulation by the state, and that states have a compelling interest in protecting children from child abuse, the critical question in this case is not whether the public interest justifies the type of search or seizure in question, but whether the authority to search or seize should be evidenced by a warrant.”

The court then addressed the issue of governmental immunity. It noted that “under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The court concluded that the caseworkers were not knowingly violating clearly established constitutional rights by their warrantless search of the school property and seizure of Mark, because they were acting pursuant to a state law giving caseworkers the right to interview a child suspected of abuse “at any location” (other than the child’s home) “without permission from the child’s parent, guardian or legal custodian if necessary to determine if the child is in need of protection of services.”

The court acknowledged that child welfare caseworkers are often called upon to make difficult decisions “without the benefit of extended deliberation.” And, “there is, perhaps, no more worthy object of the public’s concern than preventing the most vulnerable members of society, children of tender years, from being physically abused.” However, this unquestionably compelling state interest “may not be used as a pretense for arbitrary governmental intrusion into the private affairs of its citizens. Indeed, in many cases, parents send their children to private schools because they fundamentally disagree with the manner in which the government chooses to operate its public school system. Furthermore, some parents enroll their children in religious or parochial schools so that they will be educated in an environment that reinforces certain religious beliefs and values. These are important constitutional interests (i.e., right to familial relations and free exercise of religion) that should not be interfered with by government officials unless there is a compelling reason for doing so.” However, the court once again concluded that the caseworkers were entitled to immunity for their actions.

Application. This case provides a compelling demonstration of the application of the fourth amendment to church schools. However, it also demonstrates that government employees who violate the fourth amendment by searching a church school’s property, or seizing a student, may not be liable for their actions because of the principle of governmental immunity. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003).

© Copyright 2004 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m65 c0204

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Washington Court Addresses Taxation of Parsonages

Parsonages are only tax exempt when the pastor resides there, court rules.

Church Finance Today

Washington Court Addresses Taxation of Parsonages

Parsonages are only tax exempt when the pastor resides there, court rules.

A church’s senior pastor began living in the church parsonage in 1993. In 2000, the pastor purchased a vacant lot and began construction of a new home. The pastor and his family moved into the new home in March of 2001, even though construction continued for several months and the family kept much of their belongings in the parsonage until 2002. Parsonages are exempt from property tax under Washington law, and the church claimed that the parsonage should remain exempt through 2001 because the pastor’s family kept many of their personal belongings in the parsonage for much of that year. A tax assessor insisted that the parsonage ceased to qualify for exemption when the family moved out in March of 2001. A state board of tax appeals agreed with the assessor. It noted that the property tax law defined a parsonage as “a residence, owned by a church, that is occupied by a clergy person designated for a particular congregation and who holds regular services for that congregation.” The board concluded that when the pastor and his family moved out of the parsonage in March of 2001, it no longer qualified as a tax-exempt parsonage even though the pastor’s family stored many of their personal belongings there. Faith Tabernacle Open Bible Church v. State of Washington, Wash. Bd. of Tax Appeals, Docket No. 57097 (2002).

This article first appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, March 2003.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Congress Considers Social Security Change for Retired Ministers

Bill would not consider housing allowances in earning “insured status” or calculating Social Security benefits.

Church Finance Today

Congress Considers Social Security Change for Retired Ministers

Bill would not consider housing allowances in earning “insured status” or calculating Social Security benefits.

In 1996, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to clarify that retired ministers do not pay self-employment (Social Security) tax on housing allowances and the annual rental value of a parsonage. However, a corresponding change was not made to the Social Security Act. As a result, while these benefits are not subject to self-employment taxes they are used to earn insured status under Social Security and to compute benefits under the Social Security program.

The Social Security Program Protection Act of 2002 (H.R. 4070), which was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives on June 26, would amend the Social Security Act to conform it to the Internal Revenue Code, meaning that housing allowances and the annual rental value of a parsonage provided to retired ministers would not be considered in earning “insured status” or in computing the amount of Social Security benefits. The bill will now be considered by the Senate. If enacted, it will apply “to years beginning before, on, or after December 31, 1994.”

Example. Pastor John retired in 1999. This year he receives a $1,000 distribution each month from his church pension board. Half of this amount ($500) is designated as a housing allowance. Pastor John does not pay self-employment tax on the amount of his pension distributions that are designated as a housing allowance. However, under the Social Security Act, these same amounts are counted in earning “insured status” and in computing Social Security benefits. If the Social Security Program Protection Act of 2002 is enacted, the amount of Pastor John’s pension distributions that are designated as a housing allowance will not count in earning insured status or in computing Social Security benefits.

Example. Pastor Bob has always been exempt from self-employment (Social Security) tax because he filed a Form 4361 with the IRS in his first year of pastoral ministry. In 2002 he retires, and he revokes his exemption from self-employment taxes by filing Form 2031 with the IRS. His only income is the monthly pension distribution he receives from his church pension board. All of these distributions are designated as a housing allowance. Under current law, these distributions are not subject to self-employment tax, but they do count in earning “insured status” under the Social Security program and in computing Social Security benefits. If the Social Security Program Protection Act of 2002 is enacted, the amount of Pastor Bob’s pension distributions that are designated as a housing allowance will not count in earning insured status or in computing Social Security benefits.

This article first appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, September 2002.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Retirement Plans

The IRS ruled that ministers’ housing allowances are not “compensation” for purposes of computing the contribution limits to a tax-sheltered annuity (“403(b) plan”).

Church Law and Tax 2001-11-01

Retirement Plans

Key point. Contributions to tax-favored retirement plans cannot exceed legal limits.

The IRS ruled that ministers’ housing allowances are not “compensation” for purposes of computing the contribution limits to a tax-sheltered annuity (“403(b) plan”). A church has several employees who are ministers, and who are compensated with salary and housing allowances. The church reports this compensation on Form W-2. The church established a retirement plan under which its employees make salary reduction contributions to a tax-sheltered annuity. Section 415(c) of the tax code specifies that, for years prior to 2002, an employee’s contributions to a tax-sheltered annuity may not exceed the lesser of $35,000 or 25% of the employee’s compensation. The church treated ministers’ housing allowances as “compensation” for purposes of applying the section 415(c) limits. Therefore, the church allowed ministers to contribute up to the lesser of $35,000 or 25% of total compensation (including their housing allowance). This interpretation allowed ministers to contribute larger amounts to their tax-sheltered annuity since their compensation was increased by their housing allowance, and therefore the “25% of employee compensation” limit was a larger amount. The church asked the IRS for a ruling to the effect that the definition of “compensation” under section 415(c) did include ministers’ housing allowances.

The “General Definition”

The IRS began its ruling by noting that the “general definition” of “compensation” for purposes of section 415(c) includes “employee wages … and other amounts received for personal services actually rendered in the course of employment with the employer maintaining the plan to the extent that the amounts are includible in gross income ….” Section 107 of the tax code provides that the gross income of a minister does not include “the rental value of a home furnished to the minister as part of his compensation, or the rental allowance paid to the minister as part of his compensation, to the extent used by the minister to rent or provide a home.” Therefore, under the general definition, a housing allowance is not included in compensation under section 415(c).

The church pointed out, however, that the income tax regulations set forth two “alternative definitions” of compensation, and it argued that these definitions included a housing allowance. Treas. Reg. 1.415-2(d)(3).

The First Alternative Definition

One alternative definition defines “compensation” for purposes of section 415(c) to include income reported on Form W-2. Is a minister’s housing allowance a payment of compensation for which the employer is required to furnish the minister a Form W-2? No, concluded the IRS. It noted that Form W-2 does not report “amounts excluded from income (including a tax-free housing allowance)” and so “a tax-free housing allowance is not required to be reported [on Form W-2] because the tax-free housing allowance is not considered wages … and no amounts would be deducted and withheld as tax … on this amount.”

The church pointed out that the instructions to Form W-2 state that a church may wantto give an employee additional information and, in particular, information on a minister’s housing allowance by entering this item in box 14. The IRS rejected the church’s contention that this language amounted to a “requirement” that the housing allowance be reported on Form W-2.

The IRS noted that “the portion of a housing allowance that is not excluded because it is not used for the housing is income …. However, it is not … required to be reported, because [a church] has no basis to determine how much of the housing allowance was or was not used for housing.”

The Second Alternative Definition

The second alternative definition defines “compensation” for purposes of section 415(c) to include wages subject to income tax withholding. The IRS noted that “income tax withholding is imposed on remuneration paid by an employer only to the extent that an employee recognizes income.[ ]Accordingly, excludable compensation is not considered wages [for purposes of withholding]. Thus, amounts excluded from income (including a tax-free housing allowance) are not considered wages … and are not subject to income tax withholding.”

The church acknowledged that section 3401(a)(9) of the tax code exempts the wages of ministers from income tax withholding, but it insisted that if this section were disregarded, then ministers’ wages would be subject to withholding. The IRS concluded that this argument missed the point, since even if ministers’ wages were subject to withholding, this would not apply to housing allowances and other items that are specifically excluded from taxable income. The IRS observed,

As a general matter, excludable compensation is not wages [subject to withholding] so the tax-free housing allowance is excepted from [withholding]. It is not excluded from wages on account of section 3401(a)(9), a rule that limits the remuneration included in wages based on the nature or location of the employment or the services performed. Section 3401(a)(9) operates to exclude from wages taxable compensation paid to a minister whereas tax-free compensation is excluded under the general definition of wages. Thus, even if section 3401(a)(9) is disregarded as required under the alternative definitions … a tax-free housing allowance still is not wages [subject to withholding] and thus is not included in the alternative definitions of compensation.

The IRS noted that “requiring income tax withholding on amounts not includible in income could result in over-withholding and, in certain cases, would require the filing of a Form 1040 … in order to obtain a refund when filing is not otherwise required.”

Application. Church leaders should consider the following two points:

1. The IRS concluded that “for purposes of determining the limits on contributions under section 415(c) … amounts paid to a minister as a tax-free housing allowance may not be treated as compensation pursuant to the general or alternative definitions of compensation … .” Church pension plans, as well as individual churches that have established a retirement program incorporating tax-sheltered annuities for ministers, should communicate this important ruling with their ministers so that excessive contributions are not made because of a failure to include housing allowances within the definition of “compensation” for purposes of applying the “25% of total compensation” limit.

2. Section 415(c) of the tax code currently specifies that annual contributions to a tax-sheltered annuity plan (and other “defined contribution” plans) cannot exceed the lesser of (1) 25% of compensation, or (2) $35,000 (for 2001). Annual additions are the sum of employer contributions and employee contributions. The $35,000 limit is indexed for cost-of-living adjustments in $5,000 increments. The recently enacted Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 makes the following changes to the 415(c) limits: (1) It increases the $35,000 limit on annual contributions to $40,000. This amount is indexed in $1,000 increments. (2) It increases the 25% of compensation limit to 100%. According to the congressional conference committee, the 25% limit was repealed because it has operated to reduce the amount that lower and middle-income workers can save for retirement. Further, conforming the contribution limits for tax-sheltered annuities to the limits applicable to retirement plans generally will simplify the administration of the pension laws, and provide more equitable treatment for participants in similar types of plans. These change take effect in 2002. IRS Letter Ruling 200135045 (2001).

© Copyright 2001 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m63m96 c0601

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Supervision of Small Children

A Georgia court addresses church liability-Bull Street Church of Christ v. Jensen, 504 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. App. 1998)

Article summary. Churches minister to children in a variety of ways, including Sunday Schools, nurseries, day care programs, private schools, youth groups, and scouting programs. In smaller churches, only a few children may be involved, but in larger churches the number swells to hundreds or even thousands. Unfortunately, children occasionally are injured on church premises, or during church activities. In some of these cases, parents sue the church, alleging either negligent selection of a youth worker who was responsible for the injury, or negligent supervision of the injured child. A recent Georgia case addressed the liability of a church for the molestation of a 4-year-old girl by a 10-year-old boy on church premises. The court concluded that churches have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of young children, and that this duty was breached in this case because the victim had been released from a nursery area and was allowed to roam freely throughout the church without adult supervision. While unsupervised, the victim was taken to a vacant classroom and molested by the older boy. The court’s opinion will provide church leaders with helpful insights into how such incidents occur, a church’s risk of liability, and steps churches can take to minimize this risk.

A Georgia court ruled that a church was legally responsible for the molestation of a 4-year-old girl by a 10-year-old boy on church premises. This feature article will summarize the facts of the case, review the ruling, and evaluate the significance of the case to other churches.

Facts

A 4-year-old girl attended a class at her church for 3-year-old to 6-year-old children, while her mother attended an adult church service. The mother left her daughter with a husband and wife who were the teachers of the children’s class. A church elder later testified that the church had no written policies or procedures regarding the operations of Sunday School classes for children.

The victim ordinarily waited in the classroom for her mother to retrieve her after church. However, on one occasion, the children were allowed to leave the classroom and find their parents on their own without any adult supervision. While the victim waited for her mother next to a stairway leading to her classroom, she was approached by a 10-year-old boy (Corey) who asked her if she wanted to see his classroom. The victim followed Corey into an unoccupied classroom, where he pushed her underneath a table and sexually molested her. Corey later released the victim, who returned downstairs to find her mother. After telling her mother what Corey had done, the mother immediately confronted the pastor and informed him of the attack. She later testified that the pastor’s response was “oh no, it’s happened again,” and that he acknowledged that Corey had acted inappropriately towards a child of another church family. The mother also testified that the church’s elders advised her that they wanted to keep the incident quiet in order to avoid a conflict in the church.

Following the attack, the victim received treatment from a psychotherapist, and was hospitalized when she was 6 years old, and again at age 8, after expressing suicidal thoughts. A psychiatrist who treated the victim during her second hospitalization testified that the victim was severely depressed, tearful, had no interest in normal activities, and isolated herself. He concluded that Corey’s attack was the major cause of her problems.

The victim’s parents later sued their church, claiming that it negligently failed to protect their daughter from Corey despite having prior notice of his sexual propensities. A jury determined that the church had been negligent, and ordered it to pay damages to the victim. The church appealed, insisting that it could not be liable for the attack because it had no prior knowledge of any sexual misconduct by Corey.

The Court’s Ruling

The court began its opinion by noting that

as a general rule, a person who undertakes the control and supervision of a child, even without compensation, has the duty to use reasonable care to protect the child from injury. Such a person is not an insurer of the safety of the child. He is required only to use reasonable care commensurate with the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm ….

What is at issue in a case alleging negligent supervision of a child is whether the danger of the type of harm the child suffered was reasonably foreseeable. And, what is reasonably foreseeable is not exclusively dependent upon what is known about a specific place. The danger is not only what may happen at a specific place but what may happen to any child at any place, given that children are mobile and may … wander away from the place where they are supposed to be if they are not adequately supervised …. Accordingly, the issue is whether there was evidence that the danger of the sexual assault on the victim was reasonably foreseeable to the church.

In summary, a church can be liable for an injury to a child occurring on church premises or during a church activity based on negligent supervision if the injury was reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that an injury to a child can be foreseeable in either or both of two ways.

Foreseeable “General Risks”

The court concluded that some injuries are foreseeable because of the “general risks” associated with certain kinds of conduct, even if no similar injury has ever occurred in the past. It explained this type of foreseeability as follows:

Clearly, in this case the church assumed responsibility for caring for a class of 3-year-old to 6-year-old children, including the 4-year-old victim. Thus, the church had the duty to use reasonable care to protect the children from a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm. There is also evidence that the church, through the volunteer church teachers, breached that duty by allowing the victim and other young children to wander through the church without adult supervision ….

[W]e hold that the church had reasonable grounds for apprehending that if the teachers left the victim unsupervised, there was a general risk that the child could be harmed …. [T]hose who agree to supervise small children cannot avoid liability simply because the injury to a child without adult supervision occurred off the premises or because no prior, similar injury to the small child had occurred so as to place the supervisors on notice of the potential for such harm. Instead, care providers must realize that it is foreseeable that a small child, such as the victim, leaving a church classroom could wander off the church premises and be hit by a car, abducted or otherwise injured. Even if the child remained on the premises, the potential for harm exists-e.g., she could fall down stairs, fight with another child, or get into various forms of mischief that would cause injury. Even absent actual knowledge of a specific risk, those who agree to supervise small children are charged with constructive notice of the general risks of harm, including assault and molestation, that may befall an unsupervised child.

Accordingly, we conclude that [there was sufficient evidence in this case] even without evidence of [Corey’s] prior behavior, to find that the church had a duty to supervise the victim, which it breached by allowing the victim to roam free in the church where it was foreseeable that she could be harmed by a plethora of environmental and societal dangers.

In summary, a church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision for foreseeable injuries resulting from its failure to adequately supervise young children. Foreseeable injuries include those “general risks” that result from a failure to supervise, and one of those risks is sexual assault. It does not matter that no child has ever been assaulted before on a church’s premises. Such a risk is a foreseeable consequence of allowing children to roam unattended on church premises.

Foreseeability based on prior knowledge

The court also concluded that the victim’s injuries were foreseeable because the church had actual knowledge of previous sexual misconduct by Corey. It based this conclusion on the following two considerations:

1. The pastor’s response. The mother claimed that the pastor’s immediate response to the incident was “oh no, it’s happened again.” She later testified that when she asked the pastor what he meant, he explained that Corey had previously acted inappropriately towards a child from another family in the church.

2. A church elder’s knowledge. A few years before Corey assaulted the victim, another incident occurred involving Corey. A number of families from the church met at the home of a host family for a “casual get-together.” The host family’s 4-year-old daughter was in the bathtub when Corey “came in an exposed himself” to her. The girl’s mother later informed a church elder of this incident. The elder, who was a physician, informed the mother that the incident was “benign” and merely a form of “show and tell” that should not be overemphasized. He did not think the incident was serious, and advised the mother to “let the matter drop.”

Based on these facts, the court concluded that “there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that … the church had notice that [Corey] had inappropriately acted in a sexual manner towards a smaller child prior to his attack on the victim.”

Hearsay Testimony

The church argued that the only evidence that it had prior knowledge of Corey’s sexual propensities was hearsay which was not admissible in court and therefore was insufficient to establish knowledge. Hearsay evidence consists of out-of-court statements that are introduced in court to prove the truth of those statements. Such evidence generally is not admissible in court. However, the court noted that “the definition of hearsay does not include out-of-court statements that are not offered as proof of the facts asserted in such statement, but are offered merely as proof that such a statement was made.” It concluded that the statements made to the elder by the mother of the girl to whom Corey exposed himself were not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter alleged, but rather to demonstrate that the church had notice of Corey’s alleged propensities.

Relevance of the case to church leaders

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? Obviously, a decision by a Georgia appeals court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. Churches are not “guarantors” of the safety of children. The court acknowledged that churches are not “guarantors” of the safety of children. That is, a church is not automatically liable for every injury to a child that occurs on its premises or in the course of a church-sanctioned activity. For a church to be legally responsible for an injury to a child, it must be guilty of negligence or some other legal wrong.

2. Negligent supervision. A church can be liable for an injury to a child if it was negligent in the supervision of the child or its premises and activities. The court concluded that churches have a legal duty to properly supervise children, and they can be liable on the basis of negligent supervision for those “reasonably foreseeable” injuries that result from a lack of adequate supervision. The court concluded that an injury to a child can be reasonably foreseeable in two ways:

General risks. There are “general risks” associated with certain church practices that are reasonably foreseeable even if such risks have never occurred before. For example, when a church allows young children to wander about unsupervised, there are a number of “general risks,” including (1) leaving church premises and being struck by a car; (2) kidnapping; (3) falling down stairs; (4) molestation; or (5) fights with other children. A church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision for any of these kinds of injuries, even if they have never occurred before, because they are general risks that common sense indicates are “reasonably foreseeable” whenever young children are allowed to roam about unsupervised.

“Prior knowledge. An injury may be foreseeable if a similar injury has occurred in the past.

Example. A church worker releases a group of 5-year-old children before they are picked up by their parents following a morning worship service. One of the children wanders off church premises and is struck by a car. Church leaders insist that the church is not responsible since such an accident has never occurred before and so they were not “on notice” of the risk. The Georgia court rejected such a defense. It concluded that churches have a duty to supervise young children, and they will be legally responsible for “reasonably foreseeable” injuries that occur to children as a result of inadequate supervision. The fact that no child has ever wandered off of the church’s premises and been struck by a car is not relevant. The fact remains that any reasonable adult would recognize that such an injury is one of the “general risks” associated with allowing young children to wander about unsupervised, and as a result the church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision since the risk is “reasonably foreseeable.”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the child is injured when she stumbles down a church stairway. Once again, churches have a duty to supervise young children, and they will be legally responsible for “reasonably foreseeable” injuries that occur to children as a result of inadequate supervision. The fact that no child has ever stumbled down a church stairway is not relevant. The fact remains that any reasonable adult would recognize that such an injury is one of the “general risks” associated with allowing young children to wander about unsupervised, and as a result the church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision since the risk is “reasonably foreseeable.”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the child is abducted by an unknown person. The church had a duty to supervise young children, and it will be legally responsible for “reasonably foreseeable” injuries that occur to children as a result of inadequate supervision. The fact that no child has ever been abducted is not relevant. The fact remains that any reasonable adult would recognize that such an incident is one of the “general risks” associated with allowing young children to wander about unsupervised, and as a result the church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision since the risk is “reasonably foreseeable.”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the child is molested by an adult in a church restroom. Assume that a similar incident occurred at the church two years ago. According to the Georgia court, the church had a duty to supervise young children, and it will be legally responsible for “reasonably foreseeable” injuries that occur to children as a result of inadequate supervision. The child’s injuries are foreseeable in two ways. First, any reasonable adult would recognize that such an incident is one of the “general risks” associated with allowing young children to wander about unsupervised, and as a result the church is liable on the basis of negligent supervision since the risk is “reasonably foreseeable.” Second, the child’s injuries are foreseeable because of the similar incident that occurred two years before.

In conclusion, a church is assuming a significant risk of liability when it allows young children to wander about unsupervised. It will be liable for any reasonably foreseeable injury to a child, even if such an injury has never occurred before on church premises.

3. No policies. The church in this case did not have any policy regarding “early release” of young children. If such a policy had been adopted, and it permitted the release of children only to their parent or other designated adult, it is more likely that the teachers would not have released the victim. Church leaders should consider the adoption of such a policy. Of course, if adopted, the policy should be carefully explained to all teachers and workers to insure compliance.

4. The unsupervised room. The molestation in this case occurred in a vacant and unsupervised classroom. To the extent possible, church leaders should close off access to areas of the church that are not being utilized. This will reduce the risk of injuries to minors.

5. The offender’s age. In this case, the perpetrator was a 10-year-old boy. There are two points to note:

Some child molesters are children. Several studies have indicated that about twenty percent of all child molesters are themselves minors. As a result, church leaders should consider ways to reduce the risk of children molesting children. Here are some suggestions:

(1) Do not release children up to a specified age unless they are picked up by a parent or designated adult. Many churches apply this rule to children through elementary grades. In this case, the victim would not have been molested if the 10-year-old boy had not been released. Obviously, it is more difficult to retain older children. But a policy requiring the church to retain custody of children through the elementary grades until they are picked up by a parent or designated adult will reduce the risk of injuries.

(2) Do not allow minors to be the sole custodians of younger children.

(3) Adopt a screening program for adolescents who will work with adults in children’s programs. This could include references from the child’s parents and a coach or teacher.

“Acting out.” When a 10-year-old boy molests a younger child, it is possible if not probable that the molester is himself a victim of molestation, and that he is “acting out” the behavior that is being inflicted on him by an older, dominant person.

6. Intervening criminal acts. Generally, intervening criminal acts cut off liability for negligence. That is, a church should not be liable for its failure to properly supervise children or activities when a child is injured because of an intervening criminal act, since such an act ordinarily is not foreseeable. The court rejected this defense, noting that “we cannot rule that [Corey’s] intervening criminal act was unforeseeable as a matter of law.”

7. Taking incidents seriously. The court concluded that Corey’s molestation of the victim was foreseeable, in part, because of a prior incident in which Corey had “exposed” himself to another 4-year-old girl at a church member’s home. What is interesting about this incident is that neither the girl’s mother nor a church elder who was informed of the incident considered it to be serious. The elder, who was a physician, considered it to be a benign matter of sexual exploration that is normal among young children. The court viewed this incident far more seriously, noting that it constituted “sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that … the church had notice that [Corey] had inappropriately acted in a sexual manner towards a smaller child prior to his attack on the victim.” While it remains true that some degree of sexual exploration is normal among young children, church leaders must recognize that ignoring or minimizing such incidents as normal “child’s play” can expose the church to substantial legal risk.

Bull Street Church of Christ v. Jensen, 504 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. App. 1998)

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Q&A: When Should Our Church File a Form 990?

Six guidelines to help you file.

Must our church file a Form 990 with the federal government? We have received conflicting opinions.
Your church is not required to file a Form 990 with the federal government. Section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code requires every organization that is exempt from federal income taxes to file an annual return (Form 990) with the IRS. Form 990 consists of 89 questions requesting detailed information about the finances, service, and administration of the exempt organization. However, section 6033 exempts several organizations from the reporting requirements, including:

(1) a church, an interchurch organization of local units of a church, a convention or association of churches, an integrated auxiliary of a church (such as a men’s or women’s organization, religious school, missions society, or youth group), and certain church-controlled organizations (see Rev. Proc. 86-23)

(2) a school below college level affiliated with a church (or operated by a religious order)

(3) a mission society sponsored by or affiliated with one or more churches or church denominations, if more than one-half of the society’s activities are conducted in, or directed at persons in foreign countries

(4) an exclusively religious activity or any religious order

(5) a religious or apostolic organization described in section 501(d) of the Code

(6) and exempt organization whose annual gross receipts are normally $25,000 or less

Efforts are underway in Washington to require all religious organizations (including churches) to file an annual Form 990. You will be fully apprised of any developments in future newsletters.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
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