Pastor’s Age Discrimination Claim Against a Denominational Agency Was Barred by the “Ministerial Exception.”

The “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” does not necessarily preclude resolution of pastor’s claims of breach of contract, wrongful eviction, and defamation, so long as doing so would not implicate religious doctrine.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: Breach of Contract, Defamation, Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes

Key Point 8-10.1. The civil courts have consistently ruled that the First Amendment prevents them from applying employment laws to the relationship between a church and a minister.

Key point 9-07. The First Amendment allows civil courts to resolve internal church disputes so long as they can do so without interpreting doctrine or polity.

A federal district court for the District of Columbia ruled that a pastor’s age discrimination claim against a denominational agency was barred by the “ministerial exception,” but the court could resolve the pastor’s claims of breach of contract, wrongful eviction, and defamation, so long as doing so would not implicate religious doctrine.

A pastor and his wife organized a church (the “local church”) in 1995. The local church affiliated with a Protestant denomination (the “national church”) and one of its subdivisions (the “regional church”), but retained its organizational, administrative, and pastoral independence. Despite that independence, the local church entered into an agreement with the regional church with the following terms: (1) the regional church agreed to arrange financing to purchase property for the local church’s use; (2) the local church agreed to be responsible for repaying the loan; (3) the regional church held title to the property while the loan was being paid “to protect against the church’s default on the loan”; and (4) when the loan was repaid, the regional church would “relinquish the title to the property to the church free and clear of any encumbrances.” By 2005, the local church, using “the funds of the church membership without any contribution from the regional church,” had fully repaid the loan, but the regional church refused to transfer title to the local church.

In 2011, an officer of the regional church formally appointed the pastor as lead pastor of the local church. Although the pastor insisted that the regional church had no authority to determine who was the church’s pastor, he accepted the appointment and accepted a stipend of $1,500 per month. The regional church discontinued the stipend in 2012.

In 2015, an officer of the regional church informed the pastor that it was time for him to retire because the regional church had “younger people” capable of taking his place and that his last day as pastor would be May 31, 2015. The pastor ignored this ultimatum and continued to assert his authority to act as the church’s pastor. The regional church responded by changing the locks to the church without notifying the pastor, and by informing local law enforcement personnel that the pastor “had made illegal and unauthorized entry onto the properties.” The pastor was warned that he would be subject to arrest if he attempted to enter the property again.

The pastor sued the regional church, asserting the following claims:

age discrimination based on the regional church’s attempt to remove the pastor so that a younger pastor could be chosen;

breach of contract to pay a monthly stipend of $1,500 after 2012;

breach of contract based on the regional church’s failure to convey title to the local church pursuant to the agreement to carry out such a transfer upon the church’s repayment of the loan;

wrongful eviction based on the regional church’s changing the locks to the church in order to prevent the pastor from entering the building; and

defamation based on the letter the regional church disseminated to law enforcement authorities stating that the pastor had illegally entered onto the property.

The regional church asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that it was an internal church matter over which the civil courts have no jurisdiction.

Ecclesiastical abstention and ministerial exception

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is based on a “long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” The related ministerial exception “precludes application of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.” As the United States Supreme Court noted in a unanimous ruling in 2012: “The exception … ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).

The court noted that “the Supreme Court has expressed no view on whether the ministerial exception bars claims other than employment discrimination claims,” and it noted that a prior federal appeals court ruling had concluded that the exception “did not bar a breach of contract claim when resolution of such a claim is subject to entirely neutral methods of proof.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Age discrimination

The pastor claimed that the regional church discriminated against him on the basis of age because its officer forced him to retire from his position as pastor by telling him that he needed “to retire” because there were “younger people” to take his place. The court noted that the pastor had abandoned this claim on appeal, but even if he had not done so, the ministerial exception would have barred the claim:

His allegation is that the officer “forced him to retire because of his age,” thereby ending his tenure as pastor. The age discrimination claim before the court thus “is an employment discrimination [claim] brought on behalf of a minister, challenging his church’s decision to fire him.” The ministerial exception bars such a claim. That bar is in place because the court’s involvement in assessing the propriety of a pastor’s termination would improperly entangle it in “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”

Breach of contract to pay a stipend

The pastor claimed that the regional church’s discontinuation of his monthly $1,500 stipend amounted to a breach of contract. The court noted that in the District of Columbia, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: “(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.”

The regional church argued that the ministerial exception barred this claim, but the court disagreed. The court quoted from the Minker case (see above): “A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.” In Minker, the court considered a breach of an oral employment contract claim asserted by a minister. The court recognized that “it could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, the minister will be forced to inquire into matters of ecclesiastical policy even as to his contract claim,” which would require a dismissal of this claim.

The same analysis is warranted here, the DC court concluded:

If it turns out that resolution of the pastor’s claim that the regional church breached a contract to pay him a stipend requires excessive entanglement with religious doctrine, the court can grant summary judgment in favor of the regional church. But because at this early stage it is not entirely clear that resolution of [the pastor’s breach of contract claim] will require anything other than “neutral methods of proof,” dismissal on ministerial exception grounds is not warranted.

Breach of contract to convey title to property

The pastor claimed that the regional church breached its agreement to return title to the church property to the local church when it paid off the underlying loan in full. The regional church claimed that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented the court from resolving this breach of contract claim because resolution of that claim would require the court “to delve into the doctrinal beliefs of [the national church]. Specifically, the regional church explained that the property deed states that the property is to be held by the regional church in trust for the use and benefit of the national church,” and subject to The “Discipline” (the foundational document of the national church). And, of utmost importance according to the regional church, was the fact that The Discipline states that the regional church can only convey property “as may be deemed necessary or convenient for the purpose of [the regional church].” And, The Discipline describes those purposes as “religious, benevolent, charitable and educational in keeping with the purposes of national church as set forth in its Discipline.”

Therefore, the regional church reasoned, since any conveyance of real property by the regional church must be consistent with the religious “purpose” of the national church, the court was barred from resolving the breach of contract claim since doing so would directly entangle the court in the internal doctrine and practice of a religious denomination.

The court again disagreed:

Assuming the regional church is correct that terms in The Discipline are relevant to resolution of a claim that it breached a contract to convey title to the local church, it is still not apparent that resolution of the claim would require the court to assess religious doctrine or policy. The fulcrum of the regional church’s religious entanglement argument is the provision in The Discipline that states that the regional church can only convey property “as may be deemed necessary or convenient for the purpose of [the regional church].”

The regional church argues that this provision mandates that any contract to convey title must be consistent with the religious “purpose” of the national church and the court, in making that assessment as part of the breach of contract analysis, would be impermissibly assessing religious doctrine. Not so. The provision does not require that any conveyance of real property actually be consistent with the church’s religious “purpose.” Instead, it states that any conveyance must have been “deemed necessary or convenient” for that religious purpose by the appropriate individuals acting on the regional church’s behalf. An assessment of whether the regional church deemed conveyance of its property to the local church necessary or convenient for its religious purpose is a neutral determination that would not involve the court in determining what the church’s religious principles actually are. Thus, assuming the terms of The Discipline are relevant to this breach of contract claim, the regional church has not demonstrated that resolution of that claim will require the court to undertake an assessment of religious doctrine or policy. Again, to the extent that it becomes apparent that the court would be required to make such an assessment as this case progresses, the court at that time can grant summary judgment on the ground that resolution of the claim would create an excessive entanglement with religion. But, at this early stage, with that entanglement not yet apparent, dismissal on ecclesiastical abstention grounds would be premature.

Wrongful eviction

The pastor alleged that the regional church wrongfully evicted him by changing the locks on the church so that he was unable to access the building. Once again, the regional church insisted that resolution of this claim would involve impermissible religious entanglement. The court concluded that there was no evidence that this would be the case, and so it declined to dismiss this claim.

Defamation

The pastor claimed that the regional church defamed him when it disseminated a letter to law enforcement officers stating that he had made illegal and unauthorized entry onto church property. The regional church claimed that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevented the court from resolving this claim since any attempt by the court to address this claim would impermissibly implicate this court in matters of religious doctrine and policy. Again, the court disagreed, noting that it “was not convinced that resolving the property-related claims will necessitate inappropriate judicial meddling in religious matters.”

What this means for churches

This case illustrates an important principle: While the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” prevents the civil courts from resolving internal church disputes involving “matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine,” it does not necessarily preclude resolution of such disputes on the basis of strictly neutral principles requiring no recourse to faith or doctrine. Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F.Supp.3d 37 (D.D.C. 2017).

Legal Developments

First Amendment Leaves Room for Employee Lawsuits

D.C. court of appeal rules religious freedom doesn’t bar a pastor from suing for unpaid compensation.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: Compensation and Benefits

Key point 9-07. The First Amendment allows civil courts to resolve internal church disputes so long as they can do so without interpreting doctrine or polity.

A District of Columbia court of appeals ruled that the First Amendment guaranty of religious freedom did not bar a pastor from suing her church for payment of the compensation the church had agreed to pay.

In 2004, a minister (the "plaintiff") was employed by a church through the first in a series of one-year contracts. When she became pastor, the church had low enrollment, it had defaulted on its second mortgage, and it had been in default for two years. The plaintiff managed to refinance the mortgage and obtained $79,000 from the refinancing.

The church paid the plaintiff in yearly contracts during her first three years as pastor. However, because of the church's financial difficulties, in her fourth year, she agreed to receive her salary and housing allowance on a payment plan, rather than in the amounts and on the schedule previously agreed upon. She received payments in accordance with the payment plan until April 2008. She did not receive any payment for her services in 2009.

The plaintiff sued the church, claiming that it owed her $39,200 under terms of the contract covering her final year of services at the church. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court concluded that the pastor had "established by a preponderance of the evidence that this is a straightforward contract case, uncomplicated by ecclesiastical considerations." The church appealed, claiming that the dispute was an ecclesiastical matter over which the civil courts have no jurisdiction.

The appeals court began its opinion by acknowledging that the First Amendment guaranty of religious freedom "requires civil courts to defer to the decisions of the highest tribunals of hierarchical religious organizations on matters of religious doctrine, discipline, faith, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." Further, the First Amendment "precludes civil courts from interfering with a religious organization's right to choose its ministers."

However, "civil court review of church action is not entirely prohibited." It continued: "The touchstone for determining whether civil courts have jurisdiction is whether the courts may employ neutral principles of law and ensure that their decisions are not premised on the consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." The court concluded that the First Amendment did not bar the civil courts from resolving the plaintiff's breach of contract claim:

In this case, we are satisfied that the First Amendment does not bar [the plaintiff] from pursuing her contract claim against the church. The record does not suggest that resolving her contract claim will require the court to entangle itself in church doctrine. Rather, the record shows that she entered into a year-long contract to serve as pastor of the church, that she completed her obligations under the contract, and that the church did not honor its promise to pay her. Consequently, the trial court should be able to resolve the claim by employing neutral principles of law.

The plaintiff does not challenge the church's authority to hire, to fire, or to assign her duties, and she does not seek reinstatement. In other words, she does not seek to "limit the church's choice of its religious representatives," and we decline to extend the "ministerial exception" to categorically bar any claim whatsoever by a ministerial employee … . [Her] contract claim stands alone … . She does not claim she was wrongfully terminated or otherwise tether her contract claim to matters of church doctrine or governance; she claims only that the church failed to pay her salary after acknowledging its obligation to do so … . She has demonstrated that the trial court can resolve her claim without delving into matters reserved for ecclesiastical judgment.

The court cautioned that "if it becomes apparent to the trial court that this dispute does in fact turn on matters of doctrinal interpretation or church governance, the trial court may grant summary judgment to avoid excessive entanglement with religion."

What this means for churches

This case demonstrates that not all employment disputes between churches and clergy are barred by the so-called "ministerial exception." Some courts, like this one, are willing to resolve such disputes if they can do so without delving into "matters of doctrinal interpretation or church governance." Second Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812 (D.C. 2012).

Legal Developments

Constitution, Bylaws and Charters

A District of Columbia appeals court ruled that it was prohibited from resolving a lawsuit brought by members of a church claiming that the board of trustees breached its fiduciary duties by authorizing an interest-free loan to the pastor

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia

• Key point 6-03.2. Most courts have viewed requests by church members for an "accounting" of church funds to be an internal church matter over which the civil courts have no jurisdiction.

• Key point 6-07.03. Church board members have a fiduciary duty to use reasonable care in the discharge of their duties, and they may be personally liable for damages resulting from their failure to do so.

• Key point 6-07.10. Church board members may be personally liable, under state nonprofit corporation law, for loans they authorize for any officer or director of the church.

• Key point 9-07. The first amendment allows civil courts to resolve internal church disputes so long as they can do so without interpreting doctrine or polity.

A District of Columbia appeals court ruled that it was prohibited by the first amendment from resolving a lawsuit brought by members of a church claiming that the board of trustees breached its fiduciary duties by authorizing an interest-free loan to the pastor and by failing to provide the congregation with adequate information regarding the church's finances.

In 1993, a church selected a new pastor. A few months later the official board of the church, consisting of the pastor, deacons, and trustees, agreed to lend the pastor money toward his purchase of a $325,000 home at an interest rate of six percent. The pastor did not take part in the vote. At a "special called" meeting of the church membership, the board recommended approval of the loan. One church member suggested that the loan be interest-free, commenting that "the church should not profit from this loan to the pastor."

The membership approved a no-interest loan at the meeting and eventually loaned the pastor some $256,000 for the purchase, which took place in 1994. In 1996, the pastor signed an agreement to repay the loan, and the purchase money mortgage held by the church was recorded. In December of 1996, certain church members wrote a letter to the pastor requesting disclosure of certain financial information to the membership within fourteen days.

Specifically, they requested "all the facts and documents surrounding the church's role in helping the pastor purchase a home," along with any audit reports for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. They also asked for records of the "special called" meeting at which the loan to the pastor had been approved, and the church's records of past filings with the Internal Revenue Service. They apparently had learned of an audit and management report prepared by an outside CPA and submitted to the trustee board in 1993, which warned that loans made by the church to "members and sons of the church" would endanger its tax-exempt status.

The members also alleged that the congregation was asked to approve a $50,000 expenditure for a new car for the pastor in 1996 "without knowing how much money the church actually had on hand or what its financial budget was."

Not satisfied with the leadership's response to their demand for information, the members filed a lawsuit in which they asked a court to rule that the board had breached its fiduciary duties by authorizing the interest-free loan, and that the members "have a right to receive, review and inspect information and documents that will inform the members regarding the church's finances, compliance or non-compliance with federal and local laws, and other liabilities." The lawsuit also asked the court to order the church "to have an audit conducted of the church's finances by an outside Certified Public Accountant firm." The members conceded that the congregation voted to approve the loan to the pastor, but they insisted that the board failed to inform the membership of the 1993 audit report warning against such loans.

The pastor and trustees asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that judicial intervention in the church's management would violate the first amendment. The trial court denied the motion, stating that he was "confident" he could adjudicate the dispute by applying the church's constitution and bylaws "without becoming involved with any ecclesiastical matters or doctrines." The pastor and trustees appealed. On appeal, the members insisted that the court could grant their demands without inquiring into ecclesiastical issues since they were only asking for an independent audit and disclosure of information which the church was obliged to provide to its members according to its own Constitution and Bylaws and the nonprofit corporation law under which it was incorporated. The appeals court disagreed. It observed:

[A] church's financial regime, including any required reports to members, necessarily reflects an array of decisions about a member's obligation to pledge funds, and about the leaders' corresponding responsibility to account for those funds, that a civil court cannot arbitrate without entangling itself in doctrinal interpretations …. Accounting is an area riddled with major subjective decisions. When the entity in question is a religious society, those subjective decisions raise questions of internal church governance which are often themselves based on the application of church doctrine ….

The [members claim] that the [church] has expressly adopted an annual audit requirement and an obligation to report to the membership annually on its finances. They point first to … the church's Constitution, which states in part that the official board "shall be authorized to transact all business of the church and report annually, or at request of the church, of its work," and to … the Bylaws [which state that] "[a]ll new business pertaining to the church must be brought to, and considered by, the official board before any action is taken by the church." These provisions, they argue, obligate the official board to furnish the members "with complete and accurate information," on matters on which "action is [to be] taken by the church" …. While [the Constitution] authorizes (though it does not literally compel) the board to "report annually" to the church membership, it is silent about the content of such reports or how much information they must contain. It says nothing at all about the kind or particularity of information "necessary" for the members to be able "to understand and determine the financial conditions of the church." Consequently, for a court to decide-as the complaint demands-what disclosures are needed "to help [the members] in making … informed decisions" would thrust it into that realm of subjective and even doctrinal decisionmaking that [is] out of bounds. Underscoring the point is the directive at the end of the Bylaws which states that "[w]here these regulations do not cover, we shall look to the New Testament … for guidance."

The [members] also gain no help from … the church Constitution, which states that "the trustees … shall see that all moneys are paid according to the wishes of the church." Even if the members received inadequate information before approving the loan to the pastor, nothing in [the Constitution] states that the wishes of the church have to be based on full or even accurate information-matters very much in the eye of the beholder. The [members] do not claim the leadership failed to determine the wishes of the congregation on the interest-free loan, only that it withheld information needed by the members to make an "intelligent and informed decision." The language cited provides no "clear, objective accounting and reporting standards" enabling a court to evaluate that claim.

The court then turned its attention to the members' request for the court to order the church to hire a CPA firm to conduct an annual audit. In support of this request, the members cited a provision of the church Bylaws stating that "the auditing committee, named by the church, shall audit the books of the church once a year." The court observed that this language "provides no basis for compelling an audit by an outside accountant; nor, indeed, does it say anything about the form that an in-house audit would have to take; and it confers no right on the members to learn the names of past auditing committee members."

Application. This case illustrates the reluctance that the civil courts express in resolving internal church disputes, even over financial matters that seemingly involve little if any doctrinal considerations. The court did express a willingness to resolve such claims, but only if church members "allege the application of neutral legal standards, either statutory or embodied in the church's governing instruments, that are clear and objective enough to permit a court to examine the church's financial practices without involving it in resolving a dispute with doctrinal implications." This standard was not met in this case. However, it is conceivable that it could be met if a church's governing document (constitution or bylaws), or the state nonprofit corporation law under which a church is incorporated, contain language that is sufficiently secular and precise that would allow a civil court to address issues of church finances or disclosure of information without any consideration of church doctrine. Kelsey v. Ray, 719 A.2d 1248 (D.C. App. 1998). Church Records, Church Officers, Directors, and Trustees and Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes

Legal Developments

Recent Developments in the District of Columbia Regarding Church Business Meetings

West v. Morris, 711 A.2d 1269 (D.C. 1998) Key point. It is the prevailing view

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia

West v. Morris, 711 A.2d 1269 (D.C. 1998)

Key point. It is the prevailing view that the civil courts are prohibited by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom from resolving lawsuits brought by dismissed clergy challenging their dismissals, particularly if the resolution of such a dispute would require consideration of ecclesiastical matters.

Key point. Some courts require that lawsuits brought against churches contain more than vague and unsubstantiated allegations. They must "verify the truth of the charges in detail" to avoid being dismissed.

A District of Columbia court of appeals ruled that the first amendment prevented it from resolving a lawsuit by a purported church member who claimed that the election of a pastor at a church business meeting was invalid because it was in violation of procedural requirements mandated by the District of Columbia nonprofit corporations law.

Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that the church had failed to provide proper notice of the meeting. The lawsuit asked the court to award money damages, order a new election, and compel the pastor to return all moneys he had been paid by the church. A trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state whether or not he was a member. The plaintiff appealed, insisting that the lawsuit contained an "indirect allegation" of membership by noting that the church had violated his rights under the nonprofit corporation law.

The appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the case. It concluded that the level of specificity required of a lawsuit is quite low. A lawsuit must simply put the defendant on notice that he or she is being sued and briefly state the basis of liability. However, there are exceptions. In some cases, the courts require that a lawsuit contain much greater "specificity." One such exception involves allegations of fraud. The court recognized another exception in the context of conduct protected by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom:

[The first amendment] precludes civil courts from adjudicating church fights that require extensive inquiry into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. In cases which may implicate conduct protected by the [first amendment], greater specificity of pleading is required than in other kinds of suits …. [W]hen the first amendment casts a shadow over the court's … jurisdiction, the plaintiff is obligated to plead unqualified jurisdictional facts that clearly take the case outside the constitutional bar. There is no justifiable reason to make a church answer a complaint, let alone go through discovery, unless a plaintiff specifically and unequivocally pleads all facts necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction.

The court noted that lawsuits alleging fraud require "unequivocal, specific allegations … that verify the truth of the charges in detail," and it concluded that "no less should be required when the constitution severely circumscribes the court's … jurisdiction over church controversies." Turning to the plaintiff's lawsuit, the court noted that "the complaint was deficient" since "his allegations did not clearly establish that he was a member of the church, or that he was entitled, under the church's articles of incorporation or bylaws, to notice of, or the right to participate in, the selection of the pastor."

Application. This is an important case. It suggests that lawsuits involving internal church controversies are subject to dismissal if they fail to "specifically and unequivocally plead all facts necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction" and "verify the truth of the charges in detail." This will be a useful precedent for church attorneys to site when a lawsuit brought against a church contains vague allegations of liability unsupported by any facts. Unfortunately, such lawsuits are common today. This case represents a potentially effective check.

Legal Developments

Recent Developments in the District of Columbia Regarding Sexual Misconduct by Clergy and Church Workers

A court in the District of Columbia ruled that three adults were barred by the statute of limitations from suing an archdiocese for injuries they suffered as a result of being molested by a priest when they were minors.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia

Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768 (D.C. 1998)

Key point. Minors who are sexually molested by church workers may not sue their church after the statute of limitations has expired. Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run on a minor's 18th birthday. In some states the statute of limitations is suspended if a church "actively conceals" the basis for a lawsuit from a victim. But some courts have ruled that active concealment requires affirmative acts by church leaders, and that failing to disclose information to persons who have not requested it does not amount to an affirmative act of concealment.

In 1975, a priest was assigned to a Catholic church in Maryland, where he remained for seven years. The three victims all were minors during this time, and served as altar boys at the church. They were each molested by the priest on numerous occasions. In 1982 the priest was reassigned to another parish, and in 1986 the archdiocese removed him from the parish ministry altogether and assigned him to work as a chaplain in a nursing home. He was later directed to cease all ministerial functions.

In 1995 the Washington Post published a series of articles disclosing that the archdiocese knew of the priest's pedophilic tendencies long before he assumed his pastoral duties at the victims' church in 1975. The victims, now in their 30s, alleged that it was not until the publication of these articles that they had reason to suspect wrongdoing by the archdiocese with respect to the hiring and supervision of the priest.

A trial court dismissed the lawsuits on the ground that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations which specifies that such lawsuits must be brought within three years "from the time the right to maintain the action accrues." However, the three-year period does not begin to run for injuries to minors until their eighteenth birthday. In other words, the victims had until their twenty-first birthday to file their lawsuit. Since they missed this deadline by more than ten years, their lawsuits had to be dismissed.

The victims appealed, insisting that the so-called "discovery rule" applied to their claims and that the archdiocese's "fraudulent concealment" of its wrongdoing delayed the statute of limitations until the publication of the Washington Post articles in 1995. The appeals court concluded that the statute of limitations barred the victims' claims whether the discovery rule was applied or not. It noted that under both the general rule and the discovery rule exception, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff either has actual knowledge of a cause of action or is charged with knowledge of that cause of action.

The court observed that in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff can be charged with notice of his claims "even if he is not actually aware of each essential element of his cause of action. This court has repeatedly held that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of (1) an injury, (2) its cause, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing." The court concluded that

[a]ccording to their complaints, all three [victims] were aware from the outset that it was the archdiocese that had assigned [the priest] to [their church] and that [the priest's] role was that of a subordinate representative of the archdiocese. It is also undisputed that the alleged acts of abuse occurred on church premises, while [the priest] was functioning as a representative of the archdiocese. In these circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable plaintiff would have investigated his potential claims against the archdiocese at the same time that his claims accrued against its representative. Because there is no evidence of fraudulent concealment by the archdiocese, a reasonably diligent investigation would have revealed at least some evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the archdiocese (assuming arguendo that such wrongdoing had occurred). Consequently, we hold that appellants' claims against the archdiocese accrued simultaneously with their claims against the priest.

The court rejected the victims' claim that the statute of limitations should be suspended because of the actions of the archdiocese in concealing from them its responsibility for their injuries. The court conceded that when the party claiming the protection of the statute of limitations has employed "affirmative acts . . . to fraudulently conceal either the existence of a claim or facts forming the basis of a cause of action," such conduct will suspend the statute. But it concluded that the archdiocese did not engage in concealment.

First, the court noted that "it has consistently been the law in the District of Columbia that fraudulent concealment requires something of an affirmative nature designed to prevent discovery of [a] cause of action." Rather than alleging affirmative acts of concealment by the archdiocese, the victims have asserted only that the archdiocese failed to disclose information to them, and that its policy of transferring the priest from one parish to another had the effect of concealing prior allegations of sexual abuse.

The court observed that such assertions, even if true, do not constitute affirmative acts. On the other hand, had the victims requested information about the priest's background from the archdiocese and been refused access to it, the case might have been different. The court concluded that "we are unwilling to hold that a failure to disclose information that has not even been requested constitutes fraudulent concealment. The mere fact of transferring [the priest] from one parish to another could not have had the effect of concealing [the victims'] causes of action against [the priest and archdiocese] nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the archdiocese misrepresented [the priest's] background to [them]." Further, even if the archdiocese had attempted to conceal its identity as a potentially liable party, so long as the victims possessed information which would have enabled them to file a timely claim, the concealment "of the identity of liable parties, unlike the concealment of the existence of a claim, is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations."

Second, even assuming that the Archdiocese engaged in acts of fraudulent concealment, it is a "well established defense to a claim of fraudulent concealment . . . that the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of due diligence could have known, that he may have had a cause of action." An act of fraudulent concealment by a defendant "does not relieve a plaintiff of his independent duty to pursue his cause of action diligently. On the contrary, the case law makes clear that a claim of fraudulent concealment is available only to a plaintiff who has exercised due diligence in the pursuit of his cause."

The court concluded that the victims in this case did not attempt to investigate any potential claims against the archdiocese until 1995. "Because due diligence is a prerequisite to claiming the protection of the fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of limitations, it is not available to plaintiffs . . . who undertook no investigation whatever for almost twelve years after they first realized that they might have a cause of action."

Application. This case illustrates the view of some courts that the "active concealment" by church leaders that will suspend the statute of limitations in cases of child sexual abuse requires some affirmative act. A mere failure to disclose information about a church worker to parents and others who have not requested it may not satisfy this requirement.

Legal Developments

Church Liability for Accounting Irregularities

A court’s ruling provides important insight for all church leaders.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: First Amendment, Judicial Resolution of Church Disputes

Background

A court in the District of Columbia ruled that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom prevents the civil courts from resolving internal church disputes over accounting and reporting practices, except in limited circumstances. The court relied on principles that will be useful precedent to other churches in similar cases.

Can a church be sued by its own members as a result of sloppy accounting and reporting practices? This was the issue before a court in the District of Columbia in a recent case. A member sued her church on the basis of "negligent accounting and reporting to church members." The court's ruling will be instructive to all church leaders, particularly those with any concerns regarding the regularity of their church's accounting and reporting practices.

Facts

A woman who had served as a church's financial secretary for many years was dismissed as a result of an internal reorganization that eliminated her position. She later filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and "all past and present members" against her church, claiming that it was guilty of negligent accounting and reporting in violation of various "standards" applicable to churches. In particular, the woman alleged the following church violations:

failing to monitor funds received from all sources for more than twenty years

permitting itself to "fall under the complete domination" of the pastor

failing to comply with social security and other federal and local tax laws

failing to separate the church's religious operations from its "purely secular" activities such as a child care center, an apartment complex, and a grocery store

failing to account for funds turned over to the wife of the founding pastor

failing for more than fifteen years to account for the receipts averaging over $150,000 from the annual church banquet

failing to provide annual financial reports to the members based on monthly statements prepared by the former financial secretary

failing to account for church funds collected from "annual rallies" of various groups within the church

failing to account for the "tithes" paid by "more than 3,000 dues paying members of the church

failing to maintain accurate records of funds received by the church prior to the time the former financial secretary was employed

The church asked the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that it addressed matters of internal church governance. The trial court refused, and the church appealed.

The court's ruling

On appeal, the church argued that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to resolve internal church controversies. The woman claimed that the case could be resolved on the basis of neutral principles of law involving no inquiry into religious doctrine. She compared the case to a secular dispute over church property, which the civil courts have been able to resolve in some situations without offending the first amendment's guaranty of religious freedom.

The appeals court began its opinion by acknowledging that the first amendment "precludes civil courts from adjudicating church fights that require extensive inquiry into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance." However, "occasions can arise when civil courts are permitted to address church activity without running afoul of the first amendment." The central question, according to the court, was whether a lawsuit claiming negligent accounting and reporting by a church "can be decided, consistent with the [first amendment] by applying the objective, well—established concepts of accounting and recordkeeping …."

The court concluded that there are two possible circumstances that would permit a court to apply clear, objective accounting and reporting criteria to church financial practices without implicating church doctrine:

(1) if the principles are so universally … applicable to every organized church that they can, indeed must, be taken for granted without need for church action to adopt them; or

(2) even if these principles are not automatically applicable to every church, they are applicable in a particular case because the church has in fact adopted them

In either circumstance, "the court would not have a role in deciding what principles apply to the church; the court merely would be asked to apply, without ecclesiastical judgment or intrusion, a previously prescribed, authoritative, nondiscretionary, and clear, policy."

The court concluded that neither exception existed in this case, since there are no "universally accepted" principles of church accounting and reporting that apply to all churches, and the church in this case had never adopted a particular set of financial or reporting standards. It observed that "[t]he possibility of universal, indisputable accounting and reporting criteria for all churches is almost self—evidently contrary to reason." The court cautioned that if a church does adopt "clear, objective accounting and reporting standards" that do not involve the application of religious doctrine "then arguably a civil court can apply them-much as a court can resolve secular disputes over church property-because the church itself presumably has obviated all first amendment concerns." On the other hand, if a church has not adopted specific accounting and reporting standard then a court, "by having to decide whether particular principles should be applied, will inevitably have to exercise discretion over a matter that initially requires ecclesiastical judgment." The court added:

a church's financial regime, including any required reports to members, necessarily reflects an array of decisions about a member's obligation to pledge funds, and about the leaders' corresponding responsibility to account for those funds, that a civil court cannot arbitrate without entangling itself in doctrinal interpretations.

In support of its decision, the court pointed out that "accounting is an area riddled with major subjective decisions," and that when a church is involved "those subjective decisions raise questions of internal church governance which are often themselves based on the application of church doctrine."

To illustrate its point, the court noted several examples of questions that must be resolved by the church itself rather than by the civil courts:

What should be the collection, tithing, or offering practices of the church?

Should the church pursue pledges from-or take any other particular type of action affecting-members who neglect to remit their obligations?

What cash management and investment decisions should be made?

Who in the church establishes its spending priorities?

Should the pastor have one or more discretionary funds?

Should there be an audit committee, and if so, should its membership be internal, external, or both, and how many members of each type should there be?

Should the church maintain any of its funds as imprest accounts useable only for specified purposes, or should church finances be operated as a general account?

For each of the above questions, who makes the decision?

The court then ruled that a lawsuit alleging that a church has negligently failed to follow its own accounting or reporting procedures must specifically refer to the procedures that have been violated. Vague allegations that the church has disregarded such procedures are not enough, since the first amendment protects churches from having to defend against such possibly meritless charges. The court observed:

A mere reference to the existence of published accounting standards, without alleging that they … apply [or] that the church formally has adopted them, would leave the [lawsuit] too fuzzy for the court to be sure it constitutionally can rule. In short, because a [lawsuit] challenging church action is not easily cognizable in a civil court, there is a heightened pleading requirement to assure that the [church] will not be unduly burdened ….

[W]hen the first amendment casts a shadow over the court's … jurisdiction, the plaintiff is obliged to plead unqualified jurisdictional facts that clearly take the case outside the constitutional bar. There is no justifiable reason to make a church answer a complaint, let alone go through discovery, unless a plaintiff specifically and unequivocally pleads all facts necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction.

The court noted that the requirement that lawsuits brought against churches for negligent accounting or reporting refer to specific rules that have been violated is not new. It referred to the rule adopted in many states that lawsuits alleging fraud must specifically plead facts constituting fraud, and cannot rely on vague generalizations. Similarly, some states will not permit churches to be sued for negligent selection of clergy by victims of a minister's sexual misconduct unless the lawsuit pleads specific incidents of prior misconduct by the minister that were known to the church. The most prominent court to reach this result is the Ohio Supreme Court in Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991), a case addressed fully in a feature article in the September—October 1991 edition of this newsletter.

The court acknowledged that "a church's very failure to adopt accounting and reporting standards effectively protects church leaders against civil court scrutiny that might well occur if the church, acting more responsibly, had adopted objective criteria that a court could apply without intruding on church doctrine." However, it insisted that this concern "overlooks the primacy of church tribunals for deciding such matters, consistent with the first amendment." It further noted that "absent an effective church tribunal or adoption of standards a civil court can apply without crossing an ecclesiastical line, a church member's only remedy for perceived financial irregularity appears to be cutting one's losses by leaving the membership."

What this means for churches

This case is highly relevant to all church leaders, and should be studied carefully. While it is not binding outside of the District of Columbia, the court's ruling represents one of the few attempts by a court to address church accounting practices. For this reason, the case may be given greater weight in other jurisdictions. Summarized below are the most significant aspects of the court's ruling.

1. When will a court review church accounting irregularities? Some of the alleged accounting and reporting irregularities in this case are not uncommon. For example, many churches have been accused of failing to comply with social security and other federal and state tax laws; failing to properly account for funds raised for a specific purpose; or failing to provide accurate financial reports to donors. Can concerned members have a civil court intervene and "correct" such irregularities if they are not happy with their church's response? This is an important question that few courts have addressed.

The court in this case acknowledged that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom greatly restricts the authority of the civil courts to resolve internal church disputes, including those involving alleged accounting or reporting irregularities. However, the court concluded that the first amendment would not bar the civil courts from resolving such disputes if they could do so on the basis of clear, objective accounting and reporting criteria requiring no inquiry into religious doctrine-assuming that a church in fact had adopted them. A civil court could enforce such rules since it "would not have a role in deciding what principles apply to the church; the court merely would be asked to apply, without ecclesiastical judgment or intrusion, a previously prescribed, authoritative, nondiscretionary, and clear, policy."

Example. A church board adopts standards for handling designated contributions that were formulated for all charitable organizations. A donor questions whether the church is following the standards. When church leaders refuse to respond to the donor's concerns, she asks a civil court to intervene. A court may decide that it can do so since the issue of whether the church is complying with these standards involves no inquiry into religious doctrine.

Example. A member is concerned that his church board has spent some designated missions funds for general administrative purposes. When church leaders refuse to respond to the member's concerns, he asks a civil court to intervene. He is unable to point to any specific accounting principles the church has adopted that govern the dispute. According to the case discussed in this feature article, the court will not intervene since the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom protects internal church financial decisions from civil court review-if no set of accounting principles has been adopted by the church that can be enforced by a civil court without delving into church doctrine.

2. Questions the civil courts cannot resolve. The court gave eight examples of accounting and reporting irregularities that the civil courts cannot resolve: (1) What should be the collection, tithing, or offering practices of the church? (2) Should the church pursue pledges from-or take any other particular type of action affecting-members who neglect to remit their obligations? (3) What cash management and investment decisions should be made? (4) Who in the church establishes its spending priorities? (5) Should the pastor have one or more discretionary funds? (6) Should there be an audit committee, and if so, should its membership be internal, external, or both, and how many members of each type should there be? (7) Should the church maintain any of its funds as imprest accounts useable only for specified purposes, or should church finances be operated as a general account? (8) For each of the above questions, who makes the decision? The civil courts cannot resolve these questions since they cannot do so without delving into church doctrine and polity.

Example. A Minnesota court dismissed a lawsuit brought by Lutheran pastors against a denominational pension board for allegedly breaching their fiduciary duty to participants by not investing in companies that did business in South Africa. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) established a board of pensions in 1988 to manage and operate a pension fund for Lutheran pastors and lay employees "exclusively for the benefit of and to assist in carrying out the purposes of the ELCA." The ELCA adopted the position that the system of apartheid in South Africa was so contrary to Lutheran theology that it had to be rejected as a matter of faith. The ELCA passed a resolution to "see that none of our ELCA pension funds will be invested in companies doing business in South Africa." The board of pensions enforced this policy from 1988 to 1993. A dissenting group of Lutherans opposed the ELCA's decision to use its assets as a political weapon and asked to withdraw their pension funds. When their request was denied they sued the board of pensions and the ELCA, claiming that both groups had violated their fiduciary duties to participants in the pension program by elevating social concerns over sound investment strategy. A state appeals court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that a resolution of the lawsuit would require the court to interpret religious doctrine in violation of the first amendment's nonestablishment of religion clause. The court noted that "if a claim involves core issues of ecclesiastical concern, the potential for government entanglement in religious matters prevents judicial review." This was just such a case, the court concluded: "While the Board of Pensions is required to prudently invest its holdings, the ELCA created the Board to both provide for pastors' retirement needs and assist the ELCA in accomplishing doctrinal goals. The ELCA enacted the [apartheid] policy in an effort to further its social and doctrinal goals …. Accordingly, any review of the Board of Pensions' [investment policy] would entangle the court in reviewing church doctrine and policy." Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. App. 1995).

3. Lawsuits alleging church accounting irregularities must be specific. Perhaps the most important aspect of the court's decision was its conclusion that lawsuits brought by persons alleging church accounting or reporting irregularities must specifically document that the church adopted accounting standards and that they were not followed. Vague allegations that a church's accounting practices were sloppy are not enough. The court observed:

A mere reference to the existence of published accounting standards, without alleging that they … apply [or] that the church formally has adopted them, would leave the [lawsuit] too fuzzy for the court to be sure it constitutionally can rule. In short, because a [lawsuit] challenging church action is not easily cognizable in a civil court, there is a heightened pleading requirement to assure that the [church] will not be unduly burdened.

The court insisted that this principle is required by the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom:

[W]hen the first amendment casts a shadow over the court's … jurisdiction, the plaintiff is obliged to plead unqualified jurisdictional facts that clearly take the case outside the constitutional bar. There is no justifiable reason to make a church answer a complaint, let alone go through discovery, unless a plaintiff specifically and unequivocally pleads all facts necessary to establish the court's jurisdiction.

The court insisted that this conclusion was not novel or unique. It cited the following examples of lawsuits that must specifically allege facts supporting a plaintiff's claims: (1) fraud; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) allegations that a church is liable for a church worker's sexual misconduct since it was aware of similar incidents in the past. The court insisted that "no less should be required when the Constitution severely circumscribes the court's … jurisdiction over church controversies."

Key point.The court concluded that persons who sue churches are subject to a "heightened pleading requirement" if a resolution of the case would "unduly burden" the church's mission. This means that the lawsuit must plead specific facts which support the theory of liability. Vague or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient, since they will force a church to divert resources from the prosecution of its religious mission to the defense of a potentially meritless lawsuit. Church leaders should be familiar with this principle, and be prepared to assert it in response to a lawsuit.

Example. A church is sued by a person claiming that he was discriminated against in an employment decision on the basis of his age. Since the church's defense of this lawsuit might burden the prosecution of its religious mission, the church should assert that the plaintiff must cite specific facts supporting the claim of discrimination. Vague generalizations of discrimination should not be enough.

Example. A church is sued by a person who claims that the church discriminates against women in its employment and disciplinary policies. Since the church's defense of this lawsuit might burden the prosecution of its religious mission, the church should assert that the plaintiff must cite specific facts supporting the claim of discrimination. Vague generalizations of discrimination should not be enough.

Key point. The court's decision may be summarized as follows:

A church does not have to adopt any particular set of accounting or reporting standards.

If a church does not adopt any set of accounting or reporting standards, the civil courts will not intervene in disputes alleging accounting or reporting irregularities. A court cannot apply standards that church leaders have not applied themselves.

If a church does adopt such standards, a civil court can resolve a dispute involving a violation of those standards only if it can do so without inquiring into religious doctrine. Further, such a lawsuit must recite facts demonstrating that the church adopted the standards, and that they were violated.

Bible Way Church v. Beards, 680 A.2d 419 (D.C. App. 1996).

Legal Developments

Members’ Right to Challenge Sale of Church Assets

Can members stop a board from selling church assets?

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: Church Property, Officers, Directors, and Trustees

Do church members have the authority to challenge the sale of church assets by the church board?

That was the question before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in an important decision. Mount Jezreel Baptist Church was incorporated in 1883. The original certificate of incorporation stated that it was formed "for the purpose of religious worship … at the corner of Fifth Street and E Street, Southeast, in the City of Washington."

In 1982, after the safety of the historic church building became an issue, the pastor and board of trustees decided to close the church and move to a new location. For at least ten years prior to the sale of the church property, relations between the board of trustees and a segment of the congregation became increasingly hostile.

After the sale of the church building, a group of the dissidents filed a lawsuit alleging that the trustees and pastor had violated their fiduciary duty as trustees to hold church properties for the purposes specified in the corporate charter (i.e., to conduct religious worship "at the church building on the southeast corner of Fifth Street and E Street"). The dissidents further alleged that the board of trustees and pastor had "improperly managed the church's assets and business affairs" and had exceeded their authority in selling the church building.

The dissidents claimed they were attempting to "salvage the historic old Mount Jezreel church building." A trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that the dissidents were not members of the church and accordingly lacked "standing" to sue. The dissidents appealed this ruling. The appeals court noted that there were two questions—whether the dissidents had "standing" to filed the lawsuit against the board of trustees and pastor, and if so whether church members have the legal authority to challenge the decisions of a church board.

The court concluded that most of the dissidents did have standing, since they were lawful members of the church. It acknowledged that the congregation had voted in an annual business meeting to automatically dismiss any member who filed a lawsuit against the church. However, this action was taken after this lawsuit was filed. At the time the dissidents sued the board of trustees and pastor, they were members of the church, and this was all that was necessary to have "standing" to sue.

Next, the court addressed the question of whether church members have the legal authority to sue church trustees for the wrongful transfer of church property. The dissidents pointed out that title to the church's properties was in the name of the trustees who held church properties "in trust" for the members of the congregation, and that church members were "trust beneficiaries" who could sue the trustees for improper or unauthorized transactions with respect to those properties.

The court observed: "Although title to the church property is vested in the trustees or directors, the property itself is held in trust for the uses and purposes named and no other. Because the church was incorporated for the purpose of religious worship, and because the property was held in trust for that purpose, the members of the congregation are indeed the beneficiaries of the trust. As such, they have standing to sue the trustees in the event that the trust property is used or disposed of in a manner contrary to the stated purposes of the trust …. We therefore hold that, as a general principle, bona fide members of a church have standing to bring suit as trust beneficiaries when there is a dispute over the use or disposition of church property."

Mt. Jezreel Christians Without a Home v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 582 A.2d 237 (D.C. App. 1990).

Legal Developments

Law Firm Sued for Copyright Infringement

Be very cautious in duplicating copyrighted materials.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: Copyright

• A Washington, D.C. law firm that routinely made three copies of a weekly newsletter for distribution to attorneys in the firm was sued recently by the newsletter publisher for $14 million. The publisher of the newsletter is claiming "statutory damages" for copyright infringement. The law firm purchased one subscription of the newsletter at an annual cost of $675. It then allegedly made three copies of each issue that it distributed to firm members. The law firm is defending its actions on the basis of "fair use." The Copyright Act permits owners of copyrighted material to engage in the "fair use" of such material. However, the concept of fair use is a narrow one that should not be viewed as a form of blanket authorization to duplicate copyrighted materials. In determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is a "fair use," four factors are considered. First, what is the purpose and character of the use? Duplicating a work solely to avoid paying for it will seldom if ever be "fair use." Second, what is the nature of the copyrighted work? Some materials (such as dictionaries and encyclopedias) are in a sense made to be copied and quoted, and accordingly there is a broader privilege to copy these works. The nature of other works suggests a very narrow interpretation of fair use. For example, the House Report to the Copyright Act of 1976 states that "as a general principle it seems clear that the scope of the fair use doctrine should be considerably narrower in the case of newsletters than in that of either mass-circulation periodicals or scientific journals …. Copying … of even a small portion of a newsletter may have a significant impact on the commercial market." Third, what is the "amount and substantiality" of the portion copied? That is, how much of the copyrighted work is used? The greater the percentage of the copyrighted work that is copied, the less likely it is that the reproduction constitutes "fair use". One thing is clear—verbatim or nearly verbatim reproductions of an entire copyrighted work, such as a newsletter, will never be deemed a fair use. Fourth, what effect will the unauthorized use have upon the marketability of the copyrighted work? Note that the courts have ruled that this factor is not limited to an assessment of the impact of a single unauthorized use on the marketability of the copyrighted work. Rather, the courts may consider the likely impact should the particular unauthorized use "become widespread." There is little doubt that the law firm will fail in its effort to justify its unauthorized copying of the newsletter on the basis of "fair use." The implication of this case is clear—churches must be very cautious in duplicating any copyrighted materials. Before making copies, they must evaluate the availability of the fair use defense. If the availability of this defense is doubtful, then a church must either seek permission from the copyright owner, or purchase multiple copies.

Infringement

Legal Developments

Court Concluded District’s Civil Rights Act Did Require Equal Access to University Facilities and Services

University was sued by various homosexual student groups for its refusal to officially recognize them.

Richard R. Hammar, Attorney, CPA

Bio

State: District of Columbia
Categories: Freedom of Religion, Schools

Georgetown University was sued by various homosexual student groups for its refusal to officially recognize them. The students cited the District of Columbia "Civil Rights Act" which bans discrimination based on sexual orientation by any educational institution within the District.

The University (a private Catholic educational institution) argued that recognition of the groups would violate its constitutional right to religious freedom since recognition would imply endorsement of conduct contrary to Catholic doctrine.

The court concluded that the District's Civil Rights Act did not require that a private religious university recognize a student group whose beliefs and practices were contrary to church teachings. However, it held that the Act did require equal access to University facilities and services, and, since the University denied the homosexual groups certain services (a mailbox, computer labeling, mailing services, and the right to apply for funding), it was in violation of the Act.

The court found that any burden on the University's religious freedom that might result from providing these incidental services was so minimal that it was overridden by the compelling governmental interest of eradicating discrimination. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987)