Kidnapping Children on Church Premises

A recent ruling addresses a potential risk – Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Center, 699 So.2d 1242 (Ala. 1997)

Church Law and Tax1998-09-01

Kidnapping Children on Church Premises

A recent ruling addresses a potential risk – Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Center, 699 So.2d 1242 (Ala. 1997)

[ Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Article summary. The kidnapping of a child from church premises is a risk that is seldom considered by parents and church leaders. After all, who would commit so brazen a crime in a church? But this very indifference not only increases the risk of such acts, but also exposes churches to significant liability in the event such an act does occur. A recent decision by the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the liability of a church—operated child care program for the kidnapping of a baby girl. The court concluded that the child care center could be sued by the baby’s parents, even though the baby was found and returned to them. Church leaders (and any staff member who works with children) should be sure to review this article.

The kidnapping of a child from a church nursery is every parent’s worst nightmare. Yet, church leaders often fail to address this risk. They simply cannot conceive of such a crime occurring in their church. But consider the following:

• Most churches have frequent custody of infants and young children. Common examples include nursery services provided during worship services and special events, as well as formal preschool programs.

• Most churches have not developed safeguards for reducing the risk of kidnapping.

• A staggering number of marriages have ended in divorce, often followed by bitter struggles over custody of children. Parents who do not receive custody of their children sometimes look for opportunities to “reclaim” them. This often proves difficult, unless the children are placed in the temporary custody of an institution with little if any protection against transferring custody of infants to unauthorized individuals.

A recent decision by the Alabama Supreme Court addresses this tragic issue. This article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and then address steps that church leaders can take to reduce this risk.

Facts

A young couple enrolled their one—month—old baby girl (the “victim”) in a church—operated child care center. The center’s administrator provided the parents with a lengthy document entitled “operating policies.” This document, which stated that parents and guardians were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures,” set out specific rules and procedures to be followed by the center as well as by parents or guardians of enrolled children. It provided, among other things, as follows:

The [center] provides a healthy, safe, and Christian environment that promotes the physical, social, emotional, cognitive and spiritual development of young children, and seeks to respond to the needs of families.

All staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child. All participate in a continuous program of in—service education and studies for professional advancement in order to remain alert to the ever—changing needs of today’s children and families, and to the findings of current research ….

Children will be released only to properly identified persons who have been listed in the “child release” section of the Parent—Agreement Form. We must have written authorization for changes in this respect. In unusual circumstances, we will accept verbal (phone) authorization to release a child to an individual not listed in writing. It must be followed up in writing if the child is to be released to that person on an ongoing basis. We will ask for identification of individuals we do not know. It would be helpful if you would arrange for the persons to pick up your child to visit the school with you so that the staff may become acquainted with them. We will not release a child in the care of anyone under the age of 14 years.

In addition to a number of adults, the center employed a 14—year—old girl and her 17—year—old sister to assist in the care of the children. These girls were foster children who had lived with the center’s administrator for a few months. The center also allowed another sister, who was 12 years old, to assist with the children from time to time, although she was not paid for doing so. This sister was not one of the administrator’s foster children.

When the victim was three months old, and under the center’s care and supervision, she was kidnapped by the three sisters. At the time of the kidnapping, there was no qualified adult teacher, other than perhaps the administrator herself, directly supervising the sisters. The administrator later testified that the other teachers had “gone for the day” and that she thought one of the sisters had intentionally distracted her while the other two slipped the baby out the front door undetected. The evidence suggested that the 17—year—old sister was preoccupied with the notion of having her own baby, even to the point of misleading the administrator into thinking that she was pregnant, and she devised the plot to kidnap the victim.

The local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the incident, eventually found the baby, and reunited her with her parents. The parents experienced severe shock as a result of the kidnapping, and later sued the center. They claimed that the center was legally responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of the following theories: (1) negligent hiring of the three sisters; (2) negligent “supervisory policies”; (3) respondeat superior (a legal theory imposing liability on an employer for the negligent acts of its employees committed within the scope of their employment); and (4) breach of contract. With respect to the negligent hiring claim, the center pointed out that while there was evidence suggesting that the two older sisters had been physically abused (perhaps sexually) by certain members of their family, and that one of them had deceived the center’s administrator into believing that she was pregnant, there was no evidence that could have placed the center or its administrator on notice that the two older girls had criminal propensities. A trial court threw out the entire lawsuit, and the parents appealed.

The court’s ruling

Negligent hiring, negligent supervision, respondeat superior

The Alabama Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s dismissal of all of the parents’ claims except for breach of contract. The court began its opinion by observing:

It is well settled that, absent special relationships or circumstances, no person or entity has a duty to protect another from the criminal act of a third person. A defendant cannot be held liable for the criminal act of a third party unless the defendant knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to occur on the defendant’s premises.

Example. The court referred to the following 1992 New Jersey case: A mother sued a church alleging that the church had failed to use due care in watching and supervising her minor daughter in its day care program, and that this failure resulted in the rape of her daughter on the church’s premises. A state appeals court disagreed, finding that there was insufficient evidence of negligent supervision on the church’s part. It expressed its reluctance to impose liability on one person or entity for the criminal act of another, and specifically rejected the mother’s attempt to hold the church liable under the negligent supervision claim: “The affidavits of the director of the kindergarten and the pastor of the church indicate that (1) they had no knowledge of other criminal acts of a similar nature that might have occurred on the church’s premises; and (2) they had no knowledge of any previous criminal behavior by [the rapist]. Thus, the church [demonstrated] that it was not responsible for the rape.” N.J. v. Greater Emanuel Temple Holiness Church, 611 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992).

The Alabama Supreme Court, in commenting on the case summarized in this example, noted that “implied in the holding … is that there were no special circumstances or special relationships that would give rise to a duty on the church’s part to take additional steps to protect [the victim].”

Example. The court referred to one of its previous rulings in support of its conclusion. It ruled that a university was not liable for the murder of one of its students by a former professor. The victim’s parents sued the university, claiming that it had negligently hired and supervised the professor, and that it was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the murder of their son. With respect to the negligent hiring and supervision claims, the court noted that the parents “did not present substantial evidence that [the university] should have, or could have, foreseen that [the professor] would or might commit the murder.” With respect to the claim based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court noted simply that it was preposterous to assume that the professor was acting within the scope of his employment when he committed murder. Copeland v. Samford University, 686 So.2d 190 (Ala.1996).

The court concluded:

The undisputed evidence in the present case indicated that [the two older sisters] were not acting in the line and scope of their duties at the center when they kidnapped the [baby]. The evidence suggested that [the oldest sister] was preoccupied with the notion of having her own baby, even to the point of misleading [the administrator] into thinking that she was pregnant. The apparent plot hatched by the sisters to provide [the oldest sister] with a baby by kidnapping the [victim] constituted, as a matter of law, a gross deviation from the center’s business; that fact precludes the imposition of liability upon the center under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the actions of [the sisters]. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence indicated that there was nothing that should have, or could have, put [the administrator] or the center on notice that the sisters would or might kidnap one of the children.

Based on the two cases summarized above, the court concluded that the trial court acted properly in dismissing the negligent hiring and supervision claims, the respondeat superior claim, and all other claims except for breach of contract.

Breach of contract

The court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the parents’ breach of contract claim against the center. The parents asserted that they entered into a contract with the center when they enrolled their daughter in the program and paid the weekly fee of $55. In return, the center agreed to be entrusted with the care and custody of their baby. The parents claimed that the center breached this contract by the following acts and omissions:

• failing to have [the baby] at the day care when her mother … arrived to pick her up

• failing to properly supervise its employees and agents

• putting [the baby] in a position of potential harm, including kidnapping

• allowing the baby to get into the hands of “underaged, unqualified, and incompetent persons”

• allowing people to have access to the day care and have responsibilities in the running of the day care center who were not appropriate persons for such access and responsibilities

• employing unqualified people at the day care and allowing unqualified people to do the business of the day care

• failing to have a sufficient number of qualified persons on staff at all times to care for the babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to properly set up operations to appropriately care for babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to provide a safe place for the care and custody of babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to comply with state and other licensing requirements

The center insisted that there was no evidence of a contract provision imposing a duty to provide “any level of care.” The court disagreed:

The evidence indicates that the center expressly contracted with the [parents] to care for their daughter on a daily basis for a sum certain per week. The evidence is sketchy with respect to the discussions [the administrator had with the parents] when the contract was [signed]. However, reasonable inferences from the evidence indicate that the document entitled “Operating Policies” was provided to the [parents] and that it was intended by the center to become a part of the contract. That document, which incorporated the minimum standards imposed by [the state department of human resources] stated that parents were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures” contained therein. Those operating procedures specifically obligated the center (1) to release the [parents’] daughter only to a properly authorized and identified person; (2) to employ only persons qualified (in accordance with [the state’s] minimum standards) to care for the [victim]; (3) and to keep the [victim] safe while she was under its care and supervision. The evidence indicates that unqualified and unauthorized persons (the sisters) removed the [victim] from the center’s premises. The evidence also indicates that a qualified teacher or child care provider was not directly supervising the [victim] at the time of her kidnapping. The basic elements of a contract are an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of the agreement. We conclude that the [parents] presented sufficient evidence of these basic elements to submit to a jury their claim alleging the breach of an express contract.

Relevance to other churches

What is the significance of this case to other churches? Obviously, the decision by the Alabama Supreme Court has limited effect. It will not be binding on any court outside of the State of Alabama. Nevertheless, the decision represents an extended discussion of the liability of church—operated day care centers for the kidnapping of young children, and accordingly it may be given special consideration by other courts. For this reason, the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:

1. Liability based on negligent selection. Whenever a child is kidnapped on church premises, it is possible that the church may be legally responsible on the basis of negligent hiring. That is, the church was negligent in hiring those persons who would care for children, and this negligence led to the kidnapping. The parents in this case insisted that the center was liable for the kidnapping of their child on this basis. After all, the center used girls who were only 12, 14, and 17 years of age to care for infants. And, there was evidence that the two older sisters had been physically (and perhaps sexually) abused by members of their family, and that the oldest sister lied to the center’s administrator by telling her that she was pregnant. Did this evidence demonstrate that the center was negligent in employing the sisters? The court did not think so.

Key point. Other courts may disagree with the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that a church—operated child care center is not guilty of negligent hiring when it uses girls who are 17, 14, and 12 years of age to care for infants-especially when two of the girls had been sexually abused.

One judge dissented from the court’s decision. He pointed out that state regulations that apply to licensed child care centers require that workers be at least 19 years of age (16 years of age for “student aides”). He concluded that the center was guilty of negligent hiring by using persons below these state—mandated minimum ages. This was so even though the center in this case had let its license lapse and as a result the minimum age regulations were not applicable. Further, the dissenting judge asserted that the center’s administrator should have known that the three sisters did not meet the following provision in the center’s own “Operating Policies”:

All staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child. All participate in a continuous program of in—service education and studies for professional advancement in order to remain alert to the ever—changing needs of today’s children and families, and to the findings of current research.

2. Liability based on negligent supervision. Whenever a child is kidnapped on church premises, it is possible that the church may be legally responsible on the basis of negligent supervision. That is, the church was negligent in supervising those persons who had custody of the child, or in supervising its premises and activities. The parents claimed that the center was guilty of negligent supervision as a result of numerous acts, including the following:

• allowing the baby to get into the hands of “underaged, unqualified, and incompetent persons”

• allowing people to have access to the day care and have responsibilities in the running of the day care center who were not appropriate persons for such access and responsibilities

• failing to have a sufficient number of qualified persons on staff at all times to care for the babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to properly set up operations to appropriately care for babies and minor children entrusted to their care

• failing to comply with state and other licensing requirements

The court rejected the parents’ allegations, and concluded that the center was not guilty of negligent supervision. It relied primarily on a New Jersey court ruling finding that a church—operated child care center was not responsible on the basis of negligent supervision for the rape of a young child. The New Jersey court concluded: “The affidavits of the director of the kindergarten and the pastor of the church indicate that (1) they had no knowledge of other criminal acts of a similar nature that might have occurred on the church’s premises; and (2) they had no knowledge of any previous criminal behavior by [the rapist]. Thus, the church [demonstrated] that it was not responsible for the rape.” N.J. v. Greater Emanuel Temple Holiness Church, 611 So.2d 1036 (Ala.1992).

Once again, however, the dissenting judge disagreed, pointing out that the center “employed the underaged and untrained girls in the day care center” and allowed them to care for a three—month—old infant. Further, when the kidnapping occurred at approximately 4 o’clock in the afternoon, the 17 and 14—year—old sisters “were virtually the only ones left on the premises of the day care facility [since the administrator] had allowed most of the adult staff to leave for the day although there were still children to be picked up.”

Key point. Other courts may disagree with the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that a church—operated child care center is not guilty of negligent supervision when it dismisses adult workers in the afternoon and allows infants and young children to be in the sole custody of two girls aged 17 and 14.

3. Respondeat superior. The court rejected the parents’ claim that the center was responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of respondeat superior. Under this legal principle, the center would be liable for the negligence of its employees committed within the scope of their employment. The court concluded that the “undisputed evidence” indicated that the sisters were not acting within the scope of their duties at the center when they kidnapped the baby.

4. Breach of contract. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that the center could be legally responsible for the kidnapping on the basis of a breach of contract. The parents had signed a brief enrollment form containing very little information and no policies or procedures. However, the center also provided the parents with a separate document entitled “Operating Procedures”. This document was not referred to in the enrollment form, was not signed by the parents, and did not indicate that it was a contractual document. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the “Operating Procedures” document formed a part of the “contract” between the parents and the center.

The “Operating Procedures” document contained the following provisions: (1) “[t]he [center] provides a healthy, safe, and Christian environment that promotes the physical, social, emotional, cognitive and spiritual development of young children”; (2) “[a]ll staff members are selected on the basis of experience in working with young children, educational background, emotional stability, as well as care and concern for the well—being of the child”; and (3) “[c]hildren will be released only to properly identified persons who have been listed in the `child release’ section of the Parent—Agreement Form.” Since these assurances were contained in a document that the court considered to be part of a “contract” between parents and the center, the center was guilty of a “breach of contract” if it violated any of them.

The parents claimed that the center breached this contract in numerous ways, as noted above. The court agreed:

[R]easonable inferences from the evidence indicate that the document entitled “Operating Policies” was provided to the [parents] and that it was intended by the center to become a part of the contract. That document, which incorporated the minimum standards imposed by [the state department of human resources] stated that parents were expected “to read and follow the operating procedures” contained therein. Those operating procedures specifically obligated the center (1) to release the [parents’] daughter only to a properly authorized and identified person; (2) to employ only persons qualified (in accordance with [the state’s] minimum standards) to care for the [victim]; (3) and to keep the [victim] safe while she was under its care and supervision.

The court concluded that these “contractual” provisions were violated because

• unqualified and unauthorized persons (the sisters) removed the victim from the center’s premises, and

• a qualified teacher or child care provider was not directly supervising the victim at the time of her kidnapping.

Key point. Does your church operate a child care program? If so, you should recognize that any policies or operating procedures you adopt may be considered to be part of a “contract” with parents. This exposes your church to liability for breach of contract in the event that you violate any of these policies or procedures.

5. The importance of reviewing official policies. The center’s “Operating Procedures” contained a provision obligating it to employ only persons qualified in accordance with state standards. These standards required child care workers to be at least 19 years of age. Since none of the three sisters met this requirement, the center violated this provision of the “contract”. Why did the center have this provision in its Operating Procedures? Because the center had been a state—licensed facility at one time. However, the center let its license lapse, in part because church day care centers were not required to be licensed under state law. But it failed to delete or modify this provision in its Operating Procedures, meaning that it could only employ workers who met the otherwise nonapplicable state standards.

What is the lesson here? Church leaders should periodically review all policies, procedures, and forms to ensure that they are up—to—date and in full compliance with the law. The assistance of a local attorney is indispensable in this process.

Key point. It is common for churches to abandon provisions in written policies. In many cases, this occurs because church leaders fail to periodically review their policies to be sure they are current and accurate. In other cases the person responsible for creating and implementing a particular policy has relocated and no longer attends the church. Churches that no longer comply with their policies are exposing themselves to legal jeopardy, as this case illustrates. The church was liable for the victim’s kidnapping in part because it failed to comply with an outdated provision in its child care policies requiring all workers to meet state standards.

Example. A church adopts a policy requiring at least two adults to be in the nursery at all times. An adult who was scheduled to work in the nursery during a Sunday morning worship service has an emergency at the last minute that prevents her from performing her duties. The nursery director is unable to find another adult with so little notice, and assigns a 15—year—old girl to work with the other adult. A child is injured while in the nursery. The church may be liable for the child’s injuries on the basis of “negligent supervision” because it failed to follow its own “two adult” policy.

Example. A church adopts a policy requiring reference checks on all persons who volunteer to work in any youth program. Bob is allowed to work as a volunteer in a youth activity without any reference checks. The church is exposed to liability for any injuries that Bob may cause since it failed to follow its policy.

6. Reducing the risk of kidnapping. What steps can a church take to reduce the risk of kidnapping, and the risk of liability in the event that an incident of kidnapping occurs? Consider the following precautions:

Day care centers

• Comply with applicable state requirements. If your church operates a day care program, be sure you are in compliance with all applicable state requirements. Church day care centers are required to be licensed in many states. But even if your center is not required to be licensed, some state regulations may apply.

• Additional precautions. See the additional precautions for church nurseries that are summarized below.

Nurseries

• Screening workers. While screening workers may not reduce the risk of kidnapping, it will reduce a church’s risk of liability in the event an incident of kidnapping occurs. Screening ordinarily will include an application form and reference checks.

• Need more help? We have produced a variety of helpful resources to assist churches in screening nursery workers. These include: (1) the “Reducing the Risk” kit (includes a video, audio tape, and two booklets); and (2) our new “Selection and Screening of Church Volunteers” kit (includes all the forms you will need, along with an explanatory booklet). Both resources can be obtained by calling Christian Ministry Resources at 1—800—222—1840. Or, you can order them from our new online bookstore at our website www.iclonline.com.

• Check in procedures. A number of churches have implemented a check in procedure to reduce the risk of kidnapping. As children are checked in at the nursery, a small piece of plastic with a randomly selected number is pinned to their clothing. Another piece of plastic with the same number is given to the adult who brought the child. The adult is informed that the child will be returned only to a person presenting the correct number.

Example. A mother brings her infant child to the church nursery before a morning worship service. During the service, an adult male comes to the nursery and asks a teenage nursery attendant for the same child. The attendant is reluctant, because she had never seen the man before. He assures her that he is an “uncle” visiting from out—of—town. The attendant is satisfied with this explanation and gives the child to the man. Following the morning service the mother goes to the nursery and is shocked to learn that her child is not there. It is later determined that the “uncle” in fact was a former husband who was seeking custody of the child.

Example. A mother brings her infant child to the church nursery before a morning worship service. An attendant pins a plastic number on the child, and gives the mother an identical plastic number. The attendant informs the mother that the child will be returned only to a person presenting the plastic number. During the service, an adult male comes to the nursery and asks a teenage nursery attendant for the same child. He claims to be an “uncle” visiting from out—of—town. In fact, he is a former husband seeking custody of the child. The attendant asks the “uncle” to present the correct plastic number. He obviously does not have it, and so the attendant refuses to give him the child.

• Adequate supervision. Church nurseries should be staffed by an adequate number of qualified adults. The appropriate number will depend upon the number of children present. Many churches use teenagers as helpers in the nursery. Such a practice will not increase a church’s risk of kidnapping (or liability in the event of an incident of kidnapping) so long as adults are also present.

Key point. It is often helpful to contact other institutions for assistance with staffing ratios. For example, some churches base their adult to child ratio in the nursery to what the state requires of licensed day care facilities. You may also contact the Red Cross, Salvation Army, or similar organizations. The point is this-if you can demonstrate that you based your adult to child ratio on the established practices of other similar organizations in your community, then this will be a strong defense in the event you are accused of liability for an incident of kidnapping (or any injury to a child) on the basis of “negligent supervision.”

• Off—site activities. Be especially careful of off—site activities such as field trips. These outings can be difficult to control. It is essential that an adequate number of adults are present. While on the trip, precautionary measures must be implemented to assure adequate supervision of the group. For example, some churches group children in pairs, always keep the entire group together, and have frequent “roll calls.” Once again, you can call other community—based organizations for guidance.

• Be sure policies are being followed. As this case demonstrates, it is absolutely essential to familiarize nursery workers with relevant policies, and to be sure that these policies are followed. At a minimum, this should be part of an orientation process for all new nursery workers (both paid and volunteer). Periodic training sessions are also desirable to reinforce nursery policies.

• Legal review of all policies, contracts, and enrollment forms. It is a good practice to have your nursery policies, contracts, and enrollment forms reviewed periodically by a local attorney. Such a review will help to ensure that your policies are current and accurate, and in compliance with the law. The church—operated day center in this case was found liable for the incident of kidnapping in part because it failed to update its official policies.

• 2 adult rule. Churches can reduce the risk of an incident of kidnapping by establishing a “two adult” rule in the nursery. Such a rule mandates that no child shall ever be in the presence of fewer than two adults. Not only does such a policy reduce the risk of an incident of kidnapping, but it also protects workers from being unjustly accused of child molestation.

Example. A church has a policy requiring two adults to work in the nursery. However, the policy does not prohibit children from being in the custody of less than two adults. On a Sunday morning during worship services, one adult temporarily leaves the nursery for ten minutes to speak with another church member. A few days later the parents of one of the infants in the nursery suspect that their child has been molested. Suspicion is focused on the church nursery. Since the two nursery workers cannot prove that they both were present with the child throughout the entire worship service, they cannot “prove their innocence.” The worker who was present in the nursery while the other worker was temporarily absent is suspected of wrongdoing, even though she is completely innocent.

• Video. Some churches are incorporating video technology into their nurseries. Such a practice has a number of potential benefits, including the following: (1) it reduces the risk of kidnapping, since the videocamera will serve as a powerful deterrent; (2) it reduces the risk of other inappropriate behavior; (3) it provides irrefutable evidence of innocence if a nursery worker is falsely accused of wrongdoing; (4) it may identify a kidnapper.

• Restroom breaks. Church restrooms present a unique risk of kidnapping for both infants and older children. After all, they are frequented by children, they are easily accessible, and they often are in remote locations or are not adequately supervised. Church leaders should take steps to reduce this risk. While a full discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article, here are some ways that this risk can be reduced: (1) Restrict restroom breaks to restrooms that have limited access to other adults, if this is possible. (2) Have two adults accompany children in groups to the restroom, whenever possible. (3) Do not allow a lone adult to take one or more children to the restroom. (4) Consider installation of “half doors” that will permit adults to have partial vision into restrooms used by young children. (5) Do not allow young children to use the restroom without adult supervision. (6) Install videocameras in prominent locations to discourage kidnapping and provide evidence identifying the perpetrator in the event an incident does occur.

• Architecture. Unauthorized access to nursery areas by outsiders should be discouraged or prevented by the physical layout. Many churches accomplish this with counters staffed by an adult worker or attendant.

• Relevance of state regulations. State regulations that apply to licensed child care facilities do not apply to church nurseries, but they will contain a wealth of information that may be useful in adopting policies to reduce the risk of kidnapping and injuries. Further, compliance with selected regulations can be cited as evidence that your church should not be legally responsible on the basis of negligent supervision for an incident of kidnapping.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m11 m86 m58 c0598

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Congress Enacts New Tax Legislation

How churches and clergy are affected

Church Law and Tax 1998-09-01

Congress Enacts New Tax Legislation

How churches and clergy are affected

Article summary. Congress has enacted another major tax bill. While the objective was to “reform” and restructure the IRS in response to an outpouring of taxpayer complaints during days of congressional hearings, Congress also took the occasion to clarify some recent tax changes and strengthen taxpayer rights. This article reviews 40 changes of most relevance to church leaders.

“The Committee is aware that the taxpaying public may never relish contacts with the agency responsible for collecting taxes. Nevertheless, by establishing a new management structure that will better enable the IRS to develop and fulfill long—term goals, the Committee believes that the IRS will be able to gain public support, and will make contacts with the IRS as infrequent and as pleasant as possible.” (From a committee report accompanying the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.)

On July 2, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. This comprehensive legislation was designed to “restructure” the IRS to make it more responsive to taxpayers. But it does much more. It provides taxpayers with many new benefits and protections. This feature article will review those provisions of most significance to churches and ministers.

Technical Corrections and Clarifications

1. Sale of a home owned and occupied for less than two years. Under current law, a taxpayer is able to exclude up to $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly) of gain on the sale of a principal residence. To be eligible, the taxpayer must have owned the home and used it as a principal residence for at least two of the five years prior to the sale. A taxpayer who fails to meet this test because of a change in place of employment, health, or unforeseen circumstances, can exclude a fraction of the gain corresponding to the fraction of two years that he or she owned and occupied the home as a principal residence.

The new law contains a big break for taxpayers. It allows taxpayers who own and occupy their home for less than two years to claim a partial exclusion based on the fraction of $250,000 ($500,000 if married filing jointly), not the fraction of the gain, corresponding to the fraction of two years that they owned and occupied the home as their principal residence.

Example. Rev. B and his wife purchased a home on July 1, 1997 for $150,000, and sold it on July 1, 1998 for $200,000 because of a change in place of employment. Under the old rules, since they owned and occupied the home for only half of the minimum requirement of two years, they could exclude only half of the gain on the sale of their home. This meant that they could exclude only $25,000 of their $50,000 gain. But under the new rules, they can exclude up to half of $500,000-which means that their entire gain is nontaxable. They avoid paying taxes on half their gain.

This provision is effective retroactive to sales occurring after May 6, 1997.

The new law also provides that if a married couple filing a joint return does not qualify for the $500,000 maximum exclusion, the amount of the maximum exclusion that may be claimed by the couple is the sum of each spouse’s maximum exclusion determined on a separate basis. This provision is effective retroactive to sales occurring after May 6, 1997.

Example. Rev. T is unmarried, and owns a home. In July of 1998 he marries Mary, who also owns a home. The couple sell their homes in August of 1998 and purchase a new home together. They are not eligible for the $500,000 exclusion because they did not own and occupy their homes together for at least two of the five years preceding the dates of sale. However, under the new law, they each will be able to exclude up to $250,000 of gain on the sale of the homes they owned at the time of marriage.

2. Roth IRAs. Beginning in 1998 taxpayers can make annual nondeductible contributions of up to $2,000 to a “Roth IRA”. Distributions from such IRAs are not taxed if they are made after a five year “holding period,” and are made as a result of the taxpayer attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, death, disability, or purchase of a first home. Earnings on Roth IRAs accumulate tax—free. Eligibility for Roth IRAs is phased out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $95,000 to $110,000, and for married taxpayers filing jointly with adjusted gross income of $150,000 to $160,000. A regular IRA may be rolled over to a Roth IRA. Only taxpayers with adjusted gross income of less than $100,000 are eligible for this provision. If you roll over your regular IRA into a Roth IRA prior to 1999, the amount that would have been included in taxable income had the funds been withdrawn (any gain or income in excess of annual contributions) are included in your taxable income over a four—year period. The ten percent penalty on early withdrawals from an IRA does not apply.

Example. Rev. D has a nondeductible IRA with a value of $40,000. The $40,000 consists of $30,000 of annual contributions and $10,000 of earnings. Rev. D converts the IRA into a Roth IRA in 1998. As a result of the conversion, $10,000 is includible in income over four years ($2,500 per year). The 10—percent early withdrawal tax does not apply to the conversion. Contributions made by Rev. D each year to the Roth IRA will not be tax—deductible. However, following a five—year holding period Rev. D may make tax—free distributions from the Roth IRA on account of any one or more of the following conditions: (1) attaining age 59 and 1/2 or older, (2) death, (3) disability, or (4) purchase of a first home.

Key point. In summary, the advantage of a Roth IRA is that it is “backloaded.” This means that annual contributions to the IRA are not tax—deductible, but earnings and distributions are nontaxable if they meet the requirements mentioned above. This will be a major tax break for many taxpayers, and will make Roth IRAs preferable in some cases to ordinary IRAs.

The new tax law modifies Roth IRAs in the following ways:

• Four—year income “spread” is elective. Under prior law, taxpayers who rolled over a regular IRA into a Roth IRA in 1998 were required to report as taxable income over a four—year period the amount that would have been included in taxable income had the funds been withdrawn. Generally, this refers to the “gain” in the IRA over and above annual contributions. The new law gives taxpayers the option of “spreading” this income over four years, or reporting it all in 1998. If no election is made, it is assumed that the taxpayer has elected to spread income over four years. In the previous example, Rev. D has the election in 1998 to report the entire gain on the conversion IRA ($25,000) as taxable income in that year instead of spreading it out over four years.

• Death during four—year spread. What happens if a taxpayer who has elected to spread income over a four—year period dies before the end of the four years? Under the new law any amounts remaining to be included in income as a result of a 1998 “conversion” of a regular IRA into a Roth IRA are included in income on the taxpayer’s final tax return. But if a surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary of the Roth IRA, the spouse may include the remaining amounts in his or her income over the remainder of the 4—year period.

• Distributions before the end of the four—year “spread”. Taxpayers who convert a regular IRA into a Roth IRA pay tax on the gain or income they have earned on their IRA, but they are exempt from the 10—percent “early withdrawal” tax that normally applies to withdrawals from an IRA prior to age 59 and 1/2. The new law prevents taxpayers from receiving premature distributions (before the end of the 5—year holding period) from their Roth IRA while avoiding payment of the “early withdrawal” 10—percent tax. If amounts in a Roth IRA that was converted from a regular IRA are withdrawn within the 5—year holding period beginning with the year of the conversion, then, to the extent attributable to amounts that were includible in income due to the conversion, the amount withdrawn will be subject to the 10—percent early withdrawal tax.

• Corrections. In order to assist individuals who erroneously convert regular IRAs into Roth IRAs or for anyreason want to change the nature of an IRA contribution, contributions to an IRA may be transferred in a “trustee—to—trustee” transfer from any IRA to another IRA by the due date for the taxpayer’s return for the year of the contribution. Any such transferred contributions are treated as if contributed to the new IRA. Trustee—to—trustee transfers include transfers between IRA trustees as well as IRA custodians, apply to transfers from and to IRA accounts and annuities, and apply to transfers between IRA accounts and annuities with the same trustee or custodian.

• Maximum IRA contributions. The new law clarifies that an individual may contribute up to $2,000 a year to all of his or her IRAs.

Example. Rev. E is not eligible to make deductible IRA contributions because she is a participant in a church—sponsored retirement plan and earns more than the “phase—out” amount. However, she is eligible to make a $1,000 Roth IRA contribution. She can contribute $1,000 to the Roth IRA and $1,000 to a nondeductible IRA.

3. Traditional IRAs. The new tax law modifies traditional IRAs in a couple of important ways:

• Spouses who are not active participants in an employer—sponsored retirement plan. Under present law, if a married individual (filing a joint return) is an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan, the $2,000 IRA deduction limit is phased out over the following levels of adjusted gross income (“AGI”):

Taxable years beginning in: Phase—out range

1997 $40,000-$50,000

1998 $50,000-$60,000

1999 $51,000-$61,000

2000 $52,000-$62,000

2001 $53,000-$63,000

2002 $54,000-$64,000

2003 $60,000-$70,000

2004 $65,000-$75,000

2005 $70,000-$80,000

2006 $75,000-$85,000

2007 $80,000-$100,000

The new tax law confirms that an individual is not considered an active participant in an employer—sponsored retirement plan merely because his or her spouse is an active participant. For example, assume that Rev. J is eligible for a church—sponsored retirement plan, but his wife who is employed by a secular business is not. Rev. J’s wife is not an “active participant” in such a plan because her husband is. Rev. J’s phase—out range is described in the above table. His wife’s phase—out range is between $150,000 and $160,000 of adjusted gross income.

This provision is effective for tax years beginning after 1997.

l”Hardship” distributions. Under current law, the 10—percent “early withdrawal” tax does not apply to distributions from an IRA if the distribution is for first—time homebuyer expenses (subject to a $10,000 life—time cap), or for higher education expenses. These exceptions do not apply to distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans. A distribution from an employer—sponsored retirement plan that is an “eligible rollover distribution” may be rolled over to an IRA. An eligible rollover distribution that is not transferred directly to another retirement plan or an IRA is subject to 20—percent withholding on the distribution. Participants in employer—sponsored retirement plans, including section 403(b) tax—sheltered annuities, have been able to avoid the early withdrawal tax by rolling over “hardship distributions” to an IRA and then withdrawing the funds from the IRA. The new law modifies the rules relating to the ability to roll over hardship distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans (including section 403(b) annuities) in order to prevent such avoidance of the 10—percent early withdrawal tax. The law provides that distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans made on account of hardship of the employee are not eligible rollover distributions. However, the new law further clarifies that such distributions will not be subject to the 20—percent withholding rule applicable to eligible rollover distributions.

This provision is effective for tax years beginning after 1998.

4. Capital gains-elimination of 18—month holding period. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided lower capital gains rates for individuals. Generally, the 1997 Act reduced the maximum rate on the net capital gain from 28 percent to 20 percent and reduced the 15—percent rate to 10 percent. However, to qualify for these reduced rates, a taxpayer had to hold an asset for more than 18 months prior to sale. This was a major change in the law, since in the past lower capital gains rates were available if an asset had been held for only one year. Beginning in 2001, lower rates of 18 and 8 percent will apply to the gain from certain property held more than five years. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 reduces the 18—month holding period to qualify for the reduced capital gains rates to one year.

This provision takes effect for any tax year beginning after 1997.

Key point. The low capital gains rates, taken together with the reduced holding period of one year, will make taxable investments in mutual funds and individual stocks more attractive for some investors than tax—deferred retirement plans such as IRAs and 403(b) plans. The reason is that tax—deferred retirement plans generally distribute income at ordinary income tax rates, not the reduced capital gains tax rates. And, while earnings accrue on a tax—deferred basis on most retirement plans, the same is true for securities that are held indefinitely. Ministers and lay church workers should discuss with their tax advisors the possible advantages of taxable investments in light of the changes to the capital gains tax.

Key point. Ministers whose estimated taxes for 1998 were inflated because of the 18—month rule should recalculate their estimated taxes for the year and adjust their remaining quarterly payments accordingly.

Example. Rev. K sold several shares of stock in February of 1998 that had been held for 16 months. In computing his estimated tax payments for the year, Rev. K assumed that he would be paying a 28 percent capital gains tax because he held the stock for less than 18 months. He can recalculate his 1998 taxes on the basis of the 20 percent tax rate (which applies retroactively to January 1, 1998) and adjust his estimated tax payments for September 15, 1998 and January 15, 1999 accordingly.

5. Education IRAs. Taxpayers were given an important break for education expenses under a law enacted by Congress in 1997-they can contribute up to $500 each year to an “education IRA.” Here is how it works. A taxpayer establishes an education IRA and designates a “beneficiary” (usually, the taxpayer’s child). The taxpayer contributes up to $500 each year into the account, up until the beneficiary’s 18th birthday. Earnings on an education IRA generally accumulate tax—free-provided they are distributed for the post—secondary educational expenses of the beneficiary. Expenses for elementary and secondary school expenses do not qualify. Any balance remaining in an education IRA when a beneficiary attains 30 years of age must be distributed, and the earnings portion of such a distribution will be included in the beneficiary’s taxable income and subject to an additional ten percent penalty tax because the distribution was not for educational purposes.

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 provides that any balance remaining in an education IRA will be deemed to be distributed within 30 days after the date that the designated beneficiary reaches age 30 (or, if earlier, within 30 days of the date that the beneficiary dies). The Act further clarifies that, in the event of the death of the designated beneficiary, the balance remaining in an education IRA may be distributed (without imposition of the additional 10—percent tax) to a contingent beneficiary or to the estate of the deceased designated beneficiary. If any member of the family of the deceased beneficiary becomes the new designated beneficiary of an education IRA, then no tax will be imposed on such redesignation and the account will continue to be treated as an education IRA. However, the new beneficiary must be under 30 years of age for the “rollover,” or change of beneficiary, to be nontaxable.

Key point. The 10—percent tax on early distributions from an IRA will not apply to a distribution from an education IRA, which although used to pay for qualified higher education expenses is includible in the beneficiary’s gross income because the taxpayer elects to claim a HOPE or Lifetime Learning credit with respect to the beneficiary.

The new law clarifies that, in order for taxpayers to establish an education IRA, the designated beneficiary must be a life—in—being.

The new law also provides that if any qualified higher education expenses are considered in determining the amount of a distribution from an education IRA that is nontaxable, then no business expense deduction will be allowed with respect to those same education expenses.

These provisions are effective for tax years beginning after 1997.

6. Meals provided for the convenience of the employer. Current law specifies that the value of meals furnished to an employee by his employer is excluded from the employee’s gross income if the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer and they are furnished for the convenience of the employer. Under what circumstances meals provided on an employer’s premises meet this test has proven to be a difficult question. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act attempts to provide some clarification by providing that all meals furnished to employees on an employer’s premises are for the convenience of the employer if the meals furnished to at least half of the employees are for the convenience of the employer. Generally, meals are for the convenience of the employer if the employer has a “noncompensatory” business reason for furnishing the meals (for example, there are few if any restaurants nearby, and the employer would have to provide employees with longer lunch breaks if they were not furnished meals at work).

Key point. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 attempted to provide some clarification by specifying that the operation by an employer of an eating facility for employees will be treated as a nontaxable fringe benefit if (1) the facility is located on or near the employer’s premises, and (2) revenue from the facility normally equals or exceeds the operating costs of the facility.

The Code specifies that ministers may not claim an exclusion for meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of an employer in computing their self—employment tax liability. IRC 1402(a)(8).

7. Donations of computer equipment. In computing taxable income, a taxpayer who itemizes deductions generally is allowed to deduct the fair market value of property contributed to a charitable organization. However, in the case of a charitable contribution of inventory, short—term capital gain property, and certain other gifts, the amount of the deduction is limited to the taxpayer’s basis (cost) in the property. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided that certain contributions of computers by corporations to educational institutions for use by elementary and secondary school children qualify for an increased deduction. Under this special rule, the amount of the increased deduction generally is equal to the donor’s basis in the donated property plus one—half of the amount of ordinary income that would have been realized if the property had been sold. However, the increased deduction cannot exceed twice the basis of the donated property. To qualify for the increased deduction, the contribution must satisfy various requirements. This special provision expires after the year 2000.

The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 clarifies that the increased charitable contribution deduction applies regardless of whether the recipient is an educational organization or some other tax—exempt charitable entity.

This provision is effective as of August 5, 1997.

Example. A corporation would like to contribute several computers to a church—operated elementary and secondary school. The corporation will be eligible for an increased charitable contribution deduction if several conditions are met even if the school is considered to be a “religious” institution.

IRS Restructuring and Management

8. IRS structure and functions. The main focus of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 is to make the IRS more responsive to taxpayers and less vulnerable to abuse. Here are some of the ways the new law accomplishes this objective:

• IRS reorganization plan. During extensive public hearings, Congress found that a key reason for taxpayer frustration with the IRS is the lack of attention to taxpayer needs. At a minimum, taxpayers should be able to receive from the IRS the same level of service expected from the private sector. For example, taxpayer inquiries should be answered promptly and accurately; taxpayers should be able to obtain timely resolutions of problems and information regarding activity on their accounts; and taxpayers should be treated fairly and courteously at all times. In order to make the IRS more “customer” oriented, the IRS is being reorganized. The old 3—tier geographic structure (including a National Office, Regional Offices, and District Offices) is being replaced by a structure that focuses on four groups of taxpayers with similar needs-individual taxpayers, small businesses, large businesses, and the tax—exempt sector. Under this structure, each unit will be charged with end—to—end responsibility for serving its group of taxpayers.

Key point. Currently, each of the current 33 IRS district offices and 10 service centers is required to deal with every kind of taxpayer and every type of issue. The proposed plan would enable IRS personnel to understand the needs and problems of particular groups of taxpayers, and better address those issues. The current structure is also inefficient. For example, if a taxpayer moves, the responsibility for the taxpayer’s account moves to another geographical area. As a result, many taxpayers have to deal with different IRS offices on the same issues. The proposed structure would eliminate many of these problems.

Example. Rev. E is audited by the IRS. During the audit, Rev. E moves to another state. The responsibility for Rev. E’s audit is assigned to another District Office. Under the new law, the same “taxpayer unit” would oversee Rev. E’s audit from beginning to end, whether or not Rev. E moves to another state.

Example. A church is contacted by the IRS to learn why it is not withholding taxes from its pastoral employees. Of course, the reason is that clergy wages are exempt from income tax withholding under federal law. However, an IRS agent at the local District Office is not aware of this rule, because she seldom has worked with churches. The church treasurer informs her that clergy are exempt from withholding, but she is skeptical. Under the new structure, a separate IRS unit will specialize in exempt organizations. As a result, it is more likely that church treasurers will be dealing with IRS agents having some familiarity with the unique tax rules that apply to churches and clergy.

• IRS mission statement. The current “mission statement” of the IRS begins by declaring that the purpose of the IRS is “to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost.” The new law requires the IRS to revise its mission statement to provide greater emphasis on serving the public and meeting the needs of taxpayers.

• IRS oversight board. The new law provides for the establishment within the Treasury Department of the “Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board”. The general responsibilities of the new Board are to “oversee the IRS in the administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application of the internal revenue laws.” The Board will be composed of nine members, six of whom must be from the private sector.

9. Study of tax law complexity. Congress noted “a clear connection between the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code and the difficulty of tax law administration and taxpayer frustration.” It further noted that “complexity and frequent changes in the tax laws create burdens for both the IRS and taxpayers. Failure to address complexity may ultimately reduce voluntary compliance.” As a result, the new law requires the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation to provide an analysis of complexity concerns raised by tax provisions of widespread application to individuals and small businesses. The analysis is to include: (1) an estimate of the number and type of taxpayers affected; and (2) if applicable, the income level of affected individual taxpayers.

In addition, the complexity analysis should include, if possible, the following: (1) the extent to which existing tax forms would require revision and whether a new form or forms would be required; (2) whether and to what extent taxpayers would be required to keep additional records; (3) the estimated cost to taxpayers to comply with the provision; (4) the extent to which enactment of the provision would require the IRS to develop or modify regulations and other official guidance; (5) whether and to what extent the provision can be expected to lead to disputes between taxpayers and the IRS; and (6) how the IRS can be expected to respond to the provision (including the impact on internal training, whether the Internal Revenue Manual would require revision, whether the change would require reprogramming of computers, and the extent to which the IRS would be required to divert or redirect resources in response to the provision).

This provision is effective with respect to legislation considered on or after January 1, 1999.

10. Disclosure of income tax returns. The confidentiality of personal income tax returns has become a growing issue in recent years. In 1997 alone, the number of “federal income tax return disclosures” exceeded 3.2 billion! That works out to an average of 32 “disclosures” for the year for each individual tax return. The Act as originally worded would have required the IRS to place “plain English” notices on all tax forms informing taxpayers of the many different ways in which tax return information is disclosed by the IRS. However, a House—Senate conference committee dropped this provision on the ground that language in the current instruction booklets to the main tax forms provides sufficient “notice” to taxpayers. Even though the proposal for more effective disclosure to taxpayers of the nonconfidentiality of their tax returns did not pass, it has raised the issue. More and more taxpayers will now be aware of how common it is for the IRS to disclose personal tax information to others. This in turn will affect the inaccurate public perception that personal tax return data is confidential.

11. Removal of the “scarlet letter.” For many years, the IRS has placed a special code letter (“P”) in its computer systems and tax files to identify tax “protestors”. This letter has been associated with several tax protestor schemes, including the following: (1) contributions to “mail order” or other “sham” churches; (2) “constitutional” exemptions from tax; (3) reducing taxes because of the declining value of the dollar; and (4) reliance on the gold standard. While such schemes have been universally rejected by the courts, many in Congress felt that it was wrong to stigmatize a person for life as a tax protestor. After all, some of these persons eventually abandon their tax protestor position, and why should they continue to be stigmatized with the letter “P”? The new law forbids the IRS to use this designation any more.

12. Payment of taxes. The new law allows taxpayers to pay their taxes with checks payable to the “United States Treasury” instead of the IRS. The idea here is to reinforce the fact that the IRS merely collects taxes on behalf of the federal government.

Electronic Filing

13. Electronic filing. Each year the IRS publishes a list of forms and schedules that may be electronically filed. During the 1997 tax filing season, the IRS received approximately 20 million individual income tax returns electronically. Under the new law, the stated policy of Congress is to promote “paperless” filing of tax returns, with a long—range goal of providing for the filing of at least 80 percent of all tax returns in electronic form by the year 2007.

Key point. One of the goals of this electronic filing initiative is to reduce errors. The error rate associated with processing paper tax returns is approximately 20 percent, half of which is due to the IRS and half to errors in taxpayer data. Because electronically—filed returns usually are prepared using computer software programs with built—in accuracy checks, and experience no key punch errors, electronic returns have an error rate of less than one percent. In short, Congress believes that an expansion of electronic filing will significantly reduce errors (and the resulting notices that are triggered by such errors). In addition, taxpayers who file their returns electronically receive confirmation from the IRS that their return was received.

14. Due date for certain information returns. Employers are required to file an “information return” (Form W—3) by February 28 of each year reporting the amount of employee wages paid during the previous year. In addition, employers are required to file Form 1096 by February 28 of each year reporting the amount of nonemployee compensation paid during the previous year (to persons who received $600 or more). Under present law, the due date for filing information returns with the IRS is the same whether such returns are filed on paper, on magnetic media, or electronically. The new law provides an incentive to filers of information returns to use electronic filing by extending the due date for filing such returns from February 28 to March 31 of the year following the calendar year to which the return relates.

This provision applies to information returns required to be filed after December 31, 1999.

The new law also requires the Treasury Department to issue a study evaluating the merits and disadvantages, if any, of extending the deadline for providing taxpayers with copies of information returns from January 31 to February 15 (Forms W—2 would still be required to be furnished by January 31).

Example. In January of 1999 a church issues W—2 forms to five employees, and 1099 forms to three self—employed persons. These forms are due no later than January 31, 1999. The new law does not affect these deadlines. However, the church’s deadline for filing Form W—3 (transmitting the five W—2 forms) and Form 1096 (transmitting the three 1099 forms) is extended from February 28 until March 31 of 1999 if it files these forms electronically. If it does not file the forms electronically, the deadline remains February 28.

15. Electronic signatures. Federal tax law requires that tax forms be signed. The IRS will not accept an electronically filed return unless it has also received a Form 8453, which is a paper form that contains signature information on the filer. Obviously, this requirement greatly reduces the convenience and efficiency of electronic filing. The new law requires the IRS to develop procedures that would eliminate the need to file a paper form (Form 8453) relating to signature information. Until the procedures are in place, the provision authorizes the IRS to provide for alternative methods of signing all returns and other documents. An alternative method of signature would be treated identically, for both civil and criminal purposes, as a signature on a paper form.

16. Filing dates for electronically filed returns. Generally, a return is considered timely filed when it is received by the IRS on or before the due date of the return. If the return is mailed by registered mail, the dated registration statement is evidence of delivery. But what about electronically filed returns? When are they filed? The new law requires the IRS to develop rules for determining when electronic returns are deemed filed.

17. Access to account information. Under current law, taxpayers who file their returns electronically cannot review their accounts electronically. The new law requires the IRS to develop procedures under which taxpayers filing returns electronically can review their accounts electronically not later than December 31, 2006-if all necessary privacy safeguards are in place by that date.

Taxpayer Rights and Protections

18. Civil damages against the IRS for negligence. Under current law, a taxpayer may sue the government for up to $1 million because of an IRS agent’s reckless or intentional disregard of federal tax law in the course of any tax collection activity. The new law allows taxpayers to sue the government for up to $100,000 in civil damages caused by an IRS agent’s negligent disregard of the law. The law clarifies that taxpayers cannot seek civil damages for negligence or reckless or intentional disregard of the law unless they first exhaust their administrative remedies within the IRS.

This provision is effective immediately.

19. Limitation on financial status audits. The IRS selects returns to be audited in a number of ways, including “financial status” audits. Under such an arrangement, IRS agents look for discrepancies between taxpayers’ reported income and their “standard of living.” If the standard of living seems excessive in light of reported income, then several financial questions can be raised in an effort to find unreported income. This technique has been criticized because of the potential for abuse. The new law prohibits the IRS from using financial status or economic reality examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer unless the IRS has independent and reasonable proof that there is a likelihood of unreported income.

This provision is effective immediately.

20. Explanation of taxpayers’ rights in interviews with the IRS. Prior to (or at) audit interviews, the IRS must explain to taxpayers the audit process and taxpayers’ rights under that process. In addition, the IRS must explain the collection process and taxpayers’ rights under that process. If a taxpayer clearly states during an interview with the IRS that he or she wishes to consult with a “representative,” the interview must be suspended to allow the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to consult with the representative. The new law requires that the IRS rewrite Publication 1 (“Your Rights as a Taxpayer”) to more clearly inform taxpayers of their rights (1) to be represented by a representative and (2) if the taxpayer is so represented, that the interview may not proceed without the presence of the representative unless the taxpayer consents.

21. Disclosure of IRS top—secret audit formula. Disclosure of criteria for examination selection. Under current law, the IRS selects returns to be audited in a number of ways, such as through a computerized classification system (the discriminant function (“DIF”) system). The DIF system accounts for about one—third of all audits, but the IRS has refused to disclose any of the details of this system to taxpayers. The new law requires the IRS to add to Publication 1 (“Your Rights as a Taxpayer”) “a statement which sets forth in simple and nontechnical terms the criteria and procedures for selecting taxpayers for examination.” The statement must specify the general procedures used by the IRS, including the extent to which taxpayers are selected for examination on the basis of information in the media or from informants.

Key point. The IRS is not required to include any information that would be detrimental to law enforcement.

Key point. The public disclosure of at least some information regarding the top—secret DIF system is a big break for taxpayers. In the future, taxpayers will have a better idea of their chances of being audited.

The addition to Publication 1 would have to be made not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the new law.

22. Confidentiality privilege extended to some non—attorney tax professionals. Communications made between an attorney and client are “privileged,” meaning that neither party can be compelled to disclose in court the substance of their confidential conversations. For the privilege to apply, the client must have been meeting with the attorney for legal advice. The IRS also recognizes the attorney—client privilege in tax proceedings. However, no equivalent privilege is provided for communications between taxpayers and other professionals authorized to practice before the IRS, such as CPAs or enrolled agents.

The new law recognizes a new privilege of confidentiality for communications between taxpayers and individuals who are authorized to practice before the IRS. Enrolled agents and CPAs are the tax professionals contemplated by the new law. For the privilege to apply, the professional must be acting within the scope of his or her profession when the communication occurs. Further, the privilege will not apply to criminal proceedings before the IRS.

The purpose of the new privilege is to allow taxpayers to consult with other qualified tax advisors in the same manner they currently may consult with attorneys.

The provision would be effective on the date of enactment.

23. IRS employee contacts. The IRS sends many different notices to taxpayers. Many of these notices do not contain the name and telephone number of an IRS employee the taxpayer can call with questions. This failure has led to untold frustration. The new law addresses this problem by requiring that all IRS notices and correspondence contain a name and telephone number of an IRS employee whom the taxpayer may call. In addition, to the extent practicable and where it is advantageous to the taxpayer, the IRS should assign one employee to handle a matter with respect to a taxpayer until that matter is resolved.

This provision is effective 60 days after the date of the law’s enactment.

24. IRS telephone hotline. The new law requires that all IRS telephone helplines provide an option for any taxpayer to speak with a “live person” in addition to hearing recorded messages.

25. IRS local office telephone numbers. Have you ever experienced the frustration of being unable to find the telephone number for your local IRS office in the telephone directory? Millions have. The new law addresses this problem by requiring each IRS office to list its office telephone number and address in the telephone directory.

26. Approval of IRS levies. Under current law, IRS agents can impose liens, levies or seizures to collect taxes, without a supervisor’s approval (except for the seizure of a taxpayer’s home). The new law requires the IRS to implement an approval process under which any lien, levy or seizure would be approved by a supervisor, who would review the taxpayer’s information, verify that a balance is due, and affirm that a lien, levy or seizure is appropriate under the circumstances. Circumstances to be considered include the amount due and the value of the asset. Failure to follow such procedures should result in disciplinary action against the supervisor or agent.

This provision applies to all future tax collection actions.

27. Changes in levy exemption amounts. Under current law, the IRS can “levy” on all non—exempt property of a taxpayer. This means that the IRS can seize and sell a taxpayer’s property to satisfy an unpaid tax bill. But some property is exempt from this process. Examples include up to $2,500 in value of fuel, provisions, furniture, and personal effects in the taxpayer’s household, and up to $1,250 in value of books and tools necessary for the trade, business or profession of the taxpayer. The new law increases the value of personal effects exempt from levy to $6,250 and the value of books and tools exempt from levy to $3,125. These amounts are indexed for inflation.

This provision is effective for all future collection actions.

28. Waiver of early withdrawal tax for IRS levies on employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs. Under current law, a distribution of benefits from any employer—sponsored retirement plan or an IRA generally is includible in gross income in the year it is distributed, except to the extent the amount distributed represents the employee’s after—tax contributions. Distributions from qualified plans and IRAs prior to attainment of age 59 and 1/2 that are includible in income generally are subject to a 10—percent early withdrawal tax, unless an exception applies.

Under current law, the IRS is authorized to levy on all non—exempt property of the taxpayer. Benefits under employer—sponsored retirement plans (including section 403(b) plans) and IRAs are not exempt from levy by the IRS. Distributions from employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs made on account of an IRS levy are includible in the gross income of the individual, except to the extent the amount distributed represents after—tax contributions. In addition, the amount includible in income is subject to the 10—percent early withdrawal tax, unless an exception applies.

Congress concluded that the imposition of the 10—percent early withdrawal tax on amounts distributed from employer—sponsored retirement plans or IRAs on account of an IRS levy may impose significant hardships on taxpayers. As a result, the new law provides an exception from the 10—percent early withdrawal tax for amounts withdrawn from any employer—sponsored retirement plan or an IRA that are subject to a levy by the IRS. The exception applies only if the plan or IRA is levied. It does not apply, for example, if the taxpayer withdraws funds to pay taxes in the absence of a levy, or to release a levy on other property.

This provision is effective for future withdrawals.

29. Seizure of personal residences. Under current law, the IRS may seize the property of a taxpayer who neglects or refuses to pay any tax within 10 days after notice and demand. The IRS may not levy on the personal residence of the taxpayer unless (1) the District Director (or the assistant District Director) personally approves in writing, or (2) in cases of jeopardy. There are no special rules for property that is used as a residence by parties other than the taxpayer.

Congress was concerned that seizure of the taxpayer’s principal residence is particularly disruptive for the taxpayer as well as the taxpayer’s family. The seizure of any residence is disruptive to the occupants, and is not justified in the case of a small deficiency. As a result, the new law prohibits the IRS from seizing real property that is used as a residence (by the taxpayer or another person) to satisfy an unpaid liability of $5,000 or less, including penalties and interest.

The new law further requires the IRS to exhaust all other payment options before seizing the taxpayer’s principal residence.

Key point. The new law does not prohibit the seizure of a principal residence, but would treat such a seizure as a payment option of last resort. The IRS will consider installment agreements, offer—in—compromise, and seizure of other assets of the taxpayer before taking collection action against the taxpayer’s principal residence.

This provision is effective immediately.

30. “Due process” in IRS collection actions. The IRS may collect taxes by “levy” upon a taxpayer’s property (including accrued wages) if the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay the tax within 10 days after notice and demand that the tax be paid. Notice of the IRS’s intent to collect taxes by levy must be given no less than 30 days before the day of the levy. The notice of levy must describe the procedures that will be used, the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer and the procedures relating to such appeals, the alternatives available to the taxpayer that could prevent levy, and the procedures for redemption of property and release of liens.

Following days of hearings in which taxpayers recounted horror stories of IRS seizures of their property, Congress was convinced that taxpayers are entitled to protections in dealing with the IRS that are similar to those they would have in dealing with any other creditor. Accordingly, the new law establishes formal procedures designed to insure due process where the IRS seeks to collect taxes by levy. As under present law, notice of the intent to levy must be given at least 30 days before property can be seized or salary and wages garnished. During the 30—day notice period, the taxpayer may demand a hearing to take place before an appeals officer who has had no prior involvement in the taxpayer’s case. If the taxpayer demands a hearing within that period, the proposed collection action may not proceed until the hearing has concluded and the appeals officer has issued his or her determination. During the hearing, the IRS is required to verify that all statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements for the proposed collection action have been met. IRS verifications are expected to include (but not be limited to) showings that (1) the IRS agent recommending the collection action has verified the taxpayer’s liability; (2) the estimated expenses of levy and sale will not exceed the value of the property to be seized; (3) the IRS agent has determined that there is sufficient equity in the property to be seized to yield net proceeds from sale to apply to the unpaid tax liabilities; and (4) with respect to the seizure of the assets of a going business, the IRS agent recommending the collection action has thoroughly considered the facts of the case, including the availability of alternative collection methods, before recommending the collection action.

The taxpayer is allowed to raise any relevant issue at the hearing. Issues eligible to be raised include (but are not limited to): (1) challenges to the underlying liability as to existence or amount; (2) appropriate spousal defenses; (3) challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions; and (4) collection alternatives, which could include the posting of a bond, substitution of other assets, an installment agreement or an offer—in—compromise.

The taxpayer may contest the determination of the appellate officer in Tax Court by filing a petition within 30 days of the date of the determination. The Tax Court is expected to review the appellate officer’s determination for abuse of discretion and also may consider procedural issues, as under present law. The IRS may not take any collection action pursuant to the determination during this 30 day period or while the taxpayer’s contest is pending in Tax Court.

The due process procedures apply to collection actions initiated more than six months after the date of the new law’s enactment.

31. Application of fair debt collection practices. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides a number of rules relating to debt collection practices. Among these are restrictions on communication with the consumer, such as a general prohibition on telephone calls outside the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. local time, and prohibitions on harassing or abusing the consumer. In general, these provisions do not apply to the federal government (including the IRS). Congress concluded that the IRS should be at least as considerate to taxpayers as private creditors are required to be with their customers. Accordingly, the new law makes the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s restrictions relating to communication with the debtor and the prohibitions on harassing or abusing the debtor applicable to the IRS by incorporating these provisions into the Internal Revenue Code. The restrictions relating to communication with the taxpayer are not intended to hinder the ability of the IRS to respond to taxpayer inquiries (such as answering telephone calls from taxpayers).

This provision is effective immediately.

32. Offers in compromise. The tax code permits the IRS to compromise a taxpayer’s tax liability. An offer—in—compromise is an offer by the taxpayer to settle an unpaid bill for less than the full amount of the assessed balance. There are two bases for making an offer in compromise-doubt as to a tax liability for the amount owed, and doubt as to ability to pay the amount owed. Congress came to the conclusion, following several days of testimony, that the IRS should be flexible in finding ways to work with taxpayers who are sincerely trying to meet their obligations and remain in the tax system. Accordingly, Congress concluded that the IRS should make it easier for taxpayers to enter into offer—in—compromise agreements, and should do more to educate the taxpaying public about the availability of such agreements.

The new law modifies the offer in compromise rules in the following ways:

1. National and local schedules of allowances. The IRS must now develop and publish schedules of national and local “allowances” (personal expenses) that will provide taxpayers entering into an offer—in—compromise with adequate means to provide for basic living expenses. The IRS also will be required to consider the facts and circumstances of a particular taxpayer’s case in determining whether the national and local schedules are adequate for that particular taxpayer. If the facts indicate that use of scheduled allowances would be inadequate under the circumstances, the taxpayer would not be limited by the national or local allowances.

2. Low—income taxpayers. The new law prohibits the IRS from rejecting an offer—in—compromise from a low—income taxpayer solely on the basis of the amount of the offer. This provision does not affect the ability of the IRS to reject an offer in compromise made by a taxpayer (other than a low—income taxpayer) because the amount offered is too low. The new law further prohibits the IRS from requesting a financial statement if a taxpayer makes an offer—in—compromise based solely on doubt as to a tax liability.

3. Suspension of levy efforts. The new law prohibits the IRS from collecting a tax liability by levy during any period that a taxpayer’s offer in compromise for that liability is being processed, or during the 30 days following rejection of an offer (and during any period in which an appeal of the rejection of an offer is being considered).

Key point. This prohibition would not apply if the IRS determines that collection is in jeopardy or that the offer was submitted solely to delay collection.

4. Review of an IRS rejection of an offer—in—compromise. The IRS must implement procedures to review all rejections of taxpayer offers in compromise prior to the rejection being communicated to the taxpayer. The IRS must allow the taxpayer to appeal any rejection of such offer to the IRS Office of Appeals. The IRS must notify taxpayers of their right to have an appeals officer review a rejected offer—in—compromise on the application form for an offer in compromise.

5. Publication of taxpayer’s rights with respect to offers in compromise. The new law requires the IRS to publish guidance on the rights and obligations of taxpayers relating to offers—in—compromise.

6. Liberal acceptance policy. Congress instructed the IRS to “adopt a liberal acceptance policy for offers in compromise to provide an incentive for taxpayers to continue to file tax returns and continue to pay their taxes.”

These provisions are effective for all offers in compromise submitted after the date of the new law’s enactment.

33. Guaranteed availability of installment agreements. The tax code currently authorizes the IRS to enter into written agreements with any taxpayer under which the taxpayer is allowed to pay taxes (plus interest and penalties) in installment payments if the IRS determines that doing so will “facilitate collection of the amounts owed”. An installment agreement does not reduce the amount of taxes, interest, or penalties owed. However, it does provide for a longer period during which payments may be made during which other IRS enforcement actions (such as levies or seizures) are suspended. Many taxpayers can request an installment agreement by filing Form 9465. This form is relatively simple and does not require the submission of detailed financial statements. The IRS in most instances readily approves these requests if the amounts involved are not large (in general, below $10,000) and if the taxpayer has filed tax returns on time in the past. Some taxpayers are required to submit background information to the IRS substantiating their application. If the request for an installment agreement is approved by the IRS, a user fee of $43 is charged. This user fee is in addition to the tax, interest, and penalties that are owed.

Congress has concluded that the ability to make payments of tax liability by installment enhances taxpayer compliance. Further, Congress has concluded that the IRS should be flexible in finding ways to work with taxpayers who are sincerely trying to meet their obligations.

The new law requires the IRS to enter into an installment agreement, at the taxpayer’s option, if

(1) the liability is $10,000, or less (excluding penalties and interest)

(2) within the previous 5 years, the taxpayer has not failed to file or to pay, nor entered an installment agreement under this provision

(3) when requested by the Secretary, the taxpayer submits financial statements, and the Secretary determines that the taxpayer is unable to pay the tax due in full

(4) the installment agreement provides for full payment of the liability within 3 years, and

(5) the taxpayer agrees to continue to comply with the tax laws and the terms of the agreement for the period (up to 3 years) that the agreement is in place.

This provision is effective immediately.

34. Statute of limitations. The “statute of limitations” which defines the period of time during which the IRS must assess additional taxes is generally three years from the date a return is filed (a return filed before the due date is considered to be filed on the due date). Prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, both the taxpayer and the IRS may agree in writing to extend the three—year period, using Form 872 or Form 872—A. An extension may be for either a specified period or an indefinite period. The statute of limitations for the collection of tax is generally ten years after assessment. Prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, both the taxpayer and the IRS may agree in writing to extend the statute, using Form 900.

The new law eliminates the provision of current law that allows the statute of limitations on collections to be extended by agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS. The new law also requires that, on each occasion on which the taxpayer is requested by the IRS to extend the statute of limitations on an assessment of tax, the IRS must notify the taxpayer of the taxpayer’s right to refuse to extend the statute of limitations or to limit the extension to particular issues.

These provisions apply to requests to extend the statute of limitations made after the date of the new law’s enactment, and to all extensions of the statute of limitations on collections that are open 180 days after the date of enactment.

Key point. Congress concluded that taxpayers should be fully informed of their rights with respect to the statute of limitations on assessments of tax. It expressed concern that in some cases taxpayers have not been fully aware of their rights to refuse to extend the statute of limitations, and have felt that they had no choice but to agree to extend the statute of limitations upon the request of the IRS. Moreover, it concluded that the IRS should collect all taxes within ten years, and that such statute of limitation should not be extended.

35. Relief for innocent spouses. Under current law, each spouse who signs a joint tax return is fully responsible for the accuracy of the return and for the full tax liability. This is true even though only one spouse may have earned the income which is shown on the return. This is “joint and several” liability. A spouse who wishes to avoid joint liability must file as a “married person filing separately.”

Relief from liability for tax is available for “innocent spouses” in certain limited circumstances. To qualify for such relief, the innocent spouse must establish: (1) that a joint return was made; (2) that an understatement of tax, which exceeds the greater of $500 or a specified percentage of the innocent spouse’s adjusted gross income for the most recent year, is attributable to a grossly erroneous item (items of gross income that are omitted from reported income and claims of deductions or credits having no basis in law) of the other spouse; (3) that in signing the return, the innocent spouse did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was an understatement of tax; and (4) that taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for the deficiency in tax. The specified percentage of adjusted gross income is 10 percent if adjusted gross income is $20,000 or less. Otherwise, the specified percentage is 25 percent.

Congress concluded that that the innocent spouse provisions of present law are inadequate, and that it is inappropriate to limit innocent spouse relief only to the most extreme cases where the understatement is large and the tax position taken is grossly erroneous. It also concluded that partial innocent spouse relief should be considered in appropriate circumstances, and that all taxpayers should have access to the Tax Court in resolving disputes concerning their status as an innocent spouse. Finally, Congress concluded that taxpayers need to be better informed of their right to apply for innocent spouse relief in appropriate cases and that the IRS is the best source of that information.

The new law accomplishes these objectives in the following ways:

1. Relief more easy to obtain. The new law eliminates all of the understatement thresholds and requires only that the understatement of tax be attributable to an erroneous (and not just a grossly erroneous) item of the other spouse.

2. Partial relief available. The new law provides that innocent spouse relief may be provided on a partial basis. That is, the spouse may be relieved of liability as an innocent spouse to the extent the liability is attributable to the portion of an understatement of tax which the spouse did not know of and had no reason to know of.

3. Review of denials of relief. The new law specifically provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review any denial (or failure to rule) by the IRS regarding an application for innocent spouse relief.

4. A separate form. The new law requires the IRS to develop a separate form with instructions for taxpayers to use in applying for innocent spouse relief within 180 days from the date of the new law’s enactment. An innocent spouse seeking relief under this provision must claim innocent spouse status with regard to any assessment not later than two years after the date of such assessment.

These provisions are effective for understatements with respect to taxable years beginning after the date of the new law’s enactment.

36. Burden of proof. Under current law, there is a “rebuttable presumption” that any determination of tax liability by the IRS is correct. As a result, taxpayers who challenge IRS determinations have the “burden of proof”. There are a few exception to this rule, in which the IRS has the burden of proof (including fraud and proof of employee status for payroll tax purposes). Congress has concluded that (1) individual and small business taxpayers frequently are at a disadvantage when forced to litigate with the IRS, and that the present “burden of proof” rules contribute to that disadvantage; (2) facts asserted by individual and small business taxpayers who cooperate with the IRS and satisfy relevant recordkeeping and substantiation requirements should be accepted; and (3) shifting the burden of proof to the IRS in such circumstances will create a better balance between the IRS and taxpayers, without encouraging tax avoidance.

The new law addresses these concerns by providing that the IRS will have the burden of proof in any court proceeding with respect to a factual issue if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer’s income tax liability. Four conditions apply:

” The taxpayer must comply with the requirements of the tax code and regulations to substantiate any item.

” The taxpayer must maintain records required by the tax code and regulations.

” The taxpayer must cooperate with reasonable requests by the IRS for meetings, interviews, witnesses, information, and documents (including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to and inspection of witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer, as reasonably requested by the IRS). A necessary element of cooperating with the IRS is that the taxpayer must exhaust his or her administrative remedies (including any appeal rights provided by the IRS). The taxpayer is not required to agree to extend the statute of limitations to be considered to have cooperated. Cooperating also means that the taxpayer must establish the applicability of any privilege.

” Taxpayers (other than individuals) must meet the net worth limitations that apply for awarding attorney’s fees. Corporations, trusts, and partnerships whose net worth exceeds $7 million are not eligible for the benefits of the provision. No net worth limitations apply to individuals.

Key point. The taxpayer has the burden of proving that it meets each of these conditions, because they are necessary prerequisites to establishing that the burden of proof is on the IRS.

Key point. Taxpayers have not produced credible evidence if they merely make implausible factual assertions, frivolous claims, or tax protestor—type arguments. The introduction of evidence will not meet this standard if the court is not convinced that it is worthy of belief. If after evidence from both sides, the court believes that the evidence is equally balanced, the court shall find that the IRS has not sustained his burden of proof.

Key point. Taxpayers who fail to substantiate any item in accordance with the legal requirement of substantiation will be unable to avail themselves of this provision regarding the burden of proof. To illustrate, if a taxpayer required to substantiate an item fails to do so in the manner required (or destroys the substantiation), this burden of proof provision is inapplicable.

This provision applies to court proceedings arising in connection with examinations beginning after the date of the new law’s enactment.

37. Suspension of interest and certain penalties if the IRS fails to contact individual taxpayer. Under current law, interest and penalties accrue continuously while taxes are unpaid whether or not the taxpayer is aware there is tax due. In many cases, the interest and penalties eventually exceed the tax liability itself. The new law suspends the accrual of penalties and interest after 18 months if the IRS has not sent the taxpayer a notice of deficiency within 18 months following the date which is the later of (1) the original due date of the return or (2) the date on which the individual taxpayer timely filed the return. The suspension only applies to taxpayers who file a timely tax return. The provision applies only to individuals and does not apply to the “failure to pay” penalty, in the case of fraud, or with respect to criminal penalties. Interest and penalties resume 21 days after the IRS sends a notice and demand for payment to the taxpayer.

This provision is effective immediately.

38. Mitigation of “failure to deposit” penalty. An employer’s deposits of payroll taxes are allocated to the earliest period for which a deposit is due. If an employer misses or makes an insufficient deposit, later deposits will first be applied to satisfy the shortfall for the earlier period. The remainder is then applied to satisfy the obligation for the current period. If the employer is not aware this is taking place, “cascading penalties” may result as payments that would otherwise be sufficient to satisfy current liabilities are applied to satisfy earlier shortfalls.

Congress concluded that the cascading penalty effect is unfair and that employers should be able to designate payments to minimize its effect. As a result, the new law allows employers to designate the period to which each deposit is applied. The designation must be made no later than 90 days after the related IRS penalty notice. The new law also extends the authorization to waive the “failure to deposit” penalty to the first deposit a taxpayer is required to make after the taxpayer is required to change the frequency of the taxpayer’s deposits.

This provision applies to deposits made more than 180 days after the date of the new law’s enactment.

Key point. For deposits required to be made after December 31, 2001, any deposit is to be applied to the most recent period to which the deposit relates, unless the taxpayer explicitly designates otherwise.

39. Personal delivery of notice of penalty under section 6672. Any person who is required to collect and pay over any tax imposed by the tax code who willfully fails to do so is liable for a penalty equal to the amount of the tax. Before the IRS may assess any such “100—percent penalty,” it must mail a written preliminary notice informing the person of the proposed penalty to that person’s last known address. The mailing of such notice must precede any notice and demand for payment of the penalty by at least 60 days. The statute of limitations on assessments shall not expire before the date 90 days after the date on which the notice was mailed. These restrictions do not apply if the IRS finds the collection of the penalty is in jeopardy.

The imposition of the 100—percent penalty is a serious matter that potentially affects church treasurers and officers. Congress has concluded that permitting personal service of the preliminary notice may afford taxpayers the opportunity to resolve cases involving the 100—percent penalty at an earlier stage. As a result, the new law permits in person delivery, as an alternative to delivery by mail, of a preliminary notice that the IRS intends to assess a 100—percent penalty.

This provision is effective immediately.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m69 c0598

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Are Church Custodians Employees or Self-Employed?

An IRS ruling provides helpful guidance.

IRS Private Letter Ruling 9830008

Background. Every church has one or more custodians, and it is important for church treasurers to properly classify these workers as employees or self-employed. There are many reasons why this task is important, including the following:

W-2 or 1099? Churches issue a W-2 to employees at the end of the year reporting wages paid and taxes withheld. Churches issue a 1099 form to self-employed persons who are paid at least $600 during the year.

941 forms. Churches that are subject to income tax withholding, social security taxes, or both, must file Form 941 quarterly. No entries are made for self-employed workers, since they are not subject to tax withholding and they do not pay social security or Medicare taxes (they pay the self-employment tax).

Tax withholding. Churches must withhold federal income taxes and the employee’s share of social security and Medicare taxes from the wages of most nonminister employees. Self-employed workers are not subject to federal tax withholding (other than “backup withholding,” which applies if a self-employed worker fails to provide an employer with a social security number).

Treatment of fringe benefits. Some fringe benefits provided by a church to a custodian or other church worker are not taxed if the person is an employee. A common example is medical insurance premiums paid by a church on behalf of an employee.

Social security. Churches must withhold the employee’s share of social security and Medicare taxes from the wages of most nonminister employees. Self-employed workers pay their own social security (self-employment) taxes.

Unfortunately, it is not always easy to determine whether a church custodian is an employee or self-employed. Many churches use part-time custodians, who often are free to perform their services with little if any supervision or control. A recent IRS ruling addresses the correct classification of custodians.

Facts of the case. A custodian provided cleaning services to a government agency. She worked part-time and was paid on an hourly basis. She was not given any “training” by the agency; the agency had the right to change the methods she used and to direct her in how the work should be accomplished; she was supervised by an agency employee in the performance of her services; all tools, equipment, supplies, and materials needed by her in the performance of services were furnished by the agency; she did not perform similar services for others, and did not maintain her own office or represent herself to the public as being in the business of providing custodial services.

What the IRS said. The IRS concluded that the custodian was an employee and not self-employed. It noted that the degree of control by an employer over a worker is the controlling question, and that it is helpful to consider three kinds of control:

Behavioral controls. These refer to an employer’s right “to direct or control how the worker performs the specific tasks for which he or she is hired. Facts which illustrate whether there is a right to control how a worker performs a task include the provision of training or instruction.”

Financial controls. These refer to an employer’s right to direct or control “the financial aspects of the worker’s activities.” Relevant facts include a “significant investment” or unreimbursed expenses incurred by the worker, making the same services available to the public, the method of payment, and the opportunity for profit or loss.

The relationship of the parties. This refers to facts which show not only how the parties “perceive their own relationship but also how they represent their relationship to others.” As an example, the IRS referred to language in written contracts; the presence or absence of employee benefits; the right of the parties to terminate the relationship; the permanency of the relationship; and whether the services performed are part of the employer’s regular business activities.

The IRS concluded that the part-time custodian in this case was an employee on the basis of this analysis, since the employer “has the right and does in fact exercise the degree of direction and control necessary to establish an employer-employee relationship.”

Relevance to church treasurers. This ruling suggests that part-time church custodians who are paid on an hourly basis will be employees rather than self-employed, if (1) the church has the right to change the methods the custodian uses and direct how the work should be accomplished; (2) the church supervises the custodian; (3) the church provides the custodian’s tools, equipment, supplies, and materials; (4) the custodian does not perform similar services for others, and does not maintain an office or represent to the public that he or she is in the business of providing custodial services.


Key point. Many church custodians do not satisfy one or more of these conditions. For example, some part-time custodians are not supervised by any church employee, provide at least some of their own equipment and supplies, and provide custodial services to other organizations. The IRS ruling suggests that such custodians may be self-employed.


Example. Bob has a custodial business. He performs custodial services for several institutions, including a church. Bob is at the church for a few hours each week, provides his own equipment and supplies, and is paid a flat sum each week. The church treasurer should treat Bob as self-employed.


Example. Barb is a church member who performs about ten hours of custodial service for her church each week. She has done so for several years. She is not in the “business” of providing these services, and does do so for any other organization. She uses equipment and supplies provided by the church, is paid a flat hourly rate, and works with little if any supervision. Barb probably is an employee according to the IRS ruling. While there are few “behavioral controls” present, there are “financial controls.” Further, the “relationship of the parties” suggests the Barb is an employee, because of the long-term nature of her relationship with the church, and the number of hours worked each week. This is a close call, and other facts may tip the balance in favor of self-employed status.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Tax Consequences of Tuition Discounts

A recent IRS ruling provides some clarification.

IRS Letter Ruling 9821053

Background. Many churches operate schools and offer “tuition discounts” to some employees whose children attend the school. Consider the following example:

Example. A church operates a private school. The annual tuition is $2,500. However, the school allows the children of its two pastors to attend the school for free. Both pastors are full-time church employees, but they do have some involvement with the school. One of them serves as “president” of the school as part of his job description as senior pastor of the church, and the other teaches a course each semester at the school (and is paid $500 each semester). The school allows the children of its employees to attend at “half” tuition. The same rate applies to the children of church employees.

Are there tax consequences to the tuition discounts described in this example? Do the tuition “reductions” represent taxable income to the parents, or are they nontaxable? If they are nontaxable, what conditions apply? These are important questions, and church treasurers should have some familiarity with them.

“Qualified tuition reductions”. Section 117(d) of the tax code specifies that the amount of any “qualified tuition reduction” is excluded from an employee’s gross income for income tax purposes so long as the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The tuition reduction is for the education of (a) an individual who currently is employed by the school; (b) an individual who quit working at the school on account of retirement or disability; (c) a widow or widower of an individual who died while employed at the school; or (d) a spouse or dependent child of any of the above named individuals.

(2) The school is an elementary, secondary, or undergraduate institution, and it normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.

(3) “Highly compensated employees” cannot exclude qualified tuition reductions from their gross income unless the same benefit “is available on substantially similar terms to each member of a group of employees which is defined under a reasonable classification set up by the employer which does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.”

The term highly compensated employee generally refers to an employee who had compensation in excess of $80,000 for the previous year. The fact that a highly compensated employee must report the value of a tuition reduction in his or her income for tax reporting purposes does not affect the right of employees who are not highly compensated to exclude the value of tuition reductions from their income.

What about church employees? Many churches that operate private schools offer tuition discounts to employees of both the church and school, and assume that the tax treatment is the same. But is it? Does the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions from a school employee’s taxable income apply to church employees? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is far from clear. Let’s begin by looking at the example at the beginning of this article. Which employees would qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions? There is no question about the school employees—assuming that none earned more than $80,000 in the previous year. As a result, the value of the tuition discount should not be reported on their W 2 forms. This should be true even if these employees are paid by the church, since they work full time for the school and therefore could be considered school employees.

But what about the two pastors? Are they eligible for the exclusion? Section 117(d) of the Code defines a qualified tuition reduction as “any reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education (below the graduate level) at such organization.” Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) refers to educational institutions that “normally maintain a regular faculty and curriculum and normally have a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.” In other words, tuition reductions granted to the employees of an educational institution are tax exempt.

But, it is unclear whether the IRS or the courts would consider an employee who works directly for a church to be an employee of an educational institution, even if the church operates a private school. The church still may be considered to be a religious rather than an educational institution. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Code section 170(b)(1)(A)(i) specifically lists “churches” as a separate category. The IRS may consider these persons to be employed by a church rather than by an educational institution. If so, they would not be eligible for the exclusion.

Could it not be argued that the pastor who teaches one course per semester at the school is a school employee for purposes of the qualified tuition reduction exclusion because he is performing services on behalf of the school for compensation? Does the fact that he is teaching only one course per semester matter? A recent IRS ruling suggests that it does not.

A recent IRS ruling. Here are the facts of the IRS ruling. A worker was hired to teach English as a second language by a public school. She worked three evenings per week and was paid an hourly wage. Either the school or the worker could terminate the agreement for services at any time. For a number of years, the school treated the teacher as an employee and reported her wages on a W-2 form. In 1994 the school began treating the teacher as self-employed and reported her earnings on a 1099 form. The teacher was given training by the school in the form of teacher workshops; she was given instructions by the school and was subject to its supervision; from time to time the assistant principal sat in the classroom and observed her teaching; a formal evaluation was prepared by the assistant principal at least once per semester; the teacher performed her services at the school using supplies and materials furnished by the school. Other than transportation costs, the teacher did not incur any expenses while performing her services. She did not have a financial investment in a business related to her teaching and could not incur a loss or realize a profit. Under these facts, the IRS ruled that the teacher was an employee rather than self-employed. It stressed that the key consideration in deciding whether or not a worker is an employee or self-employed is the degree of control that the employer exercises over the worker’s performance of services. It concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated sufficient control to render the teacher an employee. It noted that less control is needed to find that a professional worker is an employee, since such workers generally work with very little control or supervision. IRS Private Letter Ruling 9821053.

Key point. The IRS ruling can be used to support the availability of the qualified tuition reduction exclusion to pastors and other church employees who teach one or more classes each semester at a church-operated school. After all, this ruling leaves little doubt that the IRS considers part-time teachers who work only a few hours each week to be employees. The same logic should apply to the definition of a “school employee” for purposes of determining eligibility for the qualified tuition reduction exclusion.

Key point. If you decide that a pastor who teaches a course at a church-operated school is a school employee and therefore eligible for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions, be sure to be consistent. Any teaching compensation should be reported as employee wages. If the school issues its own paychecks, it should do so for the pastor.

What about the other pastor in our example—the one who serves as the school’s president? Should he be considered a part-time school employee because his job description includes serving as the school’s president? Does it matter whether or not he is paid for his services? Obviously, employees ordinarily must be paid something, although it does not necessarily have to be in the form of cash. But while the pastor is not compensated directly for his services as school president, the argument could be made that, since his job description includes these duties, a portion of his church salary should be considered compensation for these services.

A Tax Court decision. A few years ago the United States Tax Court addressed the eligibility of a pastor and his wife for the tuition discount exclusion. Rasmussen v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. 30 (1994). The pastor served as senior pastor of a Baptist church, and his wife served as principal of a private school operated by the same church. The couple received tuition discounts for their children who attended the school. The Court noted that “by reason of their employment with the church and the school, petitioners, as well as all other full-time employees of the school, received tuition reductions for their children’s education at the school.” In fact, the Court noted that the IRS had conceded that the couple’s tuition discounts were not taxable. It is interesting that the Court observed that the couple received tuition discounts “by reason of their employment with the church and the school.” However, this language should not be pushed too far. After all, the wife was a school employee, and the tuition discounts were nontaxable by reason of her employment. Nevertheless, this case will of some value in supporting the nontaxability of tuition discounts received by the children of pastors and other church employees who are not employees of a school operated by their church.

Conclusions. Consider the following conclusions:

* Employees of a church-operated school. They qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions, assuming that all of the conditions summarized above are satisfied.

* Church employees who perform compensated service for a church-operated school. For example, a church secretary performs some secretarial services for the school; a church custodian performs some custodial services for the school; a church bookkeeper performs some accounting functions for the school; or, a pastor teaches a course. In each of these examples it is likely that the church employee will qualify for the tuition reduction exclusion, assuming that all of the conditions summarized above are satisfied.

* Church employees who perform uncompensated service for a church-operated school. As noted in this next paragraph, it is not clear that these employees are eligible for the qualified tuition reduction exclusion. However, keep in mind that in some cases a church employee who performs “uncompensated” services for a church-operated school in fact may be compensated. The pastor in our example who served as president of the school is a good example. So long as the pastor’s job description included serving as the school president, the argument can be made that he was a school employee and that a portion of his church compensation could be allocated to these duties.

Key point. Church employees who perform compensated or uncompensated services on behalf of a church-operated school should be sure that their job descriptions reflect their school services. This will increase the likelihood of their eligibility for the tuition reduction exclusion.

* Church employees who perform no services for a church-operated school. According to the literal language of the tax code, they do not qualify for the tuition reduction exclusion because they are not school employees. However, as a practical matter, there are thousands of pastors and other church employees who are claiming the exclusion under these same circumstances, and neither the IRS nor the courts have addressed their eligibility for the exclusion in any reported ruling or decision. The ultimate answer to this question depends upon how narrowly or broadly the IRS or a court will interpret the “school employee” requirement. In the final analysis, whether or not such employees should claim the exclusion will depend on how aggressive they want to be in reporting their taxes. Our recommendation—discuss your eligibility with a professional tax advisor.

Example. A federal appeals court rejected the claim of one church that its school employees were really church employees and therefore exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (minimum wage and overtime pay). The church pointed out that the school was “inextricably intertwined” with the church, that the church and school shared a common building and a common payroll account, and that school employees were required to subscribe to the church’s statement of faith. The court rejected this reasoning without explanation. This case suggests that church employees should not assume that they can be treated as school employees in order to qualify for the exclusion of qualified tuition reductions. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, September 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Supreme Court Addresses Sexual Harassment

How churches will be affected

How churches will be affected

[Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964]

Article summary. In two landmark rulings, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of employer liability for the “hostile environment” sexual harassment of supervisory employees. The Court concluded that employers are automatically liable for such harassment, but it provided employers some important relief. If they adopt a sexual harassment policy containing a complaint procedure that is communicated to all employees, and a victim of a supervisor’s “hostile environment” sexual harassment does not follow the policy, then they have an “affirmative defense” to liability. These cases make it imperative for churches to implement an effective sexual harassment policy.

The United States Supreme Court has issued two landmark cases addressing employer liability for sexual harassment. This article will address the significance of each case to churches and other religious organizations. Both cases addressed sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Act only applies to employers with at least 15 employees and that are engaged in interstate commerce. Churches that do not meet both requirements are not subject to sexual harassment liability under Title VII. However, they often will be subject to a comparable state civil rights law, and so the Court’s rulings will be directly relevant to many churches.

CASE #1 – Faragher v. Boca Raton: facts

A female college student (the “victim”) was employed as a lifeguard by a city government during the summer. Two of her supervisors created a “sexually hostile atmosphere” at the beach by repeatedly subjecting her to “uninvited and offensive touching,” by making lewd remarks, and by frequently speaking of women in offensive and crudely demeaning terms. To illustrate, one of the supervisors told the victim “date me or clean the toilets for a year.” Another supervisor informed her that female lifeguards routinely had sex with their male supervisors, and asked whether she would do the same. The victim was profoundly disturbed by the actions of her supervisors, but she never complained to higher management. Eventually, unable to cope with her supervisors’ harassment any longer, she resigned.

A few years later, the victim sued the city for sexual harassment. The city insisted that it could not be liable for the supervisors’ actions because it was not aware of the inappropriate behavior. Further, the city asserted that the victim failed to notify higher management of her claims, and this prevented the city from becoming aware of the misconduct and doing something about it. A federal district court rejected the city’s defenses and found it liable for the supervisors’ acts of sexual harassment. The court found the harassment to be so pervasive that the city should have known of its existence. The city appealed, and a federal appeals court ruled that the city could not be liable for the “hostile environment” sexual harassment of the supervisors. The victim appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s decision

Background

Sexual harassment is a form of “sex discrimination” prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations define sexual harassment as follows:

(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

This definition confirms the conclusion reached by numerous state and federal courts that sexual harassment includes at least two separate types of conduct:

“quid pro quo” harassment, which refers to conditioning employment opportunities on submission to a sexual or social relationship, and

“hostile environment” harassment, which refers to the creation of an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.

The victim in this case alleged the supervisors committed the second type of sexual harassment-by their offensive language and physical contacts they created a “hostile environment.” The Court provided helpful guidance on the meaning of a “hostile environment”:

[A] sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so. We [have] directed courts to determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive by “looking at all the circumstances,” including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Most recently, we explained that Title VII does not prohibit “genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex.” A recurring point in these opinions is that “simple teasing,” offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the “terms and conditions of employment.” These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a “general civility code.” Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender—related jokes, and occasional teasing.” We have made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment ….

When is an employer liable for “hostile environment” sexual harassment?

No absolute liability

Even if the supervisors’ behavior satisfied the Court’s definition of “hostile environment” sexual harassment, could their employer be liable for that harassment? That was the difficult question the Court addressed next. The Court rejected the victim’s argument that employers always should be responsible for the hostile environment sexual harassment committed by supervisors. It based this conclusion on two considerations:

(1) The “primary objective” of Title VII “is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” Therefore, it would “implement clear statutory policy and complement the government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability for misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it failed to provide employers with some such incentive.”

(2) Victims of sexual harassment should not be allowed to recover if they fail to “mitigate” their own damages. The Court referred to “the general theory of damages, that a victim has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages that result from violations of the statute.” For example, an employer may have implemented an effective procedure for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. Victims who fail to pursue the employer’s procedure should not recover damages that could have been avoided if they had done so. The Court concluded: “If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have avoided.”

The Supreme Court’s new rules

The court then announced the following rules for resolving employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors:

Rule #1 – general rule of employer liability. Employers are liable for the “hostile environment” sexual harassment of their supervisory employees having immediate (or “successively higher”) authority over the victim.

Rule #2 – the employer’s affirmative defense. When an employer takes no “tangible employment action” (such as hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work assignment) against a victim of a supervisor’s “hostile environment” sexual harassment, then the employer may raise the following two—part “affirmative defense” to liability: (a) the employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” usually through the implementation of an appropriate sexual harassment policy, and (b) the victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

The Supreme Court conceded that a sexual harassment policy may not be required in every case to qualify for this affirmative defense, but if left no doubt that such exceptions will be very rare. With regard to the second requirement of the affirmative defense, the Court noted that “while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”

Rule #3 – tangible employment actions. When an employer takes a “tangible employment action” (such as hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work assignment) against a victim of a supervisor’s “hostile environment” sexual harassment, then the employer is liable for that harassment and there is no affirmative defense available.

CASE #2-Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth: facts

A woman (the “victim”) worked as a salesperson for a large corporation. During her employment, she alleged that she was subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor. The supervisor had authority to make hiring and promotion decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, but his job was “not considered an upper—level management position” by his employer. He was not the victim’s immediate supervisor, but their work often put them in contact with each other. Against a background of repeated offensive remarks and gestures which the supervisor allegedly made, the victim placed special emphasis on three alleged incidents:

(1) While on a business trip, the supervisor invited her to the hotel lounge, an invitation she felt compelled to accept because he was her boss. When she gave no encouragement to his suggestive remarks, the supervisor told her to “loosen up” and warned, “[y]ou know, I could make your life very hard or very easy at [work].”

(2) When she was being considered for a promotion, the supervisor expressed reservations during the promotion interview because she was not “loose enough.” The comment was followed by his reaching over and rubbing her knee. The victim did receive the promotion.

(3) She called the supervisor about a job—related matter, and the supervisor responded: “Are you wearing shorter skirts yet, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot easier.”

After being employed for only a year, the victim quit. She sent a letter to her immediate supervisor explaining she quit because of the other supervisor’s behavior.

While employed, the victim did not inform anyone in authority about the supervisor’s conduct, despite knowing her employer had a policy against sexual harassment. In fact, she chose not to inform her immediate supervisor because “it would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents of sexual harassment.”

The victim sued her employer in federal court, arguing that it was legally responsible for the supervisor’s acts of sexual harassment and her resignation. A federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, noting that the supervisor’s behavior amounted to “hostile environment” sexual harassment, and that employers can be liable for this type of harassment only if they know of it. Since there was no evidence that the victim’s employer was aware of the supervisor’s behavior, the lawsuit had to be dismissed. The victim appealed. A federal appeals court ruled in favor of the victim. The employer appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The Court’s opinion

The Court began its opinion by observing that Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating against any employee or applicant “with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s sex.” It noted that over the years the courts have identified two types of sexual harassment-“quid pro quo” and hostile environment. “Quid pro quo” harassment refers to conditioning employment opportunities on submission to a sexual or social relationship, while “hostile environment” harassment refers to the creation of an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Because most courts assumed that an employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment” are adversely affected by quid pro quo sexual harassment, they concluded that employers are “vicariously liable” for this type of harassment, whether or not they were aware of it. However, most courts concluded that in the case of “hostile environment” sexual harassment, the impact on the victim’s “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment” was less clear. As a result, employers were liable for this kind of harassment only if it was “severe and pervasive” and they were knew that it was occurring.

The Court concluded that the harassment in this case was “hostile environment” rather than “quid pro quo” since no adverse employment action was ever taken against the victim as a result of her refusal to respond to the supervisor’s behavior. The question the Court then addressed was whether or not the employer was liable for this harassment. It observed: “We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat.” The Court reached the following three conclusions:

• Tangible employment decision. An employer is liable for a supervisor’s “hostile environment” sexual harassment if the supervisor “makes a tangible employment decision” involving the victim. A tangible employment action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” The reason an employer is liable in such cases is that “a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer.”

• No tangible employment decision. If a supervisor who engages in hostile environment sexual harassment takes no “tangible employment decision” against a victim (as was true in this case), the employer ordinarily will be liable for the harassment.

• The employer’s affirmative defense. If a supervisor who engages in hostile environment sexual harassment takes no “tangible employment decision” against a victim (as was true in this case), the employer may assert an “affirmative defense” to liability. This defense consists of two elements:

(i) The employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.” The Court noted that “[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an anti—harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”

(ii) The victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” The Court noted that an employee’s failure to use a complaint procedure provided by the employer “will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.”

Key point. Why did the Court provide employers with an “affirmative defense” to liability? It noted that Title VII “is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context … To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”

The Court sent the case back to the district court to determine whether or not the affirmative defense was available to the employer.

Relevance to churches

Church leaders must pay special attention to this case, since a decision by the United States Supreme Court is controlling in all states. With this in mind, note the following:

1. Are churches subject to Title VII? Sexual harassment is a form of “sex discrimination” prohibited by Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. Are churches covered by this law? That depends. Title VII only applies to employers that (1) have 15 or more employees, and (2) are engaged in interstate commerce. Note the following:

• Churches with fewer than 15 employees are not subject to this law.

• Churches with 15 or more employees are subject to this law if they are engaged in interstate commerce.

2. Two kinds of sexual harassment. The EEOC regulation quoted above demonstrate that there are at least two separate types of sexual harassment: (1) “Quid pro quo” harassment, which refers to conditioning employment opportunities on submission to a sexual or social relationship, or (2) “hostile environment” harassment, which refers to the creation of an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.

3. Employer liability. When is an employer liable for sexual harassment? The answer to this question is much clearer as a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions. Here is a summary of the new rules:

Rule #1 – quid pro quo harassment

If a supervisor conditions employment opportunities on an employee’s submission to a sexual or social relationship, and the employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment” are adversely affected because of a refusal to submit, this constitutes quid pro quo sexual harassment for which the employer will be legally responsible. This is true whether or not the employer was aware of the harassment.

Rule #2 – hostile environment harassment by a supervisor, with a tangible employment decision

If a supervisor creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, this is “hostile environment” sexual harassment for which the employer will be legally responsible if the supervisor takes any “tangible employment action” against the employee. A tangible employment action includes “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” The employer is liable under such circumstances whether or not it was aware of the harassment.

Rule #3 – hostile environment harassment by a supervisor, with no tangible employment decision

If a supervisor creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment through unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, this is “hostile environment” sexual harassment for which the employer will be legally responsible even if the supervisor takes no “tangible employment action” against the employee.

Rule #4 – the employer’s “affirmative defense” to liability for a supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment not accompanied by a tangible employment decision

If a supervisor engages in hostile environment sexual harassment but takes no “tangible employment decision” against a victim, the employer may assert an “affirmative defense” to liability. This defense consists of two elements:

(i) The employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.” This generally will mean that the employer has adopted a written sexual harassment policy that was communicated to employees, and that contains a complaint procedure.

(ii) The victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” This generally means that the victim failed to follow the complaint procedure described in the employer’s sexual harassment policy.

4. The importance of adopting a sexual harassment policy. It is now essential for any church having employees to adopt a sexual harassment policy, since this will now serve as a defense to liability for a supervisor’s acts of “hostile environment” sexual harassment to the extent that a victim of such harassment does not follow the policy.

Key point. A written sexual harassment policy does not insulate a church from all sexual harassment liability. It will not serve as a defense in any of these situations: (1) a “tangible employment decision” has been taken against an employee; (2) incidents of quid pro quo sexual harassment; or (3) a victim of a supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment pursues his or her remedies under the employer’s sexual harassment policy.

What terms should be included in a sexual harassment policy? Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not address this question directly. However, other courts have. Here is a list of some of the terms that should be incorporated into a written sexual harassment policy:

• Define sexual harassment (both quid pro quo and hostile environment) and state unequivocally that it will not be tolerated and that it will be the basis for immediate discipline (up to and including dismissal).

• Contain a procedure for filing complaints of harassment with the employer.

• Encourage victims to report incidents of harassment.

• ssure employees that complaints will be investigated promptly.

• Assure employees that they will not suffer retaliation for filing a complaint.

• Discuss the discipline applicable to persons who violate the policy.

• Assure the confidentiality of all complaints.

In addition to implementing a written sexual harassment policy, a church should also take the following steps:

• Communicate the written policy to all workers.

• Investigate all complaints immediately. Some courts have commented on the reluctance expressed by some male supervisors in investigating claims of sexual harassment. To illustrate, a federal appeals court observed: “Because women are disproportionately the victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.”

• Discipline employees who are found guilty of harassment. However, be careful not to administer discipline without adequate proof of harassment. Discipline not involving dismissal should be accompanied by a warning that any future incidents of harassment will not be tolerated and may result in immediate dismissal.

• Follow up by periodically asking the victim if there have been any further incidents of harassment.

Key point. EEOC guidelines referred to in the Supreme Court’s recent decision contain the following language: “Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”

Key point. The assistance of an attorney is vital in the drafting of a sexual harassment policy.

5. Consent is no defense. A woman’s “consent” is not a defense to an allegation of sexual harassment. The United States Supreme Court has observed: “[T]he fact that sex—related conduct was voluntary in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit …. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome …. The correct inquiry is whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.” In other words, a female employee may engage in voluntary sexual contact with a supervisor because of her belief that her job (or advancement) depends on it. While such contact would be voluntary, it is not necessarily welcome. Sexual harassment addresses unwelcome sexual contact, whether or not that contact is voluntary.

6. Insurance coverage. Church insurance policies generally do not cover employment related claims, including sexual harassment. If your church is sued for sexual harassment, you probably will need to retain and pay for your own attorney, and pay any judgment or settlement amount. This often comes as a shock to church leaders. You should immediately review your policy with your insurance agent to see if you have any coverage for such claims. If you do not, ask how it can be obtained. You may be able to obtain an endorsement for “employment practices.” Also, a “directors and officers” policy may cover these claims.

7. Absolute rule of employer liability rejected. The Supreme Court refused to adopt a rule that would make employers automatically liable for every act of sexual harassment committed by a supervisor. It acknowledged that some courts have ruled that “sexual assaults” by employees are within the “scope of employment,” and therefore the employer is legally responsible for them on the basis of the legal principle of “respondeat superior”. Under this principle, employers generally are responsible for the acts of employees committed within the scope of their employment. Most courts have concluded that sexual misconduct by employees is outside the scope of employment, and therefore the employer is not liable for it. But some courts have adopted a far broader view of “scope of employment” and found that sexual misconduct can meet this test. The Court squarely sided with those courts that have concluded that sexual misconduct is not in the “scope of employment,” and therefore the employer is not legally responsible for it. This is a significant conclusion, since it will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to successfully sue churches for the misconduct of church employees and volunteers. Here is what the Court said:

[T]here is no reason to suppose that Congress wished courts to ignore the traditional distinction between acts falling within the scope and acts amounting to what the older law called frolics or detours from the course of employment. Such a distinction can readily be applied to the spectrum of possible harassing conduct by supervisors, as the following examples show. First, a supervisor might discriminate racially in job assignments in order to placate the prejudice pervasive in the labor force. Instances of this variety of the heckler’s veto would be consciously intended to further the employer’s interests by preserving peace in the workplace. Next, supervisors might reprimand male employees for workplace failings with banter, but respond to women’s shortcomings in harsh or vulgar terms. A third example might be the supervisor who, as here, expresses his sexual interests in ways having no apparent object whatever of serving an interest of the employer. If a line is to be drawn between scope and frolic, it would lie between the first two examples and the third, and it thus makes sense in terms of traditional agency law to analyze the scope issue, in cases like the third example, just as most federal courts addressing that issue have done, classifying the harassment as beyond the scope of employment.

8. Sexual harassment under state law. As noted previously, churches that do not have at least 15 employees and that are not engaged in commerce are not subject to the sexual harassment prohibition under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this does not mean that they have no liability for sexual harassment. Most states have enacted their own civil rights laws that bar sexual harassment in employment, and it is far more likely that these laws will apply to churches since there is no “commerce” requirement and often fewer than 15 employees are needed to be covered by the law.

Victims of sexual harassment often prefer not to sue on the basis of Title VII even if their employer is covered under Title VII. The reason is that victims typically receive much higher awards of monetary damages in state court. Lawsuits brought under state law often allege that the employer is guilty of one or more of the following in addition to sexual harassment: (1) “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” (2) defamation, (3) negligent selection or supervision, (4) assault and battery, (5) loss of consortium, (6) invasion of privacy, (7) wrongful discharge, or (8) false imprisonment.

9. Examples. The following examples illustrate some of the more important aspects of the Court’s recent decisions.

Example. A church has 4 employees. A female employee believes that she has been subjected to sexual harassment, and threatens to contact the EEOC. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is prohibited in employment by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This law applies only to those employers having at least 15 employees and that are engaged in commerce. Since the church in this example has fewer than 15 employees, it is not subject to Title VII, and therefore the EEOC (which has jurisdiction over Title VII claims) will not be able to process the employee’s complaint.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church has 12 full—time employees and 6 part—time employees. The church meets the “15 employee” requirement (part—time employees are counted). The remaining question is whether or not the church is engaged in commerce. This question was addressed fully in the March—April 1998 edition of this newsletter. Note that the definition of “commerce” is a broad one, and it is likely that the church in this example will satisfy it.

Example. Assume that a church is covered by Title VII. A female bookkeeper claims that a male custodian has been sexually harassing her by creating a “hostile environment.” She does not discuss the custodian’s behavior with the senior pastor or church board. She later threatens to file a complaint with the EEOC, charging the church with responsibility for the custodian’s behavior. Since the harassment was not committed by a supervisor having the authority to affect the bookkeeper’s terms and conditions of employment, it was not addressed by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions. However, EEOC guidelines addressing employer liability for sexual harassment specify: “With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” If the pastor and church board were not aware of the custodian’s offensive behavior, then according to this regulation the church will not be legally responsible for it.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the bookkeeper complained on two occasions to the senior pastor about the custodian’s behavior. The pastor delayed acting because he did not believe the matter was serious. According to the EEOC regulations quoted in the previous example, it is likely that the church is liable for the custodian’s behavior since the pastor was aware of the offensive behavior but failed to take “immediate and appropriate corrective action.”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the pastor immediately informed the church board. The board conducted an investigation, determined the charges to be true on the basis of the testimony of other employees, and warned the custodian that one more complaint of harassing behavior would result in his dismissal. This action was based on the bookkeeper’s own recommendation. It is doubtful that the church will be liable for sexual harassment under these circumstances, since it took “immediate and appropriate corrective action.”

Example. A church is subject to Title VII. A female secretary claims that she was harassed frequently by a man who was frequently on church premises maintaining duplicating equipment. An EEOC regulation specifies that “[a]n employer may also be responsible for the acts of non—employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non—employees.”

Example. A church is subject to Title VII. A male supervisory employee informs a female employee that her continuing employment depends on engaging in sexual relations with him. This is an example of quid pro quo sexual harassment. The church is liable for such harassment by a supervisor whether or not it was aware of it. The fact that it had a written sexual harassment policy that prohibited such behavior will not relieve it from liability.

Example. A church is subject to Title VII. A male employee (with no supervisory authority) repeatedly asks another employee to go to dinner with him. This is not quid pro quo sexual harassment because the offending employee has no authority to affect the terms or conditions of the other employee’s work if she refuses to accept his invitations. If the offending employee’s behavior becomes sufficiently “severe and pervasive,” it may become hostile environment sexual harassment. However, the church generally is not liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by a non—supervisory employee unless it was aware of it and failed to take “immediate and appropriate corrective action.”

Example. A church is subject to Title VII. It adopts a written sexual harassment policy that defines harassment, encourages employees to report harassing behavior, and assures employees that they will not suffer retaliation for reporting harassment. A male supervisory employee engages in frequent offensive remarks and physical contact of a sexual nature with a female employee. The female employee is greatly disturbed by this behavior, and considers it inappropriate in a church. In fact, she had sought church employment because she considered it a safe environment and her job would be a ministry. The supervisor eventually dismisses the employee because of her refusal to “go along” with his offensive behavior. Throughout her employment, the employee never informed church leadership of the supervisor’s behavior. Several months after her termination, the employee files a sexual harassment complaint with the EEOC. Will the church be liable for the supervisor’s behavior under these circumstances? After all, it was not aware of the supervisor’s behavior and it adopted a written sexual harassment policy. The supervisor’s behavior constituted “hostile environment” sexual harassment for which the church will be liable. The fact that the church leadership was unaware of his offensive behavior is not relevant. Further, the church’s sexual harassment policy is no defense, since the employee suffered a “tangible employment decision” (dismissal) as a result of her refusal to go along with the supervisor’s behavior.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the employee was not dismissed and suffered no “tangible employment decision” (firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits). According to the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, the general rule is that an employer is liable for a supervisor’s “hostile environment” sexual harassment that does not result in a tangible employment decision against the victim. However, the employer has an “affirmative defense” to liability if (1) it adopted a sexual harassment policy that was adequately communicated to employees, and (2) the victim failed to pursue her remedies under the policy. The church in this case qualifies for the affirmative defense. It adopted a sexual harassment policy, and the victim failed to follow the policy’s complaint procedure. As a result, the church probably would not be liable for the supervisor’s behavior.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church is not subject to Title VII (it only has 5 employees). The church still may be liable under a state civil rights law, or under other legal theories (such as “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” negligent selection or supervision, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, or false imprisonment).

Example. A church is subject to Title VII. It has not adopted a written sexual harassment policy. A female employee files a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that a supervisor has engaged in hostile environment sexual harassment. She never informed church leadership of the supervisor’s behavior before filing her complaint with the EEOC. The church will be responsible for the supervisor’s behavior under these circumstances. It does not qualify for the “affirmative defense” because it failed to implement a sexual harassment policy.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church had adopted a written sexual harassment policy that was communicated to all employees. The church will have an “affirmative defense” to liability under these circumstances, because it adopted a sexual harassment policy and the victim failed to follow it by filing a complaint. These two examples demonstrate the importance of implementing a sexual harassment policy. Such a policy can insulate a church from liability for a supervisor’s hostile environment sexual harassment-if no “tangible employment decision” was taken against the victim, and the victim failed to pursue his or her remedies under the policy.

Example. A woman was hired as an associate pastor of a church in Minnesota. A year later, she filed a discrimination charge with the state department of human rights against her supervising pastor. She claimed that her supervising pastor repeatedly made unwelcome sexual advances toward her. He allegedly referred to themselves as “lovers,” physically contacted her in a sexual manner, and insisted on her companionship outside the work place despite her objections. The woman informed her local church leaders as well as her synod before filing the complaint with the state. Although the church and synod investigated the woman’s allegations, no action was taken to stop the alleged harassment. Less than three months after the complaint was filed with the state, the church held a congregational meeting at which it voted to dismiss the woman as pastor. The reason stated for the discharge was the woman’s “inability to conduct the pastoral office efficiently in this congregation in view of local conditions.” A state appeals court ruled that the woman could sue her former supervising pastor for sexual harassment. The court also rejected the supervising pastor’s claim that the woman was prevented from suing because she had “consented” to the supervising pastor’s conduct. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1991).

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Assignment of Income Doctrine

Tax Court ruling of special interest to church treasurers.

Ferguson v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 244 (1997)

Background. Donors occasionally attempt to “assign” their right to receive income to a church, assuming that they are avoiding any receipt of taxable income.

Example. Rev. T is senior pastor of First Church. He conducts a service at Second Church, and is offered compensation of $500. Rev. T refuses to accept any compensation, and asks the pastor of Second Church to put the $500 in the church’s building fund. Rev. T, and the treasurer at Second Church, assume that there is no income to report. Unfortunately, they may be wrong.

The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in a landmark ruling in 1940. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The Horst case addressed the question of whether or not a father could avoid taxation on bond interest coupons that he transferred to his son prior to the maturity date. The Supreme Court ruled that the father had to pay tax on the interest income even though he assigned all of his interest in the income to his son. It observed: “The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment and hence the realization of the income by him who exercises it.” The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in two other landmark cases. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).

Example. A taxpayer earned an honorarium of $2,500 for speaking at a convention. He requested that the honorarium be distributed to a college. This request was honored, and the taxpayer assumed that he did not have to report the $2,500 as taxable income since he never received it. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer should have reported the $2,500 as taxable income. It noted that “the amount of the honorarium transferred to the educational institution at the taxpayer’s request … is includible in the taxpayer’s gross income [for tax purposes]. However, the taxpayer is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction ….” The IRS further noted that “the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a taxpayer who assigns or transfers compensation for personal services to another individual or entity fails to be relieved of federal income tax liability, regardless of the motivation behind the transfer” (citing the Horst case discussed above). Revenue Ruling 79 121.

A recent Tax Court ruling. The Tax Court has issued an important ruling addressing the assignment of income to a church. Don owned several shares of stock in Company A. On July 28, Company A agreed to merge with Company B. Pursuant to the merger agreement, Company B offered to purchase all outstanding shares of Company A for $22.50 per share (an 1,100% increase over book value). On August 15, Don informed his stockbroker that he wanted to donate 30,000 shares of Company A to his church. On September 8 Don deposited 30,000 shares in his brokerage account and on September 9 signed an authorization directing his broker to transfer the shares to his church. A few days later the church issued Don a receipt acknowledging the contribution. The receipt listed the “date of donation” as September 9. The church sold all of the shares to Company B for $22.50 per share. Don claimed a charitable contribution deduction for $675,000 (30,000 shares at $22.50 per share). He did not report any taxable income in connection with the transaction..

The IRS audited Don, and conceded that a gift of stock had been made to the church. It insisted, however, that Don should have reported the “gain” in the value of his stock that was transferred to the church. Not so, said Don. After all, he never realized or “enjoyed” the gain, but rather transferred the shares to the church to enjoy.

The IRS asserted that Don had a legal right to redeem his Company A shares at $22.50 per share at the time he transferred the shares to the church. As a result, Don had “assigned income” to the church, and could not avoid being taxed on it.

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS. It began its opinion by addressing the date of Don’s gift. Did the gift to the church occur before he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share for his Company A stock? If so, there was no income that had been assigned and no tax to be paid. Or, did Don’s gift occur after he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share? If so, Don had “assigned income” to the church and he would have to pay tax on the gain. The court concluded that Don’s gift occurred after he had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share. It quoted the following income tax regulation addressing the timing of gifts of stock:

Ordinarily, a contribution is made at the time delivery is effected …. If a taxpayer unconditionally delivers or mails a properly endorsed stock certificate to a charitable donee or the donee’s agent, the gift is completed on the date of delivery or, if such certificate is received in the ordinary course of the mails, on the date of mailing. If the donor delivers the stock certificate to his bank or broker as the donor’s agent, or to the issuing corporation or its agent, for transfer into the name of the donee, the gift is completed on the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.

The critical issue was whether Don’s broker was acting as Don’s agent or the church’s agent in handling the transaction. The court concluded that the broker had acted as Don’s agent. The broker “facilitated” Don’s gift of stock to the church, and was acting on the basis of Don’s instructions. The court concluded:

[Don has] failed to persuade us that depositing stock in his brokerage account with instructions to [the stockbroker] to transfer some of the stock to the [church] constituted the unconditional delivery of stock to a charitable donee’s agent …. [Don] has failed to persuade us that depositing stock in [his] brokerage account with instructions to [his stockbroker] to transfer some of the stock to the [church] constituted the unconditional delivery of stock to a charitable donee’s agent pursuant to [the regulations] …. Based on the circumstances surrounding the gift … we believe that [the stockbroker] acted as [Don’s] agent in the transfer of the stock and that [he] relinquished control of the stock on September 9 when the letters of authorization were executed, and we so find. The gift to the [church], therefore, was complete on September 9.

The court concluded that on the date of the gift (September 9) Don had a legal right to receive $22.50 per share for all his shares of Company A, and therefore his gift to the church was a fully taxable “assignment of income.” The court observed:

It is a well-established principle of the tax law that the person who earns or otherwise creates the right to receive income is taxed. When ]the right to income has matured at the time of a transfer of property, the transferor will be taxed despite the technical transfer of that property …. An examination of the cases that discuss the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine reveals settled principles. A transfer of property that is a fixed right to income does not shift the incidence of taxation to the transferee …. [T]he ultimate question is whether the transferor, considering the reality and substance of all the circumstances, had a fixed right to income in the property at the time of transfer.

The court concluded that Don did have a “fixed right to income” at the time he donated the 30,000 shares to his church. According to the terms of the merger agreement between Company A and Company B, each outstanding share of Company A was “converted” into a right to receive $22.50 per share in cash. In essence, the stock in Company A “was converted from an interest in a viable corporation to a fixed right to receive cash.”

Conclusions. Here are a few principles for church treasurers to consider:

* Charitable contribution reporting. Note that the “assignment of income” doctrine does not bar recognition of a charitable contribution. Both the Tax Court and IRS conceded that Don was eligible for a charitable contribution deduction as a result of his gift of stock.

* Timing of a gift of stock. This case will provide helpful guidance to church treasurers in determining the date of a gift of stock. The income tax regulations (quoted above) contain the following three rules:

(1) Hand delivery. if a donor unconditionally delivers an endorsed stock certificate to a charity or an agent of a charity, the gift is completed on the date of delivery

(2) Mail. if a donor mails an endorsed stock certificate to a charity or an agent of a charity, the gift is completed on the date of mailing

(3) Delivery to an agent. if a donor delivers a stock certificate to his or her bank or stockbroker as the donor’s agent (or to the issuing corporation or its agent) for transfer into the name of a charity, the gift is completed on the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation

* Notification of income consequences. While certainly not required, church treasurers may want to inform some donors about the assignment of income doctrine. It often comes as a shock to donors (such as Don) to discover that their charitable contribution is “offset” by the taxable income recognized under the assignment of income doctrine. Assignments of income most often occur in connection with donations of stock rights or compensation for services already performed.

* Gifts of appreciated stock not affected. Many donors give stock that has appreciated in value to their church. Such transactions are not affected by the court’s ruling or by the assignment of income doctrine because the donor ordinarily has no “fixed right to income” at the time of transfer. Don’s case was much different. He had a contractual right to receive $22.50 per share for all of his shares of Company A stock as a result of the merger.

Key point. Persons who donate stock often can deduct the fair market value of the stock as a charitable contribution (there are some important limitations to this rule) and they have no “assigned income” to report.

Example. Jill is employed by a local business. Her company declares a $1,000 Christmas bonus. Jill asks her supervisor to send the bonus directly to her church. The supervisor does so. The church treasurer should be aware of the following: (1) Jill will be taxed on the bonus under the assignment of income doctrine. The church treasurer may want to point this out to Jill, although this is not required. There is no need for the church to report this income, or issue Jill a W-2 or 1099. (2) Jill should be given credit for a charitable contribution in the amount of the bonus. Since the bonus was in excess of $250 the receipt issued by the church should comply with the charitable contribution substantiation rules that apply to contributions of $250 or more.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Responding to Allegations of Child Molestation

A Washington state court issues in important ruling-Funkhouser v. Wilson, 950 P.2d 501 (Wash. App. 1998)

Church Law and Tax1998-07-01

Responding to Allegations of Child Molestation

A Washington state court issues in important ruling-Funkhouser v. Wilson, 950 P.2d 501 (Wash. App. 1998)
[ Corporations, Church Officers, Directors, and Trustees,Negligence as a Basis for Liability ]

Article summary. A Washington state court ruled that a church and a member of the church board could be sued by three women who had been molested by a volunteer youth worker when they were minors. The board member had received information indicating that the worker was a child molester, but failed to disclose this information for twenty—three years. The court found that the church had a “special relationship” with minors that imposed upon it a duty to protect them from the criminal and intentional acts of others. This feature article addresses this important ruling and its relevance to church leaders.

A woman calls your church and asks to speak with “someone in authority.” The pastor is out—of—town, so the church secretary refers the caller to a member of the church board who happens to be at the church. The caller informs the board member that a volunteer youth worker in the church is a child molester, and she urges the board member to have the volunteer removed from any position involving contact with children. The board member does not disclose this call to the pastor, the church board, or any other person. Over the next few years the volunteer worker molests the pastor’s three minor daughters. Is the board member legally responsible for the girls’ injuries? What about the church? These were some of the questions addressed by a Washington state court in an important case. This feature article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and evaluate the significance of the case to other churches.

Facts

In 1968 a member of the church board who also served as the church’s youth director (“David”) was at the church when the church secretary received a call from an unknown woman who asked to speak with someone in a position of authority. Since the pastor was not in his office the secretary asked David to take the call. The woman informed the board member that a prominent church leader (“Bob”) who had served as a member of the board of deacons, Sunday School teacher, and vacation Bible school director, was a child molester. The purpose of her call was to warn the church that Bob posed a risk of harm to children in the congregation. David advised the woman to file charges with the police, and asked that she “keep the church informed.” He did not inform anyone of the woman’s accusation until some twenty—three years later. However, he was concerned enough about what the woman told him that he felt it was his duty as the church’s youth director to “keep an eye” on Bob.

In 1969 the church employed a new pastor who had three minor daughters. Between 1969 and 1973 the two older girls were repeatedly molested by Bob. Most of these acts occurred in Bob’s home where he and his wife served as “babysitters” for the girls while the pastor and his wife traveled on church—related business. David was aware of the babysitting arrangement, but said nothing to the pastor regarding the risk Bob posed to the girls.

In 1974 the pastor and his family moved to another state to accept another pastoral position. During this time the church’s new pastor (the “successor pastor”) received information from Bob’s daughter—in—law that Bob had sexually molested his granddaughter in 1974. The successor pastor also learned from the sheriff’s office that a warrant had been issued for Bob’s arrest on charges of child molestation. The successor pastor immediately called a state denominational agency and asked an official what he should do with this information. The official allegedly advised him to “let it be and see what happens.” He also asked the successor pastor to keep him informed. In response to the successor’s question about removing Bob from the church board, the official replied “why hang your dirty wash out?” Neither the successor pastor nor the denominational official with whom he had spoken ever told anyone in the local church that Bob was a child molester.

In 1978 the former pastor and his family returned to their previous congregation. By this time the pastor’s two older daughters had grown up and moved away from home. The youngest daughter was eleven years old. Like her sisters, she was repeatedly molested by Bob in his home and on at least one occasion on church premises.

The sisters claimed that they “suppressed” their memories of Bob’s abuse for many years. In 1991 the youngest sister became fully aware of the abuse in the course of psychological counseling. She and her sisters then informed their father of the countless times they had been molested. It was only then, some twenty—two years after the first incidents of molestation occurred, that their father learned the truth. The pastor disclosed the allegations to David out of a concern that David’s own daughters may have been molested. David then disclosed the telephone call he had received from the woman some twenty—three years ago. The pastor and his daughters then learned that the successor pastor and the denominational agency had become aware of Bob’s propensities but did nothing to intervene.

In 1994 the three sisters sued David, the church, and the denominational agency that had counseled the successor pastor about Bob.

David (the church board member)

The sisters claimed that David was liable on two grounds. First, he had received information that Bob “had a prior history of child sexual abuse but negligently failed to investigate in order to substantiate the accusation against him, or to prevent him from being installed in church leadership positions that gave [him] unlimited access to and significant authority over children of the church.” Second, David “negligently and intentionally” failed to warn the girls’ father about Bob, thereby preventing him from protecting his daughters.

The local church

The sisters claimed that their church “negligently failed to protect them from abuse” despite David’s knowledge of Bob’s history of child abuse.

The denominational agency

The youngest sister claimed that the denominational agency “negligently failed to protect her” from Bob’s sexual abuse despite knowing of his disposition to sexually abuse children.

A trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and the sisters appealed.

The court’s decision

The court’s decision addressed a fundamental question-can an individual or church ever be legally responsible for not disclosing the dangerous propensities of another person? Consider the following examples:

Example. A mother informs a member of the church board that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The board member does nothing about the allegation. The same volunteer later molests another child. Is the board member legally responsible for the injuries suffered by the second victim? Did the board member have a legal duty to protect other children from harm?

Example. A church member informs her pastor that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The pastor confronts the youth worker, who leaves the church. A few weeks later the pastor learns that the youth worker has begun working with children in another church. The other church never asks the pastor for a reference or any other information concerning the youth worker. The pastor is concerned, but does not contact the other church. Later in the year it is disclosed that the youth worker molested a child in the other church. Is the pastor legally responsible for this incident? Did the pastor have a legal duty to inform the other church of the youth worker’s prior misconduct so that it could protect children from harm?

These are questions of fundamental importance to church leaders, and they were addressed directly by the court in this case.

The court began its opinion by noting that “as a general rule, there is no legal duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person.” However, it referred to two exceptions to this general rule:

(1) Special relationship. A church may have a duty to prevent a third person from causing physical harm to another if (i) a “special relationship” exists between the church and the third person which imposes upon the church a duty to control the third person’s conduct, or (ii) a “special relationship” exists between the church and the victim which imposes upon the church a duty to “protect” the victim from harm.

(2) Duty to warn. A church or church leader may be negligent by failing to warn another church that an individual represents a risk of harm to others, if the church or church leader should recognize that the failure to warn “involves an unreasonable risk of harm” to others-even if the risk involves criminal conduct. Since the court concluded that David, the church, and the denominational agency were liable on the basis of a “special relationship,” it did not determine whether or not they were also liable on the basis of a failure to warn.

special relationship-between the defendants and Bob

Did a “special relationship” exist between any of the three defendants (David, the church, and denominational agency) and Bob? If so, that defendant had a legal duty to control Bob’s conduct. If this duty was violated by failing to adequately control Bob, then the defendant would be liable for Bob’s acts of molestation.

The court noted that a “duty to control” will be imposed “only upon a showing of a definite, established and continuing relationship between the defendant and the [wrongdoer],” and that “cases in which such a duty has been established … have uniformly involved situations where the person charged with the duty of control has some sort of legal authority to control the [wrongdoer’s] conduct.”

The sisters insisted that a special relationship did exist between the three defendants and Bob which imposed upon the church a duty to “control” him. They pointed out that Bob was a “deacon” of his church, and then noted that the church constitution “recited the obligations of church members and leaders to comply with the highest standards of behavior and deportment, including the obligation to nurture those under their care and to live exemplary lifestyles.” According to the church constitution, deacons are to be “men of dignity [and] beyond reproach.” The pastor and deacons are charged with the responsibility of interviewing and disciplining members who violate their Christian obligations. The constitution contains provisions for formal disciplinary proceedings. The sisters further noted that the deacon board was expected to address issues concerning the welfare of the children in the church and to warn church members about dangers or risks presented by any church members who were “wayward or destructive in their actions (if such a situation were to arise).” They insisted that David and the church, by virtue of the church constitution, “voluntarily assumed a duty which included active intervention if one of the church members became a source of danger to other church members.”

The court rejected the sisters’ arguments, and concluded that neither David, the church, nor the denominational agency exercised sufficient control over Bob to create a “special relationship” that would impose a duty to control his behavior. Among other things, the court pointed out that the church’s disciplinary process could be triggered only upon receipt of a formal, written charge of misconduct. The woman’s telephone call in 1968 did not satisfy this requirement. Further, the church’s alleged “control” over Bob “was weaker than the usual employer—employee relationship would allow.”

Special relationship-between the defendants and the three sisters

The court noted that there is a second exception to the general rule that a church (or any other person or institution) has no legal duty to protect others from criminal acts of third persons. While a special relationship did not exist between the defendants and Bob imposing upon the defendants a duty to control his behavior, a special relationship also could arise between the defendants and the three sisters which would impose upon them a legal duty to protect the sisters from harm. If such a special relationship existed, then it may have been violated by the failure of the defendants to investigate or disclose Bob’s background. In other words, does a special relationship exist between churches and children who participate in their programs and activities? The court concluded that such a relationship did exist:

[W]e believe that churches and the adult church workers who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children of the congregation, whether as paid clergy or as volunteers, have a special relationship with those children that gives rise to a duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over them. In each of the protective special relationships considered by the Washington courts to date, one party has, in some sense, been entrusted with the well being of another. The entrustment aspect is what appears to us to underlie the imposition of the additional duty to protect someone from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.

The church then rejected the following defenses offered by David and the church:

(1) Courts should not apply contemporary understandings of child abuse to incidents occurring many years ago. David and the church insisted that much more is understood today about child sexual abuse than was understood in 1968 when the church received the telephone call concerning Bob. They also claimed that the information given by the caller was ambiguous, and that David reasonably could have believed that Bob was being accused only of having made unwanted advances of an immoral nature to a teenage girl rather than of molesting a child. The court was not convinced, noting that David was alarmed enough by the call to “keep an eye” on Bob for the protection of children in the church. Further, the court concluded that the call was not “anonymous” since the woman identified herself by name and expressed concern for the safety of children in the church.

(2) There was nothing the church could have done with the information provided by the telephone call in 1968. David and the church claimed that there is little they could have done with the information provided by the caller in 1968 since it was not a written accusation that would have triggered the possibility of formal disciplinary action under the church’s bylaws. And, they insisted that they could have been sued for defamation had they issued any warnings to the congregation based on the content of the telephone call. The court disagreed, noting that there would have been no defamation had David or the church warned the pastor that his daughters were in danger while Bob was serving as their babysitter.

(3) Most if not all of the molestation occurred in Bob’s home, and not on church premises. David and the church pointed out at least two of the daughters were never molested on church property or in the course of any church activity. The court did not consider this relevant. It noted that the daughters were alleging that the defendants were liable because they breached the duty of protection that arose as a result of the special relationship between the daughters and their church. The fact that the daughters were molested in Bob’s home did not matter. The court observed:

[T]he duty of reasonable care was breached when [David] not only failed to notify [the pastor] of the warning [he] had received but also failed to take any action that would have prevented [Bob] from continuing to serve in leadership roles in the church that gave him responsibility for the spiritual well being of the children of the congregation and that may have inspired trust by parents and children alike in [Bob’s] morality. There is also evidence in the record that [David] knew that [the pastor] had called upon [Bob] to baby—sit the [daughters] so that the pastor could travel on church business; yet he failed to warn [the pastor] that [Bob] might be a child molester.

Statute of limitations

The trial court had dismissed the claims of the youngest daughter on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Washington has a three—year statute of limitations for negligence cases, although the statute does not begin to run for injuries occurring to minors until their eighteenth birthday. The appeals court conceded that the youngest daughter’s lawsuit had been filed more than three years after her eighteenth birthday, but it insisted that she was protected by the so—called “discovery rule.” Under the discovery rule a lawsuit does not “accrue” (and the statute of limitations does not begin to run) until a person “knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, all the essential elements of the cause of action.”

The court acknowledged that the youngest daughter had always recalled some of the acts of abuse against her and had always known that they harmed her to some extent. The church and denominational agency argued that because she always remembered some of the acts and corresponding injuries, the statute of limitations began running when she turned eighteen. The court disagreed:

The issue, however, is not when [the daughter] discovered [Bob’s] intentional tort, but when she discovered or should have discovered the elements of her negligence claims against the [defendants]. This, in turn, depended on her finding out that information about [Bob’s] history of sexually molesting children had been given to the [defendants] on two separate occasions before she was molested, and that they failed to warn her father or otherwise take reasonable steps to protect her from abuse by [Bob] ….

[T]he same factors that are likely to delay recognition of the full extent of injury inflicted by the perpetrator of sexual abuse are likely to delay discovery that the abuse might have been prevented if persons having a special relationship with the child had not breached a duty to protect the child from the abuse. Here, there is evidence that although [the youngest daughter] always knew that [Bob] had molested her, she suppressed the memory of the worst of the abuse until she was in therapy. Only after receiving therapy was she able to disclose the abuse to her father. Her disclosure to her father led to the discovery of her cause of action against the [defendants] only by happenstance. [The pastor] disclosed the abuse to [David] because he was concerned for the welfare of [David’s] daughters; he did not set out to discover a cause of action by his daughters against the [defendants] or any of them by making that initial disclosure. Indeed, we believe that a [jury] could conclude that the failure of church leaders to take reasonable steps to protect children of the congregation from sexual abuse by another church leader whom they believe to have molested even one child, let alone more than one, is so far beyond the pale of expected human behavior that due diligence simply does not require that an inquiry be made as to whether church leadership concealed their knowledge instead of taking reasonable steps to protect the children of the congregation.

The court rejected the defendants’ claim that the daughter failed to exercise due diligence by failing to inform her father of the abuse: “We decline to rule as a matter of law that [she] failed to exercise due diligence by failing to disclose the abuse to her father until 1991. The [defendants] may wish to make that argument to a jury, if they can find no more logical basis for arguing a lack of due diligence, but we are not persuaded as a matter of law that [the daughter] failed to exercise due diligence.”

Significance of the case to other churches

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? A decision by a Washington state appeals court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. Personal liability of board members for failing to act. The most important aspect of this case was the court’s conclusion that churches as well as “adult church workers” have a “special relationship” with children that gives rise to a “duty to protect” those children from harm. The court observed:

[W]e believe that churches and the adult church workers who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children of the congregation, whether as paid clergy or as volunteers, have a special relationship with those children that gives rise to a duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over them.

This is an extraordinary conclusion. It exposes church leaders to liability for failing to protect children against “reasonably foreseeable risks of harm” by volunteer or paid youth workers. In this case, David (the church board member) could be sued because he breached his duty to protect the three girls from the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm associated with Bob. Of course, the church can be sued in such cases too. But the critical point is that those church leaders “who assume responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” have a duty to protect children and they can be personally liable for breaching that duty.

Key point. Basing personal liability on a failure to protect children from foreseeable harm makes the location of acts of child molestation irrelevant. Most of the incidents in this case occurred in Bob’s home. The court concluded that this did not affect David’s responsibility for the girls’ injuries.

Let’s address each of the examples presented earlier in this article in light of this ruling:

Example. A mother informs a member of the church board that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The board member does nothing about the allegation. The same volunteer later molests another child. Is the board member legally responsible for the injuries suffered by the second victim? According to the Washington court’s decision, the answer is probably yes. The board member likely has “assumed responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” as a member of the church board, and this responsibility gave rise to a “duty to protect” children in the church from any “reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over [children].” It is possible if not likely that any court following the Washington court’s ruling would conclude that this duty was breached by the board member’s failure to intervene after being informed by a mother that her minor child had been molested by the volunteer youth worker.

Example. A church member informs her pastor that her minor child was molested by a volunteer youth worker at a church activity. The pastor confronts the youth worker, who leaves the church. A few weeks later the pastor learns that the youth worker has begun working with children in another church. The other church never asks the pastor for a reference or any other information concerning the youth worker. The pastor is concerned, but does not contact the other church. Later in the year it is disclosed that the youth worker molested a child in the other church. Is the pastor legally responsible for this incident? According to the Washington court’s decision, the answer is probably yes. The pastor likely has “assumed responsibility for the spiritual well being of children” as a result of his position in the church, and this responsibility gave rise to a “duty to protect” children in the church from any “reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over [children].” It is possible if not likely that any court following the Washington court’s ruling would conclude that this duty was breached by the pastor’s failure to intervene after being informed by the parent that her minor child had been molested by the volunteer youth worker.

2. Avoiding personal liability. What steps can church leaders take to reduce the risk of personal liability after receiving information suggesting that a youth worker poses a risk of harm to children in the church? The court responded to this question as follows:

[T]he duty of reasonable care was breached when [David] not only failed to notify [the pastor] of the warning [he] had received but also failed to take any action that would have prevented [Bob] from continuing to serve in leadership roles in the church that gave him responsibility for the spiritual well being of the children of the congregation and that may have inspired trust by parents and children alike in [Bob’s] morality. There is also evidence in the record that [David] knew that [the pastor] had called upon [Bob] to baby—sit the [daughters] so that the pastor could travel on church business; yet he failed to warn [the pastor] that [Bob] might be a child molester.

In summary, the court concluded that a board member (such as David) can satisfy the “duty to protect” children and avoid personal liability by:

• warning potential victims (or their parents), and

• “preventing” an alleged molester from working with children in the church

3. What about defamation claims? The court rejected the argument that “notifying” potential victims of a known risk would be defamatory. It concluded that notifying the pastor that his three girls were being exposed to risk by their association with Bob would not be defamatory-presumably because only one person was being informed.

4. Is there a duty to inform the entire congregation? As so often happens, the court’s decision left unanswered a few critical questions. One of those questions is whether or not church leaders should “notify” an entire congregation that a known or suspected child molester is in their midst. For example, what if a person with a prior conviction for child molestation wants to teach Sunday School? Or, what if such a person merely wants to attend the church? Are board members and pastors personally responsible for this person’s actions unless they notify the entire congregation of his background? This is a very difficult question. Note that the court concluded that the risk of liability can be reduced if church leaders refuse to permit such a person to work with children in the church. In addition, the court suggested that church leaders can reduce the risk of liability by notifying individual victims or their parents. If the potential molester is not allowed to work with children in the church this will minimize the need for notification. However, as this case illustrates, it may not eliminate it altogether. Remember that most of Bob’s acts of molestation occurred off of church premises in his own home. Yet, the court found David (the board member) personally liable because of his failure to notify the victims’ father. What does this mean? It suggests that church leaders who are aware that a known or suspected child molester is “babysitting” or entertaining children from the church in his home have a duty to notify the children’s parents of the risk of harm. This is exactly what David failed to do, and he was found personally liable because of it.

Further, note that the risk of defamation of invasion of privacy is reduced if not eliminated if parents are informed only of a criminal conviction that is a matter of public record.

Key point. Church leaders should consult with an attorney before disclosing to anyone that a known or suspected child molester poses a risk of harm.

5. The church’s constitution or bylaws. The court rejected the victims’ attempt to impute liability to the church and David on the basis of the church constitution. The victims pointed out that the church constitution called upon members to comply with the highest standards of behavior, and charged the board with responsibility for disciplining members who violate those standards. A specific procedure for disciplining members also was set forth in the constitution. The court concluded that these provisions were not sufficient to impose liability on David or the church for Bob’s actions. It noted that the church’s disciplinary process could be triggered only upon receipt of a formal, written charge of misconduct, and that the woman’s telephone call in 1968 did not satisfy this requirement.

This conclusion will be good news for many churches. It is common for church constitutions to contain similar provisions, and this case will be helpful in rebutting any attempt to use such provisions as a basis for church liability.

6. The “discovery rule.” Another aspect of the court’s ruling that should be of special interest to church leaders is its expansive interpretation of the statute of limitations. Even though the youngest daughter was well aware of her injuries on her eighteenth birthday, the court ruled that the statute of limitations did not begin to “run” until she became aware of the legal basis for her claims against David and the church. This did not occur until she learned of the information that had been communicated with David about the alleged risk that Bob presented. Only then did she “discover” her legal claim, and so it was then that the statute of limitations began to run.

This ruling greatly extends the statute of limitations on child molestation claims-at least when church leaders fail to disclose or act upon information that a youth worker is a known or suspected child molester.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m67 m86 m56 m10 c0498

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

What Church Treasurers Should Know about IRS Form 8282

Part 2 – your church transfers donated property to another church or charity

Background. In last month’s Church Treasurer Alert! we addressed Form 8282, and we learned that churches should file this form if they meet the following requirements: (1) a donor makes a contribution of noncash property to the church that is valued at more than $5,000 (other than publicly traded securities); (2) the donor presented the church with a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) for signature; (3) the church sells, exchanges, consumes, or otherwise disposes of the donated property within two years of the date of contribution; (4) the church did not consume the donated property or distribute it without charge to another organization or individual in furtherance of the church’s tax-exempt purposes.

Last month’s issue assumed that your church received the donated property directly from the original donor, and disposed of it within two years of the date of the contribution. There are two additional situations that need to be addressed—what happens if your church transfers donated property to another church, and what if your church receives donated property not from the original donor but from another church? These two issues will be addressed in turn.

Your church transfers the property to another church. Your church may decide to transfer donated property to another church or charity. This can happen in three ways. First, you sell the property to the other church or charity. Second, you give the property to the other church or charity in a way that does not further your own exempt purposes. Third, you give the property to the other church or charity in a way that does further your exempt purposes. Church treasurers need to be familiar with how the Form 8282 reporting rules apply in each of these cases.

(1) Your church sells the property to another church or charity. Your church will need to file a Form 8282 with the IRS (assuming the conditions summarized above are met). See last month’s newsletter for the details. There are no additional requirements. You do not need to share any information with the other church, and it does not need to file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the original donor’s contribution to your church.

(2) Your church donates the property to another church or charity—not in furtherance of your church’s exempt purposes. In some cases a church receives donated property from the original donor and then gives it to another church or charity in a transaction that does not further its exempt purposes. To illustrate, assume that your church receives a donated car from a member and you give the car to a local charity that is not organized for the same exempt purposes as your church. You are required to file Form 8282 if you donate the car to the other charity within two years of receiving it from the original donor (assuming the conditions summarized above are met). Note that you will complete all of Part 1 (you identify the other charity on lines 2a-2d). In addition, you are required to give the other charity the following information:

  • The name, address, and employer identification number of your church. In general, this information must be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).
  • A copy of the qualified appraisal summary (the Form 8283 you received from the original donor). In general, this information must be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).
  • A copy of the Form 8282 that your church filed with the IRS within 15 days after you file it.

(3) Your church donates the property to another church or charity—in furtherance of your church’s exempt purposes. Your church may receive donated property from the original donor and then give it to another church in furtherance of your exempt purposes. In such a case your church is exempted from the Form 8282 filing requirement (see last month’s article). To illustrate, assume that your church receives a donated car from a member and you give the car to another church that is financially needy. Since this donation directly furthers your religious purposes, your church is not required to file Form 8282. The instructions to Form 8282 specify that “you do not have to file Form 8282 if an item is … distributed, without consideration, in fulfilling your purpose of function as a tax-exempt organization.”

But what about the other church? Is it exempted from the Form 8282 filing requirement? Unfortunately, the tax code, regulations, case law, and instructions to Form 8282 do not address this issue directly. The instructions to Form 8282 simply state that a “successor donee” must file a Form 8282 if it disposes of donated property within two years of the date of the original contribution. But the instructions assume that you gave the other charity a copy of your Form 8282 within 15 days after you filed it with the IRS. The problem is that your church was not required to file a Form 8282 and so there is no form to give the other church and the “15 day” requirement has no meaning.

Until further clarification is provided by the IRS, the best answer is that the other church is subject to the Form 8282 filing requirement if it disposes of the car within two years of the date it was given to your church by the original donor. You should provide the other church with the following information to assist it in complying with this requirement:

  • A copy of the qualified appraisal summary (the Form 8283 you received from the original donor).
  • An “unofficial” copy of Form 8282. Identify your church at the top of the form and then complete all of Part I and Part III. “Unofficial” means that your church did not file the form with the IRS.

In general, this information should be provided to the successor charity within 15 days after the later of (1) the date you transferred the property, or (2) the date you signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B).

Your church receives property from another church. What are your reporting obligations if you receive donated property from another church or charity? That will depend on the circumstances. Consider the following:

(1) Your church purchased property donated to another church or charity. Assume that John donated property to First Church, and that First Church sold the property to your church within two years after receiving it from John. First Church would need to file a Form 8282 with the IRS (assuming that the conditions summarized above are met). But your church is not required to file a Form 8282 even it disposes of the property within two years after the date of John’s original gift.

(2) Another church gives donated property to your church, but not in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The other church should file a Form 8282 if it transfers the property to your church within two years of the date it received the donated property (and the other conditions summarized above are met). Your church has the following obligations:

  • First, it must file Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the date it was given to the other church by the original donor. Of course, as noted above, the other church is required to provide you with information that will assist you in complying with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.
  • Second, your church should provide the other church with its name, address, and employer identification number within 15 days of the later of the date it received the property or the date it received a copy of the original donor’s qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) from the other church.


Tip. If another church donates property to your church, be sure to ask the following questions in order to determine if you will need to file a Form 8282: (1) Was the property donated to your church by the original donor? (2) If so, did the donor ask your church to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B)? (3) Did your church donate the property to our church within two years of the date of the original gift? (4) If so, did you file a Form 8282 with the IRS?

(3) Another church gives donated property to your church in furtherance of its exempt purposes. The other church is not required to file a Form 8282. However, as noted above, your church should file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the property within two years of the date it was given by the original donor to the other church.


Tip. Your church is not required to file a Form 8282 unless all of the requirements discussed at the beginning of this article are met. Further, your church is exempt from this requirement if it disposes of the donated property without charge in furtherance of its exempt purposes.

Examples. The following examples will illustrate the main points in this article.

Example. Jill donated a car to First Church on November 1, 1997. She obtained a qualified appraisal (that valued the car at $7,500), and she had the church sign her qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B). On July 1, 1998, First Church sold the car to Second Church, and on October 1, 1998 Second Church sells the car to a third party. First Church has to file a Form 8282, but Second Church does not.

Example. Same facts as the previous example except that the car was valued at only $3,500 and Jill did not obtain a qualified appraisal. Neither First Church nor Second Church is required to file Form 8282.

Example. John donated a car to First Church on July 1, 1997. He obtained a qualified appraisal (that valued the car at $9,500), and he had the church sign his qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B). First Church donates the car to Second Church on May 1, 1998, in furtherance of its religious purposes. First Church is not required to file Form 8282. Second Church will have to file a Form 8282 if it disposes of the car within two years of the date John gave it to First Church—unless it does so at no charge in direct furtherance of its exempt purposes. How will Second Church know the date of the original gift? First Church is required to provide Second Church with the following information that will assist Second Church in complying with the Form 8282 reporting requirement: (1) its name, address, and employer identification number, and a copy of John’s qualified appraisal summary, within 15 days after the later of the date it transferred the car to Second Church, or the date it signed the qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B); (2) an “unofficial” copy of Form 8282. If First Church does not provide this information, then Second Church should request it.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that Second Church does not dispose of the car until December of 1999. Since this is more than two years after John donated the car to First Church, Second Church is not required to file Form 8282.

Example. If Second Church gives the car to another church, at no charge, in furtherance of its religious purposes, then it will not need to file a Form 8282 even if the disposition occurred within two years of the date John made the original gift to First Church.

Conclusions. This article has reviewed what church treasurers need to know about Form 8282–when their church receives a gift of noncash property from another church or when it disposes of property to another church or charity. In summary, be aware that you may have to file a Form 8282 anytime that another church or charity donates property to your church. Also, note that if your church gives donated property to another church or charity, you may need to provide the other church or charity with the information summarized in this article.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Enforcing Donor Restrictions on Gifts to Charity

A Connecticut court issues an important ruling-Herzog Foundation v. University of Bridgeport, 699  A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997)[Church Officers, Directors, and Trustees]

A Connecticut court issues an important ruling-Herzog Foundation v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997)
[Church Officers, Directors, and Trustees]


Article summary.
It is common for donors to make “designated gifts” to their church. A designated gift is one that is made for a specified purpose or project. Examples include gifts designating a missionary, a building or vehicle fund, or a benevolence need. If a church elects not to honor a particular designation, does the donor have the legal authority to enforce the gift? That was the question addressed by a court in a recent case. This feature article will review the court’s ruling and apply it to common church practices.

Do donors who make “designated gifts” to their church have a legal right to enforce their designations? This is an important question of direct relevance to every church and ministry. Consider the following examples.

Example. In 1996 Bob donated $5,000 to his church with the stipulation that the money be used exclusively for the building program. This year the church board decides to cancel the building program. Bob demands a full refund of his contribution. If the church refuses to comply, what are Bob’s legal rights? Can he ask a court to compel the church to return his designated contribution?

Example. A church asked its members to contribute toward a missions project with a budget of $10,000. Barb donated $1,000 to the project, but learned later that the budget had been reached before she made her contribution. She asks the church to return her contribution. If the church refuses to comply, what are Barb’s legal rights? Can she ask a court to compel the church to return her designated contribution?

Example. A church plans to build a home for a low—income family. While much of the work is done by volunteer labor, and some of the materials are donated, the church still must raise $25,000 to complete the project. Bill does not attend the church, but he learns of the project and donates $1,000 to it. Several weeks after making his contribution Bill learns that the budget had been reached before he made his contribution. He asks the church to return his contribution. If the church refuses to comply, what are Bill’s legal rights? Can he ask a court to compel the church to return his designated contribution?

These issues were addressed directly by a recent decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court. This article will review the facts of the case, summarize the court’s ruling, and address the significance of the case to churches and religious ministries.

Facts

The facts of this case are simple. A foundation contributed $250,000 to a university with the stipulation that the funds be used to provide scholarships to needy students in the nursing program. A few years later the university closed its nursing school. The foundation sued the university, and asked a court to order the university to segregate the gift from its general fund and set it aside once again for the gift’s original purpose. If that purpose could no longer be fulfilled, then the foundation asked the court to compel the university to return the gift. A trial court and state appeals court reached conflicting decisions, and the case was appealed to the state supreme court.

The court’s decision

background

The state supreme court reached a conclusion that will come as a surprise to many church leaders-it ruled that donors who make designated gifts to charity have no legal right to enforce their designations unless they specifically reserve the right to do so. The court acknowledged that a designated contribution is held in trust by a charity for the specified purpose. And, while the donor cannot enforce a designated gift, there are others who can. These include the state attorney general, a trustee of a written trust, or anyone with a “special interest” in the enforcement of the designation. The court explained its conclusion as follows:

The theory underlying the power of the attorney general to enforce gifts for a stated purpose is that a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has a right to have his intention enforced. The donor’s right, however, is enforceable only at the instance of the attorney general … and the donor himself has no standing to enforce the terms of his gift when he has not retained a specific right to control the property, such as a right of reverter, after relinquishing physical possession of it. As a matter of common law, when a … donor of property to a charity fails specifically to provide for a reservation of rights in the trust or gift instrument, neither the donor nor his heirs have any standing in court in a proceeding to compel the proper execution of the trust …. Where the donor has effectually passed out of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a charity, neither he nor those claiming under him have any standing in a court of equity as to its disposition and control …. [W]e conclude that it is clear that the general rule at common law was that a donor had no standing to enforce the terms of a completed charitable gift unless the donor had expressly reserved a property interest in the gift.

persons who may enforce a designated gift to charity

The court concluded that the state attorney general has broad authority to enforce charitable trusts, including designated gifts to charity. Others have the same authority:

A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the attorney general or other public officer, or by a co—trustee, or by a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no special interest or by the [donor] or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin. Fiduciaries, such as trustees or co—trustees, have historically been deemed to have a “special interest” so as to possess standing [to enforce charitable trusts and designated gifts]. Still, the attorney general must be joined as a party to protect the public interest. Those with no “special interest” have no standing to bring an action to enforce the conditions of the gift. These include persons within the general class of beneficiaries of the charitable trust as well as members of the general public.

when donors may enforce a designated gift

The court noted that donors may enforce a designated gift if they reserved the right to do so. The court observed:

By expressly reserving a property interest such as a right of reverter, the donor of the gift … may bring himself and his heirs within the “special interest” exception to the general rule that beneficiaries of a charitable trust may not bring an action to enforce the trust, but rather are represented exclusively by the attorney general.

the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act

The foundation insisted that the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA) gave it the authority to enforce its designated gifts to the university. The court disagreed. UMIFA is a statute that has been enacted in nearly 40 states and that addresses the management of “institutional” or endowment funds by public charities (including universities and religious organizations). UMIFA permits the governing board of a charity to seek a release of an obsolete designation in a gift without resort to the courts by obtaining the donor’s consent: “With the written consent of the donor, the governing board may release, in whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or investment of an institutional fund.” The foundation claimed that this language supported its position since it would be inconsistent “for a statute to provide for written consent by a donor to change a restriction and then deny that donor access to the courts to complain of a change without such consent.” The court disagreed, noting that such an interpretation was directly contradicted by the drafters of the statute who made the following official comments:

It is established law that the donor may place restrictions on his largesse which the donee institution must honor. Too often, the restrictions on use or investment become outmoded or wasteful or unworkable. There is a need for review of obsolete restrictions and a way of modifying or adjusting them. The Act authorizes the governing board to obtain the acquiescence of the donor to a release of restrictions and, in the absence of the donor, to petition the appropriate court for relief in appropriate cases ….

The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to change the [charitable] beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect. (Emphasis added.)

The court noted that these “clear comments regarding the power of a donor to enforce restrictions on a charitable gift” were based on a concern by the drafters of UMIFA that donors would be exposed to “potential adverse tax consequences” if UMIFA “was interpreted to provide donors with control over their gift property after the completion of the gift.” The court explained this concern as follows:

Pursuant to … the Internal Revenue Code … an income tax deduction for a charitable contribution is disallowed unless the taxpayer has permanently surrendered “dominion and control” over the property or funds in question. Where there is a possibility not “so remote as to be negligible” that the charitable gift subject to a condition might fail, the tax deduction is disallowed ….

The drafters’ principal concern in this regard was that the matter of donor restrictions not affect the donor’s charitable contribution deduction for the purposes of federal income taxation. In other words, the concern was that the donor not be so tethered to the charitable gift through the control of restrictions in the gift that the donor would not be entitled to claim a federal charitable contribution exemption for the gift.

In resolving these concerns, the drafters of UMIFA clearly stated their position as follows: “No federal tax problems for the donor are anticipated by permitting release of a restriction. The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to change the [charitable] beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect.”

The court concluded:

Although the comments and the prefatory note to UMIFA do recognize that a donor has an interest in a restriction … we find no support in any source for the proposition that the drafters of UMIFA intended that a donor or his heirs would supplant the attorney general as the designated enforcer of the terms of completed and absolute charitable gifts. Indeed, it would have been [inconsistent] for the drafters of UMIFA to strive to assist charitable institutions by creating smoother procedural avenues for the release of restrictions while simultaneously establishing standing for a new class of litigants, donors, who would defeat this very purpose by virtue of the potential of lengthy and complicated litigation ….

On the basis of our careful review of the statute itself, its legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the policy it was intended to implement, and similar common law principles governing the same subject matter, we conclude that UMIFA does not establish a new class of litigants, namely donors, who can enforce an unreserved restriction in a completed charitable gift.

a dissenting opinion

Two of the court’s five justices dissented from the court’s opinion. They observed:

The majority here holds that the donor itself may not enforce a restriction in a gift to an educational institution when the institution had specifically agreed to that restriction. This decision is simply an approval of a donee, in the words of the donor, “double crossing the donor,” and doing it with impunity unless an elected attorney general does something about it.

This decision will not encourage donations to Connecticut colleges and universities. I fail to see why Connecticut, the home of so many respected schools that would honor their promises, should endorse such sharp practices and create a climate in this state that will have a chilling effect on gifts to its educational institutions.

Significance of the case to churches and ministries

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? Obviously, a decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. The general rule-donors cannot enforce designated gifts. According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, a donor has no legal “standing” to enforce a designated gift to charity. There is no doubt that courts in many other states will concur with this result. The reason for this rule is simple-charitable contribution is a gift, and a gift is a transfer of all of a donor’s “dominion and control” over the donated property. Allowing a donor to enforce a designated gift is not legally possible because the donor has no remaining interest in the gift. This is true even if the gift was “designated”-that is, the donor specified the purpose for which the gift was given. The fact remains that a designated gift is held by a church or charity “in trust” for the specified purpose. The trust may be expressed in a written trust instrument, but more often no instrument exists and the trust is implied. While the donor cannot enforce such a “trust,” this does not mean that a church or charity can ignore it. As the court observed in this case, the state attorney general can enforce a trust created by a designated gift, and so can any other person with a “special interest” in the trust. While this does not include donors, their families or heirs, or even beneficiaries of the gift or trust, it may include “fiduciaries” (such as a trustee of a written trust).

2. Tax considerations. The court noted that the general rule is supported by federal tax law which provides donors with a charitable contribution deduction only if they have permanently surrendered “dominion and control” over the donated property or funds. If donors were allowed to enforce the purposes of their designated contributions, then this would jeopardize their eligibility for a charitable contribution deduction since they may have retained too much control over the donated property or funds.

Key point. The court concluded that the tax deductibility of designated charitable contributions would be jeopardized if a church or charity allowed donors to “enforce” such gifts.

3. An exception to the general rule-a reservation of rights. The court mentioned one important exception to the general rule-donors can legally enforce a trust created by a designated gift if they have reserved the right to do so. One way this can be done, according to the court, is if a donor “expressly reserves a property interest such as a right of reverter.” A “right of reverter” is an interest that donors can create by appropriate wording in a legal instrument. For example, assume that Bob wants to give 5 acres of land to a church for religious purposes. He executes a deed conveying the property with a “reversion clause” specifying that title to the land will “revert” to Bob in the event that the church ever quits using the property for religious purposes. If the church violates this restriction, then Bob or his heirs will have a legal right to enforce it or demand a return of the property.

Key point. Deeds to church property often contain reversionary clauses specifying that legal title to the property shall revert to the previous owner (or his or her heirs) if a stated condition occurs. Such conditions often include an attempted sale of the church property, or use of the property for non—religious purposes. It is important for church leaders to be familiar with the deed or deeds to church property so they are aware of any such conditions.

4. An exception to the general rule-persons with a “special interest.” The court concluded that persons with a “special interest” in the enforcement of a designated gift have a legal right to enforce it. The court mentioned “fiduciaries” (such as the trustee of a trust instrument) as an example of a person having a special interest. However, the court cautioned that donors or their heirs have no such interest, nor do beneficiaries of a designated gift.

5. An exception to the general rule-ethical principles. Donors may not have the legal right to enforce a purpose specified in a designated gift, but this does not mean that a church should ignore requests by donors to honor their designations. After all, there is an ethical component that must be considered. As the dissenting justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court observed, “[t]his decision is simply an approval of a [charity] double crossing the donor, and doing it with impunity unless an elected attorney general does something about it.” Do church leaders want to be perceived as “double crossing” members who make designated gifts?

Further, the dissenting justices noted that the court’s decision “will not encourage donations to [charities].” What did they mean? Simply this-many donors are prompted to make a charitable contribution because of a desire to further a specific purpose or project. If donors realize that they have no legal right to enforce a designated gift then many of them may decide not to give.

CHECKLIST. While the court concluded that donors have no legal right to enforce a designated gift, there are a number of reasons why church leaders may want to voluntarily honor designated gifts. Consider the following:

  • While the donor ordinarily cannot enforce designated gifts, the state attorney general can. They are not unenforceable. They are simply not enforceable by the donor.
  • In some cases donors reserve a legal right to enforce a designated gift. This often happens when such a gift is expressed in a written instrument.
  • Persons with a “special interest” in the designated gift may have a legal right to enforce it. This would include a trustee (if a designated gift is reflected in a written trust instrument).
  • Church leaders may want to avoid any suggestion of “unethical” behavior. Often, church leaders who ignore the purpose specified in a donor’s designated gift are accused by the donor of unethical behavior.

6. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act. Most states have enacted the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA). The court in this case acknowledged that UMIFA provides that “with the written consent of the donor, the governing board may release, in whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or investment of an institutional fund.” In other words, the board of a charity can ask persons who donated to an “institutional” or endowment fund for their written consent to release the charity from a designation or restriction. However, the court insisted that this provision did not give donors a legal right to enforce designated gifts. Quite to the contrary, the drafters of UMIFA stated (in their official interpretation of the statute) that a donor “has no right to enforce the restriction, no interest in the fund and no power to change the [charitable] beneficiary of the fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect.”

In summary, even if your state has enacted UMIFA, it is doubtful that this will give donors a legal right to enforce designated gifts.

7. Honoring designated gifts when the designated purpose is abandoned. Assume that church leaders decide to abandon a project, such as a building program. Further assume that they do not want to unilaterally apply donors’ designated building fund contributions to some other purpose. They want to honor the donors’ intent. How do they do so? There are a number of possibilities, including the following:

Donors can be identified. If donors can be identified, they should be asked if they want their contributions returned or retained by the church and used for some other purpose. Ideally, donors should communicate their decision in writing to avoid any misunderstandings. Of course, churches should advise these donors that they will need to file amended tax returns if they claimed a charitable contribution deduction for their contributions in a prior year.

Key Point. Often, donors prefer to let the church retain their designated contributions rather than go through the inconvenience of filing an amended tax return.

Donors cannot be identified. A church may not be able to identify some donors who contributed to the building fund. This is often true of donors who contributed small amounts, or donors who made anonymous cash offerings to the building fund. In some cases, designated contributions were made many years before the church abandoned its building plans, and there are no records that identify donors. Under these circumstances the church has a variety of options. One option would be to address the matter in a meeting of church members. Inform the membership of the amount of designated contributions in the church building fund that cannot be associated with individual donors, and ask the church members to take an official action with regard to the disposition of the building fund. In most cases, the church membership will authorize the transfer of the funds to the general fund. Note that this procedure is appropriate only for that portion of the building fund that cannot be traced to specific donors. If donors can be identified, then use the procedure described in the previous paragraph. Another option is to ask a court for authorization to transfer the building fund to another church fund. Such a procedure is authorized by UMIFA.

Other options are available. Churches should be sure to consult with a local attorney when deciding how to dispose of designated funds if the specified purpose has been abandoned.

Some donors can be identified, and some cannot. In most cases, some of the building fund can be traced to specific donors, but some of it cannot. Both of the procedures summarized above would have to be used.

8. Courts in other states. Few courts have addressed the legal authority of a donor to enforce a designated gift. As a result, it is essential for church leaders to consult with a local attorney before using a donor’s designated funds for some other purpose.

9. Examples. Let’s apply these principles to the three examples at the beginning of this chapter, along with several additional examples:

Example. In 1996 Bob donated $5,000 to his church with the stipulation that the money be used exclusively for the building program. This year the church board decides to cancel the building program. Bob demands a full refund of his contribution. The church held Bob’s designated contribution “in trust” for the specified purpose. However, according to the case addressed in this article, Bob has no legal standing to challenge the church’s decision to use his designated contribution for other purposes. He cannot ask a court to compel the church to return his designated contribution. However, he can urge the state attorney general to enforce the trust.

Example. Same facts as the previous example. Assume that church leaders decide to return Bob’s designated gift to him. They base this decision on two grounds. First, the possibility that Bob may ask the attorney general to enforce the trust; and second, a feeling of moral obligation. They may return the $5,000 to Bob, but before doing so they should advise Bob that he will need to file an amended tax return for 1996 if he claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the contribution.

Example. A church asked its members in 1998 to contribute toward a missions project with a budget of $10,000. Barb donated $1,000 to the project, but learned later that the budget had been reached before she made her contribution. She asks the church to return her contribution. If the church refuses to comply, Barb cannot ask a court to compel the church to return her designated contribution (in any state following the court ruling addressed in this article). However, there are compelling reasons why church leaders should consider voluntarily honoring her request, including the following: (1) the attorney general is authorized to enforce the designation even though Barb is not, and (2) moral obligation. If church leaders decide to return Barb’s contribution, they should amend Barb’s contribution records to delete the $1,000 contribution.

Example. A church plans to build a home for a low—income family. While much of the work is done by volunteer labor, and some of the materials are donated, the church still must raise $25,000 to complete the project. Bill does not attend the church, but he learns of the project and donates $1,000 to it in 1998. Several weeks after making his contribution Bill learns that the budget had been reached before he made his contribution. He asks the church to return his contribution. If the church refuses to comply, see the analysis in the previous example.

Example. Bill contributes $2,000 to his church’s benevolence fund in 1998, with the stipulation that the gift be used for the medical expenses of Jane, a member of the congregation. The church board elects to use this gift for another benevolence need. Bill does not object to this diversion, but Jane does. She threatens to “see an attorney” if the church does not distribute Bill’s $2,000 gift to her. Jane has no legal basis for challenging the church’s action in any state that follows the court ruling addressed in this article. The court noted that only persons with a “special interest” in the enforcement of a designated gift have a legal right to enforce it. The court mentioned “fiduciaries” (such as the trustee of a trust instrument) as an example of a person having a special interest. However, the court cautioned that donors or their heirs have no such interest, nor do beneficiaries of a designated gift.

Example. Example. In 1960 Charles donated ten acres to his church. The deed contained a “reverter clause” specifying that title to the property would “revert” to Charles, or his heirs, “if the property ever ceases to be used for church purposes.” In 1998 the church decides to relocate to a new facility if it can sell its current property. A developer (who wants to demolish the church and construct a commercial building on the site) offers to buy the property. The church board learns of the “reverter clause” from a local title company. The board is not certain what to do. Charles died in 1970, and no one is aware of any heirs. According to the court ruling addressed in this article, a donor may enforce a “reverter clause.” This is an exception to the general rule that donors cannot enforce designated gifts. This right passed to Charles’ heirs at his death. Any of them would have the right to enforce the “reverter clause” that would be triggered by the church’s attempt to sell the property. This assumes, of course, that the buyer would not use the property for church purposes.

10. The court’s reliance on another case. The court based its ruling in part on an earlier decision by the Maine Supreme Court. Attorney General v. First United Baptist Church, 601 A.2d 96 (Me. 1992). In this earlier case the question was whether a state has the authority to demand an accounting of church trust funds. The court concluded that it did. The facts of the case are easily stated. In 1939, a wealthy individual made a gift of a substantial amount of stock to a church, subject to the following two conditions: (1) the church was to use the trust fund for “charitable uses and purposes,” and (2) the church was not to sell or transfer the stock for a period of fifty years. In 1983, after faithfully observing the terms of the trust for forty—four years, the church sought court permission to sell the stock. It noted that the value of the stock had fallen sharply and the rate of return was substantially less than could be achieved with other investments. The court permitted the church to sell the stock (then valued at $733,000) in order to protect the trust fund.

In 1987, the state attorney general received information suggesting that the church was not carrying out the terms of the trust. The attorney general asked the church for an accounting of the trust fund. When the church refused to comply, the attorney general sought a court order compelling the church to provide an accounting. The church argued that expiration of the fifty—year restriction on sale of stock expired in 1989, and this gave the church full legal title to the trust. The church also argued that the first amendment guaranty of religious freedom protected the church from complying with the demand for an accounting. The trial court rejected the church’s arguments, and ordered the church to provide the attorney general with an accounting. The church appealed, and a state appeals court agreed with the trial court’s ruling. The appeals court noted that the fundamental purpose of the trust continued to be for “charitable uses and purposes.” This purpose was not affected by the expiration of the fifty—year ban on sales of stock. The court then observed:

Where property is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable by the attorney general, to devote the property to that purpose.

As a result, the church was not free to spend trust funds in any manner it chose. It had to spend them consistently with the trust purpose (“charitable uses and purposes”). And, the attorney general had the legal authority to ensure that the church was complying with the trust purpose, and this authority included the right to demand an accounting of trust funds.

The court rejected the church’s claim that requiring it to prepare an accounting would violate the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. It observed:

Civil courts can constitutionally adjudicate property disputes involving religious organizations if they can be resolved in accordance with neutral principles of law and without interpretation of, or reference to, religious doctrine. We have held that a suit for an accounting of church funds is a property dispute capable of resolution by application of neutral principles of law …. The attorney general is not attempting to inquire into the financial affairs of the church, or impose a regulatory scheme, but only to obtain the information necessary for him to fulfill his statutory obligation to the public. Because we find that the trust is a public trust, separate and distinct from the church, the court ordered accounting can be accomplished by application of neutral principles of law and therefore, does not impinge upon the church’s first amendment freedoms.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Religious Activities by Public School Students

Many activities are permissible according to new
Department of Education guidelines

[Use of Public Property for Religious Purposes]

Article summary. Recently issued guidelines from the federal Department of Education confirm that students in public elementary and secondary schools may engage in a wide variety of religious practices without violating the first amendment’s nonestablishment of religion clause. This article contains the full text of those guidelines.

In 1995 President Clinton directed the Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Attorney General, to provide every public school district in America with a statement of principles addressing the extent to which religious expression and activity are permitted in our public schools. In accordance with the President’s directive, the Secretary of Education sent every school superintendent in the country guidelines on Religious Expression in Public Schools. The purpose of these presidential guidelines was to end some of the confusion regarding religious expression in public schools that had developed over more than thirty years since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1962 outlawing state sponsored school prayer. The guidelines were reissued in May of 1998 in response to further legal developments. The new guidelines are reprinted below in full:

Federal Guidelines

Student prayer and religious discussion: The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit purely private religious speech by students. Students therefore have the same right to engage in individual or group prayer and religious discussion during the school day as they do to engage in other comparable activity. For example, students may read their Bibles or other scriptures, say grace before meals, and pray before tests to the same extent they may engage in comparable nondisruptive activities. Local school authorities possess substantial discretion to impose rules of order and other pedagogical restrictions on student activities, but they may not structure or administer such rules to discriminate against religious activity or speech.

Generally, students may pray in a nondisruptive manner when not engaged in school activities or instruction, and subject to the rules that normally pertain in the applicable setting. Specifically, students in informal settings, such as cafeterias and hallways, may pray and discuss their religious views with each other, subject to the same rules of order as apply to other student activities and speech. Students may also speak to, and attempt to persuade, their peers about religious topics just as they do with regard to political topics. School officials, however, should intercede to stop student speech that constitutes harassment aimed at a student or a group of students.

Students may also participate in before or after school events with religious content, such as “see you at the flag pole” gatherings, on the same terms as they may participate in other noncurriculum activities on school premises. School officials may neither discourage nor encourage participation in such an event.

The right to engage in voluntary prayer or religious discussion free from discrimination does not include the right to have a captive audience listen, or to compel other students to participate. Teachers and school administrators should ensure that no student is in any way coerced to participate in religious activity.

Graduation prayer and baccalaureates: Under current Supreme Court decisions, school officials may not mandate or organize prayer at graduation, nor organize religious baccalaureate ceremonies. If a school generally opens its facilities to private groups, it must make its facilities available on the same terms to organizers of privately sponsored religious baccalaureate services. A school may not extend preferential treatment to baccalaureate ceremonies and may in some instances be obliged to disclaim official endorsement of such ceremonies.

Official neutrality regarding religious activity: Teachers and school administrators, when acting in those capacities, are representatives of the state and are prohibited by the establishment clause from soliciting or encouraging religious activity, and from participating in such activity with students. Teachers and administrators also are prohibited from discouraging activity because of its religious content, and from soliciting or encouraging antireligious activity.

Teaching about religion: Public schools may not provide religious instruction, but they may teach about religion, including the Bible or other scripture: the history of religion, comparative religion, the Bible (or other scripture)—as—literature, and the role of religion in the history of the United States and other countries all are permissible public school subjects. Similarly, it is permissible to consider religious influences on art, music, literature, and social studies. Although public schools may teach about religious holidays, including their religious aspects, and may celebrate the secular aspects of holidays, schools may not observe holidays as religious events or promote such observance by students.

Student assignments: Students may express their beliefs about religion in the form of homework, artwork, and other written and oral assignments free of discrimination based on the religious content of their submissions. Such home and classroom work should be judged by ordinary academic standards of substance and relevance, and against other legitimate pedagogical concerns identified by the school.

Religious literature: Students have a right to distribute religious literature to their schoolmates on the same terms as they are permitted to distribute other literature that is unrelated to school curriculum or activities. Schools may impose the same reasonable time, place, and manner or other constitutional restrictions on distribution of religious literature as they do on nonschool literature generally, but they may not single out religious literature for special regulation.

Religious excusals: Subject to applicable State laws, schools enjoy substantial discretion to excuse individual students from lessons that are objectionable to the student or the students’ parents on religious or other conscientious grounds. However, students generally do not have a Federal right to be excused from lessons that may be inconsistent with their religious beliefs or practices. School officials may neither encourage nor discourage students from availing themselves of an excusal option.

Released time: Subject to applicable State laws, schools have the discretion to dismiss students to off—premises religious instruction, provided that schools do not encourage or discourage participation or penalize those who do not attend. Schools may not allow religious instruction by outsiders on school premises during the school day.

Teaching values: Though schools must be neutral with respect to religion, they may play an active role with respect to teaching civic values and virtue, and the moral code that holds us together as a community. The fact that some of these values are held also by religions does not make it unlawful to teach them in school.

Student garb: Schools enjoy substantial discretion in adopting policies relating to student dress and school uniforms. Students generally have no Federal right to be exempted from religiously—neutral and generally applicable school dress rules based on their religious beliefs or practices; however, schools may not single out religious attire in general, or attire of a particular religion, for prohibition or regulation. Students may display religious messages on items of clothing to the same extent that they are permitted to display other comparable messages. Religious messages may not be singled out for suppression, but rather are subject to the same rules as generally apply to comparable messages.

The Equal Access Act

The Equal Access Act is designed to ensure that, consistent with the First Amendment, student religious activities are accorded the same access to public school facilities as are student secular activities. Based on decisions of the Federal courts, as well as its interpretations of the Act, the Department of Justice has advised that the Act should be interpreted as providing, among other things, that:

General provisions: Student religious groups at public secondary schools have the same right of access to school facilities as is enjoyed by other comparable student groups. Under the Equal Access Act, a school receiving Federal funds that allows one or more student noncurriculum—related clubs to meet on its premises during noninstructional time may not refuse access to student religious groups.

Prayer services and worship exercises covered: A meeting, as defined and protected by the Equal Access Act, may include a prayer service, Bible reading, or other worship exercise.

Equal access to means of publicizing meetings: A school receiving Federal funds must allow student groups meeting under the Act to use the school media-including the public address system, the school newspaper, and the school bulletin board-to announce their meetings on the same terms as other noncurriculum—related student groups are allowed to use the school media. Any policy concerning the use of school media must be applied to all noncurriculum—related student groups in a nondiscriminatory matter. Schools, however, may inform students that certain groups are not school sponsored.

Lunch—time and recess covered: A school creates a limited open forum under the Equal Access Act, triggering equal access rights for religious groups, when it allows students to meet during their lunch periods or other noninstructional time during the school day, as well as when it allows students to meet before and after the school day.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m47 m88 c0498

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

What Church Treasurers Should Know about IRS Form 8282

Part 1 – your church receives a gift of property from a donor.

Churches that receive a contribution of noncash property may be required to file a Form 8282 with the IRS. Not many church leaders are familiar with this form. This article will provide you with the information you need to comply with this reporting requirement.

Purpose of the form. The purpose of Form 8282 is to ensure that donors do not claim inflated values for property they donate to charity.

When is the form required? Your church is required to file Form 8282 with the IRS if you meet certain conditions. The following checklist will help you to quickly determine if your church needs to file this form.

Checklist #1

your church receives a gift of noncash property from the original donor

STEP #1. Did the donor present the church with a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Part B) for signature? In general, any donor who claims a charitable contribution deduction of more than $5,000 for any gift of noncash property (other than publicly traded securities) to a church or charity must obtain a qualified appraisal of the donated property and then complete a qualified appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283, Part B). The appraisal summary is attached to the tax return on which the charitable contribution deduction is claimed. Churches receiving contributions of property valued by the donor at more than $5,000 must complete and sign Part IV of Section B of the donor’s Form 8283 appraisal summary.

No. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

Don’t know. You will need more information. Ask donors who gave noncash property to the church with a potential value of more than $5,000 whether or not they obtained a qualified appraisal and submitted a qualified appraisal summary (IRS Form 8283, Part B) to the church for signature.

Yes. Go to step 2.

STEP #2. Did the church sell, exchange, consume, or otherwise dispose of the donated property within two years of the date of contribution?

No. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

Don’t know. Check the church’s records, and talk with the donor if necessary, to determine the date the property was contributed. Once the date of contribution is established, determine if the church sold, exchanged, consumed, or otherwise disposed of the property within two years of the date of contribution.

Yes. Go to step 3.

STEP #3. Does an exception apply? A Form 8282 does not need to be filed if either or both of the following exceptions apply: (1) Form 8282 does not need to be filed if a church consumes the donated property or distributes it without charge to another organization or individual. The consumption or distribution must be in furtherance of the church’s tax exempt purposes. (2) If at the time the church signed the appraisal summary (see Step 1) the donor had signed a statement on the appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part II) that the appraised value of the donated property was not more than $500. This exception will apply if a donor contributes several similar items of property (having a combined value in excess of $5,000) to a church during a calendar year, and the church disposes of or consumes one item that is separately valued by the donor at $500 or less.

No. Go to step 4.

Don’t know. Review the instructions to Form 8283 (Section B, Part II), and also the instructions to Form 8282. Note that the instructions to Form 8283 are a separate IRS document, while the instructions to Form 8282 are contained on the back side of the form itself.

Yes. Stop here. No Form 8282 is required.

STEP #4. You must file Form 8282 (only Parts I and III) within 125 days of the date you disposed of the property. There is an exception. If you did not file a Form 8282 because you had no reason to believe that the qualified appraisal requirement applied to a donor, but you later learned that it did apply, you must file Form 8282 within 60 days of learning of your obligation to file.


Key point. In the next issue of this newsletter we will address a related issue—what happens if a donor contributes property to a church, obtains a qualified appraisal and completes a qualified appraisal summary, but the church gives the property to another church or charity within two years of the date of the gift? Does the Form 8282 filing requirement “transfer” to the second church?


Key point. The Internal Revenue Manual (the IRS administrative manual) states that the tax return of any donor who contributes property valued at more than $5,000 to a charity should be selected for examination by the IRS if no Form 8282 is filed by the church. IRM 4175.2. Obviously, it is now more important than ever for churches to comply with this important filing obligation.

Miscellaneous rules. Here are a few additional considerations that will assist you in properly completing Form 8282.

  • Missing information. The instructions to Form 8282 specify that you must complete at least “column a” of Part III. If you do not have enough information to complete the other columns, you may leave them blank. This may occur if you did not keep a copy of the donor’s appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B).
  • Where to file. Send the completed Form 8282 to the Internal Revenue Service Center, Cincinnati, Ohio 46944.
  • Informing the donor. You must provide the donor with a copy of the Form 8282 you filed with the IRS.

Examples. The following examples illustrate the 4 steps summarized in the checklist.

Example. A member contributes a house to her church on July 1, 1998. The church sells the property on November 1, 1998. The church must complete and file Form 8282 with the IRS within 125 days of the date of sale, and also mail a copy to the donor.

Example. A member contributed a car to his church on October 1, 1997. The car had an apparent value in excess of $5,000, but the church is never asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV). The church sells the car on July 1, 1998. It is not required to file Form 8282. See Step 1.

Example. A member contributed a car to her church on May 1, 1998. The car had an apparent value in excess of $5,000. The church sells the car on June 1, 1998, for $8,000. The church was never asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV), and so it does not file a Form 8282. See Step 1. However, on November 1, 1998 the donor provides the church treasurer with a qualified appraisal summary for signature. Since November 1 is more than 125 days following the church’s disposition of the car, the filing deadline for Form 8282 was missed. However, an exception permits the church to file a Form 8282 within 60 days of learning that it is required to file the form. Since the church treasurer had no reason to believe that a Form 8282 was required until the donor presented the qualified appraisal summary on November 1, the church has 60 days from that date to file the form.

Example. A member contributes several shares of publicly traded stock to his church in July of 1998. The stock has a market value of $15,000. The church sells the stock within a few weeks. It is not required to file a Form 8282 because it will not be asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B, Part IV). The qualified appraisal summary requirement does not apply to gifts of publicly traded stock. Note that the qualified appraisal and Form 8282 requirements are designed to ensure that donors claim fair valuations for contributions of noncash property. In the case of publicly traded stock, the valuation is determined each business day by the stock market. There is no question as to proper valuation. As a result, the qualified appraisal summary and Form 8282 requirements do not apply.

Example. A member contributes a car to her church in June of 1998. In November, the member has a church board member sign a qualified appraisal summary on behalf of the church. The board member is not familiar with this requirement, and so does not inform the pastor, church treasurer, or any other member of the board. In January of 1999 the church sells the car. The church treasurer is familiar with the Form 8282 requirement, but does not file this form after the car is sold because he was never informed that the church had signed a qualified appraisal summary. This is a very real problem that can occur in any church. There are a number of ways to prevent this from happening. For example, the church could establish a written policy requiring a designated person (such as the senior pastor or church treasurer) to sign any qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283) on behalf of the church, and requiring a log or journal to be made of each qualified appraisal summary that is signed. If such a policy is clearly communicated to all staff and board members it is unlikely that the church will fail to comply with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.

Example. A member donates a car to his church in June of 1998. The church issues the member a receipt acknowledging the contribution. The church uses the car for three years before selling it. It is not required to file Form 8282 because it did not dispose of the car within 2 years of the date of gift. See Step 2.

Example. A member donates a car to his church in June of 1998. The next month the church board votes to give the car to the pastor. If the donor asks the church to sign a qualified appraisal summary then the church will be required to file a Form 8282 with the IRS. Part III, column e, would simply report “0” as the amount received upon disposition.

Example. A local business contributes food to a church for distribution to the needy. The church is not required to file a Form 8282 even if it is asked to sign a qualified appraisal summary by the donor. The Form 8282 requirement does not apply if a church distributes donated property without charge to another organization or individual in furtherance of the church’s tax exempt purposes.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church distributes the donated food to its members. The Form 8282 reporting requirement may apply. While the donated food is distributed without charge to church members, this may not further the church’s tax-exempt purposes unless the congregation is predominantly poor.

Conclusions. This article has reviewed what church treasurers need to know about Form 8282—when the church receives a gift of noncash property directly from the original donor. Different rules apply when a church receives donated property from another church or charity. Those rules will be addressed in next month’s newsletter.

In summary, be alert to any donation of property that may be valued by the donor at $5,000 or more. Be sure the donor is aware of the need to obtain a qualified appraisal and complete a qualified appraisal summary (Form 8283, Section B). It is a good practice to have some of these forms on hand to give to such donors. And, as noted above, designate one person to sign all qualified appraisal summaries on behalf of the church, inform the church board and staff of this policy, and make a record of each of these forms that is signed. This will help to ensure that the church is in full compliance with the Form 8282 reporting requirement.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Substantiating “Ticketless Travel”

The IRS issues a helpful ruling.

IRS Letter Ruling 9805007

The problem. For the past few years most airlines have offered passengers the option of “ticketless travel.” A few airlines have switched completely to this arrangement. The concept is simple. A passenger makes a reservation and the airline or travel agency makes an electronic record of the reservation that is stored in the airline’s computer system. The airline or travel agency collects the fare and instead of providing the passenger with a ticket issues an itinerary of the travel plus a receipt document. Often, the receipt is incorporated into the itinerary. The itinerary and receipt contain the following information: name of passenger; flight itinerary (airline name, flight number, date of flight, departure and arrival time, origin and destination airports); amount of air fare and taxes; form of payment; name of credit card and credit card holder for credit card charges. The itinerary and receipt usually are sent to the passenger by email or fax. The passenger does not receive a paper ticket or paper receipt.

Let’s assume that your pastor travels by air to a conference or seminar in another state using ticketless travel. Let’s further assume that your church has an “accountable” business expense reimbursement arrangement. Will the itinerary and receipt issued by the travel agent or airline be an adequate substantiation of your pastor’s air fare? Or, must the pastor produce additional evidence? Given the growing popularity of ticketless travel, it is important for church treasurers to be familiar with the answers to these questions. The IRS addressed this issue in a recent ruling.

What the IRS said. The IRS noted that the tax code denies a business expense deduction for any travel expense (including air fare) unless the taxpayer substantiates the expense by adequate records or other sufficient evidence. These records must substantiate the amount, time, place, and business purpose of each travel expense. In addition, receipts are required to substantiate the amount of any expense of $75 or more. Does an itinerary and receipt issued by a travel agent or airline for a ticketless trip satisfy these requirements? Yes, ruled the IRS. It noted that the tax code “does not specify the precise form of the documentary evidence” and “there is no requirement that documentary evidence must consist of original documents and no prohibition against documentary evidence in the form of” faxes or email.

The IRS concluded that an itinerary and receipt document provided to a passenger constitutes sufficient substantiation of a business travel expense under an accountable reimbursement arrangement–so long as the document “contains the amount, date, place and essential character” of the expense. Of course, an itinerary and receipt will seldom document the business nature of a trip, and so this must be proven in other ways in order to satisfy the requirements of an accountable reimbursement.


Key point. The good news is that the IRS is not requiring that ticketless travelers produce an actual air fare receipt or ticket in order to substantiate their air fare under an accountable reimbursement arrangement.


Example. Rev. G travels by air to a conference in another state, using ticketless travel. His travel agent faxes him an itinerary and receipt document confirming the price of the ticket along with the dates and destination of travel. Assuming that the church has adopted an accountable expense reimbursement arrangement, the itinerary and receipt document will provide adequate substantiation of the amount, place, and date of travel. However, Rev. G still will need to substantiate the business purpose of the trip in order to satisfy the requirements of an accountable reimbursement arrangement. This can be done in a number of ways. For example, Rev. G could provide the church treasurer with a copy of his conference registration form or a copy of a conference workbook or agenda that was distributed at the conference.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

The Risks of Inaction

An Ohio court issues an important ruling-Evans v. Ohio State University, 680 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio 1996) [Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Church Law and Tax1998-05-01

The Risks of Inaction

An Ohio court issues an important ruling-Evans v. Ohio State University, 680 N.E.2d 161 (Ohio 1996) [Negligence as a Basis for Liability]

Article summary. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the 4—H organization was not responsible for the molestation of a girl by a 4—H volunteer despite the fact that 4—H officials were aware that he was a convicted child molester when they decided to use him. The court stressed that the incident occurred in the volunteer’s home and not in the course of any official 4—H activity. The court’s opinion provides useful guidance in predicting when a church or other agency that cares for children may be legally responsible for a volunteer’s acts of child molestation occurring outside of officially sanctioned activities or programs.

A pastor receives an anonymous letter informing him that a youth worker in his church was convicted of child molestation several years ago. The pastor shares this information with the church board. The board decides that no action needs to be taken since the worker is involved in group activities that are “in the open.” Besides, other adult workers are almost always present. A few months later the worker invites a young girl in the youth group to his home and molests her. The girl and her parents sue the church. Is the church legally responsible for the molester’s behavior? Was it negligent? These were the issues before an Ohio court in a recent case. While the case involved a non—religious charity (4—H), the court’s decision is of direct relevance to church leaders. This feature article will review the facts of this unfortunate case, discuss the court’s ruling, and evaluate the relevance of the case to churches and church leaders.

Facts

In 1981 a man (the “defendant”) became a volunteer advisor for a local 4—H club in Ohio. He had two children in the 4—H program at the time. In 1984 the defendant was convicted of gross sexual imposition and corruption of a minor. He served two years in prison and was released in 1987. In 1988 he again became involved in 4—H activities. Some 4—H volunteers were aware of the criminal conviction and prison sentence, but they believed that the defendant was innocent.

A 4—H volunteer in a neighboring county was acquainted with the defendant, and invited him to be a “small animal” judge at the 1988 and 1989 county fairs. The volunteer also asked the defendant to speak at pre—fair clinics. In 1990, a 4—H official received a phone call from a woman who stated that the defendant “is on your nonrecommended, nonapproved, noncertified judges list, and I believe he is a convicted child molester. I’m not for sure, but I’ve heard that.” As a result of this conversation, the 4—H official sent out a letter to 4—H officials in every county in the state advising them to inform those persons responsible for selecting judges of the facts concerning the defendant.

The letter was discussed at a meeting of 4—H volunteers in the county in which the defendant had served as a judge and speaker. During that meeting, a woman stood up and spoke on behalf of the defendant, stating that she had known him “for a long time,” that she was aware of his prior criminal record, and that she did not believe that he was guilty. Several people then spoke up and expressed confidence in this woman’s opinion since she was personally acquainted with the defendant. Others observed that “we were only asking him to come and do a clinic, in a public setting, where he would be under our control, and then he would be back across the county lines, that it was a reasonable thing to go ahead and ask him to come and allow him to do that clinic.” The group decided to let the defendant speak at clinics in 1990 and 1991.

A young girl (the “victim”) joined the neighboring county’s 4—H program in late 1991-after the defendant had completed his judging and speaking commitments. She met the defendant, and the two began talking about the victim’s interest in small animals. These casual conversations led to numerous telephone conversations. The defendant informed the victim and her mother that he was an orthopedic physician who worked at a local hospital. He often carried a small black medical bag with him. In fact, the defendant was not a physician and was not employed in any medical occupation. The victim’s mother found the defendant to be very trustworthy, and on one occasion allowed the defendant to take the victim to his home to show her some of his animals. The victim was molested by the defendant that day, in his home, under the pretext that he was going to give her a physical examination. At the time of the molestation, the victim believed that the defendant was a physician. It was later disclosed that the defendant had molested other girls in the 4—H program, all under the same pretext that he was a physician. The defendant was later convicted on various counts of kidnapping, corruption of a minor, rape and felonious sexual assault involving four minors.

The victim and her mother sued a state university that was responsible for administering the 4—H program, claiming that the university and 4—H officials knew of the defendant’s criminal record and that he posed a risk of harm to minors, and that they were negligent in hiring him and in supervising and retaining him. A trial court refused to find the university or 4—H program liable for the victim’s injuries. It based its decision on the fact that the defendant was not acting in his capacity as a 4—H volunteer when he took the victim to his home. The court observed:

The child molesting activities of [the defendant] in this case were the direct and proximate result of [his] securing the confidence and trust of [the victim] and her parents. The county extension agent had no reason to anticipate or believe that [he] would develop such personal relationships, and he was never aware of any such activities …. [4—H officials] had neither the power nor the duty to control [the defendant’s] personal activities. The criminal acts that [he] committed against [the victim] did not occur at a 4—H event, function or activity and did not occur on property owned or under the control of 4—H. [He] was only paid to judge [events] and do pre—fair clinics …. He properly performed those responsibilities. 4—H is not responsible for the personal actions of [the defendant] or of the actions of the thousands of young people who participate in volunteer 4—H activities when they are not attending a 4—H function. In this case [the victim and her mother] have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [4—H] was negligent and such negligence was a cause of the assault on [the victim]. It was not reasonable or foreseeable that a person hired to be a judge from [another] county would then become personally involved with children and their families who attended the fair and clinics.

The victim and her mother appealed this decision to a state appeals court.

The court’s decision

Negligence

The appeals court acknowledged that “it was not disputed” that 4—H officials had knowledge of the defendant’s criminal record. The victim and her mother insisted that this was all that was needed to find 4—H responsible for the victim’s injuries on the basis of negligent hiring and retention. The court disagreed. It stressed that mere knowledge of a volunteer’s criminal background does not automatically make a charity liable for every injury caused by that person. Rather, in order for a charity to be liable on the basis of negligence a victim must prove that the charity had a “duty” to protect him or her from the volunteer. The court pointed out that such a duty ordinarily arises only if it was reasonably foreseeable that the victim would be injured by the misconduct of the volunteer or other worker. In other words, 4—H could be responsible for the victim’s injuries on the basis of negligence only if the victim could prove that her injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the decision by 4—H to use the defendant as a judge and speaker. The court concluded that this requirement was not met. It observed:

Under the facts of this case, we find that the attack on [the victim] was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [the decision by 4—H] to engage [the defendant] as a judge or clinic speaker. The record indicates that [he] was hired … to conduct four separate clinics and to judge two county fair shows. The two fair events (in 1988 and 1989) as well as two of the clinics (in 1988 and 1989) took place before the [information concerning the defendant’s criminal record] was circulated. After learning of [the defendant’s] prior record, the [4—H volunteers] met and discussed the [matter]. Thereafter, a decision was made to allow [the defendant] to speak at a clinic in 1990 and a subsequent clinic in 1991 based upon the view that the nature of his employment, including the fact that [he] would have limited contact with 4—H members, would not result in any harm. The duties [he] was hired to perform required him to speak at clinics in a controlled setting under the supervision of the county extension office. The clinics were open to the public and there was no evidence that any incidents occurred at the clinics (or fairs) in which he was asked to participate. The injured plaintiff was not a member of … 4—H at any time during which [the defendant] judged a fair show or conducted a clinic; she became a 4—H member approximately six months after [he] last spoke at a clinic and the molestation took place, not at a 4—H activity, but at [his] residence, over one year after the employment relationship between 4—H and [the defendant] had ended ….

The evidence indicated that [the defendant] gained the trust and friendship of parents and members of the 4—H community, [that] he was adept at developing personal relationships and he convinced these individuals that he was a physician and that he could be influential in obtaining “scholarships” for the children. The evidence further indicated that [he] would appear unannounced at the home of [the victim] and that he pursued a continuing relationship with the family through numerous telephone calls to [the victim’s] home ….

[T]he molestation of [the victim] by [the defendant] was a self—serving act, unrelated to [his] employment as a 4—H judge or clinic speaker. On the date of the incident, [he] made arrangements with [the victim’s] mother to pick up [the victim] and drive her to his home. As noted above, the molestation occurred at [the defendant’s] home, over a year after he was last hired to conduct a clinic … and the events giving rise to the incident occurred without the sanction, knowledge or control of the county 4—H extension office.

In summary, 4—H was not liable on the basis of negligence for the victim’s injuries because it did not owe her a “duty” of care in selecting the defendant as a judge and speaker. It did not owe her a duty of care because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the defendant would harm her. The court concluded:

[W]e are unable to conclude that the probability of harm to the [victim] should have been reasonably anticipated by [4—H] at the time [the defendant] was engaged to be a clinic speaker. As previously noted, the duties for which [he] was hired involved limited contact with those in attendance and took place in a controlled setting …. The scope of an employer’s duty in exercising reasonable care in making a hiring decision is largely dependent on the type of responsibilities associated with the particular job. In addition to the limited nature of the duties for which [the defendant] was hired as well as the limited degree of contact he had with other individuals in performing those duties, the circumstances of this case indicate that no incidents occurred at any clinic in which [he] participated … the assault at issue did not occur at a 4—H event, the injured [victim] was not a member of 4—H at the time [the defendant] was employed … and there was no employment relationship between [4—H and the defendant] at the time of the molestation [since the defendant’s] last clinic event took place over one year prior to the incident.

The court conceded that 4—H owed a duty of care “to children attending the fair and clinic events for which [the defendant] was hired.” Further, this duty may have extended to 4—H members with whom the defendant “was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities,” if known to 4—H officials. However, the court noted that “we are unable to conclude that a duty of care extended to every member of 4—H who [the defendant] may have come in contact with following his fair and clinic employment; more particularly, under the circumstances of this case [the] duty of care did not extend to the risk of foreseeing the misconduct that occurred.”

Key point. Why is a “duty of care” a requirement for negligence? Why aren’t charities liable for all of the injuries caused by their negligence-whether or not those injuries are foreseeable? The “duty” requirement was created to limit liability. To illustrate, assume that a church has a large tree on its property that has not been inspected or trimmed for many years. During a thunderstorm, a branch breaks off and severs a power line. This causes a power failure at a hospital 10 miles away, while an operation is in process, causing the patient’s condition to deteriorate. Is the church’s negligence in failing to maintain the tree the “cause” of the patient’s additional injuries? Yes it is. But this result is so unlikely that as a matter of policy the law does not impose liability on the church. There must be some limit to the consequences of one’s negligence, and that limit is defined in terms of “duty.” That is, a charity will be liable for injuries caused by its negligence-but only if it owed a “duty of care” to the victim. A charity owes a duty of care to any “foreseeable” victim of its negligence. It was not foreseeable that a church’s failure to maintain a tree would cause a problem to a surgical patient 10 miles away, and so the church is not liable for those injuries even though it caused them. It owed no duty of care to the patient. Similarly, 4—H did not owe the victim a duty of care since it was not foreseeable that she would be injured as a result of the decision by 4—H to use the defendant as a judge and speaker several months before she became a member.

Agency

The victim and her mother insisted that by selecting the defendant as a judge and clinic speaker 4—H had given him an “aura of respectability” with 4—H members and their families-and this was enough to make him an “agent”. The court disagreed. It acknowledged that a charity can be liable for a person’s actions on the basis of “apparent agency” if (1) it holds the apparent agent out to the public as having authority to do a particular act, and (2) a person dealing with the apparent agent had reason to believe that the agent possessed the authority to do the act in question. These requirements were not met, the court concluded:

[A]part from the occasions in which [4—H] hired [the defendant] to judge two fair shows and conduct four clinics, the evidence does not indicate that [it] had the right to control, nor that it manifested a right to control or supervise [his] actions. [The defendant] was not a 4—H advisor and, while he may have attempted to clothe himself with authority from the 4—H organization, his self—serving pursuits were not in service to … 4—H. In an action alleging apparent authority, a principal is responsible for the acts of an agent within his apparent authority only where the principal himself by his acts or conduct clothes the agent with the appearance of the authority, and not where the agent’s own conduct creates the apparent authority.

In summary, the defendant was not an apparent agent of 4—H since it had only retained him to serve as a judge and speaker on a few occasions. These actions could not create a reasonable impression that 4—H was “holding out” the defendant as its agent in any other context, including what he did in his own home.

Relevance to churches

What is the relevance of this ruling to other churches? Obviously, a decision by an Ohio appeals court is of limited significance since it has no direct or binding effect in any other state. Nevertheless, there a number of aspects to the ruling that will be instructive to church leaders in every state. Consider the following:

1. No negligence without a duty of care. Perhaps most importantly, this case illustrates that there can be no liability based on negligence without a duty of care. A church cannot be responsible for a person’s conduct on the basis of negligence unless it owed a duty of care to the victim. This case demonstrates the rule recognized in most states that a duty of care extends to any foreseeable victim of negligent conduct. What is the relevance of this legal principle to church leaders? Consider the following examples:

Example. A church member is assaulted and robbed in a church parking lot while approaching her car after leaving a church activity. No assaults or any other criminal activity have ever occurred in the church’s parking lot. The member sues the church, claiming that it was negligent in supervising its premises and that its negligence caused her injuries. The church can argue that it was not negligent and therefore not liable for the woman’s injuries since her injuries were not reasonably foreseeable and therefore the church owed her no duty of care.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that three other assaults have occurred in the church’s parking lot over the past two years. It is far more likely under these circumstances that the church will be legally responsible for the member’s injuries on the basis of negligence. The previous assaults in the parking lot made future assaults reasonably foreseeable, and as a result a court may conclude that the church owed its members a duty of care when they were in the parking lot. If the church breached that duty by failing to adequately supervise its parking lot, then it would be legally responsible for injuries occurring to a foreseeable victim.

2. Factors to consider in evaluating foreseeability. The court concluded that 4—H was not liable for the victim’s injuries since it could not have reasonably foreseen those injuries. This was so despite the fact that 4—H officials were aware of the defendant’s criminal record. Here are the factors cited by the court in concluding that the victim’s injuries were not foreseeable:

• The defendant was hired by 4—H in a very limited capacity-to judge a few events and speak at a few clinics.

• Both judging and speaking involved “controlled settings” with no unsupervised access to minors.

• The defendant’s judging and speaking were under the direct supervision of a 4—H official.

• The defendant’s judging and speaking were in settings “open to the public.”

• The victim was not a member of 4—H at the time of any of the defendant’s judging or speaking activities. She did not become a member until more than six months after the defendant’s last authorized activity.

• The molestation occurred not at any 4—H activity, but at the defendant’s home.

• The molestation occurred more than a year after the defendant’s last authorized activity.

• No 4—H official was aware that the defendant had taken the victim to his home.

3. A duty of care in this case. The court concluded that 4—H did owe a duty of care to children attending the defendant’s judging and speaking events, and therefore it would have been liable for any acts of molestation committed by the defendant at those events if it was guilty of negligence in hiring or supervising him.

The court added that 4—H also may have had a duty to 4—H members “with whom the defendant was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities if known to 4—H officials.” However, it insisted that 4—H did not have a duty of care “to every member of 4—H who came in contact [with the defendant] following his fair and clinic employment.”

These are very important observations. The court was saying that a charity dealing with minors is not automatically responsible for every injury that occurs. This is especially true for injuries that occur in the homes of volunteer leaders when not engaged in any official function or activity. On the other hand, if charity officials are aware that an adult worker is “involved” with a minor as a result of charity activities, then a duty of care may arise which will make the charity liable for any injury to the minor that results from the charity’s negligence. Let’s illustrate these points with some examples.

Example. T was a Sunday School teacher for several years. T resigned his position, and had no further position in the church involving minors. A few years later it is disclosed that T invited a child from the church to his home and molested her. Church leaders were not aware that T had ever invited a child to his home, or that he ever had any social contacts with children from the church. T’s parents sue the church, claiming that it was negligent in supervising T. It is unlikely that the parents will win. The church could argue that negligence is the breach of a duty of care that is owed to foreseeable victims of harm. Since it was not foreseeable that T would molest the child, the church cannot be liable for her injuries on the basis of negligence.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that T had been asked to resign as a Sunday School teacher after the pastor learned that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with another minor. Church leaders were not aware of any contacts or socializing between T and children from the church. It is unlikely that the parents will win in a lawsuit against the church. As in the previous example, the church could argue that (1) negligence is the breach of a duty of care that is owed to foreseeable victims of harm; and (2) it was not foreseeable that T would molest the child in his home, and so the church owed her no duty of care; and (3) since the church did not owe the girl a duty of care, it could not have been negligent (negligence is a breach of a duty to use reasonable care with regard to a foreseeable victim).

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that church leaders were aware that T was having frequent social contacts with the victim prior to the date of the molestation. The church may be liable to the victim under these circumstances on the basis of negligence. The court in the 4—H case noted that 4—H may have had a duty to those members “with whom the defendant was involved through 4—H club meetings or activities if known to 4—H officials.” This suggests that the church may have had a duty of care with regard to the victim if it knew that T was visiting her and that he had engaged in inappropriate contact with another minor on a prior occasion. This example suggests that churches may have an affirmative duty to “warn” parents about the propensities of known or suspected child molesters who socialize with children from the church. If such a situation arises in your church, be sure to consult with a local attorney for specific guidance. Remember-this is a volatile situation that may result in legal liability for the church if not handled correctly.

4. Not a “guarantor” of the safety of minors. This case illustrates an important point-churches and other agencies that care for children are not absolutely liable for every injury that occurs. They are not “guarantors” of the safety of the children. Rather, they will be liable only if they were negligent, meaning that they breached a duty to use reasonable care with regard to a foreseeable victim of harm.

5. Agency. Persons who are molested by a church volunteer often assert that the church is liable for the volunteer’s behavior on the basis of agency. That is, the volunteer was an “agent” of the church, and as a result the church is legally responsible for his or her actions. This case illustrates that such a conclusion is far from automatic. The victim and her mother insisted that 4—H had given the molester an “aura of respectability” with 4—H members and their families by selecting him as a judge and clinic speaker -and this was enough to make him an “agent”. The court disagreed. It acknowledged that a charity can be liable for a person’s actions on the basis of “apparent agency” if it holds the apparent agent out to the public as having authority to do a particular act, and outsiders have reason to believe that the agent possessed the authority to do the act in question. These requirements were not met in this case since 4—H had retained the molester to serve as a judge and speaker on only a few occasions. This limited involvement did not create a reasonable impression that 4—H was “holding out” the molester as its agent in any other context, including what he did in his own home.

6. The risks of mercy. It is common for church leaders to give people a “second chance.” Mercy, grace, and forgiveness are powerful elements of the Christian faith. But when these impulses are directed to convicted child molesters, church leaders need to be careful. Remember what happened in this case. Leaders of 4—H were aware that the defendant was a convicted child molester, but they chose to disregard the obvious risk that he posed because of the comments of a woman who had known him for several years and who insisted that he was not guilty. In retrospect, this was a foolish statement that directly resulted in the molester being given another chance to be placed in a position of trust involving children. Tragically, he abused this trust by molesting another victim. Church leaders must recognize that they are assuming enormous risks, and subjecting innocent lives to horrible tragedy, when they give child molesters a “second chance.” Such a decision should never be made without first consulting with your insurance agent and an attorney.

Key point. It is reckless and irresponsible for church leaders to use an applicant for youth work and ignore his previous conviction for child molestation on the ground that a church member has known the applicant for many years and does not believe that he was guilty. Remember that guilt in a criminal case is determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a very high standard to meet. The applicant had the chance to convince a jury of his innocence, but failed to do so. Trusting a member who insists that the applicant was “innocent” of the previous charges will expose the church, and its officers and directors, to substantial liability.

7. A dissenting judge. One judge dissented from the court’s opinion.

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m10 m86 m67 c0398

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Changing Signature Authority on Church Bank Accounts

Compliance with the church constitution is essential.

Background. A dispute arose in a church over the tenure of its pastor. The church board held an emergency meeting, at which the pastor was removed and a new pastor was appointed. The board also modified its bank resolution by removing the dismissed pastor’s name as an authorized signature and requiring that only those checks and withdrawals having the approval of the new pastor be honored.

The bank asked a court to determine who was authorized to control the church’s bank accounts. It sought to protect itself against multiple liability in the event that it honored checks written by both the former and current pastor of the church. The court ruled that the board’s actions were lawful, and concluded that only those checks and withdrawals having the approval of the current pastor should be authorized by the bank. The former pastor appealed.

The court’s decision. A state appeals court reversed the ruling of the trial court. It concluded that the board’s action in changing the bank resolution was invalid because it was not done in compliance with the church’s constitution. The court quoted the following language in the church’s constitution:

Any legislation passed by the board shall be presented to the [pastor] for his approval and signature. If the legislation or any part of it fails to meet his approval, it is his privilege to veto the same and send it back to the board, along with his reasons for the veto. The legislation must then be revoted upon by the full board, and must be passed by a two-thirds majority before it can become law.

The court concluded that the board’s action was legally invalid because it did not comply with this procedure. The court observed: “The evidence indisputably shows that the board failed to follow the procedural requirements of the church constitution when it transacted its business because no legislation was ever presented to [the former pastor] for his approval and signature.”

The board’s minutes revealed that the board “repassed” its resolution modifying the bank resolution by more than a two-thirds vote because it anticipated that the former pastor would veto their action. The court noted that “no exceptions in the constitution have been cited which would authorize the board to deviate from the binding written legislative procedures required by the church’s constitution.” The court concluded:

Although the board properly acted within its authority to initiate the emergency session and had the apparent authority to act in furtherance of the affairs of the corporation, the board failed to adhere to the requisite legislative procedures in the conduct of business. Therefore, the actions at issue here, taken in violation of the express legislative procedures required by the church’s constitution were not legally enacted.

The court stressed that it could resolve this dispute since “the sole issue is not of a religious nature but is secular—whether the board … duly complied with the provisions of [the church constitution].” The court insisted that its decision did “not call for the resolution of any ecclesiastical or theological dispute.”

Relevance to church treasurers. All churches periodically change their bank resolution which designates those persons who are legally authorized to sign checks or make withdrawals from church accounts. This case illustrates an important legal principle—any changes in a church’s bank resolution must be done in compliance with the church’s governing document (constitution, bylaws, etc.) to be legally valid. Failure to comply with the governing document can lead to confusion and legal complications, since this may invalidate the proposed change in authorized signatures—meaning that the previous signatories remain valid and the new ones are not. First Born Church of the Living God v. Bank South, 472 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. App. 1996).

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
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What Church Treasurers Need to Know About “Inurement”

The Tax Court issues an important ruling.

Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-575 (1997)

Background. Most church treasurers are not familiar with the term “inurement.” That is unfortunate, because unfamiliarity with this term can jeopardize a church’s tax-exempt status. For this reason it is important for church treasurers, as well as church board members, to be familiar with this term. This article will define inurement, and then review a recent Tax Court ruling that addresses the term.

What is inurement? Churches are exempt from federal income taxes so long as they comply with a number of conditions set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the tax code. One of those conditions is that “no part of the net earnings [of the church or charity] inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” What does this language mean? The IRS has provided the following clarification:

An organization’s trustees, officers, members, founders, or contributors may not, by reason of their position, acquire any of its funds. They may, of course, receive reasonable compensation for goods or services or other expenditures in furtherance of exempt purposes. If funds are diverted from exempt purposes to private purposes, however, exemption is in jeopardy. The Code specifically forbids the inurement of earnings to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals …. The prohibition of inurement, in its simplest terms, means that a private shareholder or individual cannot pocket the organization’s funds except as reasonable payment for goods or services. IRS Exempt Organizations Handbook section 381.1.

A recent Tax Court ruling. The United States Tax Court addressed the concept of inurement in a recent decision. A charity was organized to benefit disabled and underprivileged children. It conducted bingo games to raise funds. The charity’s charter contained the following paragraph:

No part of the net earning of the corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of [its exempt] purposes.

The IRS revoked the charity’s tax-exempt status on the ground that some of its earnings “inured” to the benefit of its treasurer and another officer. The IRS based its action on the following grounds:

* The treasurer and another officer of the charity embezzled more than $130,000 of bingo earnings.

* The charity paid the legal fees of the treasurer in defending himself against criminal charges associated with his embezzlement of bingo proceeds.

* The treasurer misappropriated a check that was payable to the charity.

* The charity rented a building owned by its treasurer for the bingo games, and paid him $26,000 in rent for eight months each year.

The charity appealed the IRS ruling. The Tax Court’s decision is summarized below.

embezzlement

Did the embezzlement of bingo proceeds by the treasurer and other officer constitute “inurement” of the charity’s resources to private individuals? If so, the IRS was justified in revoking the charity’s exempt status. The charity insisted that inurement requires an intentional payment of excessive compensation to an officer or employee, and that this requirement is not met when an officer embezzles a charity’s funds. The Court agreed with the charity that the embezzlement of funds did not constitute inurement:

  • [The treasurer and other officer] worked together to skim part of the proceeds of the bingo games … and to hide this skimming from [the charity’s] board of trustees by falsifying the records of the bingo operations. Part of the skimmed funds was used for unauthorized repairs and renovations, part was used for unauthorized and illegal compensation paid to bingo workers, and part went into [the officers’] pockets.
  • Neither side has directed our attention to any court opinion in the inurement area involving theft from an organization by an insider with respect to that organization, and our research has not led us to any such opinion …. The boundaries of the term “inures” have thus far defied precise definition. As [the IRS] points out, [the charity’s] suggestion that inurement means the intentional conferring of a benefit cannot be allowed to mean that there is no inurement unless “all the organizations’ officers and board members have actual knowledge of, and affirmatively act to cause, the prohibited benefit.” By the same token, we do not believe that the Congress intended that a charity must lose its exempt status merely because a president or a treasurer or an executive director of a charity has skimmed or embezzled or otherwise stolen from the charity, at least where the charity has a real-world existence apart from the thieving official. We conclude that [the charity in this case] had such a real-world existence … and that [the officers’] thefts were not inurements of [the charity’s] net earnings.

Key point. Prohibited inurement must be received by a “private shareholder or individual.” This term is defined by the income tax regulations to include “persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.” The Tax Court concluded that this term refers to “those who have significant control over the organization’s activities.”

payment of attorneys’ fees

The IRS insisted that a charity’s “payment of legal fees on behalf of its individual members and officers acting in their private capacity constitutes private inurement.” And, since the charity in this case had paid legal fees incurred by the treasurer in defending himself against the criminal prosecution, prohibited inurement occurred.

The Court noted that the charity’s charter called for the “indemnification” of officers for expenses incurred in a civil lawsuit or criminal prosecution stemming from the performance of their official duties—but only if certain conditions were satisfied. Those conditions were not met. As a result, the Court concluded: “[The charity] did not follow the procedure prescribed by its articles of incorporation for indemnifying an officer. Thus, the net effect of the transaction was that [it] paid a private expense of [its treasurer]. We conclude that this constitutes an inurement of [the charity’s] net earnings to a private shareholder or individual.”

It is important for church treasurers to be familiar with this conclusion. The payment of an officer’s legal fees by your church may constitute inurement that will jeopardize your tax-exempt status if the fees were incurred in defending the officer for acts committed in his or her private capacity. This can occur in either of two ways:

(1) Indemnification provision. Does your church charter or bylaws contain an indemnification provision permitting the payment of an officer’s legal expenses under certain conditions? If so, then it is essential that these conditions be met before any legal fees are paid. This case suggests that a failure to do so may constitute inurement and jeopardize the church’s exempt status.

(2) No indemnification provision. Many churches do not have an indemnification provision in their charter or bylaws. If this is true of your church, then the payment of the legal fees of an officer for acts unrelated to his or her official duties may constitute inurement that will jeopardize the church’s exempt status.


Example. A pastor is prosecuted for a traffic offense. The offense did not occur while the pastor was performing his pastoral duties. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses out of church funds. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A youth pastor is accused of sexual misconduct. The incident occurred off of church property and was not in the course of an official church activity. The family of the victim sues the youth pastor and church. The church’s insurance company agrees to defend the church but not the youth pastor. The church board would like to pay the youth pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the youth pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A pastor is audited by the IRS and assessed several thousand dollars in back taxes. The pastor retains a tax attorney and appeals the IRS determination. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances may constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The effect of this would be to jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status.


Example. A church issues securities to raise funds for a new building and sells the securities to members of the congregation. Several members lose a significant portion of their investments in these securities, and they sue the pastor and church. The church’s insurance policy does not cover this lawsuit, and so the church has to pay its legal expenses. The church charter contains an indemnification provision allowing the church board to pay the legal expenses of any officer as a result of actions committed in the course of church business—so long as there is no finding of criminal activity. The church board would like to pay the pastor’s legal expenses. This case suggests that the payment of the pastor’s legal expenses under these circumstances would not constitute inurement of the church’s resources to a private individual. The payment of legal expenses under an indemnification clause is not inurement if all of the conditions of the clause are satisfied. This assumes, of course, that the pastor is not found guilty of a criminal act in connection with the issuance or sale of securities.

misappropriation of a check

The charity issued a check in the amount of $2,500 to another charity. One of its officers acquired the check and endorsed it to himself. The IRS asserted that this was another example of prohibited inurement that justified a revocation of the charity’s tax-exempt status. The Tax Court disagreed, noting that any misappropriation would have been an “unauthorized taking, essentially a theft similar to the bingo proceeds skimming that [the officers] engaged in.” As such, it was not inurement since it was not a voluntary and intentional action by the charity.

rental of an officer’s building

The IRS insisted that the charity’s payment of $26,000 each year to its treasurer to rent his building for bingo sessions amounted to prohibited inurement. The charity argued that it had to pay rent to someone to conduct bingo games and that the amounts it paid to its treasurer were reasonable. The Tax Court announced the following rule:

  • An organization’s payment of reasonable rent to an insider for the organization’s use of the insider’s property would not constitute inurement of net earnings but payment of an excessive amount in the form of rent would.

The Court acknowledged that if the charity paid more than reasonable rent to the treasurer for use of his building “then it appears that there was inurement of [its] net earnings to [the treasurer].” However, the Court concluded that the IRS had failed to prove that $26,000 was an excessive amount of rent and therefore no inurement was established.


Example. A church board member owns a building near the church. The church would like to rent a portion of this building for one day each week. The board member and church enter into a lease agreement calling for annual lease payments of $50,000. Such an arrangement will constitute prohibited inurement, and will jeopardize the church’s tax-exempt status, if the size of the lease payments is “excessive.” Whether or not the lease payments are excessive requires an analysis of all of the facts.


Key point. The lesson for church treasurers is clear—never enter into a lease arrangement with a pastor, officer, or board member unless the lease payments are reasonable in amount. We recommend that you obtain a written opinion from a neutral real estate broker, or attorney, that the amount of the lease payments is reasonable. Such a letter will be very helpful to the church in the event that the IRS asserts that the lease arrangement resulted in prohibited inurement.

retroactivity

The IRS revoked the charity’s tax-exempt status retroactively for all of the years in which prohibited inurement occurred. The Tax Court agreed that this was appropriate. The Court observed that “if the revocation, which occurred years after the last of the years in issue, had been made prospective only, then the revocation would have been little more than a meaningless act.” This is an important point. It illustrates that if prohibited inurement occurs, the IRS has the discretion to revoke a charity’s exempt status retroactively for those years during which the inurement occurred (and for all subsequent years).

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Recovering “Lost Profits” in an Eminent Domain Proceeding

Court rules church is not a business and cannot ask for payment for “lost profits.”

Church Finance Today

Recovering “Lost Profits” in an Eminent Domain Proceeding

Court rules church is not a business and cannot ask for payment for “lost profits.”

Assume that a government agency informs you that it is going to take a portion of your property as part of a street expansion project. Can it do so? And if so, what if anything should the church receive in return? Church treasurers should be familiar with the answers to these questions.

Let’s begin with the basic principle that government can take private property for a public purpose without the owner’s consent—so long as it pays the owner “just compensation.” This is known as “eminent domain” or “condemnation.” Churches are subject to eminent domain like any other private property owner. But what is “just compensation” when a government agency “takes” part or all of a church’s property? That was the issue before a Florida court in a recent case. A county government exercised the power of eminent domain to take a portion of a church’s parking lot. The county agreed to pay the church for the value of the land it took. The church wanted more. It insisted that the county pay it “business damages.” Under many state laws the government must pay business owners “business damages” in addition to the value of the property that is taken. Business damages recognize that a business does not receive “just compensation” when the government reimburses it only for the value of property taken by eminent domain. Such a taking may also adversely affect the business’s profits, at least in the near future.

The church argued that it was entitled to business damages because of the county’s taking of its property. It noted that the county had taken a portion of its parking lot which would result in “lost profits” because fewer donors would be able to attend services. A state appeals court disagreed. It noted that business damages are available only for “businesses,” and that the church was not a business. It observed: “Because the promotion of religion, not its own livelihood, is the primary purpose of a church … we conclude that a church is not a business as that term is used [in the statute].” Trinity Temple Church of God in Christ v. Orange County, 681 So.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1996).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, April 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Do Federal Employment and Discrimination Laws Apply to Churches?

A federal court issues an important ruling- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

In a decision of extraordinary importance, a federal court has addressed the application of federal civil rights laws to religious organizations. This decision will assist church leaders in evaluating the application of several civil rights laws to church employment practices. These include the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act.

The case addresses not only the meaning of “commerce,” but also the important question of when a church and its affiliated entities (such as a school or preschool) should be treated as “one employer” for purposes of meeting the minimum number of employees required by these laws.

Finally, the court addressed the important question of which employees are counted in meeting the minimum number required by these laws. Because no other court has ever addressed such questions in the context of religious organizations, this decision is of immense importance to church leaders and should be studied carefully.

Are churches, church—operated schools, and other religious organizations subject to the wide array of federal civil rights laws that apply to employers engaged in commerce and having a minimum number of employees? This is a troublesome question that the courts have seldom addressed. The lack of judicial interpretation has increased the confusion over the application of these laws to religious organizations. A federal appeals court has addressed this issue directly in an important ruling. This article reviews the facts of the case, summarizes the court’s decision, and explains the relevance of the case to churches and other religious organizations.

Facts in the case

A church school placed an ad in a local newspaper for a part-time music teacher. A woman (the “plaintiff”) with multiple sclerosis, and confined to a wheelchair, called the school in response to the ad. The plaintiff’s recollection of that telephone conversation differs substantially from the school’s account. According to the plaintiff, she spoke with the principal’s secretary, who informed her that the school was in the process of scheduling appointments for interviews.

The secretary asked the plaintiff if she had an educational background in music. When the plaintiff replied that she did, the secretary scheduled an appointment. The plaintiff then asked the secretary if the building was “wheelchair accessible.” At this point the secretary placed the plaintiff on hold for several minutes. When the secretary returned to the phone, she informed the plaintiff that the interview had been canceled.

The plaintiff then suggested that the school “accommodate” her disability by conducting the interview outside. She was again put on hold, and was later informed that the school would not make this accommodation. The plaintiff then asked, “You mean you won’t even make an accommodation for an interview because of my disability?” The secretary responded, “I wouldn’t put it that bluntly” and informed the plaintiff that she should direct further questions to the principal.

The school’s account of the telephone conversation was quite different. It acknowledged that the plaintiff had called about the advertisement, and had asked if the building was wheelchair accessible. The school claimed that the secretary informed the plaintiff that the building was not accessible, but then informed her that the part-time music teacher position had already been filled. The plaintiff then became upset and asked if the position had been filled because she had indicated that she was handicapped. The secretary denied this motive, but the plaintiff remained agitated. The secretary placed the plaintiff on hold to let her “calm down,” and when she picked up the phone again she asked for the plaintiff’s name and phone number so that the principal could call her. The plaintiff did not disclose this information, saying that she would call the principal later.

The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which determined that the plaintiff had been a victim of discrimination on account of her disability. The EEOC sued the church and its school, claiming that they both had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as a result of their refusal to “accommodate” the plaintiff’s disability, and their failure to hire her because of her disability.

The church and school argued that they were not covered by the ADA since they were not engaged in “commerce” and had less than 15 employees.

The trial court’s decision

Background

The ADA prohibits employers engaged in an activity “affecting commerce” and having at least 15 employees from discriminating in any employment decision on account of the disabled status of an employee or applicant for employment who is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation by the employer. Note that both conditions are required in order for an employer to be subject to the ADA—it must be engaged in an activity affecting commerce, and it must have at least 15 employees. The court considered these two tests separately.

Commerce

Were the church and school engaged in an industry affecting commerce? The court noted that the ADA defines this crucial term as “any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

The church and school insisted that they were not an “industry affecting commerce” under this definition. The court concluded that the school did affect commerce. It relied on an earlier case in which a federal appeals court found that an employer affected commerce since (1) it purchased products and supplies from out of state; (2) its employees traveled out of state on the employer’s business; and (3) its employees made interstate telephone calls. Martin v. United Way, 829 F.2d 445 (3d Cir.1987). The court concluded:

The school and its employees have engaged in activities that affect commerce. The school purchased supplies and books from companies outside of the District of Columbia …. Approximately five of its employees commuted to the school from outside of the District. Employees made interstate telephone calls and mailed letters to locations outside of the District of Columbia.

However, the court cautioned that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence that the church had engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce, and so “this issue is inconclusive.” The court added that “[we] presume that some of the same factors exist with respect to the church.” There is little doubt that the court believed that the church was engaged in commerce.

15 Employees

The ADA does not apply to an employer simply because it engages in activities that affect commerce. The employer also must have a minimum of 15 employees during the current or preceding calendar year. “Current calendar year” is defined as the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred.

The court acknowledged that the school employed fewer than 15 employees. Recognizing this, the plaintiff argued that under the so-called “single employer doctrine” the court should combine the employees of the church and its school and preschool to come up with the required 15 employees.

Under the single employer doctrine, separate entities that represent a “single, integrated enterprise” may be treated as a single employer for purposes of meeting the 15 employee test. The plaintiff asserted that the church operated the school and the preschool, and therefore these three entities should be considered as one.

Key point. The court noted that the parties had failed to indicate in their pleadings whether the church, school, and preschool were a single legal entity under one corporate umbrella or three separate legal entities.

In deciding whether or not the church, school, and preschool were a “single, integrated enterprise,” the court applied a four-part test announced by the Supreme Court in a 1965 ruling. Radio Union v. Broadcast Services, 380 U.S. 255 (1965). This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control.

The court clarified that “the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive,” and that “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.” The court cautioned that a plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and that there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.

The court referred to an earlier federal appeals court case finding that the entities must be “highly integrated with respect to ownership and operations” in order for single employer status to be found.

The court’s analysis of each of the four factors is summarized below.

(1) interrelation of operations

The court referred to combined accounting records, bank accounts, lines of credit, payroll preparation, telephone numbers, or offices as examples of “interrelated” operations. However, it concluded that there was insufficient interrelationship between the church, school, and preschool to consider them as a single employer. It did acknowledge that the pastor signed the school’s budget, that a room in the church occasionally was used for school purposes, and that school children ate in a room that was also used by the preschool.

However, the following factors demonstrated that there was insufficient interrelationship among the three entities (church, school, and preschool) to treat them as a single employer: (1) the school had a separate budget; (2) daily operations of the three entities (church, school, and preschool) were independent; (3) hours of operation of the three entities were significantly different (preschool was open earlier and later than the school, and the church alone was open on Saturdays and Sundays); (4) each of the three entities was operated by a different staff; (5) each of the three entities had its own principal or administrator; (6) each entity had different employment contacts and practices; (7) the school was located in a different building from the church and preschool; and (8) while the schoolchildren ate lunch in a room that was also used by the preschool, they did not use the room at the same time.

(2) common management

A second factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of common management. The court noted that the “focus of this factor … is on the existence of common directors and officers.” In other words, are the directors and officers of the separate entities the same? The court concluded that this factor was not present in this case: “Here, there are separate management structures for the church, the day care center, and the school. These structures do not continuously monitor one another. The circumstances present here do not warrant a finding of common management.”

The court cautioned that common management will exist when one organization runs another organization “in a direct, hands-on fashion, establishing the operating practices and management practices.”

(3) centralized control of labor operations

A third factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of “centralized control of labor operations.” The court observed that “the control required to meet the test of centralized control of labor relations is not potential control, but rather actual and active control of day-to-day labor practices.” This test was not met, the court concluded:

The enterprises here have separate employees, directors, and employment practices. The sole way in which the church is involved with the labor practices of the school is in the final phases of hiring. Plaintiff asserts that the pastor “interviews all applicants for the school,” but plaintiff’s own exhibits contradict this assertion. Rather, the principal and assistant principal screen resumes and conduct interviews; the pastor does not become involved until the end of the process, after the principal and assistant principal have selected two or three finalists, at which point he gives his input. When there is a disagreement, the pastor makes the final decision. The entities have different administrators and distinct labor pools. Plaintiff does not present adequate evidence of day-to-day active control by the church of the school’s labor relations to justify a finding that the entities should be treated as a single employer.

(4) common ownership or financial control

A fourth factor to consider in deciding whether or not to treat separate entities as a “single employer” is the presence or absence of “common ownership or control.” The court noted that “there is common ownership of the property and the buildings in which the day care center, the church, and the school are located, and that the pastor must sign the school’s budget.” On the other hand, the court noted that the church was part of the Archdiocese of Washington “which is the corporate entity that owns the property and the buildings. Further … the Archdiocese has ultimate control over the school’s budget.” The court cautioned that “even if the Archdiocese were a party, common ownership alone is not enough to establish that separate employers are an integrated enterprise.” The court continued:

Even though the Archdiocese, rather than the church, is the owner and locus of financial control, the church does have some intermediary supervisory power over the school. However, given (1) the Archdiocese’s ultimate control over the school’s budget, (2) the Archdiocese’s status as owner of the property and buildings, and (3) the fact that the school, the church, and the day care center have separate budgets, the court finds that this factor does not support a finding that the entities constitute a single employer. Accordingly, the court declines to apply the integrated enterprise doctrine to consolidate defendants into constituting a single employer.

The appeals court’s ruling

15 employees

The EEOC appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. A federal appeals court for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the church, school, and preschool should not be treated as a single employer in applying the 15 employee requirement.

Of most significance to the appeals court was the fact that the record did not reveal whether or not the church, school, and preschool were one corporate legal entity, or three separate entities. The court observed that “we cannot answer a question of utmost importance—whether the school (and the day care center) are distinct legal entities or whether they are merely parts of one legal entity—the church.”

Why was this question so important? Because the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) has only been applied in the context of separate legal entities. In other words, if the church, school, and preschool were a single corporate entity, with the school and preschool operating under the church’s corporate umbrella, then they presumably would be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee requirement. There would be no need to apply the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test.

This test would be applied only if the three entities were legally distinct—that is, they were each separately incorporated. Only then would the 4 factor test be applied to determine whether or not the three entities were sufficiently related to be treated as a single employer for purposes of the 15 employee requirement.

The court conceded that “the door is at least open to apply the test to entities that have different names (a condition satisfied here)—even if they are not legally distinct (a condition that may or may not be satisfied here),” and that “leaving the door open allows the possibility that a single legal entity could … encompass divisions that are sufficiently independent of one another to warrant being treated as distinct employers within the meaning of the employment discrimination statutes.” The court added that “such cases are perhaps rare, but we see no reason to think they are non-existent.”

Key point. The court sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether or not the church, school, and preschool were a single entity or three separate legal entities. If they were a single entity, it would be much more likely that they would be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee requirement.

In summary, the appeals court’s analysis can be reduced to the following points:

Church with no affiliated entities. Consider only the church’s employees in applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

Church with one or more affiliated entities that are not separately incorporated. Many churches operate a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other ministry. If these ministries are not separately incorporated, then the church along with its affiliates ordinarily will be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law). In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

Church with one or more affiliated entities that are separately incorporated. Many churches operate a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other ministry. If these ministries are separately incorporated, then the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test under the Americans with Disabilities Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

Example. A church with 10 employees is accused of violating the federal age discrimination law by not hiring a job applicant who was 60 years old. Since the church does not have 20 employees, it is not subject to the federal age discrimination law.

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the church operates a preschool that has 12 employees. The preschool is not separately incorporated. Since the preschool has no separate legal existence, the church and preschool probably will be treated as a “single employer” for purposes of applying the 20 employee test under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (or any other federal discrimination law).

This means that the 10 church employees and 12 preschool employees are combined, and therefore the 20 employee requirement is met. In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 20 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. In applying this test, the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive, and “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.”

A plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and “there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.”

This example assumes that the church is engaged in commerce. Finally, note that the appeals court in the case addressed in this article cautioned that “the cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases … applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non-aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test].”

Example. Same facts as the previous example, except that the preschool is separately incorporated. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of applying the 20 employee test under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (or any other federal discrimination law-see the table at the end of this article). This test focuses on the following four factors: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. In applying this test, the absence or presence of any single factor is not conclusive, and “control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern.”

A plaintiff “must make a substantial showing to warrant a finding of single employer status,” and “there must be sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.” A table at the end of this article will help in applying this test.

This example assumes that the church is engaged in commerce. Finally, note that the appeals court in the case addressed in this article cautioned that “the cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases … applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non—aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test].”

Religious employers

The appeals court acknowledged that no other court has ever addressed the application of the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test to religious organizations:

The cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases in this circuit or elsewhere applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non—aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test]. Although we express no opinion on the question, we note that the question to be answered by the [trial] court on remand may be [the first time any court has addressed this question].

Counting employees

The court also addressed the important question of which employees should be counted in determining whether or not the minimum 15 employee test is met. Should part—time employees be counted? Hourly workers? Temporary workers? Persons on vacation or sick leave? These are important questions that must be answered in applying the 15 employee test.

The church, school, and preschool pointed out that in order to be subject to the ADA, an employer must have at least 15 employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” They noted that the church was open on Saturdays and Sundays, and that a few of its employees worked on those days.

Therefore, if the work week is defined to include Saturdays and Sundays, then they would not have the required number of employees “for each working day” since only a few persons worked on those days. Obviously, many churches have a few employees whose duties require them to work on Saturdays or Sundays.

However, since the number of employees who work on these days usually is minimal, such churches could argue that they are not covered by any civil rights law (federal or state) that applies to employers having a specified number of employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.”

The appeals court referred to a 1997 Supreme Court ruling addressing the question of which employees to count in applying the 15 employee requirement under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and similar requirements under other federal civil rights laws). Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 117 S.Ct. 660 (1997).

The Supreme Court noted that Title VII applies only to an employer “who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” During one year an employer had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day, but in only nine weeks of the year was it actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day (including paid leave as compensation). The difference resulted from the fact that the employer had two part-time hourly employees who ordinarily skipped one working day each week.

The Supreme Court applied the so-called “payroll method” for counting employees. Under this approach, an “employee” is any person with whom the employer has an employment relationship during the week in question. The Court explained: “Under the interpretation we adopt … all one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure.”

As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision repudiates the argument made by the church, school, and preschool that they did not meet the 15 employee requirement since less than 15 employees were employed on Saturdays and Sundays.

Key point. In summary, in determining whether an employer has 15 or more employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,” each week in which an employer has an employment relationship with 15 or more employees is counted.

Key point. The Supreme Court acknowledged that self-employed persons will appear on an employer’s payroll, and that they should not be counted in applying the 15 employee requirement under the Americans with Disabilities Act. It clarified that in counting employees under the “payroll method” it adopted, only those persons who in fact are employees are counted.

Relevance to other churches

What is the significance of this case to other churches? A decision by a federal appeals court has limited effect. It is binding only in the relevant federal circuit-which in this case is the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, federal appeals court rulings often are given special consideration by courts in other jurisdictions. More importantly, the decision represents one of the few extended discussions of the coverage of religious organizations under federal civil rights laws, and so it may be given special consideration by other courts. For these reasons the case merits serious study by church leaders in every state. With these factors in mind, consider the following:

1. Definition of “commerce.” A number of federal civil rights and employment laws apply to employers that (1) are engaged in interstate commerce, and (2) have a minimum number of employees. These laws include the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act.

The first question to ask in determining if any of these laws applies to a church is whether or not the church is engaged in commerce. This has been a difficult question to resolve, partly because of the lack of court decisions addressing it. This case is helpful because the court relied on a simple three—part test in deciding that the school was engaged in commerce.

(1) Does the church purchase products and supplies from out of state?

(2) Do church employees travel out of state on church business (including commuting to work)?

(3) Do church employees make interstate telephone calls or send mail out of state?

Example. A church is accused of violating the Americans with Disabilities Act. The church insists that it is not engaged in commerce. However, note the following: (1) the church purchases Sunday School literature from a publisher in another state; (2) the church purchases office equipment and computers from a mail—order company in another state; (3) a few church employees commute to work from another state; (4) the pastor occasionally is sent by the church to conferences in other states; (5) church staff occasionally make out—of—state telephone calls; (6) church mail occasionally is sent out of state. There is no question that this church is engaged in commerce if the three—part test discussed above is applied. As a result, the church would be subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act so long as it had a minimum of 15 employees.

There are other factors that indicate that a church or other religious organization is engaged in commerce. These include any one or more of the following:

  • Operation of a private school
  • Sale of products (such as literature or tapes) to persons or churches in other states
  • Persons from other states attend your church
  • operation of a “web page” on the internet
  • operation of a commercial or “unrelated trade or business”
  • television or radio broadcasts

Example. A church is accused of engaging in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The church insists that it is not covered by Title VII since it is not engaged in commerce. The church operates a web page on the internet. This single factor may persuade a court that the church is engaged in commerce.

Example. A church is accused of engaging in age discrimination in violation of federal law. The church insists that it is not covered by this law since it is not engaged in commerce. The church conducts a weekly 15-minute radio broadcast. This single factor indicates that the church is engaged in commerce.

Key point. Even if your church does not satisfy any of these factors, it still may be deemed to be engaged in commerce.

Key point. The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling in 1997 that defined “commerce” very broadly. The case is important because it involved a religious organization (a church-affiliated summer camp). The case is discussed in the recent developments section of this newsletter. This case makes it more likely that churches and other religious organizations will be deemed to be engaged in commerce.

The Court observed: “Even though [the] camp does not make a profit, it is unquestionably engaged in commerce, not only as a purchaser … but also as a provider of goods and services …. The attendance of these campers necessarily generates the transportation of persons across state lines that has long been recognized as a form of “commerce” …. Our cases have frequently applied laws regulating commerce to not—for-profit institutions …. The nonprofit character of an enterprise does not place it beyond the purview of federal laws regulating commerce. We have already held that the commerce clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit …. We see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of [the commerce clause].” Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).

2. 15 employees. Some federal civil rights laws apply only to employers having a minimum number of employees. To illustrate, employers must have 15 or more employees to be subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. An employer must have at least 20 employees to be subject to the federal age discrimination law. These laws raise two important questions: (1) which employees are counted, and (2) are a parent organization and its affiliates or subsidiaries treated as a single employer? The court resolved these questions as follows:

Which employees are counted?

The court applied the “payroll method” in counting employees, on the basis of a 1997 Supreme Court decision that adopted this method. Under this method, an “employee” is any person with whom the employer has an employment relationship during the week in question. To illustrate, in determining whether an employer has 15 or more employees “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,” each week in which an employer has an employment relationship with 15 or more employees is counted. Note that only those persons on the payroll who are employees are counted. Self-employed persons are not considered. Church leaders need to recognize, however, that the definition of “employee” in this context is very broad, and would include most full-time and part-time workers. An example of a self-employed person in this context would be a plumber the church hires for a day or so to make repairs.

Employees of affiliated organizations

Should the employees of an affiliated or subsidiary organization be combined with the employees of a parent organization when counting employees? That is, should the employees of a school, preschool, retirement facility, or other church-affiliated ministry be combined with the employees of the church when counting employees for purposes of applying federal civil rights laws? This is an important question, given the large number of churches that operate affiliated ministries. The court in this case resolved this question as follows:

Unincorporated affiliates. The employees of affiliated ministries that are not separately incorporated ordinarily will be combined with the employees of the parent church for purposes of counting employees under federal civil rights laws. In rare cases, this conclusion may not be automatic. For example, if the affiliates have different names, and are “sufficiently independent,” then single employer status may not be automatic. Rather, the Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) may be applied to determine whether or not the church and its affiliates constitute a single employer for purposes of applying the 15 employee test. While such a result will be rare, it is not non-existent.

Separately incorporated affiliates. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test (discussed above) is applied to determine whether the church along with its affiliates should be treated as a single employer for purposes of counting employees. However, the court in this case cautioned that the 4 factor test may not always be appropriate in the context of religious organizations:

The cases in which we have applied the [4 factor test] have all involved business corporations. We have found no cases in this circuit or elsewhere applying the test to a religious corporation. Because a religious corporation can possess unique attributes … it may be the case that even where there are multiple religious entities, aggregation (or non-aggregation) of employees in employment discrimination cases should not be resolved under [this test]. Although we express no opinion on the question, we note that the question to be answered by the [trial] court on remand may be [the first time any court has addressed this question].

3. Should churches incorporate affiliated ministries? Does this case encourage church leaders to separately incorporate affiliated ministries in order to reduce the likelihood that federal civil rights and employment laws will apply to them? Not necessarily. The only benefit to separate incorporation of affiliated ministries, according to this court, is that the employees of the affiliates are not automatically combined with church employees for purposes of counting employees under federal civil rights and employment laws. The Supreme Court’s 4 factor test is used to determine whether or not the employees of the affiliates are counted.

Note that in some cases the relationship between a church and its affiliates will be sufficiently close under the 4 factor test to combine all employees. Therefore, churches wanting to separately incorporate an affiliated ministry solely to avoid the application of federal civil rights and employment laws should carefully consider the 4 factor test. If this test would be met, even with separate incorporation of the affiliate, then it makes no sense to pursue separate incorporation unless there are other compelling reasons to do so.

Note that there are compelling reasons not to incorporate an affiliated ministry in many cases. Most importantly, by treating the affiliate as a department or integral part of the church, it is much more likely to share in the church’s exemption from property taxes and sales taxes (where applicable) and the church’s preferential zoning classification.

4. Avoidance of EEOC “anti—church” bias. Many church leaders are not concerned about the application of federal civil rights laws, since they are confident that they do not discriminate in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, age, or disability. However, many view avoidance of federal civil rights laws as desirable, because it can be a very costly, frustrating, and time-consuming ordeal to defend against discrimination cases—even if they are clearly frivolous. Over the past several years, many churches have been charged with violating federal civil rights laws. In a surprising number of these cases, the EEOC itself sues the church. This is a truly extraordinary action that the EEOC reserves for only a few hundred “high profile” cases each year. Churches that are sued by the EEOC are in for a truly negative experience. They often are considered guilty until proven innocent. They are treated with thinly veiled condescension and contempt by government investigators. And, they often are forced to spend thousands of dollars in their own defense since such claims ordinarily are not covered under their general liability insurance policy.

Consider the following example. A Catholic university refused to grant tenure to a nun on the basis of “marginal performance in teaching and scholarly publications.” The nun claimed that the university was guilty of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC launched a 2-year “investigation” of the university in an attempt to substantiate the nun’s claim of discrimination. It then sued the university, despite the fact that the university’s actions in denying tenure to a nun in the canon law department was clearly outside of the protection of Title VII. A federal appeals court, in dismissing the EEOC lawsuit, noted that the first amendment’s “nonestablishment of religion” clause, which prohibits “excessive entanglement” between church and state, was violated by the 2-year investigation by the EEOC:

An excessive entanglement may occur where there is a sufficiently intrusive investigation by a government entity into a church’s employment of its clergy …. In this case, the EEOC’s 2-year investigation of [the nun’s] claim, together with the extensive pre-trial inquiries and the trial itself, constituted an impermissible entanglement with judgments that fell within the exclusive province of the Department of Canon Law as a pontifical institution …. This suit and the extended investigation that preceded it has caused a significant diversion of the Department’s time and resources. Moreover, we think it fair to say that the prospect of future investigations and litigation would inevitably affect to some degree the criteria by which future vacancies in the ecclesiastical faculties would be filled. Having once been deposed, interrogated, and haled into court, members of the Department of Canon Law and of the faculty review committees who are responsible for recommending candidates for tenure would do so “with an eye to avoiding litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve the … needs” of the Department. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3rd 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

5. State civil rights and employment laws. Even if you determine, on the basis of this article, that your church is not covered by some or all of the federal civil rights and employment laws summarized in the table at the end of this article, note that many states have enacted their own versions of these laws, and it is possible that these will apply to your church. So, be sure to review your state law to see if there is any comparable law that applies to your church.

6. The Shenandoah Baptist case. In one of the only other court decisions to address the application federal employment laws to employees of a church-operated affiliate, a federal appeals court ruled in 1990 that the federal minimum wage law applied to employees of a church-operated private school. In rejecting the church’s claim that the minimum wage law (the Fair Labor Standards Act) did not apply to a church-operated school, the court noted that the Act was amended in 1966 to specifically cover nonprofit, private schools.

The church claimed that school employees were really church employees and therefore exempt from the Act. It pointed out that the school was “inextricably intertwined” with the church, that the church and school shared a common building and a common payroll account, and that school employees must subscribe to the church’s statement of faith. The court rejected this reasoning without explanation.

The court rejected the church’s claim that its constitutional right of religious freedom would be violated by subjecting its school employees to the minimum wage and “equal pay” provisions of the Act. Any burden on the church’s religious beliefs was limited and outweighed by the government’s compelling interest in ensuring that workers receive the minimum wage. The court observed that school employees whose religious convictions were violated by the school’s coverage under the Act could simply return a portion of their compensation back to the church. Or, they could volunteer their services to the school. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).

7. The minister-church relationship. The courts have refused to apply federal civil rights laws to the relationship between a church and its ministers. Therefore, even if a church is engaged in commerce and has the required number of employees for a federal civil rights law to apply, it will not be liable for violating such a law with respect to a minister. To illustrate, a federal appeals court made the following observation in a case involving a dismissed minister’s claim of unlawful discrimination: “This case involves the fundamental question of who will preach from the pulpit of a church, and who will occupy the church parsonage. The bare statement of the question should make obvious the lack of jurisdiction of a civil court. The answer to that question must come from the church.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court acknowledged that the government’s interest in preventing employment discrimination “is compelling,” but it concluded that such an interest “does not override” the protection that the church claims under the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

In another case a female sued a religious denomination alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when her application to serve as an “associate in pastoral care” was rejected. In rejecting this lawsuit, the court observed:

[C]ourts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling state interest from burdens where the “inroad on religious liberty” is too substantial to be permissible …. This case is of the latter sort: introduction of government standards to the selection of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange the relationship between church and state. While an unfettered church may create minimal infidelity to the objective of Title VII, it provides maximum protection of the first amendment right to the free exercise of religious beliefs. In other words, in a direct clash of “highest order” interests, the interest in protecting the free exercise of religion embodied in the first amendment to the Constitution prevails over the interest in ending discrimination embodied in Title VII. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).

In another case a black female sued her religious denomination, claiming both sex and race discrimination when her application for appointment as a member of the clergy was denied. A federal appeals court rejected her claim, noting that “religious bodies may make apparently arbitrary decisions affecting the employment status of their clergy members and be free from civil review having done so.” The court added: “[The minister’s] argument, that Title VII may be applied to decisions by churches affecting the employment of their clergy, is fruitless.” The court concluded: “To accept [the minister’s] position would require us to cast a blind eye to the overwhelming weight of precedent going back over a century in order to limit the scope of the protection granted to religious bodies by the free exercise clause.” Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of the United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).

8. Religious exemptions. A number of federal civil rights laws contain limited exemptions for religious organizations. To illustrate, the Americans with Disabilities Act states that religious organizations (including religious educational institutions) are not prohibited “from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work” connected with the carrying on by the organization of its activities. The ADA further provides that “a religious organization may require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization.”

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifies:

This title shall not apply to … a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.

This provision permits religious corporations, associations, and educational institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion in the employment of any person for any position. In 1987 the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that this exemption did not violate the first amendment’s nonestablishment of religion clause. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Many state civil rights laws contain limited exemptions for religious organizations.

A Summary of the Court’s Decision

Explanation: In deciding whether or not the employees of a church-operated school and preschool should be combined with the employees of the church in deciding whether or not the “15 employee” requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act was met, the court applied a 4 factor test. This test ordinarily is applied only if the church and its affiliates are separate legal entities. If they comprise a single legal entity, they presumably are a single employer for purposes of the 15 employee requirement without the need to apply this test. In rare cases there may be exceptions to this rule.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

A Summary of the Court’s Decision Regarding Federal Employment and Discrimination Laws as Related to Churches

A Summary of the Court’s Decision FactorFacts suggesting presence of single employerFacts suggesting absence of

A Summary of the Court’s Decision

FactorFacts suggesting presence of single employerFacts suggesting absence of single employerCourt’s conclusion

#1 – interrelation of operationspastor signed the school’s budget
• a room in the church occasionally used for school purposes
• school children eat in a room that is also used by the preschool
• court referred to another court ruling finding sufficient interrelation where subsidiary organization received at least 90% of its business from the parent corporation and shared office suite, resources, fax and phone numbers, and printing services
• school has a separate budget
• daily operations of the 3 entities (church, school, and preschool) are independent
• hours of operation of the 3 entities are significantly different (preschool is open earlier and later than the school, and the church alone is open on Saturdays and Sundays)
• each of the 3 entities is operated by a different staff
• each of the 3 entities has its own principal or administrator
• each entity has different employment contracts and practices
• the school is located in a different building from the church and preschool
• while the schoolchildren eat lunch in a room that is also used by the preschool, they do not use the room at the same time
this factor did not suggest that the church, school, and preschool were a single employer
#2 – common managementthe court cautioned that common management will exist when one organization runs another organization “in a direct, hands—on fashion, establishing the operating practices and management practices”no common directors or officers
• separate management structures for the church, the day care center, and the school
• the 3 entities do not continuously monitor one another
this factor did not suggest that the church, school, and preschool were a single employer
#3 – centralized control of labor operationsthe pastor interviews all applicants for employment positions at the school• actual, not potential, control of day—to—day labor practices is required
• the 3 entities have separate employees, directors, and employment practices
• the principal and assistant principal screen resumes and conduct interviews, and the pastor does not become involved until the end of the process, after the principal and assistant principal have selected 2 or 3 finalists, at which point he gives his input
• the 3 entities have different administrators and distinct labor pools
• court referred to another court ruling that rejected single employer status where different managers “controlled the daily operations and employment practices” of the entities
this factor did not suggest that the church, school, and preschool were a single employer
#4 – common ownership or financial controlcommon ownership of the church, school, and preschool properties
• pastor signs the school’s budget
• court referred to another court decision finding sufficient relationship where one corporation handled the other’s accounts receivable, provided it with administrative backup, handled its payroll and cash accounting, monitored all sales shipments, and kept its bank accounts near the headquarters even though the corporation was in another state
• church is part of an archdiocese which owns the property and the buildings
the archdiocese has ultimate control over the school’s budget
• common ownership alone is not enough to establish that separate employers are an integrated enterprise
• the 3 entities have separate budgets
• court referred to another court decision holding that this fourth test addresses the legitimacy of the entities; if neither of the entities is a “sham” then the test is not met
this factor did not suggest that the church, school, and preschool were a single employer

Application Of Selected Federal Employment Laws To Churches And Other Religious Organizations

StatuteMain ProvisionsCovered Employers

Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Actbars discrimination in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion15 or more employees + interstate commerce
religious employers can discriminate on the basis of religion
Age Discrimination in Employment Actbars discrimination in employment decisions on the basis of age (if 40 or over)20 or more employees + interstate commerce
Americans with Disabilities Actbars discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability who can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable employer accommodation (that does not impose undue hardship)15 or more employees + interstate commerce
religious employers can discriminate on the basis of religion
Employee Polygraph Protection Actemployers cannot require, request, suggest, or cause any employee or applicant to take a polygraph examinterstate commerce (no minimum number of employees)
Immigration Reform and Control ActI—9 form must be completed by all new employees demonstrating identity eligibilityall employers
Fair Labor Standards Actrequires minimum wage and overtime pay to be paid to employeesemployers who employ employees who are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as well as any employee “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993eligible employees qualify for up to 12 weeks unpaid leave per year because of (1) birth or adoption of child, including care for such child, or (2) caring for spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition, or (3) the employee’s serious health condition50 or more employees + interstate commerce
Occupational Safety and Health Actmandates a safe and healthy workplace for covered employeesan organization “engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees”
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1991bars employees at least 40 years old from “waiving” their rights under age discrimination law unless the waiver meets strict legal standards20 or more employees + interstate commerce

© Copyright 1998 by Church Law & Tax Report. All rights reserved. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. Church Law & Tax Report, PO Box 1098, Matthews, NC 28106. Reference Code: m43 c0298

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Does Your Insurance Policy Cover Sexual Misconduct?

An important ruling illustrates the need to know this answer.

D.E.M. v. Allickson, 555 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1996)

Background. Assume that your church is sued because of an incident of sexual misconduct. You immediately notify your insurance company. A few days later, you receive a letter from your insurer informing you that there is no coverage under your insurance policy for such a claim. How would you respond? This was the dilemma that confronted a church in a recent case.

Facts. A woman facing serious medical problems and surgery turned to her pastor for spiritual and emotional guidance. The pastor abused his position of trust by engaging in “grossly inappropriate sexual advances.” The couple ended up having a sexual relationship that lasted for nearly two years.

Though both parties attempted to conceal their relationship, rumors began spreading among church members that the pastor was having an affair. When confronted by a church employee about the rumors, the couple adamantly denied them. The church made no further investigation and took no action.

The affair eventually ended, and the woman claimed that she had suffered “great pain of mind and body” as a result of the pastor’s behavior. She sued her church, claiming that it was responsible for her injuries on the basis of “negligent supervision.” Specifically, she claimed that the church failed to respond adequately to the rumors of sexual misconduct, and its failure to do so caused her injuries.

The insurance company’s response. The church immediately notified its insurer of the claim and requested a defense of the lawsuit. The church’s insurance policy provided coverage for “bodily injury” and “property damage.” The insurer responded with a letter denying any coverage. The letter read, in part:

We must advise that this policy would provide no coverage for a suit charging sexual misconduct of a pastor. You do not give a date of loss as to when the alleged misconduct took place; but the date would not be relevant. The policy your church has with our company … did not at any time provide coverage for this type of claim …. It provides no coverage for damages as a result of sexual misconduct or for your defense of a lawsuit … because of such charges.

In fact, the church’s insurance policy did not exclude coverage for sexual misconduct claims. The church and its attorney repeatedly asked the insurer to reconsider its position, but the insurer refused to do so—despite the fact that the policy did not exclude the woman’s claim.

A few years later, the woman entered into an out-of-court settlement with the church for $300,000. However, the settlement stipulated that it would be collected only against the church’s insurance policy. The woman then sued the insurance company to collect the settlement amount.

The insurer by now conceded that the woman had suffered “bodily injury” as a result of the pastor’s conduct. It also conceded that “bodily injury” includes emotional and psychological injuries. However, for the first time the insurer claimed that the insurance policy did not cover the woman’s claim since the church had never notified it that a claim for “bodily injury” was being made. The insurer further insisted that the settlement was “unreasonable,” and as a result it had no duty to pay it. A court rejected both defenses and ordered the insurer to pay the full amount of the settlement.

The court’s ruling. The court ruled that it was too late for the insurer to claim that the church failed to notify it of a bodily injury claim. It noted that “an insurer which denies liability on specified grounds may not later attempt to deny liability on different grounds,” and then observed:

[The insurer] repeatedly asserted the policy did not provide coverage for sexual misconduct claims, even when asked several times to reconsider its denial of coverage. Not until the church and [the woman] had entered into the settlement agreement … did [the insurer] advise anyone of its reliance on the alleged failure to give notice of a bodily injury claim ….

In essence [the insurer] asks us to sanction the functional equivalent of a “shell game.” [The insurer] denied liability and refused to defend on the basis of a non-existent sexual misconduct exclusion to the policy. The church, abandoned by its insurer, was required to expend sums for attorneys’ fees to settle the claims. When recovery was then sought from [the insurer] it disingenuously asserted it was relying all along upon the lack of notice of a claim for bodily injury, which lack of notice the church could have remedied had it ever been apprised of [its insurer’s] secret theory. Under these facts it would be greatly unjust and unfair to allow [the insurer] to escape liability upon the unasserted lack of notice. Having failed to apprise the church of its reliance upon the bodily injury provision when the church was in a position to correct the alleged lack of notice [the insurer cannot] raise the alleged lack of notice of a bodily injury claim as a defense to coverage or its duty to defend.

The court also rejected the insurer’s claim that the settlement amount was unreasonable. It noted that the church was potentially liable for negligent supervision and that an expert witness had testified that a jury would have reached a verdict in a range between $25,000 and $1.8 million. It also referred to the “increased expenses and publicity had the case gone to trial.” Under these circumstances, a $300,000 settlement was not unreasonable.

Relevance to church treasurers. Consider the following:

1. Review your insurance policy. Now is a good time to review your church insurance policy to see what is covered and what is not. This case illustrates the importance of knowing whether or not sexual misconduct claims are covered. Be sure to pay special attention to the “exclusions” mentioned in your policy. Also note any limitations on the amount of insurance that is available. Some insurance policies exclude any coverage for sexual misconduct claims; some provide coverage, but only for the church (and not for the person engaging in the misconduct); and some limit the dollar amount available for such claims. This case illustrates that a policy covering “bodily injury” should provide the church with coverage for sexual misconduct claims—unless they are specifically excluded.

2. What if your insurer denies coverage? Don’t give up. There still may be coverage, or at least a duty to defend. Ask an attorney to review your policy and provide you with an opinion regarding coverage. If the attorney concludes that coverage exists, have him or her contact the insurance company on your behalf.

3. Settlement agreements. Church members often are reluctant to sue their church. The woman in this case eventually entered into a settlement agreement with the church which stipulated that the settlement amount could be satisfied only out of the insurance proceeds. Such an arrangement relieves the church of any potential liability, minimizes adverse publicity, and relieves the plaintiff of any concern about suing his or her church. It is an approach that church treasurers and other church leaders should keep in mind when facing a potential legal claim by a church member.

4. Notifying your insurer of a loss. This case also illustrates the importance of promptly notifying your insurer of a loss and referring to the specific basis for coverage under your church insurance policy.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.

Proof of Exemption from Sales Tax

Take steps to make sure this exemption is up to date.

Church Finance Today

Proof of Exemption from Sales Tax

Take steps to make sure this exemption is up to date.

Background. In many states, sales of construction materials by suppliers to contractors are exempt from sales tax if the contractor uses the materials on a church construction project. To qualify for the exemption, a contractor ordinarily must obtain an exemption certificate or number from the church that is presented to the supplier.

A recent case. A contractor was hired by a church to complete a construction project. The contractor purchased a large quantity of materials from a supplier, and presented an exemption certificate from the church. On the basis of the certificate, the supplier did not charge sales tax. The state revenue department later audited the supplier, and determined that it owed several thousands of sales taxes on the sales it made to the contractor. It rejected the supplier’s claim that it relied on the exemption certificate presented by the contractor. It insisted that suppliers cannot rely on exemption certificates, but rather must take additional steps to insure that the supplies in fact are used for a church construction project.

An Illinois court rejected the revenue department’s claim, and ruled that the supplier did not owe any taxes. It concluded that suppliers are free to rely on valid exemption certificates presented to them by contractors who are performing church construction projects. They do not have any duty to confirm that the supplies in fact are used on such construction projects. Accepting the state’s argument would “vastly alter the retailer’s burden.”

Relevance to church treasurers. Are sales of materials to churches exempt from sales tax in your state? If so, consider the following two precautions:

* Be sure your exemption is current. In many states, churches must apply for a sales tax exemption, and the exemption lasts only for a specified number of years. In some cases, churches have lost their exemption because of a failure to renew it. This will result in significant and unexpected sales tax liability.

* Contracts. If your church enters into a contract for the purchase of goods (such as a construction contract, or a contact for the purchase of computer equipment), be sure that the issue of sales taxes is addressed. Often it is not, or there is a brief notation that the church is exempt from sales tax. What happens if the church’s exemption is later questioned by the state revenue department? For example, the state asserts (as in this case) that a mere reference to the church’s exemption is not sufficient. A church can protect itself by inserting language in a contract that (1) confirms that the church is exempt from sales tax under state law; and (2) clarifies that the contractor or seller will be responsible for the payment of any sales tax assessed as a result of its failure to comply with any condition required by state law or sales tax regulations. Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 663 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. 1996).

This article originally appeared in Church Treasurer Alert, February 1998.

Richard R. Hammar is an attorney, CPA and author specializing in legal and tax issues for churches and clergy.
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